Pratītyasamutpāda in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: Conditioned Origination in the Yogācāra *Abhidharma*

by

Robert Benjamin Kritzer

B.A. (University of California at Berkeley) 1974
M.L.S. (University of California at Berkeley) 1975
M.A. (University of California at Berkeley) 1976

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Committee in charge:

Professor Padmanabh S. Jaini, Chair
Professor Lewis L. Lancaster
Professor Thomas Havens

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UMI Number: 9602619

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

The dissertation of Robert Benjamin Kritzer is approved:

[signature] 3-17-95.
Chair Date

[signature] 3-17-95
Date

[signature] March 17, 1995
Date

University of California at Berkeley

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Reference as it appears in the Bibliography
Aām$_s$	Sastri, Shanti Bhikshu. *Abhidharmāmṛta* (Sanskrit retranslation).
AD	*Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti.* Edited by P. S. Jaini.
AKBh	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.* Edited by P. Pradhan.
AKBh$_t$	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Tibetan text). Peking Bstan 'gyur 5591 (*mdo'grel* gu).
AKVy	*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā.* Edited by U. Wogihara.
AS	*Abhidharmasamuccaya*: "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṃga." Edited by V. V. Gokhale.
AS$_c$	*Ta cheng a p'i ta mo chi lun* (大乘阿毘達磨集論 = *Abhidharmasamuccaya*). T. 1605.
AS$_t$	*Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Tibetan text). Peking Bstan 'gyur 5550 (*mdo 'grel* li).
ASBh	*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya.* Edited by Nathmal Tatia.
ASBh$_t$	*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (Tibetan text). University of Tokyo Derge Bstan 'gyur 4053 (*sems tsam* 13).
ASVy$_c$	*Ta cheng a p'i ta mo tsa chi lun* (大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 = *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*). T. 1606.
ASVy$_t$	*Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (Tibetan text). Peking Bstan 'gyur 5555 (*mdo 'grel* śi).
AVS	*Arthaviniścayasūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana).* Edited by N. H. Samtani.
AVSN	[*Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* in] *Arthaviniścayasūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana).* Edited by N. H. Samtani.
ĀVVS	*Fen pie yüan ch'i ch'u sheng fa men ching* (分別縁起初勝法門経 = *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra*). Translated by Hsüan-tsang. T. 717.
BoBh	*Bodhisattvabhūmi.* Edited by Unrai Wogihara.
Cwsl	*Ch'eng wei shih lun* (成唯識論). By Dharmapāla. T. 1585.

DBh	*Daśabhūmikasūtra: Daśabhūmīśvaro nāma mahāyānasūtram.* Edited by Ryūkō Kondō.
DBh_t	*Avataṃsakasūtra* (Tibetan text). Peking Bka' 'gyur 761 (the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* is contained in *Phal-chen* li, pp. 241-289).
DBhvy	*Daśabhūmivyākhyāna*. Peking *Bstan 'gyur* 5494 (*Mdo 'grel* ṅi).
Hyscl	*Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論). By Asaṅga. T. 1602.
KIK	*Kokuyaku Issaikyō*
Ksp	*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.* Edited by Étienne Lamotte in *Traité de la Démonstration de L'Acte.*
MS_t	*Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (Tibetan text). Edited by Étienne Lamotte in *La Somme du Grand Véhicule D'Asaṅga.*
Msā	*Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra.* Edited by Sylvain Lévi.
$MSBh_t$	[*Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya* (Tibetan text). Translated in] Lamotte, Étienne. *La Somme du Grand Véhicule D'Asaṅga.* Tome II (French translation of *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*).
Mvbh	*Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra: Containing the Kārikā-s of Maitreya, Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu, and Ṭīkā by Sthiramati.* Edited by Ramchandra Pandeya.
MvbhṬ	[*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā* in] *Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra: Containing the Kārikā-s of Maitreya, Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu, and Ṭīkā by Sthiramati.* Edited by Ramchandra Pandeya.
$MvbhṬ_t$	*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā* (Tibetan text). University of Tokyo Sde dge Bstan 'gyur 4032 (*sems tsam* 2).
Psk_t	*Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (Tibetan text). Peking Bstan 'gyur 5560 (*mdo 'grel* si).
Psvy	*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (*Rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba daṅ po daṅ rnam par dbye ba bśad pa*). Peking Bstan 'gyur 5496 (*mdo 'grel* chi)
SĀ	*Tsa a han ching* (雜阿含經 = *Saṃyuktāgama*). T. 99.
Sav	*Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (in *Yogācārabhūmi.* Edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya).
Sav_t	*Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* (Tibetan text). Peking Bstan 'gyur 5536 (*mdo 'grel* dzi).
Shindō	*Shindōjōyuishikiron.*

ŚrBh	*Śrāvakabhūmi.* Edited by Karunesha Shukla.
Tcpfmml	*Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* (大乘百法明門論). By Vasubandhu. T. 1614.
Trṃś	*Triṃśikā.* In *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Deux Traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā.* Edited by Sylvain Lévi.
TrṃśBh	*Triṃśikābhāṣya.* In *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Deux Traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā.* Edited by Sylvain Lévi.
Vbh	*A p'i ta mo ta p'i p'o sha lun* (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 = *Vibhāṣā*). Translated by Hsüan-tsang. T. 1545.
Vsm	*Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya.* Edited by Henry Clark Warren.
YBh	*Yogācārabhūmi*
YBh_t	*Yogācārabhūmi* (Tibetan text; Peking edition).
YBh_{t_d}	*Yogācārabhūmi* (Tibetan text; Taipei Derge edition).

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

The significance of the treatment of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*AS*) was noted as early as 1947 by V.V. Gokhale, who, in introducing the Sanskrit fragments of the *AS*, mentioned it as one of the topics in the text meriting special study (*AS*: 14). Walpola Rahula of course included this section in his French translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Rahula 1980: 42-44), but he neither translated nor referred to the corresponding passage of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (*ASBh*). More recently, Matsuda Kazunobu has studied Asaṅga's interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in connection with the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* and Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (*Psvy*) (Matsuda 1982a). He has also published a very accurate Japanese translation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* portions of both the

Abhidharmasamuccaya and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (Matsuda 1983), which is accompanied by an excellent introduction and bibliographical notes; unfortunately, however, he has not analyzed the contents in depth.

Here, I shall provide an English translation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* sections of both the text and the commentary, as well as discussions of some of the more important issues related to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition. In my discussion, I shall refer to some related texts, most notably the *pratītyasamutpāda* section in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*YBh*: 198-232), which seems to have been the major source of this section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. I shall also compare the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with Sarvāstivādin materials, from which it often differs considerably, and with Vasubandhu's own, so-called "Sautrāntika," positions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*AKBh*), which frequently are closer to what is found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* than to Sarvāstivāda.

That the author(s) or compiler of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* knew the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* is clear: indeed, in the section immediately following ours the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) is defined as *ālayavijñāna* together with the impressions of good (i.e., the *mokṣabhāgīyadharmas*).[1] However, many discussions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, including the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, fail to mention the term *ālayavijñāna* or even to refer to the concept with a related term, although their contexts would seem to offer an opportunity to expound this crucial doctrine. On the other hand, there is nothing in the discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* that would contradict the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*. This tendency to avoid referring to *ālayavijñāna* raises questions about the nature and purpose of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as a whole, questions that perhaps cannot fully be answered without a deeper understanding of the development of Mahāyāna Yogācāra from pre-Mahāyāna sources.

[1]*hetupratyayaḥ katamaḥ? ālayavijñānaṃ kuśalavāsanā ca* (*AS*: 27). *kuśalavāsanā mokṣabhāgīyānāṃ vāsanā draṣṭavyā* (*ASBh*: 35-36).

Thanks to Professor Lambert Schmithausen's monumental work, *Ālayavijñāna* (Schmithausen 1987), we are now able to approach the *Yogācārabhūmi* with some hope of sorting out its various strata, some of which, as he has shown, presuppose *ālayavijñāna*, while others do not. Since the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* appear to depend on the *Yogācārabhūmi* for much of their material, it is useful to compare the pertinent sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi* with those of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. By doing so, we can understand what kind of sources the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* drew on and to what extent it altered or developed the material that it took from them.

B. Concerning the Biography of Asaṅga

1. Reservations about the Authorship of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

It may seem strange that I have not mentioned the name Asaṅga earlier, although the fact that I refer to "the author(s) or compiler" of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* probably suggests my reasons for not having done so. Schmithausen, in a discussion of the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which he strongly considers to be a compilation, raises the possibility that "at least some of the remaining works of the [so-called Maitreya Asaṅga] complex (e.g. the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun and even the Abhidharmasamuccaya) do not lack compilatory features either" (Schmithausen 1987: 189). I am more willing than Schmithausen to search for Yogācāra theories underlying expositions that do not employ explicitly Yogācāra terminology; therefore, I am able to accept the possibility that the same author can make a clearly Mahāyāna statement in one context while, in Schmithausen's words, doing "his best to avoid specifically Mahāyāna interpretations" (Schmithausen 1987: 193) in others. On the other hand, in reading the

Abhidharmasamuccaya, I am never aware of the personality of the author in the way that I am when I read, for example, Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. I admit that this is merely an impression and not a basis for denying Asaṅga's authorship, but in the present study I shall simply refer to "the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*" rather than to "Asaṅga." Although I shall not attempt to prove my suspicions regarding Asaṅga's authorship of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I believe that my comparison of the expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* will suggest that these two texts were not written by the same person. The relationship between these two expositions therefore casts further into doubt the traditional attribution of both the *Yogācārabhūmi, in toto,* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* to a single author, Asaṅga.

Although I shall not refer to Asaṅga as the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the traditional biographies raise some issues that I must discuss here. There are four important sources for biographical information about Asaṅga: Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu, *P'o su p'an tou fa shih chuan*;[2] Hsüan-tsang's *Ta t'ang hsi yü chi*;[3] Bu ston's *Chos 'byuṅ*;[4] and Tāranātha's *rGya gar chos 'byuṅ*.[5] As the accounts of Asaṅga's life have been summarized by various scholars including Sylvain Lévi (1911, v. 2: 1-7), Alex Wayman (1961: 25-41), Walpola Rahula (1966: 133-136; 1980: ix-xiii), Janice Willis (1982: 3-12), and Paul Griffiths (1986: 174 n. 7, 9), I shall not include a summary here. However, there are two points concerning Asaṅga's biography about

[2]婆藪槃豆法師傳 --T. 2049: 188-191; English translation by J. Takakusu (Takakusu 1904).

[3] 大唐西域記 (T. 2087: 896b-c); English translation by, among others, Samuel Beal (Beal 1983: 226-229).

[4]*Bu ston chos 'byuṅ*: 837 line 7 ff.; English translation by E. Obermiller (Obermiller 1986: 136-147).

[5] English translation by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970 :154-175).

which I should like to comment: the question of his Hīnayāna school and the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The first pertains to the understanding not only of the texts ascribed to Asaṅga, but also to the *corpus* of Vasubandhu, insofar as both figures are said to have converted to Mahāyāna in the middle of their careers.[6] The second is crucial in establishing the history of the development of early Yogācāra thought and is a matter of considerable controversy.

2. Asaṅga's Hīnayāna School

According to Paramārtha, Asaṅga was associated with the Sarvāstivāda school (*sa p'o to pu*, 薩婆多部) before being converted to Mahāyāna (T. 2049: 188c). Hsüan-tsang, on the other hand, states that he was associated with the Mahīśāsaka school (*mi sha sai pu*, 彌沙塞部 --T. 2087b), while the two Tibetan sources, although including elaborate stories of the ordeals Asaṅga underwent before receiving Mahāyāna teachings from Maitreya (Obermiller 1986: 137-140; Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 155-161), do not contain explicit accounts of his conversion and do not mention his having belonged to a Hīnayāna school, let alone specifying to which school he belonged. Thus, as far as the historical or pseudo-historical tradition goes, only Hsüan-tsang identifies Asaṅga's Hīnayāna school as Mahīśāsaka.

In his *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript*, Alex Wayman argues that Hsüan-tsang is correct. Wayman first gives several possible explanations for the difference between Hsüan-tsang's and Paramārtha's accounts: 1) Paramārtha may be referring to Asaṅga's ordination lineage, not his doctrinal beliefs; 2) Asaṅga may have been a Sarvāstivādin before becoming a Mahīśāsaka; and 3) Mahīśāsaka was, in any case, a branch of Sarvāstivāda or Mūlasarvāstivāda, so Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha are both

[6] I shall comment in Chapter 5 on how the traditional biography of Vasubandhu has influenced scholarly opinion concerning his doctrinal development.

correct (Wayman 1961: 25).

These explanations are not unreasonable, at least at first glance. In support of the first one is Paramārtha's wording: "He [Asaṅga] too became a priest in the Sat-ba-ta (Sarvāsti-vāda) school."[7] The phrase that Takakusu translates as "became a priest," *ch'u chia* (出家, Sanskrit *pravraj-*), refers to ordination; when Paramārtha refers to doctrine, he uses the word *i* (義), as for example when he says that Vasubandhu used Sautrāntika doctrine to refute Sarvāstivāda.[8] However, the same argument can be applied to Hsüan-tsang's account, according to which Asaṅga was ordained into, and practiced with, the Mahīśāsaka school but after a short while came to believe in Mahāyāna;[9] if Paramārtha, as Wayman suggests, is referring only to Asaṅga's ordination lineage and not his doctrinal beliefs, it is equally possible that Hsüan-tsang, depending upon what he means by the word "practice,"[10] is doing the same thing. In any case, even if one is willing to trust sources such as these, which are full of fantastic and hagiographical elements, Hsüan-tsang's attribution seems to me to be no more authoritative than Paramārtha's.

Wayman, however, does not rely exclusively on historical records to support his case that Asaṅga belonged to, and believed in the doctrines of, the Mahīśāsaka school. In his *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript*, he also examines several points of doctrine that are discussed in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the sole authorship of which he attributes to Asaṅga, and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and remarks on their similarity to doctrines attributed to the Mahīśāsakas (Wayman 1961: 26-29). In a more recent study,

[7] Takakusu 1904: 273. The original is 亦於薩婆多部出家。(T. 2049: 188c).

[8]立薩婆多部義隨有壁處以經部義破之 (T. 2049: 190b).

[9] 彌沙塞部出家修學。頃之迴信大乘。(T. 2087: 896b).

[10]Nakamura Hajime, referring to the *Saṃghabhedavastu* of the Sarvāstivādin *vinaya*, lists *brahmacaryaṃ carati* as one of the Sanskrit equivalents of 修學 (Nakamura 1975: 624). This would suggest that the term has nothing to do with doctrine.

"Doctrinal Affiliation of the Buddhist Master Asaṅga," which seems to have been prompted by criticisms of his conclusions in the *Analysis*, Wayman summarizes those points and adds a number of others (Wayman 1989: 210-213). Since we have no Mahīśāsaka texts aside from the Chinese translation (T. 1421, 1422) of the Mahīśāsaka *vinaya* (Bareau 1955: 182), he necessarily relies on the traditional accounts of the doctrinal beliefs of the sects, particularly Vasumitra's, and the summary of these accounts in Bareau's *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Bareau 1955). Lamotte, in his *History of Indian Buddhism*, discusses these sources, which he frequently characterizes as "pseudo-historical," at considerable length. Although he allows that "the disputations provide an exact idea of the doctrinal orientation of the great Buddhist sects," he concludes that "it is doubtful whether the sects themselves established the list of propositions which the disputations attribute to them and even more doubtful that they imposed adherence to them on all those who, for historical or geographical reasons, belonged to the same creed as themselves or lived in their district." Furthermore, he points out that the most important Buddhist authors are eclectic and do not necessarily believe in all of the doctrinal positions held by the schools to which they at least nominally belong (Lamotte 1988: 521-522).

Wayman, to be sure, qualifies his argument by recognizing this fact: "It was not my theory that Asaṅga, in going along with the Mahīśāsaka, is committed to the full list of the tenets ascribed to this sect in the rather brief works devoted to the theories of the eighteen Buddhist sects, and where often the tenets are expressed with too much brevity" (Wayman 1989: 213). Nevertheless, in the case of Vasumitra's account Wayman is again perhaps too willing to take at face value sources of dubious historical accuracy, and throughout both of the works I have mentioned, he treats Asaṅga as though he were a thoroughly historical figure, the details of whose career can be accurately known from the materials available.

In "Doctrinal Affiliation," Wayman presents two additional arguments in support

of Asaṅga's having been a Mahīśāsaka. The first concerns the Hīnayāna scriptural sources of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and, like all of Wayman's arguments, is based on the assumption that Asaṅga is the sole author of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Wayman has identified verses from the *Samyuttanikāya*, the *Udānavarga*, and the *Suttanipāta* that are, or the Sanskrit equivalents of which are, the sources for the *Śarīrārthagāthā* of the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and he concludes that: "Asaṅga exhibits within his vast learning a control of those matters which are of vital interest to the Theravāda sect of Buddhism, especially as concerns the content of such Pāli works as the *Netti-Pakaraṇa* and the *Sutta-nipāta*. In terms of Bareau's theory that the Mahīśāsaka were the India-based counterparts of the Theravāda, this compatibility of Asaṅga's views with the Theravāda supports a theory that Asaṅga belonged to the Mahīśāsaka, but does not prove it" (Wayman 1989: 210).[11]

However, if one glances through Honjō Yoshifumi's *A Table of Āgama-citations in the Abhidharmakośa and the Abhidharmakoṣ[sic]opāyikā* (Honjō 1984), one can find the same set of texts cited frequently in an essentially Sarvāstivādin context. This suggests to me that "those matters which are of vital interest to the Theravāda sect" (and therefore to the Mahīśāsaka sect) were actually of as vital interest to Sarvāstivāda as to the author, or authors, of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In fact, if one does not accept Asaṅga's authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, one could conceivably adduce the same evidence as proof of the Sarvāstivādin background of its author(s). Perhaps I am not doing justice to this argument of Wayman's, but to the extent to which I understand it, it does not

[11]Bareau has recently published an article (Bareau 1993) in which he examines the lists of *asaṃskṛtadharmas* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Manobhūmi*) and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*. He adduces the similarity between these lists and that of the Mahīśāsaka school (according to Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*) as evidence in support of Wayman's opinion regarding Asaṅga's affiliation with Mahīśāsaka. I have not had a chance to explore this subject in detail. Before commenting on Bareau's article, I would have to go through the couple of dozen references to the *asaṃskṛtas* in other portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* as well as Harivarman's discussion of this subject in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*.

convince me of Asaṅga's association with the Mahīśāsaka school.

In his final argument, Wayman refers to a passage from the *Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra,* which says of certain disciples that they "will not conceive notions (*saṃjñā*) of the earth, or those of water, of fire, of wind, of space (*ākāśa*), or of consciousness (*vijñāna*). Those persons will accordingly be called Mahīśāsaka" (Wayman 1989: 213). Wayman understands this to mean that "those called Mahīśāsaka, by avoiding notions of the six elements, accept *cittamātra,* also accept only the four great elements, plus *ākāśa,* to explain man basically" (Wayman 1989: 214). He then compares this passage to a discussion of *cittamātra* from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi,* which he translates and about which he says: "The term *cittamātra* as here used implies an ideal man, that it is possible to reach, presumably by *yoga,* a state of pure consciousness (*cittamātra*) free from derived consciousness (*caitta*). As a corollary, one reaches a state of just four elements (*mahābhūta*) free from derived elements (*bhautika*). At that time one would be free of notions (*saṃjñā*)" (Wayman 1989: 215). Finally, he comes to his conclusions concerning the name Mahīśāsaka:

"It is because they teach the six elements as constituting man's "earth" they have the name meaning "who teach the earth" -- the earth of which one should have no notions -- those six elements. And taking Asaṅga's passage [i.e., the *Yogācārabhūmi* passage] into account, it is undeniable that his celebrated theory of Cittamātra is bound up with the scriptural passage about the six elements. Is this not, then, a justification for the terminology of the seventeen *bhūmis*? The word *bhūmi* means "earth" as does *mahī.* Hence, Asaṅga's *bhūmi* system, involving in a "place" the alteration between the *citta* and the *caitta,* as between the *mahābhūta* and the *bhautika,* is not an upward progression, as the very titles of the seventeen show" (Wayman 1989: 215).

I have had to quote so many sections of Wayman's final argument because I am not confident enough in my understanding of it to summarize it. However, as far as I

can tell the argument is rather speculative and not likely to convince anyone who is not already strongly disposed to believe that Asaṅga was a Mahīśāsaka.

Although I do not agree with Wayman that he has strongly supported, if not proved, his point regarding Asaṅga's Hīnayāna school, I think that I can understand his reasons for trying to establish it. As he points out in his *Analysis*, the *Yogācārabhūmi* is essentially *abhidharma*, and as such, it is based on *sūtra* that is predominantly, if not exclusively, Hīnayāna. Considering Asaṅga to have been the author, Wayman assumes that those portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that are based on Hīnayāna *sūtras* must represent the views of Asaṅga's Hīnayāna sect. Hence, according to Wayman, Yogācāra *abhidharma*, for that is what much of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is, consists of the addition of some Mahāyāna material to the *abhidharma* of a specific Hīnayāna school, Mahīśāsaka; in his words, "Asaṅga did not give up his Hīnayāna views but simply added part of the Mahāyāna to those" (Wayman 1961: 45). In this way, Wayman explains the coexistence of large stretches of material that seem to have no Mahāyāna content with occasional passages that can be identified as Yogācāra or Mahāyāna. In order to explain the preponderance of Hīnayāna material in certain portions of the text and the concentration of the Mahāyāna material in other portions, he proposes in "Doctrinal Affiliations" a relative chronology of the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. First, Asaṅga composed the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Samāhitabhūmi* at a very early age, then the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī*, the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, and the *Śrutamayī-*, *Cintāmayī-*, and *Bhāvanāmayībhūmis*, all before his conversion to Mahāyāna. After his conversion, he wrote the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the remainder of the *Bhūmivastu*, and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (Wayman 1989: 203). This chronology, incidentally, is quite different from those proposed by Lambert Schmithausen[12] and Aramaki Noritoshi;[13] I shall discuss the assumptions underlying

[12]According to Schmithausen, there are three main layers: 1) parts of the *Bhūmivastu* (= *Maulībhūmi*) including the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*; 2) the remainder of the *Bhūmivastu*; and 3) the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (Schmithausen 1987: 14).

their chronologies in Chapter 5.

Presumably, Wayman would explain the contents of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which he describes as a "condensation of material from the *Yogācārabhūmi*" (Wayman 1961: 33), in the same way, that is, as Mahīśāsaka doctrine with some Mahāyāna additions. However, if the intent of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is to summarize the Mahīśāsaka *abhidharma* contained in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, why does it include so much Mahāyāna material? After all, as Walpola Rahula observes, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* contains nearly all the major doctrines of Mahāyāna (Rahula 1980: xiv). And (I assume here for the sake of argument that Asaṅga is the sole author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*) if Asaṅga had already been converted to Mahāyāna before writing the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, why would he have repeated the Mahīśāsaka material that he had already included in those portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that he wrote before he was converted? Wayman says that Asaṅga simply added Mahāyāna views to Hīnayāna ones, but surely the conversion of as accomplished a philosopher as Asaṅga would involve a more radical alteration of outlook than Wayman would have us believe.

It seems far more likely to me that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is creating (or refining) a new, Mahāyāna *abhidharma*. This is not to say that it does not include much of the same material that can be found in the Hīnayāna *abhidharma*, particularly that of Sarvāstivāda and perhaps, as Ronald Davidson suggests, its branches (Davidson 1989: 254). However it is not, I think, committed to the doctrines of any Hīnayāna school. Rather, instead of relying specifically on the *abhidharma* of, for example, the Mahīśāsakas, Asaṅga (and other Yogācāra *abhidharma* authors), like the authors of Hīnayāna *abhidharma* texts, draw much of their material directly from the *sūtras* and from the earlier *abhidharma*

[13]Aramaki also distinguishes three layers, but the contents of the second two are different: 1) the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*; 2) portions of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* and portions of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*; and 3) the remainder of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and the first nine *bhūmis* of *Bhūmivastu* (personal communication).

of their own (i.e., the Yogācāra) school. In my analysis of the *pratītyasamutpāda* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I hope to illustrate its extensive reliance on, and refinement of, ideas found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Furthermore, I believe that the interpretation of *sūtra* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, even at least sometimes in the earliest portions, does not follow the *abhidharma* of its author's (or authors') putative Hīnayāna school, but instead is based on Yogācāra ideas. The fascinating question of whether all Yogācāra is Mahāyāna is outside of the scope of this study.

3. The Authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

The other major issue raised by the biographical sources is the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Again, the traditional accounts differ. According to Paramārtha, Maitreya, at Asaṅga's request, came down from Tuṣita heaven to preach the *Shih ch'i ti ching* (十七地經 = *Yogācārabhūmi*) at night, while during the day, Asaṅga, who was the only one who could approach Maitreya, explained Maitreya's speech to the rest of the audience (T. 2049: 188c; Takakusu 1904: 274-275). According to Hsüan-tsang, on the other hand, Asaṅga ascended to Maitreya's palace at night and received from him the *Yogācārabhūmi* (瑜伽師地論), the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (大乘莊嚴經), the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* (中邊分別論) and other texts, which he explained to the masses during the day (T. 2087: 896b; Beal 1983: 226).[14]

The Tibetan tradition is more willing to attribute the actual authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Asaṅga. Bu-ston first tells the story of Asaṅga's ascent to Tuṣita heaven, where Maitreya expounds the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Yogācārabhumi*, and other Mahāyāna *sūtras*. In order to elucidate these, Maitreya composes the five works of

[14]Paul Demiéville, in *La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa*, includes a long section devoted to the figure of Maitreya; in it he convincingly refutes Maitreya's historicity (Demiéville 1954: 376-387, especially 381 n. 4).

Maitreya,[15] which Asaṅga brings down to earth. However, Bu-ston shortly thereafter states that Asaṅga composed "his great treatise in five divisions" (in other words, the *Yogācārabhūmi*) after his return to earth (Obermiller 1986: 139-140). In Tāranātha's version of the same story, Asaṅga, after arriving in Tuṣita heaven, "listened to the Mahāyāna doctrine in its entirety from Ajitanātha [Maitreyanātha] and learnt the real significance of the whole collection of *sūtra*-s. Then he listened to the 'Five Works of Maitreya'" (Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 159). Unlike Bu-ston, Tāranātha does not mention the *Yogācārabhūmi* as one of the texts preached to Asaṅga by Maitreya. However, Tāranātha does mention the *Yogācārabhūmi* as one of the treatises written by Asaṅga some time after his return from Tuṣita heaven (Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 160).

Both Bu-ston and Tāranātha, in their sections on the life of Vasubandhu, relate a story according to which Vasubandhu, hearing or reading a work or some works of Asaṅga, criticized Asaṅga:

> "Alas, Asanga, residing in the forest,
> Has practised meditation for 12 years.
> Without having attained anything by his meditation,
> He has founded a system, so difficult and burdensome,
> That it can be carried only by an elephant!"[16]

Although Bu-ston does not mention the *Yogācārabhūmi* by name, referring only to "numerous treatises" (Obermiller 1986: 143), Tāranātha says specifically that Vasubandhu "read the *Five Bhūmi*-s, the work of *ārya* Asaṅga" (Chimpa and

[15]According to the Tibetan tradition, these include the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, and the *Uttaratantra* (Nakamura 1987: 256).

[16]Obermiller's translation of Bu-ston's version (Obermiller 1986: 143; quoted by Wayman in Wayman 1961: 40. For Tāranātha's version, see Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 168).

Chattopadhyaya 1970: 168). Incidentally, Wayman, perhaps relying on Tāranātha, assumes that Bu-ston's version is actually referring to the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Wayman 1961: 40). Thus, Tāranātha unequivocally attributes the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Asaṅga, while Bu-ston seems to contradict himself by first saying that Maitreya expounded it to Asaṅga and then stating that Asaṅga composed it himself.

In addition to these biographical accounts, we also have traditional attributions in the canonical collections that include the *Yogācārabhūmi*. According to the *Taishō* edition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the author is Maitreya (*Mi le*, 彌勒--T. 1579: 279a; Demiéville 1978: 134), while according to the index to the Peking edition of the *Bstan 'gyur*, the author is Asaṅga (*thogs med*).

Before I move on to modern scholarly opinion on this subject, I must again take issue with a statement of Wayman's. According to him, "There is no disagreement between Chinese and Tibetan tradition as to the common provenance of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*" (Wayman 1961: 40). This is just not true. Neither Paramārtha nor Hsüan-tsang mentions the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* or *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, so we must rely on the canonical attributions for the Chinese tradition regarding these works: both texts are attributed to Asaṅga, with no mention of Maitreya (Demiéville 1978: 136). The Tibetan tradition, which unlike the Chinese accepts Asaṅga as the author of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, agrees with the Chinese in accepting him as the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. Therefore, although the Tibetan tradition accepts the common authorship of the three texts, as Wayman claims, the Chinese tradition certainly does not. In his later work, Wayman in fact mentions the attribution of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Maitreya in the Chinese canon, and he speculates that "Hsüan-tsang, believing that Maitreya had inspired Asaṅga, may have entered the name Maitreya in order to get a hearing for the work, to ensure its study in his country where the Buddhists mainly followed Sūtras, such [as] the Pure Land ones,

the *Avataṃsaka*, the Lotus Sūtra, and so on" (Wayman 1989: 202).

Wayman's reasoning seems to be that, since "Demiéville has sufficiently demonstrated the absurdity of regarding Maitreya as a 'historical personage,'"[17] we can safely assume that the story of Asaṅga's having received the *Yogācārabhūmi* from Maitreya is totally fictional, and that the reality that underlies it is that Asaṅga wrote it himself. I agree with Wayman regarding the question of Maitreya, but I think that we must be more open-minded regarding the Chinese tradition that the author of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is not the same as the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*.

Modern scholars have a variety of opinions regarding the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Some, for example, Janice Willis (Willis 1982) and Walpola Rahula (Rahula 1980: xi), simply accept the traditional attribution to Asaṅga, do not acknowledge that a difference of opinion exists, and therefore make no attempt to justify their acceptance. Others recognize that there is a difference of opinion but do not seriously engage it. For example, Wayman states that "It is untenable to hold that certain sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi* were written by different persons," and supports this statement by saying, "My reading over the years in the *Yogācārabhūmi* has led me to conclude that is the same person writing throughout" (Wayman 1989: 201-202). At the other extreme is Nakamura Hajime, who accepts the Chinese attribution to Maitreya or Maitreyanātha and, at the end of two pages of description of the contents of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, merely mentions that "There is an opinion that, as the contents of the *Yogācārabhūmi* are substantially different to a great extent from other works ascribed to Maitreya, its author may be different from Maitreyanātha" (Nakamura 1987: 258).

Lambert Schmithausen, on the other hand, who has also read very extensively in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, believes that it is a compilation (Schmithausen 1987: 13) and,

[17]Wayman 1961: 33, referring to Demiéville 1954.

responding to Hakamaya Noriaki, is unwilling to grant much credence to traditional attributions: "I for one prefer to confine myself to the statement that it is possible (perhaps even probable) that Asaṅga compiled Y or, as Hakamaya himself puts it in a later article, somehow participated in its compilation (i.e. that 'tradition' may, in this case, in fact contain a kernel of historical truth in our sense). But this possibility still needs verification, and for the time being I for one cannot exclude the opposite possibility" (Schmithausen 1987: 185). In fact, in his most recent work on the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *Ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen identifies so many passages from various portions of the text that differ so substantially from passages in other portions that, to my mind, he has effectively proved his theory that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is a heterogeneous compilation that cannot be attributed to Asaṅga.[18]

The question of the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is obviously pertinent to the study of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which, to the best of my knowledge, has hitherto been universally accepted (except, perhaps, by Schmithausen) as the work of Asaṅga. That the *Yogācārabhūmi* chronologically precedes the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is also generally, but not universally, conceded; Janice Willis (1982: 10) and A.K. Warder (1991: 441), who accept Asaṅga's authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, both state that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is earlier without, as Schmithausen points out (1987: 262 n. 100), providing any evidence to support their positions.[19] It is indeed difficult to imagine that the same person would have first written the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, a work that is the model of brevity and organization, and afterwards produced the text to which the Tibetan tradition refers when it criticizes "Asaṅga's system" as being "so

[18]Schmithausen's bibliography incidentally contains invaluable information about Japanese scholarship on the *YBh*, much of which is discussed in the text of the book. He also reiterates in English some of the points made in his earlier German works, especially Schmithausen 1969 and 1969a.

[19]In addition, Schmithausen adduces the fact that the *AS*, but not the *YBh*, is familiar with certain doctrines found in the "Maitreya" texts as proof that *AS* is later than *YBh*.

difficult and burdensome that it can be carried only by an elephant" (Obermiller 1986: 143; see above).

Perhaps a better idea of the relationship between the two texts is suggested by Rahula in the introduction to his translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: "Ce que l'*Abhidhammapiṭaka* en pāli est pour les Theravādin, le *Jñānaprasthāna* pour les Sarvāstivāda, le *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* pour les Mādhyamika, le *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* l'est pour les Yogācārin" (Rahula 1980: xiv). Although I disagree with Rahula about the authorship of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, I think that his characterization of the text as Yogācāra *abhidharma*, with which Wayman agrees (Wayman 1961: 45; see above), is accurate. It is, moreover, significant that Rahula compares the *Yogācārabhūmi* with texts belonging to the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmapiṭakas* proper, rather than with the later treatises. Rahula sets aside his analogy regarding the *Yogācārabhūmi* and goes on to compare the question-and-answer format of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with that of certain Pāli *Abhidhammapiṭaka* texts, such as *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga*, and *Dhātukathā*. But it must be stressed that if the *Yogācārabhūmi* is compared with the *Abhidharmapiṭakas*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is more properly analogous to the manuals such as the *Abhidharmāmṛta*, which consists largely of similar questions and answers. In any case, the analogy should not be taken too far, since the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is a much more sophisticated text than the early Sarvāstivāda manuals, let alone the works of the Pāli *abhidhamma*.

C. The Sources of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya Pratītyasamutpāda* Exposition

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the most readily identifiable source of the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is the

pratītyasamutpāda exposition of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.[20] The last eight sections, in particular, of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition are very *abhidharma*-like in style. Although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* exposition is much shorter, the formats of the two are quite similar, and a number of the same topics are treated in both (see note to Chapter 2, section A1). In general, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, besides being terser, is more systematic than even the latter part of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition; not only does the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* summarize much of the contents of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition, but it shows considerable doctrinal development. This, I believe, suggests advances in the Yogācāra philosophy that underlies the two texts.

Aside from the *Yogācārabhūmi*, there is, I believe, another, rather surprising source of the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, namely, the sixth chapter of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. In general, the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not refer to Mahāyāna *sūtras*, the notable exception being the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, which Schmithausen suggests is, in fact, later than much of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, probably including, according to him, the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition (Schmithausen 1987: 12). The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* similarly relies on Mahāyāna *sūtra* sources only rarely, although Schmithausen has identified a passage originating in the Large *Prajñāpāramitā* (Schmithausen 1987: 193). However, as I shall show in the notes to my translation, there are some striking similarities between some portions of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition and the prose of the *abhimukhī*

[20]This exposition consists of nine sections, of which the first, entitled *śarīra* (*YBh*: 198-203), is also found in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* and is quite different in style from the last eight (*YBh*: 203-232), which appear to be later. Schmithausen refers to the *śarīra* section as the "Pratītyasamutpāda Analysis," but he does not seem to comment on the relationship between it and the other eight sections. A verse that appears just before the *śarīra* section links it to the remainder of the exposition (see note to Chapter 2, section A2c).

Ui (1958: 279-295 passim) and Matsuda (1983) have noted some of the similarities between the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* expositions.

bhūmi that strongly suggest that the author of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* was influenced by the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.

D. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as Yogācāra *abhidharma*

In attempting to establish points of difference between the Yogācāra and Sarvāstivādin *abhidharmas*, I have naturally looked first at Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which, although it is well known not to be an orthodox Sarvāstivādin text, clearly analyzes the issues involved in many doctrinal controversies, and which of course has the advantage of being thoroughly indexed (Hirakawa 1973) and superbly translated (La Vallée Poussin 1971). Vasubandhu is famous for generally upholding the Sautrāntika position when it differs from Sarvāstivāda. However, the fact that what he identifies as Sautrāntika can often be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* has not been remarked upon until recently. Moreover, in at least several cases, when he does favor Sarvāstivāda over Sautrāntika, the *Yogācārabhūmi* position also is in agreement with Sarvāstivāda.

Although nothing can be said conclusively until all of the Sautrāntika positions mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* have been compared with the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I suspect that Vasubandhu's so-called Sautrāntika opinions are, in fact, Yogācāra *abhidharma* in disguise.[21] If this is true, it raises questions about the meaning of the terms Sautrāntika and Yogācāra as well as about the definition of Mahāyāna. Currently, a number of Japanese scholars are studying these problems, and I

[21]In a recent article, Eli Franco suggests that the features of the *Viṃśatikā* that Schmithausen (1967) has identified as Sautrāntika are the result of the fact "that its opponents are the Sautrāntikas. It seems reasonable, therefore, that in trying to make his point, Vasubandhu would argue as much as possible from the Sautrāntika presuppositions and that he saw no need to drag the *ālayavijñāna* into the controversy..." (Franco 1994: 369-370). I find this explanation of Vasubandhu's method in the *Viṃśatikā* provocative and useful, even though it does not directly account for what he is doing in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

shall refer to them throughout in my attempt to trace a number of Vasubandhu's positions to their sources in Yogācāra *abhidharma*. I hope to make this the basis for future work on Vasubandhu.

II. TRANSLATION OF THE *ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA* EXPOSITION[1]

A. Introductory Section

1. Questions

AS a. How [should] the conditioned origination [of samsaric existence, consisting of the five *skandhas*, eighteen *dhātus*, and twelve *āyatanas*, be understood]?

b. How many [of those *skandhas*, etc.,] originate conditionally?

c. For what purpose is [samsaric existence] investigated? (*katham pratītyasamutpannaṃ, kati pratītyasamutpannāni, kim arthaṃ pratītyasamutpādaparīkṣā* -- *AS*: 25)

2. Answers

a. The conditioned origination [of samsaric existence] should be understood from the point of view of: [i] its definitions (*lakṣaṇataḥ*); [ii] its analysis into the members (*aṅgavibhāgataḥ*) [of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula]; [iii] its sets of members (*aṅgasamāsataḥ*); [iv] the definition of the conditional operations of its members (*aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānataḥ*); [v] the definition of the functions of its members (*aṅgakarmavyavasthānataḥ*); [vi] its grouping of members according to [three categories] of defilement (*aṅgasaṃkleśasaṃgrahataḥ*); [vii] its import (*arthataḥ*); [viii] its profundity

[1]Page numbers for the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* refer to V.V. Gokhale's "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṃga," which I have used instead of Pradhan's edition because Pradhan retranslates from the Chinese and Tibetan portions that are missing from the Sanskrit, on occasion without acknowledging what he has done. The *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition can be found on pages 26 through 28 in his edition (Pradhan 1950).

(*gambhīryataḥ*); [ix] its varieties (*prabhedataḥ*); [x] and its progressive and regressive orders [of defilement and purification] (*anulomapratilomataḥ*). (*lakṣaṇato 'pi, aṅgavibhāgato 'pi, aṅgasamāsato 'pi, aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānato 'pi, aṅgakarmavyavasthānato 'pi, aṅgasaṃkleśasaṃgrahato 'pi, arthato 'pi, gambhīryato 'pi, prabhedato 'pi, anuloma[pratiloma]to 'pi pratītyasamutpannaṃ dra[ṣṭa]vyam* -- *AS*: 25-26)[2]

b. All [of samsaric existence consisting of the *skandhas*, etc., originates conditionally] except for a certain portion of the element consisting of mental objects and the sphere consisting of mental objects.[3] (*sarvāṇi, dharmadhātvāyatanaikadeśaṃ sthāpayitvā* [*asaṃskṛtam*] -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh Except for a certain portion of the element consisting of mental objects and the sphere consisting of mental objects [means] except for the portion that is characterized as unconditioned existence (*asaṃskṛtalakṣaṇam*). (*dharmadhātvāyatanaikadeśaṃ sthāpayitvety asaṃskṛtasya lakṣaṇam* -- *ASBh*: 31 n. 1)[4]

[2]Compare this with the *Daśabhūmika*, which says that the Bodhisattva should investigate *pratītyasamutpāda* in its ten aspects and in both its progressive and regressive orders (*sa evaṃ daśākāraṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ pratyavekṣate 'nulomapratilomaṃ*), the ten aspects in terms of which he should investigate being: 1) *bhavāṅgānusamdhitaḥ*; 2) *ekacittasamavasaraṇataḥ*; 3) *svakarmasaṃbhedataḥ*; 4) *avinirbhāgataḥ*; 5) *trivartmānupravartanataḥ*; 6) *pūrvāntapratyutpannāparāntāvekṣaṇataḥ*; 7) *triduḥkhatāsamudayataḥ*; 8) *hetupratyayaprabhavataḥ*; 9) *utpādavyayavinibandhataḥ*; and 10) *bhāvakṣayatāpratyavekṣaṇataḥ* (*DBh*: 101-102). The detailed discussion of each of these aspects that precedes this summary comprises a large portion of chapter six of the *sūtra*. For a translation, see Aramaki 1974 (Honda's translation [1968], at least of this chapter, is not only useless but misleading).

This is one of several striking similarities in format between the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition and a large part of the prose section of the sixth chapter of the *Daśabhūmika* that lead me to believe that it was a source for the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

[3]For this translation, see Rahula 1980: 42; the Chinese translation [AS_c: 670c] and the Tibetan translations of *ASBh* [$ASBh_t$: 23a] and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* [$ASVy_t$: 191b] all identify this portion as *asaṃskṛta*; see also Matsuda 1983: 38.

[4]This passage, given here in Tatia's retranslation, is found only in the Tibetan translations of *ASBh* and *ASVy*; see note above. See also Matsuda 1983: 48 n. 20 for an emendation of the retranslation of *asaṃskṛtasya lakṣaṇam* [*ASBh*: 31 n. 1] to *asaṃskṛtalakṣaṇam*. The Tibetan text is: chos kyi khams daṅ skye mched kyi phyogs

AS c. [Samsaric existence is investigated as originating conditionally] for the purpose of renouncing attachment to the *ātman* and to [the ideas that *dharmas*] originate without cause or that they originate from causes inconsistent [with their results].[5] (*ahetuviṣamahetukātmābhiniveśatyājanārtham* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh [Samsaric existence is investigated as originating conditionally] for the purpose of renouncing attachment to the *ātman* and to [the idea that] *dharmas* originate without cause or from inconsistent causes, such as Īśvara, etc.[6] (*ātmadharmāhetukeśvarādihetukābhiniveśatyājanārtham* -- *ASBh*: 31 n. 1)[7] *gcig ma gtogs par žes bya ba ni 'dus ma byas kyi mtshan ñid do* (*ASBh*$_t$: 23a2).

[5] Rahula translates this as "dans le but d'abandonner l'attachment à un Soi sans cause ou ayant des causes irrégulières" [Rahula 1980: 42], but he seems to have ignored the Tibetan translation: *bdag daṅ rgyu med pa daṅ/ mi mthun pa'i rgyu las byuṅ bar mṅon par žhen pa spaṅ ba'i phyir ro* [*AS*$_t$: 76b]. This interpretation would seem to be supported by the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*: *hetāv ajñānaṃ katamat/ ahetukaṃ vā kalpayato viṣamahetuṃ vā īśvaraprakṛtipuruṣāntarādikaṃ vāyoniśaḥ kalpayato yad ajñānaṃ* [*YBh*: 205]. See also *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*: *tatra hetusamāropaḥ saṃskārādīnāṃ viṣamahetukalpanāt/ hetvapavādo nirhetukatvakalpanāt/ phalasamāropaḥ sātmakānāṃ saṃskārādīnām avidyādipratyayapravṛttikalpanāt* [*Mvbh*: 112]. Matsuda likewise differentiates between attachment to a Self and the two erroneous ideas about causes [Matsuda 1983: 38].

[6] This passage, retranslated by Tatia, is found only in the Tibetan translations of the commentary: *bdag daṅ chos rgyu med pa daṅ/ dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa'i rgyu las byuṅ bar mṅon par žen pa spaṅ ba'i phyir ro* (*ASBh*$_t$: 23a 2-3; see also *ASVy*$_t$: 191b. The mention of Īśvara as an example of an inconsistent cause probably comes from the passage in *Sav* mentioned above [*YBh*: 205]).

[7] In contrast to the *AS*, the *Sav* exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* begins with a summarizing verse (*uddāna*) that prefaces its answer to the question, "What is conditioned origination?" in the following way:

"Structure (*śarīra*), division (*mukha*), import (*artha*), analysis (*vibhaṅga*), sequence (*krama*), irrefutability (*acodanā*),

Traditional etymology (*nirukti*), conditioning (*pratyayatva*), and by way of the detailed exposition of the conditions (*pratyayatvaprabhedataḥ*),

Summary of scriptural expositions (*sūtrāntasaṃgraha*), and, last of all, variety (*vicitra*) (will be discussed)" (*śarīramukhaṃ arthaś ca vibhaṅgakramam acodanā/ niruktiḥ pratyayatvaṃ ca pratyayatvaprabhedataḥ/ sūtrāntasaṃgrahaś ceti vicitraḥ paścimo bhavet* -- *YBh*: 198).

Of these topics, *mukha* (*YBh*: 203) corresponds to *prabheda* in the *AS*, and

B. Detailed Answers to Questions

1. *Lakṣaṇataḥ*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of its definitions? (*kathaṃ lakṣaṇataḥ* -- *AS*: 26)

[It should be understood from the point of view of its definitions] with reference to the fact that: [i] [samsaric existence] arises from conditions that are inactive (*nirīhapratyaya*); [ii] [samsaric existence] arises from conditions that are impermanent (*anityapratyaya*); and [iii] [samsaric existence] arises from conditions that are effective (*samarthapratyaya*). (*nirī[ha]pratyayotpattitām upādāya, anityapratyayotpattitām upādāya, samarthapratyayotpattitām upādāya* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40A As for what the Lord has taught to be the definitions of conditioned origination, [namely,] "Since this exists, that exists," and "Due to the arising of this, that arises," in the same way (*bhagavatoktaṃ yat pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇam — asmin satīdaṃ bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate/ yad uta* -- *ASBh*: 31 n. 1)[8] [he taught:] "Conditioned

vibhaṅga (*YBh*: 204-212) to *vibhāga*. The *AS* section on *artha* contains most of the components of the *YBh* section of the same name (*YBh*: 203), along with several new additions; see my note at the end of section B7.

In the *AS*, the discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* with respect to the conditional operations of the members (*aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānataḥ*) deals with the same subject as the *YBh* section on conditioning (*pratyayatva*) (*YBh*: 215). Finally, the contents of the *AS* sections on the sets of the members (*aṅgasamāsataḥ*) and on the progressive and regressive orders (of defilement and purification -- *anulomapratilomataḥ*) are similar to the contents of the *YBh* section on structure (*śarīra*) (*YBh*: 198-203).

[8](This portion has been retranslated by Tatia from the Tibetan: *bcom ldan 'das kyis rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'byuṅ ba'i mtshan ñid gaṅ gsuṅs pa ni 'di yod pas/ 'di 'byuṅ/ 'di skyes pa'i phyir 'di skye ba ste/ 'di ltar* ... (*ASBh$_t$*: 23a 3; see also *ASVy$_t$*: 191b; and T. 1606: 711b).

by Ignorance, the Karmic Forces[9] [exist], etc." (*avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity evam ādi* -- *ASBh*: 31)

Among these [three definitions]:

i. [The first definition,] "Since this exists, that exists," is with reference to the fact that [samsaric existence] arises from conditions that are inactive. The meaning [of this definition] is as follows: merely due to the fact that the condition exists, the result arises. And it is not the case that there is any action on the part of the condition [aimed at] the origination of the result. (*tatra* [i] *asmin satīdaṃ bhavati nirīhapratyayotpattitām upādāya/ sati kevalaṃ pratyaye phalaṃ bhavati, na tu phalotpādānaṃ prati pratyayasya kācid īhety arthaḥ* -- *ASBh*: 31)

ii. [The second definition,] "Due to the arising of this, that arises," is with reference to the fact that [samsaric existence] arises from conditions that are impermanent because it cannot be established that any result originates from a cause that has not [yet finished] arising.[10] ([ii] *asyotpādād idam utpadyate anityapratyayotpattitām upādāya, na hy anutpādikāraṇāt kiṃcid utpadyamānaṃ kāryaṃ siddham iti kṛtvā* -- *ASBh*: 31)

iii. [The third definition,] "Conditioned by Ignorance, the Karmic Forces [exist], etc.," is with reference to the fact that [samsaric existence] arises from conditions that are effective. Even though [conditions] are inactive and impermanent, it does not follow that every result originates [indiscriminately] from any condition. Rather, [a result originates] only from a [specifically] effective condition, as the Karmic Forces [originate] from Ignorance [and so on,] up to Old Age and Death, [which originate] from birth. ([iii] *avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity evam ādi samarthapratyayotpattitām upādāya/ nirīhakatvānityatve 'pi sati na yataḥ kutaścit pratyayāt sarvam eva phalam utpadyate, kiṃ tarhi samarthāt/ tadyathā 'vidyātaḥ saṃskārā yāvaj jātito jarāmaraṇam iti* -- *ASBh*: 31)

[9] *saṃskārāḥ*; for this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 653.

[10] The meaning is that, by the time the effect arises, the cause has already finished arising; that is to say, it is already destroyed.

2. *Aṅgavibhāgataḥ*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of its analysis into the members [of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula]?

[It should be understood as consisting of] twelve members. The twelve-membered [formula of] conditioned origination consists of: Ignorance (*avidyā*), the Karmic Forces (*saṃskāra*), Consciousness (*vijñāna*), Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*),[11] the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*),[12] Contact (*sparśa*), Feeling (*vedanā*), Subconscious Desire (*tṛṣṇā*),[13] Appropriation (*upādāna*), Karmic Existence (*bhava*), Birth [into a given species of living beings] (*jāti*), and Old Age and Death (*jarāmaraṇa*). (*katham aṅgavibhāgataḥ/ dvādaśāṅgāni, dvādaśāṅgaḥ pratītyasamutpāda — avidyā, saṃskārāḥ, vijñānaṃ, nāmarūpaṃ, ṣaḍāyatanaṃ, sparśaḥ, vedanā, tṛṣṇā, upādānaṃ, bhavaḥ, jātiḥ, jarāmaraṇañ ca* -- *AS*: 26).[14]

ASBh 40B (No comment on this section)

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[11]For this translation, see Aramaki 1988. I am here simplifying his "individual-intersubjective existence."

[12] For this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 652.

[13]For this translation, see Aramaki 1988.

[14]The section on *aṅgavibhāga* in the *AS* appears to be nothing more than a list of the members of the formula. In comparison, the corresponding portion in *YBh* on *vibhaṅga* (according to the *uddāna* [*YBh*: 198] and the last sentence of the section [*YBh*: 212]) or *vibhāga* (according to the first sentence of the section [*YBh*: 204]) contains long and detailed explanations of each member; for example, in the case of Ignorance, the *YBh* devotes two and a half pages of Sanskrit text to definitions and discussions of many different kinds of ignorance (*YBh*: 204-206).

3. *Aṅgasamāsataḥ*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of its sets of members?[15]

[It should be understood as consisting of] the projecting [set of] member[s] (*ākṣepakāṅga*), the projected [set of] member[s] (*ākṣiptāṅga*), the actualizing [set of] member[s)] (*abhinirvartakāṅga*), and the actualized [set of] member[s] (*abhinirvṛttyaṅga*). (*katham aṅgasamāsato 'pi/ ākṣepakāṅgaṃ, ākṣiptāṅgaṃ, abhinirvartakāṅgaṃ, abhinirvṛttyaṅgañ ca* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40C If we then group [into sets] the twelve members beginning with Ignorance that we have already distinguished, we have four [sets of] member[s], namely the projecting [set] of member[s], etc. In the exposition of the originating [aspect of conditioned origination], only the following need be expounded. All [of conditioned origination] should be understood as being explained by the four [sets of] member[s]: that which projects and that which is projected at the time of cause, and that which actualizes and that which is actualized at the time of result. (*yāny avidyādīni dvādaśāṅgāni vibhaktāni tāny eva punaḥ samasya catvāry aṅgāni bhavanty ākṣepāṅgādīni/ etāvac ca pravṛttinirdeśe nirdeṣṭavyam yad uta hetukāle yenākṣipyate yac cākṣipyate phalakāle yenābhinirvartyate yac cābhinirvartyate tad etat sarvam ebhir aṅgair nirdiṣṭaṃ veditavyam* -- *ASBh*: 31)

AS Of what members does the projecting [set] consist? [It consists of] Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness.

Of what members does the projected [set] consist? [It consists of] Individual

[15]The Sanskrit text reads *katham aṅgasamāsato 'pi*, but the *api*, which is found in neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese, seems to have slipped in from section one, where each of the ten ways of understanding *pratītyasamutpāda* is followed by *api*. Therefore, I ignore it in my translation.

Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling.

Of what members does the actualizing [set] consist? [It consists of] Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence.

Of what members does the actualized [set] consist? [It consists of] Birth and Old Age and Death. (*ākṣepakāṅgaṃ katamat/ avidyā, saṃskārāḥ, vijñānañ ca/ ākṣiptāṅgaṃ katamat/ nāmarūpaṃ, ṣaḍāyatanaṃ, sparśaḥ, vedanā ca/ abhinirvartakāṅgaṃ katamat/ tṛṣṇā, upādānaṃ, bhavaś ca/ abhinirvṛttyāṅgaṃ katamat/ jātiḥ jarāmaraṇañ ca* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh Among these [four sets], [i] The projecting [set of] member[s] consists of Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness means that consciousness is impregnated by actions preceded by ignorance of the [Noble] Truths [in such a way] that future rebirth may be actualized. (*tatra* [i] *ākṣepakāṅgam avidyā saṃskārā vijñānaṃ ca, anāgatajanmābhinirvṛttaye satyeṣv ajñānapūrvakeṇa karmaṇā cittavāsanārthena* -- (*ASBh*: 31)

[ii] The projected [set of] member[s] consists of Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling since, due to that impregnation of consciousness, the seeds [of Individual Existence, etc.,] develop so as to actualize Individual Existence, etc., in the future life in due order of dependence, the later [members being dependent on the] preceding [ones]. ([ii] *ākṣiptāṅgaṃ nāmarūpaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ sparśo vedanā ca, tayā cittavāsanayā nāmarūpādīnām āyatyāṃ pūrvottarasaṃniśrayakrameṇābhinirvṛttaye bījapuṣṭitaḥ* -- (*ASBh*: 31)

[iii] The actualizing [set of] member[s] consists of Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence since, under the sway of undestroyed Subconscious Desire[16] with respect to *kāmadhātu*, etc., due to wishing and craving (*chandarāga*), which is preceded by pleasure in the varieties of good and bad deeds with respect to

[16]The Sanskrit text reads *tṛṣṇādivasena*, but the Chinese and Tibetan translations omit the *ādi*, as does Matsuda (Matsuda 1983: 39).

kāmadhātu, etc., [insofar as] consciousness is under the sway of clinging,[17] there is, at the stage of death, the realization of the impressions of either kind of actions[18] [i.e., good or bad] conforming to wishing and craving [that leads] to the yielding of results. ([iii] *abhinirvartakāṅgaṃ tṛṣṇā upādānaṃ bhavaś ca aprahīṇakāmāditṛṣṇādivasena kāmādiṣu sucaritaduścaritaprakārāratipūrvakeṇa chandarāgeṇa sopādāne vijñāne sati maraṇāvasthāyāṃ phaladānaṃ prati chandarāgānurūpyāntarakarmavāsanābhimukhībhāvāt/* -- *ASBh*: 31)

[iv] The actualized [set of] member[s] consists of Birth and Old Age and Death since, when there is realization of the impressions of other[19] actions in the way [mentioned above], Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*), etc., arises accordingly, as it has been projected, in a group of beings (*nikāyasabhāga*) that is distinguished [according to] the various destinies (*gati*), classes of beings (*yoni*), etc. ([iv][20] *abhinirvṛttyaṅgaṃ jātijarāma[ra]ṇaṃ ca. tena prakāreṇa karmāntaravāsanābhimukhye satyantarasmin gatiyonyādibhedabhinne nikāyasabhāge yathākṣipte nāmarūpādinirvṛtteḥ/* -- *ASBh*: 31)

Mention of Birth and Old Age and Death [is made] for the sake of [causing] aversion by referring to the three characteristics of conditioned things (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*). (*jātijarāmaraṇavacanaṃ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇatrayādhikāreṇodvejanārtham/* -- *ASBh*: 31-32)

Old Age and Death are put [together] to form one member because death is possible even without old age. It is not similarly the case that, among the class of beings born from the womb, the Six Senses can exist without [the member that precedes them,

[17] *sopādāne vijñāne sati*. For this translation of *sopādāna*, see Schmithausen 1987: 69 ff.

[18] Matsuda (1982a: 52 n. 34; also, 1983: 39) emends *antara* to *anyatra* here on the basis of the Tibetan translation, and I follow his emendation.

[19] Matsuda comments on the difficulty in understanding the word *antara* here He proposes a solution that I do not completely understand, but if I am correct about his general meaning, this *karma*, which causes rebirth into a specific *gati*, etc., is different (*antara*) from *karma* that causes rebirth in general (Matsuda 1983: 49 n. 27).

[20] Gokhale has omitted the number here, but I include it for the sake of consistency.

namely] Individual Existence, and so on [for the other members]. Thus, it is to be understood that these [members] comprise separate members. (*jarāmaraṇasyaikāṅgakaraṇaṃ vināpi jarāṃ maraṇasaṃbhavāt/ na tv evaṃ jarāyujāyāṃ yonau vinā nāmarūpādibhiḥ ṣaḍāyatanādīnāṃ sambhava ity eṣāṃ pṛthagaṅgīkaraṇaṃ veditavyam* -- *ASBh*: 32).

4. *Aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthāna*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of the conditional operations of its members?

The definition of the conditional operations of its members is to be understood in terms of impressioning (*vāsana*), continuing force (*āvedha*), [being the object of] contemplation (*manasikāra*), and concomitance (*sahabhāva*). And that [definition in terms of these four is to be applied] according to the circumstances [in the case of each of the links of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula]. (*katham aṅgapratyayatvavyavasthānataḥ/ vāsanato 'pi, āvedhato 'pi, manasikārato 'pi, sahabhāvato 'py aṅgānāṃ pratyayatvavyavasthānaṃ veditavyam/ tac ca yathāyogam* -- *AS*: 26).

ASBh 40D The definition of the conditional operations of its members is with reference to the four conditions (*pratyaya*). (*aṅgapratya[yatvavya]vasthānaṃ caturaḥ pratyayān adhikṛtya* -- *ASBh*: 32)

In this definition:

[i] First of all, Ignorance, having arisen prior to the Karmic Forces, is the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) [of the Karmic Forces] in terms of impressioning. Because *karma* that has been produced [in] a series [of personality][21] perfumed by it [i.e., Ignorance]

[21] *saṃtāna* -- for this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 67.

is capable of activating rebirth, at that time [i.e., at the time of rebirth] [Ignorance] is operative.[22] (*tatra* [i] *tāvad avidyā saṃskārāṇāṃ purvotpannā*[23] *vāsanato hetupratyayaḥ, tat paribhāvitasaṃtānotpannānāṃ karmaṇāṃ punarbhavābhisaṃskaraṇasāmarthyāt tatkālasamudācāriṇī* -- *ASBh*: 32)

[ii] [Ignorance] is the immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) [of the Karmic Forces] in terms of continuing force because the stream of Karmic Forces continues to evolve in accordance with its specific propelling power.[24] ([ii] *āvedhataḥ samanantarapratyayaḥ, tadākṣepakaviśeṣeṇa saṃskārasrotānupravṛtteḥ* -- *ASBh*: 32)

[iii] [Ignorance] is the object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) [of the Karmic Forces] in terms of [its being the object of] contemplation because, for one who is benighted, it becomes the object of incorrect contemplation on "the Supreme" (*agratā*), etc. ([iii] *manaskārata ālambanapratyayaḥ, mūḍhāvasthāyā agratādibhir ayoniśomanaskārālaṃbanībhāvāt* -- *ASBh*: 32)[25]

[iv] [Ignorance] is the influencing condition (*adhipatipratyaya*) [of the Karmic Forces] in terms of concomitance because, due to its influence, the volition associated

[22]The Tibetan translations of the *ASBh* and *ASVy* disagree with each other and with the Sanskrit text in this section, and the Chinese translation of the *ASVy* disagrees with all the other versions. Like Matsuda (Matsuda 1983: 40), I follow the Sanskrit text since the Tibetan versions seem corrupt (e.g., they both give *rgyu* for *saṃtāna*, instead of *rgyun*), and Hsüan-tsang's translation is a bit free.

[23]The Tibetan translations of *ASBh* (23b7) and *ASVy* (193a1-2) both read *de la ma rig pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi rkyen te/ sṅa logs su byuṅ ba'i bag chags*, etc. This would suggest *purvotpannavāsanato*. $ASVy_c$ seems in any case closer to the Tibetan than to our Sanskrit: 且如無明望行。前生習氣故。 However, as I stated in the immediately preceding note, I follow the Sanskrit, which seems to make more sense given the context.

[24] Matsuda (1983: 40) follows the Tibetan translations in reading the Sanskrit *tadākṣepaviśeṣena* as *tadā* + *ākṣepaviśeṣena* [*de'i tshe 'phen pa'i bye brag* -- $ASBh_t$: 24a1; $ASVy_t$: 193a 3], but the temporal reference does not seem to me to make sense here; I follow Hsüan-tsang's Chinese, where 彼 [*tad* = *tasya*] refers to back to Ignorance, which Hsüan-tsang seems to have supplied in order to clarify the passage (無明能引發故。為等無間緣。由彼引発差別諸行流轉相續生故。-- T. 1606: 711c).

[25]Although I think that, in each of these four explanations, the causal relationship between *avidyā* and the *saṃskāras* is implied, I cannot understand how *avidyā* is the *ālambanapratyaya* of the *saṃskāras*.

with it fabricates a false object. (sahabhāvato 'dhipatipratyayaḥ, tadādhipatyena tatsamprayuktāyāś cetanāyā viparītālambanābhisaṃskāraṇāt -- *ASBh*: 32)

5. *Aṅgakarmavyavasthāna*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of the function of the members? (*katham aṅgakarmavyavasthānataḥ* -- *AS*: 26)

a. Ignorance (*avidyā*)

AS What is the function of Ignorance? It deludes beings concerning existence, and it is the condition of the Karmic Forces. (*avidyā kiṃkarmikā/ bhave ca sattvān sammohayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati saṃskārāṇām* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40E Ignorance deludes beings concerning existence because, due to its concealing, there is a lack of real knowledge regarding the past, future, and middle [i.e., present] existences,[26] wherefore one has doubts, [for example,] "Did I exist in the past, or did I not exist?" and so on.[27]

And it is the condition of the Karmic Forces because, due to it, there is an accumulation of *karma* that is conducive to rebirth. ([i] *avidyā bhave sattvān sammohāyati, tadāvṛtteḥ pūrvāntāparāntamadhyāntānāṃ yathābhūtāparijñānāt/ yata evaṃ vicikitsati* —

[26]This definition of Ignorance is found in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* of the *Saṃyuktāgama* [T. 99: 85a (*sūtra* 198)] as well as in the *Yüan ch'i ching* (緣起經) translated by Hsüan-tsang [T. 124: 547]; see also Matsuda 1982a: 43; De Jong 1979: 246; *Arthaviniścayasūtra*: 7.

[27]*ity evam ādi* here refers, I think, to the other types of Ignorance mentioned in the *sūtra* and defined in the *Sav* (see *YBh*: 204; *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*: 9b 2-3; *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*: 103).

kiṃ nv aham abhūvam atī[te] 'dhvany āhosvin nābhūvam ity evam ādi/ *pratyayaś ca bhavati saṃskārāṇām, tadvaśena punarbhavikakarmopacayāt* -- *ASBh*: 32)[28]

b. Karmic Forces (*saṃskāra*)

AS What is the function of the Karmic Forces? They distinguish beings according to the destinies (*gatiṣu*), and they are the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness.[29] (*saṃskārāḥ kiṃkarmakāḥ/ gatiṣu ca sattvān vibhajanti, pratyayāś ca bhavanti vijñānavāsanāyāḥ* -- *AS*: 26)

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[28]After the *AS* definition of the function of each member, I shall provide translations, together with the text, or summaries (in square brackets), of the corresponding portions from the section on *vibhaṅga* (*vibhāga*) in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of *YBh*, as well as translations from a corresponding section of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (these are my own translations; see also Honda 1968: 189-190).

Sav (*YBh*: 204-206): [The exposition of Ignorance in the *Sav* section on *vibhāga* consists of definitions of various types of Ignorance; the types mentioned largely correspond with those found in the above-mentioned *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* in the *Saṃyuktāgama*. As I mentioned immediately above, the explanation in *ASBh* of the first function of Ignorance appears to be a summary of the definitions of the first three types in *Sav*. Regarding the definitions of internal ignorance (*adhyātmam ajñānam*) and external ignorance (*bahirdhājñānam*), Schmithausen remarks that in this passage from *Sav*, *avidyā* is closely associated with *satkāyadṛṣṭi/ātmadṛṣṭi*, while a distinction is usually made between them in Yogācāra and Sarvāstivādin texts (Schmithausen 1987: 518 n. 1421.]

DBh (98-99): "Here, Ignorance has two functions (*dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā*; for translation, see Aramaki 1974: 177). It deludes beings regarding objects (*ālambanataḥ*), and it provides the cause (*hetu*) for the generation of the Karmic Forces" (*tatrāvidyā dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati/ ālambanataḥ sattvān saṃmohayati/ hetuṃ ca dadāti saṃskārābhinirvṛttaye*).

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[29]*vijñānavāsanāyāḥ*. For this translation, see Matsuda 1983: 41. According to the Chinese translation, the Karmic Forces are the condition of Consciousness due to impressions (二與識作緣。由熏習故。 -- T. 1605: 671a).

ASBh The Karmic Forces distinguish beings according to the destinies because, due to *karma*, there is a diversity of different destinies for beings to go to.

And they are the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness because [they] nourish the seeds in order that Individual Existence[30] may arise in the future. (*saṃskārā gatiṣu sattvān vibhajanti, karmavaśena sattvānāṃ gatyantaragamanavaicitryāt/ pratyayāś ca bhāvanti vijñānasya vāsanāyāḥ, āyatyā nāmarūpābhinirvṛttaye bījapoṣaṇāt* -- *ASBh*: 32)[31]

c. Consciousness (*vijñāna*)

AS What is the function of Consciousness? It supports the bond of action of beings, and it is the condition of Individual Existence. (*vijñānaṃ kiṃkarmakaṃ/ sattvānām karmabandhañ ca dhārayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya* -- *AS*: 26)

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[30] In the Tibetan and Chinese versions, the word "etc." follows "Individual Existence" (*ASBh*$_t$: 24a 5; *ASVy*$_t$: 193b 2; T. 1606: 711c).

[31] *Sav* (*YBh*: 206): [The *sūtra* mentions three types of *saṃskāras*: physical, vocal, and mental. The *Sav* defines them as meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable (*āniñjya*) *karma* and states in which realm each type can be performed.]

DBh (99): "The Karmic Forces also have two functions. They manifest the generation of karmic results (*vipāka*) in the future, and they provide the cause for the generation of Consciousness" (*saṃskārā api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati/ anāgatavipākābhinirvṛttaṃ cādarśayati/ hetuṃ ca dadāti vijñānābhinirvṛttaye*).

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu in commenting on the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* includes the same information as the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*. In addition, he states the reasons for which one performs the various actions; for example, one performs non-meritorious action in order to obtain an agreeable sensation in this life in Kāmadhātu (*AKBh*: 139-140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 84).

ASBh Consciousness supports the bond of action of beings[32] because it arises[33] simultaneously with the impressions deposited by the Karmic Forces.

And it is the condition of Individual Existence because Individual Existence attains growth due to the entrance of Consciousness into the mother's womb. (*vijñānaṃ karmabandhaṃ dhārayati, saṃskārāhitavāsanāsahotpatteḥ/ pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya, mātuḥ kukṣau vijñānāvakrāntyā nāmarūpavivṛddhigamanāt* -- *ASBh*: 32)[34]

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[32]Matsuda emends the Sanskrit text, adding *sattvānāṃ*, on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese (see *ASBh*$_t$: 24a 5; *ASVy*$_t$: 193b 3; T. 1606: 712a).

[33]The Chinese translation adds "and is destroyed" (與行所引習氣俱生滅故。-- T. 1606: 712a).

[34]*Sav* (*YBh*: 206): [The *sūtra* defines Consciousness as the six *vijñānakāyas* and names each of them. The *Sav* gives a detailed definition of the first of the six, eye-consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), according to its own theory of seeds (characterized by Schmithausen as "somewhat archaic" {Schmithausen 1987: 178}):]

"What is eye-consciousness? It is, in the future, the consciousness [resulting] from the discernment (*prativijñapti*) of *rūpa*, which is based on the organ of sight, that has the form of a seed permeated by meritorious, demeritorious, or immovable [*karma*] and [the consciousness] that has the form of the fruit which is produced by that seed" (*cakṣurvijñānaṃ katamat/ āyatyāṃ cakṣurindriyāśrayāyā rūpaprativijñapter yat puṇyāpuṇyāneñjyaparibhāvitabījabhūtaṃ vijñānaṃ yac ca tadbījasamudbhavaṃ phalabhūtaṃ* [*YBh*: 206]. Underlined portions represent Schmithausen's corrections from the manuscript [Schmithausen 1987: 472 n. 1154]. See also note to Chapter 4, section B2).

[The *Sav* goes on to say that the other five types of consciousness should be similarly understood, and it says which types of consciousness are found in which realms.]

DBh (99): "Consciousness also has two functions. It brings about conception into (the next) existence, and it provides the cause for the generation of Individual Existence" (*vijñānam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānaṃ bhavati/ bhavapratisaṃdhiṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti nāmarūpābhinirvṛttaye*).

For Vasubandhu's comments on *vijñāna* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, see Chapter 5.

d. Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*)

AS What is the function of Individual Existence? It makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence,[35] and it is the condition of the Six Senses. (*nāmarūpaṃ kiṃkarmakam/ ātmabhāvaṃ sattvān grāhayati, pratyayaś ca ṣaḍāyatanasya* --*AS*: 26)

ASBh Individual Existence makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence because, due to its arising, beings are distributed[36] among the various births (*nikāyasabhāga*).

And the fact that Individual Existence, etc., is the condition of the Six Senses, etc., is to be seen as being due to the production of the later members in dependence on the earlier members.[37] (*nāmarūpam ātmabhāvaṃ sattvān grāhayati tannirvṛttyā sattvānāṃ*

[35]For this translation of *ātmabhāva*, see Schmithausen 1987: 24.

[36]Matsuda (1983: 49 n. 31) points out that $ASBh_t$ and $ASVy_t$ both give *brten pa* for *bhajana*, but he does not indicate why this is remarkable. Perhaps he is justifying his acceptance of Tatia's emendation of the manuscript's *bhājana*, which is normally translated into Tibetan as *snod* (Hirakawa 1973, v. 1: 276). The word *bhajana*, according to the Sanskrit-English dictionaries (Monier-Williams 1970: 744; Apte 1986: 1182), simply means "sharing" or "dividing," which is reflected in Matsuda's translation. The word *bhājana*, on the other hand, generally translated into Chinese as 器 (vessel), is, at least in the case of the *AKBh*, usually found in contexts in which it specifically refers to the external world (Hirakawa 1973, v. 1: 276); therefore, it strongly connotes, if it is not equivalent with, *bhājanaloka* (*snod kyi 'jig rten*, 器世界, which is not found in the Chinese translation: 由彼生已得預有情衆同分差別數故。 [T. 1606: 712a]). Thus, while a verbal meaning from the root *bhaj* is preserved in *bhajana*, *bhājana* seems to be totally nominal and does not make sense in the context of our passage. Given the fact that the Sanskrit manuscript is quite late (approximately thirteenth century, according to Gokhale [introduction to *AS*: 13]), I think that Tatia and Matsuda are correct in emending the reading according to the Tibetan. Schmithausen, without commenting on it, also accepts *bhajana* (Schmithausen 1987: 553 n. 1477A6).

[37]According to the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, the members from Consciousness through Feeling, in other words the members belonging to the projected set (in the *AS* and *ASBh*, of course, this consists of the members from Individual Existence through Feeling since these texts include Consciousness in the projecting set), are really simultaneous since, in the form of seeds, they are created by *karma* all at once. However, they are often spoken of as occurring in order, because when they yield results, they appear at different times (T. 1585: 43c; *Shindō*: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 489). Therefore, the relationship of dependency among these members is different from that among the other members. It

nikāyasabhāgāntarabhajanāt/ nāmarūpādīnāṃ ṣaḍāyatanādipratyayabhāvaḥ pūrvāṅgisaṃniśrayeṇottarāṅganirvṛttito draṣṭavyaḥ -- *ASBh*: 32)[38]

c. Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*)

AS What is the function of the Six Senses? They cause beings to grasp the completion of the basis of personal existence, and they are the condition of Contact. (*ṣaḍāyatanaṃ kiṃkarmakam/ ātmabhāvaparipūriñ ca sattvān grāhayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati sparśasya* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh The Six Senses [cause beings to grasp the completion of the basis of personal existence because, when they [the Six Senses] arise, the remaining organs are no

is to this fact, I think, that the *Bhāṣya* is referring in this comment.

[38]*Sav* (*YBh*: 207): [The *sūtra* defines Individual Existence as consisting of the four immaterial *skandhas* (= *nāma*) as well as *rūpaskandha*, which consists of the four *mahābhūtas* and the matter derived from them (*upādāyarūpa*). The *Sav* explains each of the immaterial *skandhas* and the two types of matter, and states in which realms they can be found. At the end of the section, it gives a definition according to its seed theory:]

"And all this [Individual Existence] is twofold: having the form of the seed [of Individual Existence] contained in the seed of Consciousness, and having the form of the result [i.e., Individual Existence as an actualized entity] produced by that [seed]" (*sarvaṃ tad api dvividhaṃ/ vijñānabījaparigṛhītabījabhūtaṃ ca tadabhinirvarttitaphalabhūtaṃ* [I am emending Bhattacharya's *tadanirvarttitaphalabhūtaṃ*, which is an obvious scribal error] *ca*).

See Schmithausen 1987: 278 n. 147b; 472 n. 1155 for his understanding of the first aspect of Individual Existence: "the Seed of *n.* possessed by, or contained in, *v.*" Elsewhere, however, he indicates that the seed of the future *nāmarūpa* is contained in the seed of the future *vijñāna* (Schmithausen 1987: 178).

DBh (99): "Individual Existence also has two functions. It forms the mutual support [with Consciousness (see La Vallée Poussin 1913: 12-18)], and it provides the cause for the generation of the Six Senses" (*nāmarūpam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānaṃ bhavati/ anyonyopastambhanaṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti ṣaḍāyatanābhinirvṛttaye*).

[longer] lacking.[39] (*ṣaḍāyatanam ātmabhāvaparipūriṃ ca sattvān grāhayati, tannivṛttāv indriyāntarāvaikalyāt* -- *ASBh*: 32-33)[40]

f. Contact (*sparśa*)

AS What is the function of Contact? It turns beings towards the experience of the sense objects, and it is the condition of Feeling. (*sparśaḥ kiṃkarmakaḥ/ viṣayopabhoge ca sattvān pravartayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati vedanāyāḥ* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh Contact turns beings towards the experience of the sense objects because, due to it, there is experience of the three types of sense objects, pleasurable ones, etc.[41]

[39]Following Matsuda (1983: 49 n. 32), who notes that it was added to the Sanskrit manuscript and is found in none of the other versions of the text, I omit the sentence *pratyayaś ca bhavati sparśasya* here, as well as the sentence *pratyayaś ca bhavati vedanāyāḥ* in the comment on Contact. The last portion of the comment on Individual Existence as a condition of the Six Senses applies to the discussions of the Six Senses and Contact as well.

[40]*Sav* (*YBh*: 207): [The *sūtra* simply lists the six *āyatanas*. The *Sav* defines *cakṣurāyatana* in detail, saying that it is the subtle matter (*rūpaprasāda*) by which visual consciousness is supported and by which material objects are seen in the three times and that the other *āyatanas* are to be understood similarly. Following this, a definition is given according to seed theory:]

"And all this [the Six Senses] is twofold: having the form of the seed [of the Six Senses] contained in the seed of Individual Existence and having the form of the result [i.e., the Six Senses as actualized entities] produced by that [seed]" (*tad api dvividhaṃ nāmarūpabījaparigṛhītabījabhūtaṃ* [emended from Bhattacharya's *nāmarūpaparigṛhīta-bījabhūtaṃ* following Schmithausen 1987: 472 n. 1156] *tad abhinirvartitaphalabhūtaṃ ca*).

[The *Sav* then mentions how many *āyatanas* can be found in each of the three realms.]

DBh (99): "The Six Senses also have two functions. They manifest the separateness of their objects, and they provide the cause for the generation of Contact" (*ṣaḍāyatanam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānaṃ bhavati/ svaviṣayavibhaktitāñ cādarśayati/ hetuṃ ca dadāti sparśābhinirvṛttaye*).

[41]*Sav* (*YBh*: 207): [The *sūtra* defines Contact as the six kinds of *sparśakāyas* (觸

<u>(*sparśo viṣayopabhoge sattvān pravartayati,*</u> *tanmukhena sukhavedanīyāditrividhaviṣayopabhogāt* -- *ASBh*: 33)

g. Feeling (*vedanā*)

AS What is the function of Feeling? It turns beings towards the experience of[42] <u>existence,[43] and it is the</u> condition of Subconscious Desire. (*vedanā kiṃkarmikā/*

身: I can only find this compound in the *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, where it is said to be equivalent to *sparśana*, with nothing corresponding to 身 being found in the Sanskrit text {Hirakawa 1977: 311}, but in the version of the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* found in the Sanskrit text of the *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, *sparśa* is defined as *ṣaṭsparśakāyāḥ* {*AVS*: 10}, so I feel confident in my retranslation. Curiously, however, both Chinese versions of *AVS* have only 觸 {T. 762: 651b; T. 763: 654c}).

Bhattacharya remarks that the Sanskrit text of *Sav* is corrupt here, and he claims that the Tibetan text is illegible. However, the Peking version is quite legible, and I have summarized from it (*Sav*$_t$: 121b 3-4); Schmithausen's emendation from the manuscript essentially agrees with the Tibetan (Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613).

The *Sav* defines *cakṣuḥsaṃsparśa* as the grasping of the object as agreeable (or disagreeable or neutral) that is occasioned by the coming together of the three (object, sense organ, and consciousness). The *Sav* continues, saying that the other *saṃsparśa*s should be similarly understood. Again, it defines Contact according to seed theory:]

"They [the six types of Contact] again are twofold: having the form of the seed [of Contact] contained in the seed of the Six Senses, and having the form of the result [i.e., Contact as an actualized entity] produced by that [seed]" (*te punar dvividhāḥ/ ṣaḍāyatanabījaparigṛhītabījabhūtāś ca tadabhinirvartitaphalabhūtāś ca*).

[The *Sav* then states how many types of Contact can be found in each of the three realms.]

DBh (99): "Contact also has two functions. It is contact with objects, and it provides the cause for the generation of Feeling" (*sparśo 'pi dvividhakāryapratyupasthāno bhavati/ ālaṃbanasparśaś ca bhavati/ hetuṃ ca dadāti vedanābhinirvṛttaye*).

However, La Vallée Poussin and Rahder both read *ālambanasparśanaṃ ca karoti*: "It brings about contact with objects" (La Vallée Poussin 1913: 118; Rahder 1926: 50), and the Tibetan agrees: *dmigs pa la reg par yaṅ byed do* (*DBh*$_t$: 103b 8). I cannot tell which version the Chinese translation supports (能觸所緣 -- T. 286: 515a; T. 278: 558c; T. 1522: 169b; T. 279: 194; T. 287: 553a. I cannot make sense of Dharmarakṣa's early translation, T. 285).

[42]Matsuda supplies 次の in parentheses: "(the next) existence" (Matsuda 1983: 41) here and in the case of *tṛṣṇā*, immediately below.

janmopabhoge ca sattvān pravartayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati tṛṣṇāyāḥ -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh Feeling turns beings towards the experience of existence because, on the basis of it, there is the experience of the desirable, etc., results of action.

And it is the condition of Subconscious Desire because, due to a craving for connection, etc., with it [i.e., Feeling], there is the arising of Subconscious Desire.[44] (*vedanā janmopabhoge ca sattvān pravartayati, tadadhiṣṭhānenesṭādikarmavipākopabhogāt/ pratyayaś ca bhavati tṛṣṇāyāḥ, tatsamprayogādyabhilāṣamukhena tṛṣṇotpatteḥ* -- *ASBh*: 33)

h. Subconscious Desire (*tṛṣṇā*)

AS What is the function of Subconscious Desire? It draws beings to existence, and it is the condition of Appropriation. (*tṛṣṇā kiṃkarmikā/ janmani ca sattvān ākarṣayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati upādānasya* -- *AS*: 26)

[43]The Peking edition of AS_t interprets *janmopabhoga* as a *dvandva*: "existence and experience" (*skye ba dan loṅs spyod* -- AS_t: 77a 8). However, $ASBh_t$: 24b 2 and $ASVy_t$: 194a 1 both take it as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*: *skye ba'i loṅs spyod*.

[44]*Sav* (*YBh*: 208): [The *sūtra* defines Feeling as the three types of Feeling: pleasurable, painful, and neither pleasurable nor painful. The *Sav* in turn defines each of these three types and states in which realms they can be found. Again, it gives a definition according to seed theory:]

"These Feelings also are twofold: having the form of the seed [of Feeling] contained in the seed of Contact, and having the form of the result [i.e., Feeling as an actualized entity] produced by that [seed]" (*tā api vedanā dvividhāḥ sparśabījaparigṛhītabījabhūtās tadabhinirvartitaphalabhūtāś ca*).

DBh (99): "Feeling also has two functions. It brings about the experience of that which is agreeable, disagreeable, and neither [agreeable nor disagreeable], and it provides the cause for the generation of Subconscious Desire" (*vedanāpi dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati/ iṣṭāniṣṭobhayaviparītayuktānubhavanaṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti tṛṣṇābhinirvṛtaye*).

ASBh Subconscious Desire draws beings to existence because, due to its power, there is no interruption in the stream of future existences (*janmāntarasrotas*).

And it is the condition of Appropriation because, due to a desire for savor, wishes and greed (*chandarāga*) with respect to *Kāma*[*dhātu*], etc., arise.[45] (*tṛṣṇā janmani sattvān ākarṣati, tadvaśena janmāntarasroto 'nupacchedād/ pratyayaś ca bhavaty upādānasya, āsvādaprārthanāmukhena kāmādiṣu chandarāgapravṛtteḥ* -- *ASBh*: 33)

i. Appropriation (*upādāna*)

AS What is the function of Appropriation? It makes the consciousness of beings [become] endowed with grasping[46] in order [that they] seize a new birth, and it is the condition of Karmic Existence. (*upādānaṃ kiṃkarmakaṃ/ punarbhavādānāya*[47] *sopādānaṃ ca sattvānāṃ vijñānaṃ karoti, pratyayaś ca bhavati bhavasya* -- *AS*: 26)

[45]*Sav* (*YBh*: 208): [The *sūtra* defines Subconscious Desire as Subconscious Desire in each of the three realms. The *Sav* defines Subconscious Desire in each realm as a defiled desire (*kliṣṭā prārthanā*) with respect to the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*: here, I think, in the sense of experiences) of that realm. This desire is dependent upon the actions (*saṃskāra*) performed in that realm, and it produces misery (*duḥkha*) in that realm.]

DBh (99): "Subconscious Desire also has two functions. It brings about desire for desirable things, and it provides the cause for the generation of Appropriation" (*tṛṣṇāpi dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati/ saṃraṃjanīyavastusaṃrāgaṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti upādānābhinirvṛttaye*).

[46]*sopādāna*. I have translated *upādāna* here in this way to distinguish it from *upādānāṅga*.

[47]I have emended Gokhale's *punarbhavādānāc ca* to *punarbhavādānāya* on the basis of the Sanskrit text as preserved in the *Bhāṣya*; evidently the manuscript is not clear (see Pradhan 1950: 27 n. 4; Pradhan, following the Tibetan *yaṅ srid pa len pa'i phyir* [*AS*$_t$: 77b 1], gives *punarbhavādānārthaṃ*). Matsuda does not comment on the text of *AS* here, but his translation must have been based on either *punarbhavādānāya* or *punarbhavādānārthaṃ* (Matsuda 1983: 41).

ASBh Appropriation makes the consciousness of beings [become] endowed with grasping in order [that they] seize a new birth because the impressions of actions determine the conception [of beings][48] in [a form of] rebirth specified as [a particular] destiny, such as hell, etc.[49]

And it is the condition of Karmic Existence because, due to its power, the impressions of the Karmic Forces obtain activity.[50] (*upādānaṃ punarbhavādānāya sopādānaṃ ca sattvānāṃ vijñānaṃ karoti, narakādigativiśiṣṭapunarbhavapratisaṃdhaye karmavāsanāniyamāt/ pratyayaś ca bhavati bhavasya, tadvaśena saṃskāravāsanayor vṛttilābhāt* -- *ASBh*: 33)[51]

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[48]Found in $ASBh_t$ and $ASVy_t$ but not in the Sanskrit or in the Chinese translation of the *Vyākhyā*.

[49]This passage is difficult, and neither the Tibetan (*sems can dmyal ba la sogs pa'i 'gro ba bye brag can du yaṅ srid pa'i ñiṅ mtshams sbyor bar 'gyur ba'i las kyi bag cags ṅes par byed pa'i phyir ro* -- $ASBh_t$: 24b 4; *sems can dmyal ba la sogs pa'i 'gro ba bye brag can du yaṅ srid pa ñiṅ mtshams sbyor bar 'gyur ba'i las kyi bag cags ṅes par byin pa'i phyir ro* -- $ASVy_t$: 194a 5) nor the Chinese (為那落迦趣等差別後有相續不斷。令業習氣得決定故。 -- T. 1606: 712b) translations seem to correspond exactly to the Sanskrit.

[50]Like Matsuda (1983: 42), I favor the readings of the Tibetan *Bhāṣya* and *Vyākhyā* and the Chinese *Vyākhyā*, which suggest *saṃskāravāsanāvṛttilābha*, over the *saṃskāravāsanayor vṛttilābha* of the Sanskrit text.

[51]*Sav* (*YBh*: 208): [The *sūtra* lists four types of Appropriation. The *Sav* defines them and specifies in which realms each type can produce suffering (*duḥkham abhinirvartayati*).]

DBh (99): "Appropriation also has two functions. It brings about the bond with defilement , and it provides the cause for the generation of Karmic Existence" (*upādānam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānaṃ karoti/ saṃkleśabandhanaṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti bhavābhinirvṛttaye*).

j. Karmic Existence (*Bhava*)

AS What is the function of Karmic Existence? It inclines beings towards rebirth, and it is the condition of Birth. (*bhavaḥ kiṃkarmakaḥ/ punarbhave ca sattvān abhimukhīkaroti, pratyayaś ca bhavati jāteh* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh Karmic Existence inclines beings towards rebirth because it conveys them immediately to a new destiny.

And it is the condition of Birth because the next life (*nikāyasabhāgāntara*) arises due to it. (*bhavaḥ punarbhave sattvān abhimukhīkaroti, anantaragatyantarāvāhanāt pratyayaś ca bhavati jāteh, tato nikāyasabhāgāntaranirvṛtteḥ* -- *ASBh*: 33)[52]

[52]*Sav* (*YBh*: 208-209): [The *sūtra* lists three types of Karmic Existence, namely existence in the *Kāma*, *Rūpa*, and *Ārūpya* realms. The *Sav* defines *kāmabhava* as consisting of: (1) *pūrvakālabhava*, (2) *karmabhava*, (3) *maraṇabhava*, (4) *antarābhava*, (5) *upapattibhava* (Bhattacharya gives *upādhibhava*, but the Tibetan *skye ba'i srid pa* {Sav_t: 122b 2} and the Chinese 生有 {T. 1579: 323b} suggest that this is an error, on either his part or that of his manuscript), (6) *nārakabhava*, (7) *tiryagbhava*, (8) *pretabhava*, (9) *devabhava*, and (10) *manuṣyabhava* and adds that it is generated by the possession of actions and defilements produced in the past (*pūrvakṛtasaṃskārakleśaparigrahaprabhāvita*; *sṅon byas pa'i 'du byed daṅ/ ñon moṅs pa yoṅs su zin ciṅ bskyed pa yin no* {Sav_t: 122b 3}; Hsüan-tsang translates *prabhāvita* as 熏發, suggesting that impregnation has a role in the generation of *bhava* {T. 1579: 323c}). The *sūtra* then defines *rūpabhava* and *ārūpyabhava*. Finally, it explains the apparent contradiction between this list of ten *bhavas* and the usual list of seven *bhavas* by saying that, in the list of seven, one (presumably *karmabhava*) is *ākṣepaka*, one (presumably *antarābhava*) is concerned with the attainment of existence (*bhavasamprāpaka*), and five are concerned with the experience of the results (of past *karma*, i.e., *naraka*, *tiryañc*, *preta*, *deva*, and *manuṣya*) (see, for example, *AKBh*: 114; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 13). This seems to be a merging of two lists, the list of seven and a list of four, consisting of *antarābhava*, *upapattibhava*, *pūrvakālabhava*, and *maraṇabhava* (see *AKBh*: 124; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 45; also, *ASBh*: 25, where these four types of *bhavas* are said to be equivalent to the last four in a list of twenty-four produced things {*utpannas*}).]

DBh (99): "Karmic Existence also has two functions. It establishes the destiny of another [i.e., the next] life, and it provides the cause for the generation of Birth" (*bhavo 'pi dvividhakāryapratyupasthāno bhavati/ anyabhavagatipratyupasthānaṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti jātyabhinirvṛttaye*).

I. Birth (*jāti*)

AS What is the function of Birth? It produces beings in the proper order: Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling; and it is the condition of Old Age and Death. (*jātiḥ kiṃkarmikā/ nāmarūpaṣaḍāyatanasparśavedanānupūrvyā ca sattvān abhinirvṛtayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati jarāmaraṇasya* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh Birth produces beings in the proper order: Individual Existence, etc., because it conveys them through the various states, one after another.

And it is the condition of Old Age and Death because, when there is birth, there is the possibility of change-of-state (*anyathātva*) and of the destruction of the continuity of the person [who has been born]. (*jātir nāmarūpādyānupūrvyā sattvān abhinirvartayati, uttarottarāvasthāntarāvāhanāt, pratyayaś ca bhavati jarāmaraṇasya, jātau satyām tatprabandhasyānyathātvavināśasaṃbhavāt* -- *ASBh*: 33)[53]

[53]*Sav* (*YBh*: 209): [The *sūtra* defines *jāti* in terms of ten stages, from the first moment of birth up to the establishment of *jīvitendriya*, whereby the length of a being's life is determined (the various versions of the *sūtra* differ considerably here; in this case, the *Sav* follows most closely the order and terminology of the *Yüan ch'i ching* {緣起經} translated by Hsüan-tsang {T. 124: 547c}). The *Sav* defines these stages as follows: (1) *jāti* is the first moment of actualization (*abhinirvṛtti* -- in his translation of *Sav*, Hsüan-tsang takes this in the sense of conception and translates it as 託生時 {T. 1579: 323c}) in the case of beings born from the womb or from an egg; (2) *saṃjāti* is the completion of the basis of personal existence in this (the antecedent of "this" is not clear; it seems to refer to the inside of the womb or egg { *de ñid kyi nań du--Sav*$_t$: 122b 7} before their emergence {*saṃjātiḥ katamā/ yā tatraiva ātmabhāvaparipūriraniḥsṛtasya* -- the Sanskrit text, as Bhattacharya remarks, is strange here; in order to understand the general idea, I follow the Chinese although I am still not completely confident of the meaning: 等生云何。謂即於彼身分圓滿。仍未出時。[T. 1579: 323c]}. The *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*, comments on another version of the *sūtra*, which contains another stage, not included in our version, namely, *upapatti*. According to the *AVSN*, *saṃjāti* is the completion of *nāmarūpa*, while *upapatti* is the obtaining of the remainder of the body on the part of the completed *nāmarūpa* {*saṃpūrṇanāmarūpasya viśiṣṭakāyāvasthāprāptiḥ--AVSN*: 148}. Thus, *saṃjāti* in the *Sav* is equivalent to *saṃjāti* and *upapatti*, taken together, in the *AVSN*); (3) *avakrānti* (Bhattacharya gives *bhavakrānti*, which, again, is clearly an error; the *AVSN* {148} gives *avakrānti*) is the coming forth from this (again, the antecedent is unclear; *avakrānti* usually refers to the descent into the womb, i.e., conception {see Monier-Williams 1970: 97}, but here, it clearly refers to a later stage in the process of

m. Old Age and Death (*jarāmaraṇa*)

AS What is the function of Old Age and Death? They repeatedly yoke beings to decline due to age and to the termination of life-span (*jīvitapariṇāma*). (*jarāmaraṇaṃ kiṃkarmakam/ punaḥ punar vayaḥpariṇāmena jīvitapariṇāmena ca sattvān yojayati* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh Old Age and Death repeatedly yoke beings to decline due to age and to the termination of life-span because of yoking them to the destruction of youth and life. (*jarāmaraṇaṃ punaḥ punar vayaḥpariṇāmena jīvitapariṇāmena ca sattvān yojayati,*

birth); (4) *abhiniḥsṛti* is the growth of that which has come forth (*abhinirvṛtti* in the *AVSN* {148}); (5) *prādurbhāva* is the instantaneous production of beings born from moisture and apparitional beings; (6) *skandhapratilābha* is the production of the five *upādānaskandhas* in these types of beings and states (*āsv eva yoniṣv avasthāsu*-- *YBh*: 209; according to the *AVSN* {149}, this is taught to refute the notion of a single, unified self); (7) *dhātupratilambha* refers to the fact that these *skandhas* consist only of causes and conditions (*hetupratyayaparigṛhītatā*; according to the *AVSN* {149}, this is taught to refute the notion that the body is the self); (8) *āyatanapratilambha* refers to the fact that the *skandhas* consist only of conditions different from themselves (*tadanyapratyayaparigṛhītatā*; according to the *AVSN*: 149, this is taught to refute the notion that the perceiver of objects is the self); (9) *skandhābhinirvṛtti* refers to the growth of the *skandhas*, which is due to the daily (Bhattacharya reads *pratidina* with *jīvitendriyaprādurbhāva*, which follows, and notes that the Tibetan text omits it; in fact, both the Tibetan { *Sav*$_t$: 123a 3} and the Chinese translations {T. 1579: 323b} include it in their definitions of *skandhābhinirvṛtti*) taking of nourishment; (10) *jīvitendriyaprādurbhāva* is the continued existence of the *skandhas* according to the amount of life remaining.

Finally, the *Sav* states that the condensed meaning (*samāsārtha*) of Birth encompasses: the intrinsic state of birth (*jāteḥ svabhāva*); the place in which one is born; the entity that is born (this is missing from Bhattacharya's Sanskrit text, but it is found in both the Tibetan {*gaṅ skye ba daṅ* -- *Sav*$_t$: 123a 4} and the Chinese {若所生 -- T. 1579: 323c}); the causes and conditions of which Birth consists; and the nourishment and co-arising factors by means of which Birth is preserved (*yena copastambhenāhṛtena sahajena ca dhriyata ity*)].

DBh (99): "Birth also has two functions. It brings about the emergence of the *skandhas*, and it provides the cause for the generation of Old Age" (*jātir api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati/ skandhonmajjanaṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti jarābhinirvṛttaye*).

yauvanāyuṣor vināśena yojanāt -- *ASBh*: 33)[54]

6. *Aṅgasaṃkleśasaṃgraha*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of the inclusion of the members in [the three categories of] defilement? Ignorance, Subconscious Desire, and Appropriation are included in [the

[54]*Sav* (*YBh*: 210-212): [The *sūtra* first deals with Old Age and lists a number of the afflictions that accompany it (again, the version translated by Hsüan-tsang seems closer to the version commented on in *Sav*). The *Sav* defines individually seventeen of them (there are a number of discrepancies among the Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan versions) and then, as in the case of *jāti*, it gives a summary:]

"What is the condensed meaning of Old Age? Old Age is to be understood (as) the end of life, (which is equivalent to) going beyond the (normally allotted) states of life (*daśātivṛttir*) (and which consists of): the degeneration (*pariṇāma*; literally, transformation) of the body (*āśraya*); the degeneration of the hair (*keśa* as Bhattacharya notes, this is missing in the Tibetan); the degeneration of growth (*puṣṭi*); the degeneration of beauty and strength (*tejobala*); the degeneration of health (*ārogya*); the degeneration of color (?*varṇa*?); the degeneration of movement (*īryāpatha*); the degeneration of the immaterial faculties (*arūpīndriya*); the degeneration of the material faculties" (*rūpīndriya*) (*jarāyāḥ punaḥ samāsārthaḥ katamaḥ/ āśrayavipariṇāmaḥ keśavipariṇāmaḥ puṣṭivipariṇāmas tejobalavipariṇāma ārogyavipariṇāmo varṇavipariṇāma īryāpathavipariṇāmo 'rūpīndriyavipariṇāmo rūpīndriyavipariṇāmo daśātivṛttir āyuḥsaṃkṣepasamāsārtho draṣṭavyaḥ* -- *YBh*: 211).

[The *sūtra* finally states that all beings, from whatever class of being, must experience Death, which is defined by a number of nearly synonymous terms. The *Sav* gives detailed explanations of each of these terms and again provides a summary:]

"What again is the condensed meaning of Death? The condensed meaning of Death (encompasses): that which is death; the entity that dies; the manner of death; and the time subsequent to this (i.e., after death) of the one who has died" (*māraṇasya punaḥ samāsārthaḥ katamaḥ/ yā ca cyutiḥ/ yasya dharmasya cyutiḥ/ yathā ca cyutiḥ cyutasya ca tadūrdhvaṃ yaḥ kālaḥ/ ity ayaṃ samāsārthaḥ* -- *YBh*: 211-212).

DBh (99): "Old Age also has two functions. It brings about the degeneration of the faculties, and it provides the cause for the generation of the meeting with Death. Death also has two functions. It destroys the conditioned factors, and it brings about the non-interruption of ignorance" (*jarāpi dvividhakāryapratyupasthānā bhavati/ indriyapariṇāmaṃ ca karoti/ hetuṃ ca dadāti maraṇasamavadhānābhinirvṛttaye/ maraṇam api dvividhakāryapratyupasthānaṃ bhavati/ saṃskāravidhvaṃsanaṃ ca karoti/ aparijñānopacchedaṃ ca karoti*).

category of defilement consisting of *kleśa* (*kleśasaṃkleśa*). The Karmic Forces, Consciousness, and Karmic Existence are included in [the category of] defilement consisting of action (*las kyi kun nas ñon moṅs pa* = *karmasaṃkleśa*). The remaining [members] are included in [the category of] defilement consisting of birth (*tshe'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa* = *janmasaṃkleśa*).[55] (*katham aṅgasaṃkleśasaṃgrahataḥ/ yā cā 'vidyā, yā ca tṛṣṇā, yac copādānam ity ayaṃ saṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ* – *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40F The inclusion of Consciousness [in the category of] defilement consisting of action is due to the fact that the member Consciousness is defined[56] as the impressions of the Karmic Forces (*saṃskāravāsanāprabhāvitatvād*).[57] (*vijñānasya*

[55]There is some problem with the Sanskrit text here. According to Gokhale's edition, the entire section on *aṅgasaṃkleśasaṃgraha* reads as follows: *katham aṅgasaṃkleśasaṃgrahataḥ/ yā cā 'vidyā yā ca tṛṣṇā yac copādānam ity ayaṃ saṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ*. Gokhale gives no indication that his manuscript differs from AS_t, AS_c, $ASVy_t$, or $ASVy_c$. Pradhan, who also fails to acknowledge that his edition differs from the above-mentioned Chinese and Tibetan translations, as well as from Gokhale's edition, gives the following: *kathaṃ aṅgasaṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ/ yā cāvidyā yā ca tṛṣṇā yac copādānam ity ayaṃ saṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ/ ye ca saṃskārā yac ca vijñānaṃ yac ca bhava ity ayaṃ karmasaṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ/ śeṣāṇi janmasaṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ* (Pradhan 1950: 27). Pradhan's text essentially agrees with the Chinese and Tibetan translations, with one major exception: instead of *saṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ*, the latter suggest *kleśasaṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ* (*ñon moṅs pa'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa*: 煩惱雜染). Since I do not have access to the photographs of the manuscript, I cannot determine whether Gokhale's version or Pradhan's version or neither accurately reflects the manuscript reading. It is possible that Gokhale simply dropped the portion from *ye ca saṃskārā* to the end, or perhaps Pradhan translated this portion from the Tibetan and neglected to tell us so. Rahula evidently translates directly from Pradhan's text and gives no evidence of having consulted either the Tibetan and Chinese translations or Gokhale's edition: "L'ignorance, la soif, la saisie: tel est le group de l'impureté [simple] (*saṃkleśasaṅgraha*). Les formations...." (Rahula 1980: 43). Matsuda, on the other hand, in his Japanese translation, follows the Tibetan and Chinese versions without commenting on Gokhale or Pradhan's readings or Rahula's translation (Matsuda 1983: 42). Since the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula have elsewhere been analyzed according to three types of *saṃkleśa*, beginning with *kleśasaṃkleśa* (e.g., *Vbh*: 32 ff.; MS_t: 13; implied in *AK* III 26 [*AKBh*: 134]), I shall accept and translate from Pradhan's text, with the emendation of *kleśasaṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ* for *saṃkleśasaṃgrahaḥ*.

[56]I am indebted to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for bringing to my attention Schmithausen's long discussion of the meaning of the ending *prabhāvita* in Schmithausen 1969: 109-111.

[57]The point of this comment is to explain why the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes *vijñāna* in *karmasaṃkleśasaṃgraha* rather than in *janmasaṃkleśasaṃgraha*, which is where

karma[saṃ]kleśasaṃgrahaṇaṃ saṃskāravāsanāprabhāvitatvād vijñānāṅgasya -- *ASBh*: 33)

7. *Artha*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of its import? [The import of] conditioned origination [comprises the following]: (1) the import of the absence of a creator (*niḥkartṛkārtha*); (2) the import of the presence of causes (*sahetukārtha*); (3) the import of the absence of beings (*niḥsattvārtha*); (4) the import of dependence (*paratantrārtha*); (5) the import of inactivity (*nirīhakārtha*); (6) the import of impermanence (*anityārtha*); (7) the import of momentariness (*kṣaṇikārtha*); (8) the import of the uninterrupted series of cause and result (*hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha*); (9) the import of corresponding cause and result (*anurūpahetuphalārtha*); (10) the import of varied cause and result (*vicitrahetuphalārtha*);[58] and (11) the import of determined cause and result (*pratiniyatahetuphalārtha*).[59] (*katham arthataḥ/ niḥkartṛkārthaḥ pratītyasamutpādārthaḥ,*

it is included in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (*Mvbh*: 33). The *ASBh* here refers to the explanation of the first function of Consciousness in the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section of *AS* (see above). For a discussion of this point, see Funahashi 1991: 22-25.

[58]Gokhale instead supplies *nānāhetuphalārtha* in square brackets, indicating that the word is missing in the manuscript and that he is translating it from the Tibetan or Chinese. Pradhan gives *vicitrahetuphalārtha* without any comment (Pradhan 1950: 27). Could he read something in the manuscript that was indecipherable by Gokhale, or is he supplying it from the *ASBh*? Again, without photographs of the manuscript, I cannot explain this. I shall follow Pradhan on the basis of the *ASBh* version.

[59]Matsuda (Matsuda 1983: 49 n. 34) notes that this list of eleven imports of *pratītyasamutpāda* is identical to that of the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* (分别縁義初勝法門經 -- T. 717: 841b; 縁生初勝分法本經 -- T. 716: 834b). In fact, there are some differences, mostly in translations of terms, between the two versions of *ĀVVS* as well as between both versions of *ĀVVS* and *AS*; below are the three lists for comparison:

AS (Identical to *ASVy*): (1) 無作者義; (2) 有因義; (3) 離有情義; (4) 依他起義; (5) 無作用義; (6) 無常義; (7) 有刹那義; (8) 因果相續不斷義; (9) 因果相似攝受義; (10) 因果差別義; (11) 因果決定義.

縁生初勝分法本經 -- T. 716: 834b (translated by Dharmagupta): (1) 無作者義; (2) 共因者義; (3) 無衆生義; (4) 他生義; (5) 不動義; (6) 無常義; (7) 念念空義; (8) 因果相

sahetukārthaḥ, niḥsattvārthaḥ, paratantrārthaḥ nirīhakārthaḥ, anityārthaḥ, kṣaṇikārthaḥ, hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārthaḥ, anurūpahetuphalārthaḥ, [nānāhetuphalārthaḥ,] pratiniyatahetuphalārthaś ca pratītyasamutpādaḥ -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40G [The import of conditioned origination comprises]: (1) the import of the absence of a creator because of the absence of any creator, such as Īśvara; (2) the import of the presence of causes because [samsaric existence] is caused by Ignorance, etc.; (3) the import of the absence of beings because of the non-existence of a self per se (*svayamanātmatvāt*); (4) the import of dependence because of the dependence [of everything conditionally produced] on conditions (*pratyayādhīnatvāt*); (5) the import of inactivity because the conditions lack exertion (*pratyayānāṃ nirvyāpāratvāt*); (6) the import of impermanence because of the fact that nothing is eternal (*aśāśvatatvāt*); (7) the import of momentariness because of the non-abiding [of that which is conditionally produced] after the time of production; (8) the import of the uninterrupted series of cause and result because the moment of result arises at the same time that the moment of cause perishes (*kāraṇakṣaṇanirodhasamakālaṃ kāryakṣaṇotpādāt*); [*ASBh* p.34] (9) the import of corresponding cause and result[60] because it is not the case that every [result] arises from

續不斷義; (9) 種種因果義; (10) 相似因果義; (11) 決定因果義.

分別緣起初勝法門經 -- T. 717: 841b (translated by Hsüan Tsang): (1) 無作者義; (2) 有因生義; (3) 離有情義; (4) 依他起義; (5) 無動作義; (6) 性無常義; (7) 刹那滅義; (8) 因果相續無間絶義; (9) 種種因果品類別義; (10) 因果更互相符順義; (11) 因果決定無雜亂義.

Notice also that numbers 9 and 10 are reversed in the *ĀVVS* list.

In the same note, Matsuda refers to a list of eight imports of *pratītyasamutpāda* found in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *YBh*. I shall list them here for convenience of comparison, but I shall discuss them in Chapter Six (underlined items correspond to *AS*): (1) *niḥsattvārtha*; (2) *anityārtha*; (3) *itvarapratyupasthāpanārtha*; (4) *paratantrārtha*; (5) *nirīhārtha*; (6) *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha*; (7) *anurūpahetuphalapravartanārtha*; and (8) *karmasvabhāvārtha* (*YBh*: 203). Thus, *AS* contains *niḥkartṛka-*, *sahetuka-*, *kṣaṇika-*, *vicitrahetuphala-*, and *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha*, which are not in the *YBh* list. On the other hand, *AS* lacks *itvarapratyupasthāpanārtha* and *karmasvabhāvārtha*, which are included in *YBh*.

[60]The Sanskrit text of *ASBh* reads *anurūpahetuphalaparigrahārtha*, which

every [cause] indiscriminately (*sarvataḥ sarvasyāsaṃbhavāt*); (10) the import of varied cause and result because of the production of single and manifold results from manifold and single causes (*anekaikajatiyāt kāraṇād ekānekajātīyakāryotpatteḥ*);[61] (11) the import of determined cause and result because there is no coming to fruition of things heterogenous to the stream.[62] (*niṣkartṛkārtha īśvarādikartṛrahitatvāt/ sahetukārtho 'vidyādihetukatvāt/ niḥsattvārthaḥ svayam anātmatvāt/ paratantrārthaḥ pratyayādhinātvāt/ anityārtho 'śāśvātatvāt/ kṣaṇikārtha utpattikālāt pareṇānavasthānāt/ hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārthaḥ kāraṇakṣaṇanirodhasamakālaṃ kāryakṣaṇotpādāt/ anurūpahetuphalaparigrahārthaḥ sarvataḥ sarvasyāsaṃbhavāt/ vicitrahetuphalārtho 'nekaikajātīyāt kāraṇād ekānekajātīyakāryotpatteḥ/ pratiniyatahetuphalārthaḥ saṃtānāntarāphalanāt* -- *ASBh*: 33-34)[63]

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corresponds to the 因果相似攝受義 of the Chinese translations of *AS* and *ASVy*. However, the Sanskrit text of the *AS* and the Tibetan translations of the *AS*, *ASBh*, and *ASVy* all agree on *anurūpahetuphalārtha*.

[61]I do not understand what this means, and Matsuda does not make it any clearer. In the section on the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, *pratiniyama* is explained as being a designation for the varied nature of cause and effect (*hetuphalanānātvam* -- Pradhan 1950: 11). But the *Bhāṣya*'s explanation of *hetuphalanānātvam*, that it refers to the way that desirable effects proceed from good actions, etc. (*iṣṭasya phalasya sucaritam aniṣṭasya duścaritam ity evam ādi/ phalānāṃ pṛthak pṛthag anyonyahetukatvam* -- *ASBh*: 10), does not seem to pertain to the question of "single and manifold" causes and effects here.

[62]There seems to be a correspondence between *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* and one of the six modes of *bīja* mentioned in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (see Chapter 6, section A). According to the *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya*, "Ils [*bījas*] sont *les auteurs d'un fruit propre*: un germe donné produit seulement le fruit qui lui est propre. Ainsi, la connaissance-réceptacle produit seulement la connaissance-réceptacle, et le blé produit seulement le fruit du blé" (Lamotte 1973: 40-41). Although our text does not mention *ālayavijñāna* or *bīja*, it describes the same causal principle, namely that the result is essentially homogenous with the cause.

[63]Some of these *arthas* call to mind the definitions of certain of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Pradhan 1950: 11; *ASBh*: 9-11): specifically, *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha* seems to correspond to *pravṛtti*; *vicitrahetuphalārtha* and *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* seem related to *pratiniyama* (see note above); *anurūpahetuphalārtha* corresponds to *yoga*; and *kṣaṇikārtha* perhaps is related to *java*. I shall examine the relationship between the group of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* pertaining to cause and effect and *pratītyasamutpāda* in Chapter Six.

8. *Gāmbhīrya*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of its profundity? Its profundity is to be understood in terms of (a) the profundity of cause (*hetugāmbhīrya*); (b) the profundity of characteristics (*lakṣaṇagāmbhīrya*); (c) the profundity of arising (*utpattigāmbhīrya*); (d) the profundity of continued existence (*sthitigāmbhīrya*); and (e) the profundity of function (*vṛttigāmbhīrya*).[64] (*katham gāmbhīryataḥ/ hetugāmbhīryato 'pi, lakṣaṇagāmbhīryato 'pi, utpattigāmbhīryato 'pi, sthitigāmbhīryato 'pi, vṛttigāmbhīryato 'pi gāmbhīryaṃ draṣṭavyam* -- *AS*: 26)[65]

ASBh 40H (1) Moreover, the fivefold profundity of conditioned origination is to be understood by means of these imports [of the absence of a creator, etc.].[66]

(a) Profundity of cause [is to be understood] by means of two imports [i.e., *niḥkartṛkārtha* and *sahetukārtha*] because [these imports (?) are] an antidote to theories of inconsistent causation[67] and theories of no causation (*viṣamahetvahetuvāda*).

(b) Profundity of characteristics [is to be understood] by means of one import

[64]The Sanskrit text of *ASBh* gives *pravṛtti* instead of *vṛtti*, but there is no difference between the Chinese texts of *AS* and *ASVy*, which both give 轉, or among the Tibetan texts of *AS, ASBh,* and *ASVy*, which all give *'byuṅ bas.*

[65]The *sūtrāntasaṃgraha* section of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition also analyzes profound *pratītyasamutpāda* in terms of *anitya, duḥkha, śūnya,* and *nairātmya* (*YBh*: 228-229). This rather long discussion, with reference to *bīja*, is interesting and merits further study.

[66]This is supplied from the *ASVy* (*ASVy*$_t$: 78b; T. 1606: 712c2), the text of which is somewhat different from that of the *ASBh*. For convenience, I shall reproduce the corresponding portions of the Tibetan texts of *ASBh* and *ASVy*.

(*ASBh*$_t$) *yaṅ don 'di dag gis rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'byuṅ ba rnam pa lṅas zab par rig pa bya'o/*

(*ASVy*$_t$) *yaṅ byed pa po med pa la sogs pa'i don 'di dag gis rkyen so so las kun tu skye ba rnam pa lṅas rtogs dka' bar rig pa bya ste/*

[67]That is to say, in which the cause is inconsistent with the result (see also section A2c).

[i.e., *niḥsattvārtha*] because of the fact that there is no self.

(c) Profundity of arising [is to be understood] by means of two imports [i.e., *paratantrārtha* and *nirīhakārtha*] because of the fact that, even though results arise due to conditions, they are not [really] manufactured by them.

(d) Profundity of continued existence [is to be understood] by means of two imports [i.e., *anityārtha* and *kṣaṇikārtha*] because of the [illusory] appearance of duration on the part of things that are not [really] constant (*avyavasthitānāṃ sthityābhāsanād*).

(e) Profundity of function [is to be understood] by means of four of the imports [i.e., *hetuphalabandhānupacchedārtha, anurūpahetuphalārtha, vicitrahetuphalārtha*, and *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha*] because of the difficulty of understanding the function of cause and result.[68] (*punar ebhir evārthaiḥ pratītyasamutpādasya pañcavidhaṃ gāmbhīryaṃ veditavyam/ hetugāmbhīryaṃ viṣamahetvāhetuvādapratipakṣena dvābhyām arthābhyām/ lakṣaṇagāmbhīryaṃ nirātmakatayaikārthena/ utpattigāmbhīryaṃ pratyayebhyaḥ phalotpattāv apy atatkṛtatayā dvābhyām arthābhyām/ sthitigāmbhīryaṃ avyavasthitānāṃ sthityābhāsanād dvābhyām arthābhyām/ pravṛttigāmbhīryaṃ hetuphalapravṛttidurvijñānatvāc caturbhir arthair iti* -- *ASBh*: 34)

AS Furthermore, conditioned origination is momentary, yet it is perceived to have continued existence (*sthiti*).

Conditioned origination consists of inactive (*nirīhaka*) conditions, yet it is perceived to have potent (*samartha*) conditions.

[68]Matsuda follows the Tibetan versions in understanding *hetuphalapravṛtti* to refer to the production of results from causes (*'byuṅ bas zab pa ni rgyu las 'bras bu 'byuṅ ba rnam par śes par dka' ba'i phir te* -- *ASBh$_t$*: 25a). However, it seems to me that the Tibetan translators did not understand this correctly since this explanation of *pravṛttigāmbhīryam* is almost identical to the the explanation of *utpattigāmbhīryam*: *skye p[b?]as zab pa ni rkyen rnams las 'bras bu 'byuṅ ba yaṅ ṅes ma byas ba'i phyir ro/* (*ASBh$_t$*: 25). Since the four *artha*s that are related to *vṛtti-* or *pravṛttigāmbhīryam*) concern the mechanism of the production of results from causes, rather than the mere fact of production, I think that my translation of *vṛtti/pravṛtti* as function is better.

Conditioned origination is devoid of beings, yet it is perceived from the point of view of beings (*sattvataś copalabhyate*).

Conditioned origination has no creator, yet the non-perishing of actions and results is perceived. (*api khalu lakṣaṇikaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ, sthitiś copalabhyate/ nirīhakapratyayaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ, samarthapratyayaś copalabhyate/ niḥsattvaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ, sattvataś copalabhyate/ niṣkartṛkaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ, karmaphalāvipraṇāśaś copalabhyate* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40H (2) Even without an agent (*kartṛ*), there exist action (*karma*), the performance (*kriyā*) [of action], and the experience of the result of that [action] (*tatphalopabhoga*); this is how the non-perishing of actions and results is to be understood here. (*antareṇa eva kartāraṃ karma kriyā cāsti tatphalopabhogaś cety ayam atra karmaphalāvipraṇāśo veditavyaḥ* -- *ASBh*: 34)

AS [That which is conditionally produced][69] is produced (i) not by itself, (ii) not by another, (iii) not by the two [i.e., by itself and by another], (iv) not by its own action, not by the action of another, and not without cause. For this reason, too, [conditioned origination] is profound.[70] (*na svato na parato na dvābhyāṃ na svayaṃkā[rapara]kārāhetusamutpannaḥ/ ato 'pi gambhīraḥ* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40H (3) (i) A *dharma* is made not by itself because that by which it might be made [namely, itself], not yet having been produced, does not exist. (ii) [A *dharma*] is made not by another because the conditions [due to which it arises] are not an agent. (iii)

[69]The Chinese supplies 諸緣起法 (T. 1605: 671b).

[70]*Hysel*, in its discussion of *pratītyasamutpādakauśalya*, similarly relates four profundities to this *catuṣkoṭi*: 由善了知四種甚深緣起故。謂不從自生。不從他生。非自他生。非無因生。(T .1602: 546b).

[A *dharma*] is made not by both[71] because [it is not made][72] by those two causes [that have already been shown in (i) and (ii) to be impossible]. (iv) [A *dharma*] is produced not by its own action, not by the action of another, and not without cause[73] because conditions have the ability to produce results.[74] (*na svayaṃkṛto dharmo 'nutpannasyābhāvād yenāsau kriyate/ na parakṛtaḥ pratyayānām akartṛkatvāt/ nobhayakṛta etenaiva kāraṇadvayena/ na svayaṃkārāpa[ra]kārahetusamutpannaḥ hetupratyayānāṃ phalotpattau sāmarthyāt* -- *ASBh*: 34)

[There is] another way [of explaining this]: (i) [A *dharma*] is not made by itself because of its dependence on conditions. (ii) [A *dharma*] is not made by another because, even when the conditions [for its arising] are present, there is no production of that which lacks a seed. (iii) [A *dharma*] is not made by both [itself and another] because both of them are inactive (*tadubhayor nirīhakatvāt*).[75] (iv) [A *dharma*] is not produced without cause because seeds and conditions have real efficacy. (*aparaḥ paryāyaḥ/ na svayaṃkṛtaḥ pratyayāpekṣaṇāt/ na parakṛtaḥ satsv api pratyayeṣu nirbījasyānutpādāt/ nobhayakṛtas tadubhayor nirīhakatvāt/ nāhetusamutpanno bījapratyayānāṃ śaktisadbhā[va]d iti* -- *ASBh*: 34)

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[71]*nobhaya* in contrast with *na dvābhyāṃ* in the *AS*.

[72]The Tibetan versions supply this: *rgyu de gñis kyis ma byas pa'i phyir ro* -- *ASBh*$_t$: 25a; *ASVy*$_t$: 195b.

[73]Tatia's Sanskrit text reads *nāsb*[sic]*ayaṃkārāpa[ra]kārahetusamutpannaḥ*, which is supported by the Chinese translations of both *AS* and *ASVy* (非不自作他作因生 -- T. 1605: 671b-c; T. 1606: 712c). However, as Tatia points out, the Tibetan texts of *AS* (*AS*$_t$: 78a), *ASBh* (*ASBh*$_t$: 25a-b), and *ASVy* (*ASVy*$_t$: 195b) all agree (*raṅ gi byed pa daṅ/ gźan gyi byed pa daṅ/ rgyu med pa las byuṅ ba yaṅ ma yin*) in supporting Gokhale's reading of the *AS* manuscript (*svyaṃkā*[*rapara*]*kārāhetusamutpannaḥ*). I shall follow Matsuda (Matsuda 1983: 44; 50 n. 37) in adopting the Sanskrit reading from the *AS*. Incidentally, Pradhan's edition does not completely agree with Gokhale's: *svayamkārāpa*(*ra*)*kārāhetusamutpannaḥ* (Pradhan 1950: 27). Again, without access to the manuscript, I cannot say whose reading is mistaken.

[74]Matsuda notes that the *ASBh*$_t$, *ASVy*$_t$, and *ASVy*$_c$ give *pratyayānāṃ* instead of the *hetupratyayānāṃ* of Tatia's text (Matsuda 1983: 50 n. 38). Again, I follow him in my translation.

[75]See the *ASBh* explanation of *nirīhakārtha* above.

Indeed it is also [said]:

Because it has its own seed, [a *dharma*] is not [produced] by another;

Because of its dependence on those [conditions],[76] [it is] not [produced] by itself.

Because of the powerlessness to act [of itself and another, it is] not [produced] by the two.

And because of the efficacy of those [seeds and conditions], [it is] not [produced] without cause.[77]

Conditioned origination would be profound [even] if it were [only] a repudiation of the two points (*dvividhakoṭi*): "not by itself"; "not by another." It is still more so in that four points are repudiated. Therefore, it must be understood that [conditioned origination] is the ultimate in profundity. (*bhavati hy api — svabījatvān na parataḥ na svayaṃ tadapekṣaṇāt/ niśceṣṭatvān na ca dvābhyām tac chakter nāpy ahetutaḥ// iti/ na svayaṃ na parato dvividhakoṭipratikṣepe 'pi gambhīraḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ syāt prāg eva yatra catasro 'pi koṭayaḥ pratikṣipyante, tasmād etasya paramagāmbhīryaṃ veditavyam* -- *ASBh*: 34)

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[76]The Chinese translation of *ASVy* supplies the antecedent of the *tad* of the Sanskrit text (*tadapekṣaṇāt*): 待衆縁 -- T. 1606: 712c.

[77]I have so far been unable to find the source of this verse. Both Matsuda and the *KIK* translators seem to have been unable to locate it.

9. *Prabheda*[78]

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of its varieties? Its varieties are to be understood in terms of: (i) the variety of the arising of consciousness (*vijñānotpattiprabheda*); (ii) the variety of birth and death (*cyutyupapattiprabheda*);[79] (iii) the variety of the arising of the external crop (*bāhyaśasyotpattiprabheda*);[80] (iv) the variety of dissolution and development (*saṃvartavivartaprabheda*); (v) the variety of the support [of beings] by means of nourishment (*āhāropastambhaprabheda*); (vi) the variety of the distinction between desirable and undesirable destinies (*iṣṭāniṣṭagativibhāgaprabheda*);[81] (vii) the variety of purity (*viśuddhiprabheda*); and (viii) the variety of powers (*prabhāvaprabheda*). (*katham prabhedataḥ/ vijñānotpattiprabhedataḥ, cyutyupapattiprabhedataḥ, bāhyaśasyotpatti-prabhedataḥ, saṃvartavivartaprabhedataḥ, āhāropastambhaprabhedataḥ, iṣṭāniṣṭagativibhāgaprabhedataḥ, viśuddhiprabhedataḥ, prabhāvaprabhedataś ca prabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ* -- *AS*: 26)

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[78]As I mentioned above (see note to section A2c), the *prabheda* portion corresponds to the *mukha* section of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, which states that *pratītyasamutpāda* proceeds by means of eight "doors" (*mukha*): 1) *adhyātmaṃ vijñānotpattimukha;* 2) *bahirdhā sasyaniṣpattimukha*; 3) *sattvalokacyutyutpattimukha*; 4) *bhājanalokasaṃvartavivartamukha*; 5) *āhāropastambhamukha*; 6) *iṣṭāniṣṭakarmatadanurūpaphalopabhogamukha*; 7) *prabhāvamukha*; and 8) *vyavadānamukha* (*YBh*: 203). Matsuda (1983: 50 n. 39) has noted this correspondence, as well as the slight differences between the two texts, and he has identified another corresponding passage from the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* (T. 717: 841a; T. 716: 833c).

[79]The Chinese here supplies the word 內 -- "internal": 內死生差別 (T. 1605: 671b).

[80]The Chinese here adds 等 -- "etc.": 外穀等差別 (T. 1605: 671b).

[81]Matsuda (Matsuda 1983: 50 n. 40) has identified a parallel to this in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, which mentions two types of *pratītyasamutpāda*, *svabhāvavibhāgin* and *iṣṭāniṣṭavibhāgin* (MS_t: 10-11; Lamotte 1973: 36-37).

ASBh 401 [Its varieties are to be understood: (i) in terms of the variety of the arising of consciousness [because] it is said [in the *sūtra*] that visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) arises depending on the eye and on matter (*rūpa*), and so on in this manner; (ii) in terms of the variety of birth and death[82] [because,] with reference to the world of beings, it is said [in the *sūtra*] that the Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition, and so on in this manner; (iii) in terms of the variety of the arising of the external crop[83] [because] the sprout (*aṅkura*) depends on the seed (*bīja*), and the stem (*kāṇḍa*) depends on the sprout. Similarly, stalks (*nāla*),[84] leaves (*patra*), blossoms (*puṣpa*), and result (*phala*) are to be [understood as being] connected [in such a relationship of successive dependency]; (iv) in terms of the variety of dissolution and development because the "great earth" (*mahāpṛthivī*), etc., arises due to the predominance of common *karma* on the part of all beings (*sarvasattvasādhāraṇakarmādhipatya*); (v) in terms of the variety of the support [of beings] by means of nourishment because beings abide in the three realms due to the four types of nourishment;[85] (vi) the variety of the distinction between desirable and undesirable destinies because [beings] go to good or bad destinies depending on [their] good and bad conduct; (vii) in terms of the variety of purity [because]

[82]Tatia's text reads *vyutpattiprabhedataḥ*, but this is surely an error. AS_t (78a 4), $ASBh_t$ (25b 4), and $ASVy_t$ (196a 2) all have *'ci 'pho daṅ skye ba'i rab tu dbye ba*, while T. 1605 (671b) and T. 1606 (712c) both have 内死生差別, so we are justified in emending it to *cyutyupapattiprabhedataḥ*.

[83]Tatia's text reads *bāhyavasyotpattiprabhedato*, but this, too, must be an error. AS_t (78a 4-5), $ASBh_t$ (25b 4), and $ASVy_t$ (196a) all have *'phyi'i lo tog 'byuṅ ba'i rab tu dbye ba*, while T. 1605 (671b) and T. 1606 (712c) have 外穀等差別 and 外穀差別, respectively, so we are justified in emending it to *bāhyaśasyotpattiprabhedataḥ*.

[84]Tatia's text reads *nā 'patrapuṣpaphalāni*, which does not make sense. Without referring to Tatia, Matsuda, presumably on the basis of the Chinese (枝葉花果 -- T. 1606: 712c) and the Tibetan (*sbu gu daṅ 'dab ma daṅ/ me thog daṅ 'bras bu rnams* -- $ASBh_t$ 25b) emends the Sanskrit to *nālapatrapuṣpaphalāni* (Matsuda 1983: 45).

[85]For four kinds of *āhāra* (*kavaḍikāra, sparśa, manaḥsaṃcetanā,* and *vijñāna*) see *AKBh*: 152.

it is said that [the process of obtaining enlightenment] begins with the arising of the (*dharmas*) leading to penetration into truth (*nirvedhabhāgīya*)[86] depending on the (*dharmas*) leading to liberation (*mokṣabhāgīya*) [and proceeds] in due order through the path of insight (*darśanamārga*) and the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) up to the obtainment of arhatship,[87] or, [to give another example, it] begins with the arising of correct understanding (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) depending on the speech of another[88] and on correct contemplation (*yoniśo manaskāra*), which is internal, [and thus eventually leads to] the destruction of all outflows (*sarvāsravakṣaya*); (viii) in terms of the variety of powers [because] it is said that the distinguished qualities (*vaiśeṣika guṇa*), such as superknowledge (*abhijñā*), etc., are dependent on [spiritual] realization (*adhigama*). By means of these varieties, the conditioned origination of the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) is to be investigated in detail. (*vijñānotpattiprabhedataś cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam ity evam ādi/ vyutpattiprabhedataḥ*[89] *sattvalokam adhikṛtya , avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity evam ādi/ bāhyaśasyotpattiprabhedato*[90] *bījaṃ pratītyāṅkuraḥ, aṅkuraṃ pratītya kāṇḍaḥ/ tathā nā 'patrapuṣpaphalāni*[91] *yojyāni/ saṃvartavivartaprabhedataḥ sarvasattvasādhāraṇakarmādhipatyaṃ pratītya*

[86]For this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 78.

[87]In the sixth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*, one can find the order of spiritual attainment compared to the development of a plant: "In one life, one will produce the roots of good that lead to liberation. In the second [life, one will produce the *dharmas*] that lead to penetration. In the third [life, one will produce] the Path. [This is] like the order of the planting of the seed, the growth of the plant, and the production of the fruit" (*ekasmin janmani mokṣabhāgīyaṃ kuśalamūlam utpādayet/ dvitīye nirvedhabhāgīyāni/ tṛtīye āryamargam/ bījaviropaṇasasyābhivṛddhaphalotpattikramavat* [*AKBh*: 349; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 178]).

[88]The Chinese translation adds that this is external (外) in contrast to the internal correct contemplation that follows (T. 1606: 712c).

[89]See note to translation above.

[90]See note to translation above.

[91]See note to translation above.

mahāpṛthivyādīnām utpādāt/ āhāropastambhaprabhedataś catura āharān pratītya traidhātuke sattvānām avasthānāt/ iṣṭāniṣṭagativibhāgaprabhedataḥ sucaritaduścarite pratītya sugatidurgatigamanāt/ viśuddhiprabhedato mokṣabhāgīyāni pratītya nirvedhabhāgīyotpattito yāvad darśanabhāvanāmārgānupūrvyārhattvaprāptitaḥ, parato vā ghoṣaṃ pratītyādhyātmaṃ ca yoniśo manaskāraṃ samyagdṛṣṭis tato yāvat sarvāsravakṣaya iti/ prabhāvaprabhedato 'dhigamaṃ pratītyābhijñādayo vaiśeṣikā guṇā iti/ ebhiḥ prabhedair vistareṇa saṃskārāṇāṃ pratītyasamutpādo 'nusartavayaḥ -- *ASBh*: 35)

10. *Anulomapratiloma*

AS How [should the conditioned origination of samsaric existence be understood] from the point of view of [its] progressive and regressive order? The exposition of the progressive and regressive order of conditioned origination is to be understood from the point of view of both the (i) progressive and (ii) regressive order of defilement and (iii) the progressive and (iv) regressive order of purification. (*katham anulomapratilomataḥ/ saṃkleśānulomapratilomato 'pi vyavadānānulomapratilomato 'pi pratītyasamutpādasyā 'nulomapratilomanirdeśo draṣṭavyaḥ* -- *AS*: 26)

ASBh 40J The (i) progressive and (ii) regressive order of defilement: (i) the exposition of the progressive order [of conditioned origination, namely,] "the Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition," etc., [is to be understood as] concerning the regular order of origination-and-continuance[92] (*pravṛttyānupūrvī*); (ii) the exposition of the regressive order [of conditioned origination] is to be understood as concerning the establishment of the [Four Noble] Truths [namely:] "Old Age and Death exist; there is an origin of Old Age and Death; the cessation of Old Age and Death is [possible]; there is a

[92]This is Schmithausen's translation of *pravṛtti* (1987: 173).

Path leading to the cessation of Old Age and Death." ([*sam*]*klcśānulomapratiloma iti pravṛttyānupūrvim adhikṛtya, avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity cvam ādy anulomanirdcśaḥ/ jarāmaraṇaṃ jarāmara*[*ṇa*]*samudayo* [*jarāmaraṇanirodho*] *jarāmaraṇanirodhagāminī pratipad iti satyavyavasthānam adhikṛtya pratilomanirdcśo vcditavyaḥ* -- *ASBh*: 35)

The (iii) progressive and (iv) regressive order of purification[93]: (iii) thus for instance, [the statement,] "the cessation of the Karmic Forces is the result of the cessation of Ignorance, etc.," is the exposition of the progressive order of purification; (iv) [and the question,] "Due to the non-existence of what will Old Age and Death not exist [and] due to the cessation of what [will] the cessation of Old Age and Death [result]?" is the exposition[94] of the regressive order [of purification]. ([*vyavadānānulomapratilomata iti*] *tadyathā 'vidyānirodhāt saṃskāranirodha ity cvam ādi vyvavadānānulomanirdcśaḥ/ kasmin na sati na jarāmaraṇaṃ bhavati kasya nirodhāj jarāmaraṇanirodha iti pratilomanirdcśataḥ* -- *ASBh*: 35)

[93]This is missing from both the Sanskrit manuscript and the Tibetan translations of *ASBh* and *ASVy*. Tatia supplies *vyavadānānulomapratilomata iti* from the Chinese (淸淨順逆者 -- T. 1606: 713a), but *vyavadānānulomapratiloma iti* would have been better since it is parallel to *saṃklcśānulomapratiloma iti* above, which is translated into Chinese as 雜染順逆者 and which better suits the syntax of the comment.

[94]As Tatia notes, the Tibetan and Chinese versions have *pratilomanirdcśaḥ* instead of the *pratilomanirdcśataḥ* of the Sanskrit manuscript. Like Matsuda (Matsuda 1983: 50 n. 41), I prefer *pratilomanirdcśaḥ*.

III. THE TWO LIFETIMES/SINGLEFOLD THEORY OF CAUSATION

A. Two Lifetimes or Three?

In order to understand the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula more than superficially, it is necessary, as Takasaki Jikido has pointed out (Takasaki 1987: 151) to investigate the relationships among the various members, as well as the meanings of the individual members. The section on *aṅgasamāsa* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is just such an investigation, and its fourfold division of the members is one of the most striking features of its discussion of conditioned origination. Since this division is only one of a number of such divisions proposed by Buddhist thinkers, we must compare it with other interpretations, especially those of the Sarvāstivāda, whose *abhidharma* the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* often seems to supercede.

One division, particularly helpful for an understanding of the relationship among the members, can be found, among other places, in the *Vibhāṣā* and in Vasubandhu's exposition of Sarvāstivādin doctrine in the *Abhidharmakośa*. According to this division, there are three groups: Ignorance, Subconscious Desire, and Appropriation are of the nature of defilement (*kleśa*); the Karmic Forces and Karmic Existence are of the nature of *karma*; and Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, Feeling, Birth, and Old Age and Death are of the nature of substance (*vastu*)[1] or result (*phala*).[2]

[1]Vasubandhu explains this as being due to the fact that they are the support of *kleśa* and *karma* (*kleśakarmāśrayatvāt*).

[2]*AK* III 26; *AKBh*: 134; see also La Vallée Poussin 1913: 34-36.

In a note to his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, La Vallée Poussin states that "Dans toutes les autres sources, le troisième *vartman* est seulement défini comme rétribution (*vipāka*) [ou fruit, *phala*]" (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 68 n. 2). Unfortunately, he does not specify what all these other sources are. As far as I have discovered, the earlier *abhidharma* texts do not, in fact, define the third *vartman* as *vipāka* or *phala*. The *Vibhāṣā* simply states that the three divisions are *kleśa*, *karma*, and *vastu* (三分者。謂煩惱業事。) and it mentions the opinion of another teacher that the members can be gathered

Therefore, the first two groups are, in essence, cause. However, *kleśa* cannot produce result immediately; the mediation of *karma* is necessary.[3] Thus, *karma*, which in Sarvāstivāda, but not in other schools, has a physical as well as a mental component,[4] enables the purely mental state of defilement to have tangible consequences, namely rebirth, which consists of both mental and physical factors. The last group, is result, which in turn comprises two subsets of consecutive members, one consisting of Consciousness through Feeling, the other of Birth and Old Age and Death. These two subsets correspond to the projected and actualized sets of members in the

into three groups: *kleśa*, *karma*, and *duḥkha* (又十二支。攝為三聚。謂煩惱業苦-- T. 1545: 122b). The *Abhidharmāmṛta* calls the third division *duḥkha* (T. 1553: 970c; *Aām*$_s$: 70). Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmahṛdaya* uses the term 體, which is probably a translation of *vastu* (T. 1550: 826c; Willemen 1975: 129), while Upaśānta's *Abhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1551: 860c) and the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1552: 935b) both use 事, the common translation of *vastu*. None of these texts mentions *vipāka* or *phala*.

On the other hand, the *Visuddhimagga*, as La Vallée Poussin mentions in the same note, also contains three divisions, the third of which is called *vipākavaṭṭa*; what he does not mention, however, is that *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* are not included (*saṅkhāra-bhavā kammavaṭṭaṃ, avijjā-taṇhupādānāni kilesavaṭṭaṃ, viññāṇa-nāmarūpa-saḷāyatana-phassa-vedanā vipākavaṭṭan ti* -- *Vsm*: 498) because they comprise *viññāṇa*, etc. (*Āyatiṃ phalapañcakan ti viññāṇādīni pañca. Tāni jātigahaṇena vuttāni. Jarāmaraṇaṃ pana tesaṃ yeva jarāmaraṇaṃ* -- *Vsm*: 498).

None of the commentators whom I have been able to consult (Yaśomitra, Saṃghabhadra, P'u-kuang, and Fa-pao) remarks upon Vasubandhu's application of the term *phala* to the members included in *vastu*. Of course, in the three lifetimes/ twofold causation system, it makes sense to call these members "result," since *vijñāna*, etc., are the result of past *avidyā* and *saṃskāra*, while *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* are the result of present *tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava*. Conversely, in the two lifetimes/ singlefold system, it does not make sense to call *vijñāna* (or, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *nāmarūpa*), etc., "result," since they are seeds; only when they are actualized as *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* can they be called *phala* (see section C2 of this chapter).

Usually, when Vasubandhu changes or adds to what is contained in the *Vibhāṣā* and *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, there is some significance; however, in this case, I cannot figure out what it is.

[3] *kleśāt karma/ upādānāt bhavo 'vidyāyāś ca saṃskārāḥ* (*AKBh*: 134–135; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 68).

[4] See, for example, the definition of *kāyavijñapti* in the *AKBh*: *cittavaśena kāyasya tathā tathā saṃsthānaṃ kāyavijñaptiḥ* (*AKBh*: 162; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 4). *Avijñaptirūpa*, too, although not exactly material, is nevertheless *rūpa*, and, as P.S. Jaini has pointed out in a personal communication, *karma* inheres in it (see also Hirakawa 1990: 189-193; Wood 1979).

Abhidharmasamuccaya, with the exception of Consciousness, the causal aspect of which the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* emphasizes by including it in the projecting set. This is in contrast to not only Sarvāstivāda, which considers *vijñāna* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula to be *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and thus purely fruitional, but also the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which includes *vijñāna* in the group of projected members on the grounds that it refers to the seeds, which have been projected from the previous life, that are the cause of *ālayavijñāna*.[5]

Concerning the number of lifetimes needed to complete one cycle of causation, there are two major schools of thought. The first, presented by Vasubandhu as the orthodox Sarvāstivādin position (*AK* III 20; *AKBh*: 131) and which is indeed found in the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 117a) and in the *Abhidharmāmṛta* (*A p'i t'an k'an lu wei lun*, 阿毘曇甘露味論 -- T. 1553: 970c; *Aām*$_s$: 70), requires three lifetimes and two rounds of causation (*san shih liang ch'ung*, 三世両重 -- this phrase, commonly used by Japanese Buddhist scholars, seems to have its origin in the commentarial tradition on the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*; see *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 358-359). According to this system, Ignorance and the Karmic Forces belong to the past life; Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, Feeling, Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence belong to the present life; and Birth and Old Age and Death belong to the future life. In this arrangement, the past life, namely Ignorance and the Karmic Forces, is the cause of the resultant aspect of the present life, namely Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling. The causal aspect of the present life, i.e., Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence, produces the future life, which consists of Birth and Old Age and Death (*AK* III 20; *AKBh*: 131).

This system, which is probably the most widely known division of the members

[5]二所引支。謂本識內親生當來異熟果攝識等五種。是前二支所引發故。此中識種謂本識因。(T. 1585: 43c; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 482; *Shindō*: 354-355).

of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula (it can be seen for example in the Pāli tradition in the *Visuddhimagga*),[6] has a certain appeal. First of all, by mentioning three lifetimes, it answers the commonsensical questions of how we arrived in this lifetime to begin with, and what will become of us in the next life. Furthermore, it suits one of the major contentions of the Sarvāstivāda school, that the past and the future really exist, that is to say, that past and future *dharmas* exist. Finally it is simple, at least superficially, since it does not disturb the order of the members; thus, it lends itself to pictorial representation in the outer ring of the wheel of life (*bhavacakra*, Tibetan *srid pa'i 'khor lo*) familiar to us from Tibetan painting.[7]

The second way of distributing the members into lifetimes requires only two lifetimes and one round of causation (*liang shih i ch'ung*, 兩世一重; see the comment above regarding the *san shih liang ch'ung* division). According to this system, or at least to the version presented in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, the projecting set of members (Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness) and the actualizing set (Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence) belong to one life, while the projected set (Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling) and the actualized set (Birth and Old Age and Death) belong to the next life. Thus, all the causal members are assigned to the earlier lifetime, and all the resultant members to the later. This system is generally recognized as being associated with the Yogācāra school although Matsuda, following Yamaguchi Susumu's conclusions regarding the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, seems to feel that it is more properly classified as Hīnayāna

[6]*Atīta-paccuppannnānāgatā c'assa tayo kālā. Tesu pāḷiyaṃ sarūpato āgatavasena, avijjā saṅkhārā cā ti dve aṅgāni atītakālāni; viññāṇādīnu bhavāvasānāni aṭṭha paccuppannakālāni; jāti c'eva jarāmaraṇañ ca dve anāgatakālānī ti veditabbāni* (*Visuddhimagga*: 496). See also *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*: *avijjā saṅkhārā atīto addhā, jātijarāmaraṇaṃ anāgato addhā, majjhe aṭṭa paccupanne addhā ti tayo addhā* (*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*: 142).

[7]For a list of the constituents of each of the four rings, see the large Tibetan-Chinese dictionary (*Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*: 2976-2977).

and hence belongs to the Sautrāntika school (Matsuda 1982a: 48). Although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* never says so explicitly, its scheme can equally well explain birth from the past life into the present and from the present life into the future.[8]

If I understand Matsuda correctly, he believes that the treatment in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is the earliest example of the "two lifetimes/singlefold" theory of causation (Matsuda 1982a: 48). However, this very terse arrangement of the members of the formula, which cannot be understood without reference to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, does not give the appearance of being a newly worked-out scheme. In searching for its sources, I have found that its system has certain features in common with the distribution of members to lifetimes in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, while it closely accords with the discussion in the *Yogācārabhūmi* section on *pratītyasamutpādaśarīra* (found in both the *Maulībhūmi* and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*). In order to trace the development of the two lifetimes/singlefold theory, I shall provide translations of the relevant portions of the two texts mentioned above, and I shall try to show how they lead to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* system, which I think is the most fully developed version.

B. From the Sixth Stage of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*

1. Concerning the Text

The textual history of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* is very complex, and, in the case of the brief portion of the sixth stage dealing with the lifetimes with which the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula are associated, the discrepancies among the Chinese and

[8]For an early Chinese discussion of this question in particular and a summary of various divisions of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula over numbers of lifetimes, see the *Ta ch'eng i chang* of Ching-ying Hui-yüan (T. 1851: 549-550).

Tibetan translations and the extant Sanskrit version are strikingly numerous. Among these variants one can distinguish two basic textual traditions, the difference between which, I believe, reflects developments in Yogācāra thought. Although my conclusions, being based on such a small excerpt from the text, are highly speculative, I think that the earlier of the two traditions may have been a source for the ideas found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, while the later seems to have been influenced by the fully developed two lifetimes/singlefold causation theory.[9]

I have consulted ten different versions of the text of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*: [1] Dharmarakṣa's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhūmika*, circa 297 A.D. ;[10] [2] Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhūmika*, c. 409;[11] [3] Buddhabhadra's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhūmika* as a part of the *Avataṃsakasūtra*, c. 418-420;[12] [4] the root text of the *Daśabhūmika* as given in Bodhiruci's Chinese translation of Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Daśabhūmika*, c. 508-511;[13] [5] the text of the *Daśabhūmika* as quoted within Vasubandhu's comment (see text four); [6] Śikṣānanda's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhūmika* as a part of the *Avataṃsakasūtra*, c. 695-697;[14] [7] Śīladharma's Chinese translation of the *Daśabhūmika*, c. 753-790;[15] [8] the Tibetan translation by Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi, Ye śes sde, etc., ninth century;[16] [9] the text of the *Daśabhūmika* as

[9]A very abbreviated summary of the following argument can be found in Kritzer 1992.

[10]*Chien pei i ch'ich chih te ching* (漸備一切智徳經 -- T. 285).

[11] *Shih chu ching* (十住經 -- T. 286).

[12] *Ta fang kuang fo hua yen ching* (大方広仏華厳經 -- (T. 278).

[13] *Shih ti ching lun* (十地經論 -- T. 1522: 707a). The Sanskrit title, as restored from the Chinese is *Daśabhūmikasūtraśāstra*; restored from the Tibetan, it is *Daśabhūmivyākhyāna* (Demiéville 1978: 129).

[14]*Ta fang kuang fo hua yen ching* (大方広仏華厳經 -- T. 279: 194b).

[15]*Shih ti ching* (十地經 -- T. 287).

[16]Peking *Bka' 'gyur* 761 (*Phal-chen* I yi).

found in the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu's commentary, ninth century;[17] and finally [10] the Sanskrit text based on Nepalese manuscripts, date unknown, but probably some time after the end of the ninth century.[18]

In the case of our small section of the *sūtra*, texts one through four essentially agree (although text one is such a short version that it is impossible to be certain), and I shall refer to them as the first version. Texts six through ten likewise essentially agree, and I shall call them the second version. Text five, the text of the *Daśabhūmika* as quoted in the Chinese translation of Vasubandhu's comment, contains elements of both versions. Below, I shall provide translations of each version.

2. Translations[19] from the *Daśabhūmika*

a. The First Version[20]

"The Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition"; this is the affairs of the past life. "Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling"; this is the affairs of the present life. "Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, Karmic Existence, Birth, and Old Age and Death"; this is the affairs of the future life. Thus, there is the occurrence of three lifetimes.

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[17] Peking *Bstan 'gyur* 5494 (*Mdo 'grel* XXXV ñi).

[18] *Daśabhūmikasūtra*: 101. For dates, see Itō 1988: 37-60.

[19] These are my own translations, but the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* has been translated in its entirety by a number of scholars: Tatsuyama 1938 (our passage is found on p. 124); Honda 1968: 191; Aramaki 1980: 182; and Cleary 1993: 748).

[20] From Kumārajīva's translation: 無明因縁諸行者。即是過去世事。識名色六入觸受。是現在事。愛取有生老死。是未來是事。於是有三世出。(T. 286: 515ab). Buddhabhadra's translation is almost identical: 又無明及行是過去事。識名色六入觸受是現在事。愛取有老死是未來事。於是有三世轉。(T. 278: 559a). The earliest translation, Dharmarakṣa's, appears to be drastically abridged: 以無明矣。為去來今。見縛流布。(T. 285: 476c).

b. The Second Version[21]

"The Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition"; this is the consideration of the past life. "[From] Consciousness through Feeling"; this is the consideration of the present life. "[From] Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence"; this is the consideration of the future life. From here onwards [i.e., Birth and Old Age and Death] is the continuation of this [consideration of time divisions].[22]

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[21]From Kondō's Sanskrit text: *avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā iti/ eṣā pūrvaṃtikī apekṣā/ vijñānaṃ yāvad vedanety eṣā pratyutpannā apekṣā/ tṛṣṇā yāvad bhava ity eṣā aparāntikī apekṣā/ ata ūrdhvam asyāḥ* [according to Rahder's edition, *asya* -- Rahder 1926: 51] *pravṛttir iti* (*DBh*: 101). Śiladharma's translation (無明緣行是前世觀待。識乃至受是現在觀待。愛乃至有是後世觀待。由是於後相續流轉。 -- T. 287: 553c) and Śīkṣānanda's (無明緣行者。是觀過去。識乃至受。是觀現在。愛乃至有。是觀未來。於是以後。展轉相續。 -- T. 279: 194b) both agree, while the Tibetan translation adds *jāti* to the future life: *de ltar ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnams śes bya ba 'di ni sṅon gyi mtha' la bltas pa'o/ rnam par śes pa daṅ miṅ daṅ gzugs daṅ drug gi skye mched daṅ reg pa daṅ/ tshor ba 'di dag ni da ltar byuṅ ba la bltas pa'o/ sred* [corrected from *srid* on the basis of the Derge (Ñiṅ ma edition, v. 13, text 44, p. 308, leaf 1227)] *pa daṅ ñe bar len pa daṅ srid pa daṅ/ skye ba źes bya ba 'di ni phyi ma'i mtha la bltas pa ste/ de phan chad du 'aṅ de dag rgyun tu* [sic] *'byuṅ ṅo* (*Avataṃsakasūtra*$_{t}$: li 105a 5-7).

This portion of the text is quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: *api tu khalu punar yad ucyate 'vidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā iti eṣā pūrvāntikyapekṣā/ vijñānaṃ yāvad vedaneti/ eṣā praty-utpannāpekṣā/ tṛṣṇā yāvad bhava iti eṣā 'parāntikyapekṣā 'ta ūrdhvam asya pravṛttir iti* (*Śikṣāsamuccaya*: 227-228; Bendall and Rouse 1971: 215). Notice that this version reads *asya* instead of *asyāḥ*.

I am grateful to Matsuda Kazunobu for informing me of two old Nepalese manuscripts of the *Daśabhūmika*, belonging to the Cecil Bendall Manuscript Collection in the National Archives in Kathmandu, and for transcribing the relevant portions. These manuscripts are not reflected in the Kondō or Rahder editions. Bendall uses one of them in his edition of *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, and he claims that it dates from the sixth century, which seems exceedingly early (*Śikṣāsamuccaya*: 291). This manuscript unfortunately lacks much of our passage, and it is impossible to even know whether it corresponds with the first or the second version. The reading from the other manuscript is substantially identical to Kondō's. See Matsuda 1991 for more information on the Bendall collection.

[22]I am taking the antecedent of *asyāḥ* to be *apekṣā*; however, the Chinese translations specify the continuation of the *santāna*. Rahder's *asya* could conceivably have *santānasya* as its antecedent.

3. Comparison of the Two Versions

If we compare these two versions, we can see two significant differences. The first version explicitly includes Birth and Old Age and Death in the group of members pertaining to the future life, while the second version omits them from this group. Furthermore, the final sentence of the first version seems to state straightforwardly that the twelve members are to be assigned to three lifetimes, while the last sentence of the second version implies that Birth and Old Age and Death do not belong to the same lifetime as Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence.

If we next compare the first version to the Sarvāstivādin three lifetimes/twofold causation system, we can see that the distribution of members in the present and future lives is quite different. According to Sarvāstivāda, the members from Consciousness through Feeling comprise the fruitional aspect of the present life, while Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence, which also belong to the present life, are causal with respect to the future life. In the first version of the *Daśabhūmika*, however, those members that Sarvāstivāda considers the cause of the future life are themselves included in the future life. At first glance, this seems strange, since as a rule in both Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra discussions of *pratītyasamutpāda*, causal members and resultant members are associated with different lifetimes.

However, as Itō Zuiei has observed, the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Daśabhūmika* contains a mixture of *abhidharma*-like precision and undifferentiated, undeveloped formulations (Itō 1988: 718). In the discussion of lifetimes, the grouping of the causes of the future life together with the future life itself suggests that our passage is an example of the latter. Thus, when the *Daśabhūmika* relates the members to the various lifetimes, we need not assume as rigid an association as is found, for example, in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Nor, in fact, must we understand past, present, and future to be

absolute concepts. As we shall see below, Vasubandhu, in his commentary on this passage, shows the relative nature of the three times.

In terms of the development of the two lifetimes/singlefold causation system, in the first version of the *Daśabhūmika,* the members from Ignorance through Feeling are grouped in the same way as they are in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* arrangement (with the exception of Consciousness), while the members from Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence no longer share the present life with the members from Consciousness through Feeling. Thus, if we look only at the past and present lives, we can see a fully completed round of causation: past *avidyā* and *saṃskāra* are the cause of the present life, which consists of *vijñāna, nāmarūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa,* and *vedanā.* Here there are no remaining members that require fruition in a third lifetime, as do Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in the Sarvāstivāda system. If we use the terminology of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* to describe the arrangement in the first version of the *Daśabhūmika,* the projecting and projected groups of members are in place, again except for Consciousness, which here belongs to the present life and must be considered part of the projected group (for a further discussion of the ambiguous position of Consciousness, see below). The actualizing and actualized members, on the other hand, are both mentioned with reference to the future life. No other texts that I have consulted, whether Sarvāstivādin or Yogācāra, include these members in the same life, nor does the *Daśabhūmika* discuss its own arrangement, and I do not see how the location of Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in the future can be justified.

4. Concerning Vasubandhu's Commentary on the *Daśabhūmika*

It is difficult to establish which version of the root text Vasubandhu actually used and included in his commentary on the *Daśabhūmika,* as well as what exactly he said

about it, because there is a considerable discrepancy between the Chinese and Tibetan translations of this text, of which no Sanskrit manuscript is extant. Itō remarks that the Tibetan translation is more easily understood than the Chinese (Itō 1988: 99), and this observation is certainly valid regarding the passage under discussion. The two versions differ most markedly concerning the root text as presented in the beginning of the section, that is, before the comment begins, and as quoted in the comment. The versions of the comment itself, on the other hand, have only one meaningful difference; this is found in the discussion of the present life. I am unable to establish which of the two translations is more faithful to the original, so I shall refer to the Tibetan since it makes more sense. I shall, however, provide translations of both versions.

5. Translations from Vasubandhu's Commentary

a. From the Tibetan Translation[23]

i. Root text[24]

Furthermore, what is [indicated by the phrase,] "The Karmic Forces are conditioned by Ignorance," is the consideration of the past life. The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "From Consciousness [through] Feeling," is the consideration of the present. The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "**FROM SUBCONSCIOUS DESIRE [THROUGH] KARMIC EXISTENCE**," is the consideration of the future. **BEYOND THAT, THOSE**

[23]Portions that differ significantly from the Chinese translation are in small boldface capital letters.

[24]*yaṅ ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed mams źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de ni sṅon gyi mtha' pa'i bltos pa'o/ mam par źes pa nas tshor ba źes bya ba'i bar de ni da ltar byuṅ ba'i bltos pa'o/ sred pa nas srid pa źes bya ba'i bar de ni phyi ma'i mtha' pa'i bltos pa ste/ de yan chad du yaṅ de dag rab tu 'byuṅ ṅo* (*DBhvy*: ṅi 256a 3-5).

[CONSIDERATIONS OF TIME DIVISIONS] CONTINUE.

ii. Commentary[25]

In this case, what is [indicated by the phrase,] "The Karmic Forces are conditioned by Ignorance," is the consideration of the past life because that which was done in the past is for the sake of this life.[26] The present existence is the previous lifetime of [i.e., with respect to] the future life. The meaning of [this] reference is to be understood in the sense of cause.

The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "From Consciousness [through] Feeling," is the consideration of the present BECAUSE, BEING THE RESULT OF WHATEVER ACTION [WAS PERFORMED] IN THE PAST LIFE FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, THESE [MEMBERS], CONSCIOUSNESS, [ETC.], SINCE THEY HAVE COMPLETED BEING PRODUCED AS RESULT IN THIS [LIFE], LACK THE ABILITY TO PRODUCE RESULT IN THE FUTURE LIFETIME.

The interval that is [indicated by the phrase,] "From Subconscious Desire [through] Karmic Existence," is the consideration of the future because [these members] immediately necessitate the production of a new existence.

"BEYOND THAT, THOSE [CONSIDERATIONS OF TIME DIVISIONS] CONTINUE

[25]*de la ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed mam*[sic] *źes bya ba de ni sṅon gyi mtha' pa'i bltos pa źes bya ba ni tshe'i 'di'i phyir sṅar byas pa'i phyir ro/ da ltar byuṅ ba ni ma 'oṅs pa'i sṅon gyi mtha'o/ bltos pa'i don rgyu'i don du rig par bya'o mam par źes pa nas tshor ba źes bya ba'i bar de ni da ltar byuṅ bai bltos pa'o źes bya ba ni don gaṅ la tshe rabs sṅa ma'i las gaṅ yin pa de'i 'bras bu rnam par źes pa de dag 'dir 'bras bur bskyed zin pas phyi ma la 'bras bu bskyed pa'i mthu med pa'i phyir ro/ sred pa nas srid pa źes bya ba'i bar de ni phyi ma'i mtha' pa'i bltos pa ste/ źes bya ba ni yaṅ srid pa mṅon par 'grub par gcig tu ṅes par byed pa'i phyir ro/ de phan chad du yaṅ de dag rab tu 'byuṅ ṅo źes bya ba ni bltos pa las yaṅ srid pa mṅon par 'grub pa'i phyir ro* (*DBhvy*: ṅi 256a 5-256b 1).

[26]The phrase, *tshe 'di'i phyir*, is difficult to translate; the meaning seems to be that what was done in the past is the cause of the present life.

because a new existence is actualized from [this kind of] consideration.[27]

b. From the *Shih ti ching lun* (十地經論)[28]

i. Root text

"The Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition"; this [is said] considering the affairs of the past life. "Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling"; this [is said] considering the affairs of the present life. SUBCONSCIOUS DESIRE, APPROPRIATION, KARMIC EXISTENCE, BIRTH, AND OLD AGE AND DEATH"; this [is said] considering the affairs of the future life. ACCORDING TO THIS [WAY OF] CONSIDERING [THE AFFAIRS OF THE VARIOUS LIVES], THERE IS THE CONTINUATION OF THREE LIFETIMES.[29]

ii. Commentary

"The Karmic Forces have Ignorance as their condition"; this is considering the affairs of the past life. Because birth in the present is produced by [that] past, the result in the present is the future [life with respect to the past life]. This [way of] considering the past is in the sense of [taking the previous life to be] the cause [of the following life].

"Consciousness, Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling" this

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[27]I am not sure whether the Tibetan *las* here means that rebirth somehow is caused by this [inaccurate] way of considering the three times or whether it has the sense of "according to."

[28]Portions that differ significantly from the Tibetan translation are in bold face type.

[29]經曰。無明緣行者。是見過去世事。識名色六入觸受是見現在世事。愛取有生老死。是見未來世事。於是見有三世轉。(T. 1522: 170a).

is considering the affairs of the present life. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE PAST LIFE, THESE ACTIONS CAN OBTAIN RETRIBUTION IN THE [FORM OF] CONSCIOUSNESS, ETC., IN THE PRESENT LIFE. FURTHERMORE, IT CAN OBTAIN RETRIBUTION IN THE FUTURE.

"Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence"; this is considering the affairs of the future, because it is established that there will be another rebirth.

"ACCORDING TO THIS [WAY OF] CONSIDERING [THE AFFAIRS OF THE VARIOUS LIVES], THERE IS THE CONTINUATION OF THREE LIFETIMES because, there being again a rebirth in a later life, there is continuation.[30]

6. Analysis of Vasubandhu's Comment

(In the discussion that follows, I shall, as I mentioned above, rely on the Tibetan translation.)

Vasubandhu's comments on the past lifetime are particularly interesting in that they point out the relative nature of the three times. According to his interpretation, the past life in the context of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula is the time of cause. Thus, if we take any three successive lifetimes, Lifetime One is the past life with respect to, and hence the cause of, Lifetime Two. Lifetime Two is the past life with respect to, and hence the cause of, Lifetime Three. The logical conclusion, and the point that I think Vasubandhu is making, is that it would be better to talk of the antecedent lifetime and the ensuing lifetime, in this way reducing the three lifetimes to two. Incidentally, the commentaries on

[30]論曰。無明緣行即是見過去世事者。現在生是過去作故。現在果即是當來す即是見過去世因義。識乃至受是見現在世事者。過去世生隨所有業彼業得現在識等果報。復能得未來果報。愛取有是見未來世事者。復有生一往定故。於是見有三世轉者。復有後生轉故。(T. 1522: 170a).

the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* seem to make the same point.[31]

In his discussion of the members that the *Daśabhūmika* assigns to the future life, Vasubandhu in fact does not mention past, present, or future by name; he simply refers to a subsequent existence. He states that Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence cause the production of a new existence, and he implies (or at least I infer) that this new existence is equivalent to the members, Birth and Old Age and Death. In this case, Vasubandhu's comment only makes sense in the context of the second version of the *Daśabhūmika* passage (the version that Vasubandhu quotes within his comment), in which the last two members are not grouped with the previous three; if all five members from Subconscious Desire through Old Age and Death belonged to the same lifetime (as they do in the Chinese, but not in the Tibetan, translation of the root text), the causal relationship that Vasubandhu attributes to them would be impossible.

Thus, the second version of the *Daśabhūmika* passage, especially as interpreted by Vasubandhu, is yet another step closer to the fully developed, Yogācāra two lifetimes/singlefold causation theory. The members that comprise the actualizing and actualized groups are now assigned to different lifetimes and so can assume a cause and result relationship. Moreover, the real status of the future lifetime has been somewhat undermined. It is true that, at this point, the lifetimes to which the actualizing and actualized groups of members belong is not yet clear. However, the second version, far more than the first, can support an interpretation consistent with the two lifetimes theory; this fact suggests to me that the text was altered for doctrinal reasons either shortly before Vasubandhu wrote his commentary or under its influence.[32]

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[31]"The past [consists of] the ten causal members; the present [consists of] the two resultant [members]. Furthermore, the present [consists of] the ten causal [members]; the future [consists of] the two resultant [members]." (過去十因.現在二果.又現在十因.未来二果也. -- *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 359)

[32]For more on Vasubandhu's understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* as expounded in his *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, see Matsuda 1982a and 1982b; see also Chapter 5, for a discussion of Vasubandhu's views.

C. From the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

1. General Remarks Concerning the *Śarīra* Section

When we look at the section on the structure of conditioned origination (*pratītyasamutpādaśarīra*) in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi*,[33] we can find the members of the formula arranged in similar, although not precisely the same, groups as in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and we can also find an explanation of the logic underlying this grouping. Matsuda disagrees with Ui Hakuju, whom he quotes as saying that the *śarīra* section contains neither a three lifetimes/twofold causation theory nor a two lifetimes/singlefold theory. Referring to another, more or less parallel passage in the *Śravakabhūmi*, he maintains that the *Yogācārabhūmi* discussions in fact express a two lifetimes/singlefold causation theory (Matsuda 1983: 30-32). Although, as Matsuda has pointed out, the *śarīra* section is quite difficult to understand (Matsuda 1983: 31), I shall attempt to show the relationship between the ideas presented therein in a not fully systematized fashion and those found in a more systematic form in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.[34]

Unlike the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the *Yogācārabhūmi* refers to three lifetimes in

[33]The *śarīra* portion only of *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* (*YBh*: 198-203; *YBh$_t$*: zi 115a 3-118b 3; T. 1579: 321a-322a) is parallel to the first portion of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* (*YBh$_t$*: 'i 285a 3-287b 6; T. 1579: 827c-828c).

[34]Similar ideas can be found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in a discussion of ten types of causes (*hetu*), among which *ākṣepahetu* is defined as follows: *avidyādīnāṃ dharmānām dṛṣṭa eva dharme yāni bījāni jātasya bhūtasyeha/ tāny anyajānmikasya jātijarāmaraṇasyākṣepahetuḥ* (*BoBh*: 100; T. 1579: 501c); the entire discussion of the ten types of causes, which includes an extensive explanation of *bīja* causality in botanical terms, as well as a definition of *abhinirvṛttihetu* (*BoBh*: 99-100; T. 1579: 501b-c), deserves further study. The *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* also has a discussion of ten types of causes, in which *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* are defined (*YBh*: 106ff; T. 1579: 301b ff.). I shall return to *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the ten *hetus* system in a later chapter.

its discussion: "What is the structure (*śarīra*, of *pratītyasamutpāda*)? Briefly, it is the definition of conditioned origination in its three phases: [1] how one is born in the present life from the past life; [2] how one is born in the future life from the present life; and [3] how one, having been born in the present life, exists and departs to purification."[35] However, although three lifetimes are mentioned, the twelve members seem to be able to complete a cycle of cause and result in only two lifetimes as I shall show in my translation of the discussion of the second phase. I shall also occasionally refer to the first phase.

2. Translation of Phase Two -- Present Life to Future Life[36]

How do the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) evolve through conditioned origination from the present life to the future life? And how do they cease evolving, and [how] are they purified by cessation?[37]

The person who has been reborn in the present life according to [the process described in Phase One] experiences two types of results of previous actions: the internal result-by-way-of-maturation, and the subordinate result, which consists of feeling arising from [contact with] objects. He is deluded concerning both types of results, having heard bad teachings or due to past habits. He who is deluded concerning the internal result-by-way-of-maturation does not understand in accordance with the truth that the production of future rebirth is suffering. And due to his ignorance with respect to his former lives, he performs and accumulates *karma* as before. When he performs new actions, his

[35] *Samāsatas tribhir ākāraiḥ pratītyasamutpādasya vyavasthānaṃ bhavati/ yathā pūrvāntān madhyānte sambhavati/ yathā ca madhyāntād aparānte sambhavati/ yathā ca ca madhyānte sambhūto vartate vyavadānāya ca paraiti* (*YBh*: 198).

[36] *Ybh*: 200-201. I am grateful for the help of Professor Aramaki Noritoshi and Yamabe Nobuyoshi in reading this passage.

[37] *kathaṃ madhyāntād aparānte saṃskārāṇāṃ pratītyasamutpādasaṃbhavo bhavati kathaṃ cāsambhavaḥ/ asambhavāc ca vyavadānaṃ* (*YBh*: 200).

consciousness comes under the sway of acts in the present life.[38]

Thus, conditioned by Ignorance, the Karmic Forces arise, and conditioned by the Karmic Forces, Consciousness [arises]. And the same Consciousness in the present life becomes the cause [of consciousness in the process of actualization] because it comprises [the seed of] consciousness in the process of actualization as its result in the future. And, with reference to Consciousness in its entirety, [Consciousness] is defined as the six consciousnesses. And this Consciousness is endowed with the seed of Individual Existence belonging to rebirth in the future. Furthermore, this seed of Individual Existence is endowed with the seed of the Six Senses belonging to rebirth in the future. And this seed of the Six Senses is endowed with the seed of Contact belonging to rebirth in the future. And this seed of Contact is endowed with the seed of Feeling belonging to rebirth in the future. And this [process of] causality is to be known as the projecting cause in the present life of rebirth [into the future life], by which is projected the entire personal existence from Consciousness through Feeling.[39]

That person has [so far] projected a new existence because of the first delusion, concerning the [internal] result-by-way-of-maturation. And then, because of the second

[38]*sa tathā madhyānte sambhūtaḥ pudgalo dvividhaṃ pūrvakarmaphalaṃ pratyanubhavati/ ādhyātmikaṃ ca vipākaphalaṃ viṣayanirjātaṃ* (Emended from *viṣama-* on the basis of the Tibetan *yul las* [*YBh*$_t$: 286a 3]) *ca veditam adhipatiphalaṃ* / *so 'saddharmaśravaṇaṃ vāgamya pūrvābhyāsaṃ vā dvividhe 'pi phale saṃmūḍho bhavati/ so 'dhyātmaṃ vipākaphale saṃmūḍhaḥ punarbhāvābhinirvṛttiṃ duḥkhato yathābhūtaṃ na jānāti/ sa pūrvāntikīṃ cāparāntikīṃ cāvidyām adhipatiṃ kṛtvā pūrvavat saṃskārān karoty upacinoti/ tasya tadvijñānam abhinavaṃ karma kurvatas tatkarmopagaṃ bhavati dṛṣṭa eva dharme* (*YBh*: 200).

[39]*evam avidyāpratyayāḥ* [*saṃskārā* (supplied from *YBh*$_t$: zi 116b 8)] *utpadyante saṃskārapratyayaṃ ca vijñānaṃ/ tac ca vijñānaṃ dṛṣṭe dharme hetubhūtam āyatyām abhinirvṛttivijñānaphalaparigrahāt/ sarvaṃ ca vijñānam* [The Chinese and Tibetan translations of the version in *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, however, indicate *saṃtāna* (personal continuity) instead of *vijñāna* (T. 1579: 828a; *YBh*$_t$: 'i 286a 7). It is not clear to me whether this difference is significant.] *adhikṛtya ṣaḍvijñānakāyā ity ucyante/ tac ca vijñānam āyatyāṃ paunarbhavikanāmarūpabījopagataṃ/ tad api nāmarūpabījam āyatipaunarbhavikaṣaḍāyatanabījopagataṃ/ tac ca ṣaḍāyatanabījam āyatipaunarbhavikasparśabījopagataṃ/ tac ca sparśabījam āyatipaunarbhavikaveditabījopagataṃ/ ayaṃ tāvat punarbhavasya madhyānte ākṣepako hetur veditavyo yena vijñānādayo veditaparyavasānaḥ kṛtsna evātmabhāva ākṣipto bhavati* (*YBh*: 200).

delusion, concerning the [subordinate] result arising from [contact with] objects, he produces Subconscious Desire for feelings arising from [sense-]objects.[40]

Because of [this] Subconscious Desire, he starts either searching for objects of desire or searching for [samsaric] existence. Accordingly, he appropriates sense-objects, or he appropriates [wrong] views, observances and vows, and a belief in the self. And when he has performed [either] Appropriation, the projecting cause [produced by the] previous [round of causation and consisting of Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and the causal Consciousness, endowed with the seeds of Consciousness in the process of actualization, the seeds of Individual Existence, etc.], endowed with and conjoined with Subconscious Desire and Appropriation, is called "Karmic Existence." [41]

When [Karmic Existence], which is identified with the cause that actualizes rebirth, perishes in the immediately following moment, the appearance of the conditioning factors, starting with Consciousness and continuing through Feeling, occurs, either gradually or all at once, due to the projecting cause thus projected [by the causation from the previous life].[42]

[40]*sa pūrvakeṇa vipākaphalasammohenaiva punarbhavam ākṣipya dvitīyena viṣayanirjātaphalasammohena viṣayavedanālambanāṃ tṛṣṇām utpādayati* (*YBh*: 201).

[41]*yathā tṛṣṇayā kāmaparyeṣaṇāṃ vāpadyamāno bhavaparyeṣaṇāṃ vā kāmopādānaṃ vopādadāti dṛṣṭiśīlavrat*[*ātmavād-* should be inserted here on the basis of both the Tibetan (*YBh$_t$*: zi 117a 6) and the Chinese (T. 1579: 321c) translations)*opādānāṃ vā/ upātte copādāne tṛṣṇopādānasahitasaṅgataḥ pūrvaka ākṣepako hetur bhava ity ucyate* (*YBh*: 201).

Thus, *bhava* consists of the *ākṣepakahetu*, together with *tṛṣṇā* and *upādāna*.

[42]*upapattyabhinirvṛttihetusaṃgṛhītasya ca bhavasyānantaraṃ kālaṃ kṛtavato yathākṣiptenākṣepahetunā vijñānādīnāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ veditaparyantānāṃ pradurbhāvo bhavaty anukramaśo vā sakṛd vā* (*YBh*: 201).

It is important to note that *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* is not a *dvandva* compound referring to two types of causes, *upapattihetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (see the Tibetan [*skye ba mṅon par 'grub pa'i rgyur* -- *YBh$_t$*: 117a 7] and Chinese [即是後有生因 -- T. 1579: 321c] translations). Elsewhere, in a section of the *Sav pratītyasamutpāda* exposition that I consider later than the *śarīra* portion, *upapatti* and *abhinirvṛtti* are contrasted, and Vasubandhu in *AK* distinguishes between *upapattihetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (see Chapter 4, section 7d for my discussion of *tṛṣṇā* in the context of *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna*). Here, *upapatti* seems to refer to rebirth in general, not to birth in a specific *dhātu*, *gati*, or *yoni*.

Thus, in the present life, Subconscious Desire arises conditioned by Feeling resulting from contact with Ignorance. Appropriation arises conditioned by Subconscious Desire. Karmic Existence arises conditioned by Appropriation. Birth [in the future] arises conditioned by Karmic Existence. Conditioned by Birth, the various kinds of suffering, such as Old Age, disease, and Death, etc., are experienced directly in some realms of birth, while in other [realms] they must be understood as being inherent in the form of [their] seeds.[43]

Thus, there will arise in the future life conditioning factors, depending [both] on Karmic Forces conditioned by Ignorance and on Subconscious Desire conditioned by Feeling in the present life.[44]

3. Analysis of Phase Two of the *Śarīra* Portion

Before comparing the above discussion with the scheme in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, let me summarize the treatment in the *śarīra* portion; in doing so, I shall also refer to the section on *pratyayaḥ* that is found a few pages later in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Although this section, like the remainder of the exposition, seems later and more systematized, it can help us make sense of some of the obscurities of the earlier portion.

In the passage that I have translated, the *Yogācārabhūmi* designates two types of causes, the projecting cause (*ākṣepakahetu*) and the cause that actualizes rebirth (*upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu*). The projecting cause consists of Ignorance, the Karmic Forces,

[43]*evaṃ dṛṣṭe dharme avidyāsaṃsparśajā veditapratyayā tṛṣṇā/ tṛṣṇāpratyayam upādānaṃ/ upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ/ bhavapratyayā jātiḥ/ jātipratyayāś ca jarāvyādhi-maraṇādayo duḥkhaviśeṣāḥ saṃmukhībhavanti/ kvacid upapattyāyatane kvacid bījānuṣaṅgato veditavyaḥ* [this should be emended to *veditavyāḥ*] (*YBh*: 201).

[44]*evaṃ madhyānte avidyāpratyayān saṃskārān vedanāpratyayāṃ ca tṛṣṇāṃ pratītyāparānte saṃskārāṇāṃ samudayo bhavati* (*YBh*: 201).

and Consciousness in the present life, together with the seeds of Consciousness (in the form of the six *vijñānakāyas*), Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling in the future. The cause that actualizes rebirth consists of Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in the present life. The above passage does not designate the result of these causes, but the later section on *pratyaya* does: "How many members are included in the projecting cause? [The members] from Ignorance through Feeling. How many members are included in the cause that actualizes rebirth? [The members] from Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence. How many members are included in the result of both the projecting cause and the cause that actualizes rebirth? In the present and the future, [the members] from Consciousness through Feeling in the states of Birth and Old Age and Death."[45]

At this point, a table of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* system may be useful:

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[45]*katy aṅgāny ākṣepahetusaṃgṛhītāni/ avidyām upādāya yāvad vedanā/ katy aṅgāny abhinirvṛttihetusaṃgṛhītāni/ tṛṣṇām upādāya yāvad bhavaḥ/ katy aṅgāny ākṣepābhinirvṛttihetvoḥ phalasaṃgṛhītāni/ dṛṣṭe ca dharme samparāye ca vijñānādīni vedanāvasānāni jātijarāmaraṇāvasāni* (*YBh*: 215). However, this portion of the text presents problems. The Sanskrit *jātijarāmaraṇāvasāni* is clearly a mistake, since both the Tibetan and the Chinese translations indicate some form of the word *avasthā* or *avasthānam*; I have indicated this in my translation. But the Tibetan translation (*tshe 'di nas tshe phyi ma'i rnam par śes pa nas tshor ba la thug pa rnams daṅ/ skye ba daṅ/ rga śi'i nas skabs rnams so*--*YBh*$_t$: zi 126b 1-2) and the Chinese translation (答於現法後法中。識等乃至受。於生老死位。所攝諸支--T. 1579: 324c) are not identical.

Projecting Cause

Ignorance

Karmic Forces

Consciousness (a. Causal Consciousness)


(b. Seeds of Consciousness in the process of actualization)

Individual Existence

the Six Senses

Contact

Feeling



Result of the Projecting Cause and of the Cause that Actualizes Rebirth

Birth[46]

Old Age and Death[47]



Cause that Actualizes Rebirth

Subconscious Desire

Appropriation

Karmic Existence

The repetition of Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling is explained by the fact that they take the form of seeds in the projecting cause, while they are actualized entities when they are the results of the two causes. Consciousness, on the

[46] *Jāti* consists of *vijñāna* here.

[47] *Jarāmaraṇa* consists of *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparśa*, and *vedanā*.

other hand, actually appears three times; as the causal consciousness as well as the seeds of the six consciousnesses in the projecting cause, and as the new, actualized consciousness when it is the result of the two causes.

In this way, the discussion of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* represents a theory of causation based on seeds. In brief, the causal consciousness in this lifetime contains the seeds of rebirth in the next lifetime. The cause that actualizes rebirth, namely Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence in this lifetime, makes the seeds of rebirth yield results, thereby producing rebirth in the future[48].

D. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* Two Lifetimes/ Singlefold Causation System

A similar, but not identical, theory is, I believe, represented in a more schematized form in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Again, a table might be useful:

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[48]Another grouping of the *aṅgas* can be found in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Viniścāyasaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 638a). According to this arrangement: 1)牽引次第 consists of *avidyā* and *saṃskāra*; 2)生起次第 consists of *vijñāna, nāmarūpa,* and *ṣaḍāyatana*; 3)（生起）受用境界次第 consists of *sparśa* and *vedanā*; and (4) 受用苦次第 consists of *tṛṣṇā, upādāna, bhava, jāti,* and *jarāmaraṇa*. I have been unable to find any other mention of this grouping, and I shall not try to reconstruct the Sanskrit names of the four groups. This passage is worthy of further study.

Projecting Set of Members		Projected Set of Members
Ignorance		Individual Existence
Karmic Forces	→	the Six Senses
Consciousness		Contact
		Feeling

Actualizing Set of Members		Actualized Set of Members
Subconscious Desire	→	Birth
Appropriation		Old Age and Death
Karmic Existence		

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not use the term *bīja* at all in its explanation of *aṅgasamāsa*; however, it is clear from the *Bhāṣya* discussion of the projected set that the terms Individual Existence, the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling here designate seeds rather than actualized *dharmas*. Furthermore, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* points out that the term Consciousness here refers to the causal aspect of *vijñāna*, i.e., the *karmabījas*,[49]

[49]I have not, in fact, discovered any occurrences of this term in Sanskrit texts. However, the Chinese 業種子or 業種, which should be equivalent to *karmabīja*, is quite common, especially in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*. Mochizuki defines the term as the seeds of the fruit of *karma* (業果の種子), as opposed to the seeds of speech (*vyavahārabīja*). *Karmabīja* is a synonym of *karmavāsanā* (業習氣). It describes the ability of the seeds of good or bad mental *karma* created by *manovijñāna* to help the other weak, inferior, morally neutral seeds (他の羸劣無記の種子) produce existence. Other synonyms include 異熟習氣 (*vipakavāsanā*), 有支習氣 (*bhavāṅgavāsanā*), 有分熏種子, and 有受盡相種子 (Mochizuki 1974: 1054).

The term 業種子 appears in the Chinese translation of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*; however, the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions include neither *karmabīja* nor *karmavāsanā* nor any of the other synonyms. Instead , Hsüan-tsang seems to be adding his own phrase, "moistens the *karmabījas*" to explain the action of *tṛṣṇā* and *upādāna* in actualizing rebirth. Compare: *yadbalena yatsāṃmukhyena tatkarmavipākadāna* (following Shukla, I drop a repeated *dāna*) *sāmarthaṃ bhavaty ayam abhinirvṛttihetuḥ* (*ŚrBh*: 385); *de'i stobs dań/ de'i mthu las de'i rnam par smin pa skyed par nus pa'ań yin pa ste/ de ni mńon par 'grub pa'i rgyu yin no* (YBh_t: wi 169b 8-170a 1); 由此勢力由此功能潤業種子。令其能與諸異熟果。

while the seeds of the *vipākavijñāna* (i.e., the *vijñānabījas*; see *Shindōjōyuishikiron*: 355) are included in the member, Individual Existence (T. 1585: 43c). The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* refines the *Yogācārabhūmi* system by further analyzing the projecting cause into sets of projecting and projected members, thereby assigning the seeds of Individual Existence, etc., to the next lifetime, where they are a potentiality waiting to be actualized.

Thus, the treatment of *aṅgasamāsa* is typical of the method in much of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Without even mentioning *bīja*, let alone *ālayavijñāna*, it systematizes ideas found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and, perhaps, in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, in order to formulate an *abhidharma* that is consistent with *bīja* and *ālayavijñāna* theory. In this case, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is so effective that its exposition is incorporated, with only slight changes, in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, a text that, of course, explicitly propounds the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*.

如是一切名生起因。(T. 1579: 454b-c; underlined portions do not correspond to Sanskrit or Tibetan).

According to the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, *karmavāsanā* refers to the power, deposited in the *ālayavijñāna* by mental *karma*, to actualize a future existence (*puṇyāpuṇyāneñjacetanā karma/ tena karmaṇā yad āna(sic)gatātmabhāvābhinirvṛttaye ālayavijñāne sāmarthyam āhitaṃ/ sā karmavāsanā* -- *TrṃśBh*: 36).

In the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, *karmavāsanā* is defined in terms of *bīja*: *karmavāsanāyā iti/ kā punar iyaṃ karmavāsanā nāma? anāgatasya jānmāno bījaṃ hetubhāvaḥ* (*MvbhṬ*: 29).

Schmithausen suggests that "in the early Yogācāra sources a clear-cut distinction between the different categories of *vāsanās* or *bījas* is often missing or at least not easily recognizable" (1987: 343 n. 448) and that the seeds of future *atmabhāvas* can "hardly be dissociated from the Impressions of karman" (1987: 428 n. 831).

Therefore, what the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* here refers to by the term 業種, and what La Vallée Poussin retranslates as *karmabīja*, probably has the meaning of *karmavāsanā*.

IV. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

A. Related Texts

The fifth section (*aṅgakarmavyavasthāna*) of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition consists of explanations of the functions of the individual members. Each member, with the exception of *jarāmaraṇa*, has two functions, the second of which is to act as the condition of the following member. In the notes to his Japanese translation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, Matsuda mentions that this section corresponds to the *vibhaṅga* section of the discussion in *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, which he identifies as a commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhāganirdeśasūtra* found in the *Saṃyuktāgama* (T. 99 [no. 298]: 85a-b; Matsuda 1983: 49 n. 28).[1] In my discussion, I shall examine both the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi vibhaṅga* section and another possible source for the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the section from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* that I have included in the notes to my translation. Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to read, except very partially, Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. As is again pointed out by Matsuda, the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* quotes the entire text of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* treatment of *avidyāṅga* (Matsuda 1983: 47 n. 11) and often corresponds to the discussions of *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (Matsuda 1983: 49 n. 28). For this reason, I shall only occasionally refer to this very important text, which, although it is later than *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, may help us understand better the philosophical underpinnings of the abhidharma system of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. In the future, I hope to study

[1]The discussion in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* in some cases seems to match more closely the version of the *sūtra* as translated by Hsüan-tsang (T. 124: 547b-548a) than the version in the *Saṃyuktāgama*, to which Matsuda mentions it corresponds (Matsuda 1982a: 43); however, I cannot here address the question of the exact source of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* discussion.

the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* in greater depth.

Before I discuss a number of the individual members in detail, I shall make a few very general comments on what I consider to be the relationship between the discussions in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* and the *Daśabhūmika* and those in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. The *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi vibhaṅga* section is, to a large extent, a rather straightforward commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhāganirdeśasūtra*, and its discussions of the first two (Ignorance and the Karmic Forces) and the last five members (Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, Karmic Existence, Birth, and Old Age and Death) of the formula seem unremarkable from a doctrinal point of view. However, as Schmithausen has noted (see note to Chapter 2, section B5c), the discussion of the members from Consciousness through Feeling presents a theory of causation by seeds; this indicates that it is a Yogācāra interpretation, albeit an early or "primitive" one.

The discussion in the *Daśabhūmika*, on the other hand, does not contain any terms such as *bīja* that are specifically associated with Yogācārā doctrine. The form of the discussion, however, is nearly identical to that of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Each member is first defined in terms of its activity in itself and then in terms of its function as the condition of the following member. Outside of these two texts, I have been unable to find a similar discussion, with the possible exception of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* discussion of Consciousness through Feeling, in which it seems that each member is considered to be at once itself and the seed of itself produced by the preceding member. I believe that it is possible that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* adopted the form of the *Daśabhūmika* discussion in order to emphasize that not only the function of each member, but also the precise relationship between one member and another, is important for an understanding of conditioned origination. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* only mentions and does not explain the second function of each member, with the crucial exception of the

Karmic Forces, which it specifies as being the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness.[2] The comments of the *Bhāṣya*, however, clarify the nature of each relationship.

In this chapter, I shall discuss *avidyā, saṃskāra, nāmarūpa, vedanā, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa,* and *tṛṣṇā*; the functions of *vijñāna* will be the subject of the next chapter.

B. Discussion of Individual Members

1. Ignorance

According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the first function of Ignorance is to delude beings concerning existence. This seems to be a fairly straightforward summary of the definition found in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, which consists of a long list of different types of Ignorance regarding various aspects of existence. The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* certainly understands it this way; it supplies from the *vibhaṅga* section of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* the examples of Ignorance regarding past, future, and present lives in order to show that delusion regarding existence consists of the various types of Ignorance mentioned in the *sūtra* and that each of these types should be understood according to the explanations in *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*.

A related explanation of the nature of Ignorance can be found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in a passage in which Vasubandhu gives his own, as opposed to the orthodox Vaibhāṣika, explanation of *pratītyasamutpāda*: "an ignorant person, not understanding that what originates conditionally is merely the conditioning factors..."[3] Yaśomitra explains that "merely the conditioning factors" refers to the non-existence of a

[2]See translation (Chapter 2, section B5b).

[3]*bālo hi pratītyasamutpannaṃ saṃskāramātram idam ity aprajānan* (*AKBh*: 139; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 84).

self.[4] Here, Vasubandhu seems to have chosen for the purpose of summarizing Ignorance another of the types of Ignorance mentioned by the *sūtra*, *adhyātmam ajñānam*, which is explained as follows by the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*: "What is internal ignorance? It is the ignorance of one who improperly considers his conditioning factors to be a self."[5] This discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*AKBh*: 139-140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 83-88) generally follows the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*; I shall discuss it further below, especially with reference to Consciousness.

The definition in the *Daśabhūmika* is considerably broader if we understand *ālambana* to refer to all the objects of experience;[6] furthermore, the association of *avidyā* with *ātmadṛṣṭi* noticed by Schmithausen in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* passage (see note to Chapter 2, section B5a), and implicitly present in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, is not found here.

2. Karmic Forces

Professor Yuichi Kajiyama has pointed out to me that *saṃskāra* can have two meanings, *karma* and *vāsanā*.[7] In other words, it can be used in the sense of either of the meanings attributed to *karma* by Takasaki Jikido in his discussion of Yogācāra doctrine: "a residual force (*vāsanā*, 習氣) insofar as it remains after having perished, and a formative force (*saṃskāra*, 行) insofar as it gives rise to the following mode of activity"

[4] *mātragrahaṇam ātmapratiṣedhārtham* (*AKVy*: 299).

[5] *adhyātmam ajñānaṃ katamat/pratyātmikān saṃskārān ayoniśa ātmanā manasi kurvato yad ajñānam* (*YBh*: 204).

[6] See *AK* II 62c: *ālambanaṃ sarvadharmāḥ* (*AKBh*: 100).

[7] According to Kajiyama (personal communication), these two meanings occur in *abhidharma*, but a quick look at the Taishō index suggests that the term *vāsanā* does not appear in *abhidharma* texts earlier than the *Abhidharmakośa* except for the *Vibhāṣā*. Further study is necessary to establish at exactly what point *vāsanā*, like *bīja*, takes on the technical meaning that becomes so important in Yogācāra texts.

(Takasaki 1987: 204). Consequently, according to Kajiyama, the *vijñāna* that is dependent on the *saṃskāras* also can be understood in two different senses, the rebirth consciousness (*pratisaṃdhivijñana*) and the six ordinary forms of consciousness (*ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ*), respectively. Of the texts under discussion, the *Daśabhūmika* unambiguously sticks to the first pair of meanings, and its definitions of both the Karmic Forces and Consciousness are in keeping with the definitions found in the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation of the formula, in which each member represents a different state of the five *skandhas* (see Chapter 5). Its discussion of the function of the Karmic Forces does not suggest an awareness of any of the issues associated with *ālayavijñāna* or seed theory.

Coming to the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, we find that in the *śarīra* exposition, the focal point of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula with regard to seed theory is Consciousness (see note to Chapter 2, section B5c). It is the role of Consciousness that departs radically and obviously from pre-Yogācāra interpretations. In contrast, although, as Schmithausen points out, the Karmic Forces put Consciousness "under their sway" (*karmopagam*), which implies that they "impress" Consciousness, or leave seeds in it (Schmithausen 1987: 178), the passage never explicitly mentions *bīja* or *vāsanā* in connection with *saṃskārāṅga*. Similarly, in the *vibhaṅga* section, there is nothing about the Karmic Forces that goes beyond the spirit of what was said in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*. The *vibhaṅga* section defines the Karmic Forces simply as *karma*, with no mention of *vāsanā*,[8] while it accepts the *sūtra* definition of *vijñāna* as the six *vijñānakāyas*.[9] Thus, if we are

[8]*kāyasaṃskāraḥ katame/ kāyakarma kāmāvacaraṃ rūpāvacāraṃ puṇyāpuṇya-saṃkhyātam adha ūrdhvaṃ punar āniñjyasaṃkhyātaṃ/ vāksaṃskārāḥ katame/ vākkarma/ śeṣaṃ pūrvavad draṣṭavyaṃ/ manaḥsaṃskārāḥ katame/ manaskarma/ tat kāmadhātau puṇyāpuṇyaṃ nāneñjyaṃ dvayor uparimayor dhātvor āneñjyam eva ca* (*YBh*: 206).

[9]*cakṣur vijñānaṃ katamat/ āyatyāṃ cakṣurindriyāśrayāyā rūpaprativijñapter yat puṇyāpuṇyāneñjyaparibhāvitabījabhūtaṃ vijñānaṃ yac ca tadbījasamudbhavaṃ phalabhūtaṃ/ yathā cakṣurvijñānam evaṃ śrotraghrāṇajihvākāyamanovijñānāni draṣṭavyāni/ āśrayaviṣayakṛtaś caiṣa prativijñaptiviśeṣo draṣṭavyaḥ/ tat punaḥ kāmāvacaraṃ ṣaḍvidhaṃ rūpāvacaraṃ caturvidham ārūpyāvacaram ekavidham eva* (*YBh*: 206). Underlined portions represent Schmithausen's corrections from the manuscript (Schmithausen 1987: 472 n. 1154). See also note to Chapter 2, section B5c.

to take the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi vibhaṅga* definitions at face value, *karma* from the earlier lifetime causes the six types of consciousness in the later life. This relationship, however, is problematic in a technical context, in which, as Kajiyama and Takasaki suggest, *karma* should be the cause of *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, not of the *vijñānakāyas*.

However, when we look at the *vibhaṅga* description of *cakṣurvijñāna*, it is clear that the *saṃskāra* that conditions *vijñāna* is not, in fact, simply Takasaki's "formative force." Schmithausen refers to both the *śarīra* and the *vibhaṅga* portions[10] in explaining the relationship between *saṃskāra* and *vijñāna* that is implied by the *vibhaṅga* definition of *cakṣurvijñāna*: "If I see it correctly, the *Pratīty. Analysis* contains a somewhat archaic doctrine of Seeds (*bīja*) according to which *vijñāna* — still understood as the [mental series constituted by successive moments of one or the other of] the six ordinary kinds of *vijñāna* — "approaches" or "follows" (—*upaga*—) karman, i.e. comes under its sway by being somehow "impressed" by it so that it becomes the cause or Seed of the (*vipāka-*) *vijñāna* which is the initial factor of a new existence" (Schmithausen 1987: 178). Schmithausen's explanation is perhaps as difficult to understand as the passages themselves, but it emphasizes that, even though the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* still interprets *vijñāna* as the six *vijñānas*, it has broadened their definition to include both actualized Consciousness and seeds. If Schmithausen is correct, and the *vipākavijñāna* at this stage is still somehow identical to the six ordinary *vijñānas*, then *saṃskāra* must at the same time "form" the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and be the "residual force" from which future *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., arises.

Furthermore, in the *śarīra* portions (see Chapter 3, section C2) it is clear that the way in which the Karmic Forces condition Consciousness by bringing it "under its sway" is not the same way in which the *karma* of the past life, according to the *Daśabhūmika* as well as to Sarvāstivāda, conditions Consciousness by producing *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* in

[10] Unlike me, Schmithausen does not seem to consider the *śarīra* portion to be earlier than the remainder of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition.

the present life. Thus, both the *śarīra* and the *vibhaṅga* portions at least implicitly suggest the impressioning or seed-planting function of the Karmic Forces.

The explanation of the first function of *saṃskāra* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* consists of a very terse statement about how the Karmic Forces work in determining rebirth, that is to say about their formative function. This is essentially the same as the first function in the *Daśabhūmika*. However, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines their second function as being the conditions of the *vāsanās* contained in Consciouness. This is dramatically different from the definition in the *Daśabhūmika*, as well as from the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* definition of *saṃskāra*. Furthermore, it goes beyond what is found in either of the portions of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* expositions that I have discussed. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, as we have seen above, includes Consciousness among the projecting members and thereby assigns it to the earlier of two lifetimes. Moreover, as we have also seen, Consciousness as understood in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* has been identified with the *karmabījas* by the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (see note to Chapter 3, section D). The present definition of the second function of the Karmic Forces, together with the definition of the first function of Consciousness, which follows, is probably the basis for this identification.

In the *aṅgasamāsa* section, the causal role of Consciousness is emphasized, a fact that suggests to me that the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* presupposes a more fully developed concept of *ālayavijñāna* than that which underlies the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* discussion. As I have mentioned, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in general avoids the use of terminology usually associated with Yogācāra, such as *vāsanā* and *bīja*. However, in order to justify an interpretation of *vijñāna* that stresses its causal aspect, the text is here forced to be more explicit than usual. By introducing the term *vāsanā* into its definition of *saṃskārāṅga*, it rationalizes the inclusion of *vijñānāṅga* in the group of projecting members. If the Karmic Forces were stated here to be the condition

of Consciousness, instead of the condition of the impressions contained in Consciousness, then they would represent the "formative force" of *karma*, and the Consciousness resulting from them would have to be reassigned to the group of projected members. The ability to project belongs, properly speaking, to *karma*,[11] and only if Consciousness is identified with *karma*, can it belong to the projecting group of members. Thus, for the sake of maintaining consistency between its interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the particular theory of *ālayavijñāna* and *bījas* to which it subscribes, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* must emphasize the "residual force" of *karma*. To do so, it must depart from giving a simple, non-innovative interpretation of the formula at an earlier point (that is to say, at *saṃskārāṅga* rather than at *vijñānāṅga*) than the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*.

The treatment in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, although terse, is more sophisticated than that of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* or the *Daśabhūmika*, and it systematically incorporates both backward-looking and forward-looking definitions in the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section. Thus, the first function of the Karmic Forces is the performance, under the influence of Ignorance, of the *karma* that, according to its moral nature, produces rebirth in one of the various destinies; this is *avidyāpratyayaṃ saṃskāram*. The second function is the depositing of the impressions that comprise the following member, *vijñāna*; this is the *saṃskāra* in *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*. The crucial difference between the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Daśabhūmika* is that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states explicitly that the nature of the causal relationship between the Karmic Forces and Consciousness is one of impressioning or impregnation. In the *Daśabhūmika*, on the other hand, the Karmic Forces "provide the cause of the generation of Consciousness," the first function of which is to "bring about conception into the next existence" (see note to Chapter 2, section B5d).

[11]See, for example, a portion of Vasubandhu's discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *AKBh*, to which I shall refer again later: *tasyāvidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ karmākṣepavaśāc ca vijñānasaṃtatis tāṃ tāṃ gacchati* (*AKBh*: 140).

Schmithausen has shown that one of the problems that the Yogācāras have used *ālayavijñāna* to solve is the dependence of Consciousness on the Karmic Forces (Schmithausen 1987: 6). Referring to a number of texts, including the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Triṃśikābhāṣya, Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya, Pañcaskandhabhāṣya,* and *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, he says, "the *saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the prior existence which receives the Impression of karman and - by continuously propagating itself along with this Impression - becomes, in its turn, the cause of a new existence (beginning with *nāmarūpa*). This exegetical issue thus involves the systematical issue of (ālaya)vijñāna as the recipient and support of karmic Impressions (*vāsanā*)" (Schmithausen 1987: 253-254 n. 51). The description of the second function of the Karmic Forces in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, together with the location of *vijñāna* in the projecting group of members, suggests that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, which, while probably earlier than the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, is certainly older than the other texts mentioned by Schmithausen, already presupposes a *vijñāna* that can, in Schmithausen's terminology, receive and support karmic impressions. In other words, it presupposes *ālayavijñāna*.

3. Individual Existence

The definition of *nāmarūpa* in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, which is quoted in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* (note to Chapter 2, section B5d), is a very basic one, and it can be found as well in early Vaibhāṣika texts such as the *Abhidharmāmṛta*.[12] However, even this very simple definition immediately suggests some rather complex problems. If, in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, *nāmarūpa* is dependent on *vijñāna* and at the same time consists, in part, of *vijñānaskandha*, then the question arises as to how *vijñāna* can be

[12]痛想行識陰是謂名。四大及造色是謂色。二事俱說名色 (T. 1553: 971a; Śāstrī 1953: 71).

included in two *aṅgas*. Schmithausen shows how the Vaibhāṣikas get around this problem in two different contexts. In their interpretation of the formula in terms of a single moment (*kṣaṇikapratītyasamutpāda*), they alter the definition of *nāmarūpa* so as to exclude *vijñānaskandha*.[13] In their *āvasthika* interpretation, on the other hand, both *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* consist of all five *skandhas* at different moments (Schmithausen 1987: 464). According to the discussion of *āvasthikapratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmakośa*, *nāmarūpa* refers to the *skandhas* from the moment of conception (*pratisaṃdhi*) to the moment immediately preceding the development of the Six Senses,[14] that is to say, to a stage of the embryo.[15]

[13]"Individual Existence consists of the four *skandhas* that appear together with *vijñāna*" (*vijñānasahabhuvaś catvāraḥ skandhā nāmarūpam* -- *ASBh*: 133; referred to in Schmithausen 1987: 173, 464 ns. 1110, 1114). Paramārtha's translation agrees with the Sanskrit: 與識俱起四陰名色。(T. 1559: 205c).

However, as La Vallée Poussin points out (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65 n. 2), Hsüan-tsang alters this in his translation to three *skandhas* (識俱三蘊總稱名色 -- T. 1558: 48c). P'u-kuang's commentary, which is based on Hsüan-tsang's translation, suggests that *vedanā* is not included in *nāmarūpa* because, like *vijñāna*, it is already a member of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in its own right (識俱三蘊。謂於五蘊中除識及受以別立支故取想蘊全色行二蘊少分。 -- T. 1821: 166a). Yaśomitra's comment is confusing: *rūpam atra sahabhū-vijñāpty-avijñapty-ādi. saṃjñ'ādi-skaṃdha-trayaṃ nāma* (*AKVy*: 286). If *nāma* consists of three *skandhas*, presumably it must include *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*. But then, why doesn't the text read *vedanādiskandhatrayaṃ*? In fact, according to Wogihara's note, two manuscripts do read this way. I have not been able to consult La Vallée Poussin's reading.

[14]*saṃdhicittāt pareṇa yāvat ṣaḍāyatanaṃ notpadyate sā 'vasthā nāmarūpaṃ tāvat ṣaḍāyatanam ity ucyate*-- *AKBh*: 132.

[15]However, in the portion of the *AKBh* in which, as I show in my chapter on *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*, he expounds his own, provisional opinion, Vasubandhu contradicts the definition according to *kṣaṇikapratītyasamutpāda*: *vijñānapūrvakaṃ punas tasyāṃ tasyāṃ gatau nāmarūpaṃ jāyate pañcaskandhakaṃ kṛtsnajanmānugataṃ/ vibhaṅge mahānidānaparyāye caivaṃ nirdeśat* -- *AKBh*: 140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 85). As the *AKVy* states, the definition to which Vasubandhu here refers is the *sūtra* definition according to which *nāma* consists of four *skandhas* (*vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna*) and *rūpa* of one (*rūpaskandha*): *vibhaṃga evaṃ nirdeśād iti. Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtre nāmarūpavibhaṃga evaṃ nirdeśāt. nāma katamat. catvāro 'rupiṇaḥ skandhā iti. rūpaṃ katamat. yatkiṃcid rūpam iti vistareṇa. yāvad yac cedaṃ rūpaṃ yac ca nāma. tad-ubhayaṃ nāma-rūpam ity ucyata iti* -- *AKVy*: 299-300. In this particular case, Vasubandhu's definition coincides with that of the *āvasthika* interpretation since both agree that *nāmarūpāṅga* consists of five *skandhas*. Again, Vasubandhu follows the same *sūtra* upon which the *Sav pratītyasamutpāda* exposition is a commentary.

Another issue involving *nāmarūpāṅga* arises from the statement found in several *sūtras* that *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, like two bunches of reeds, are mutually dependent; Schmithausen identifies the *Naḍakalāpikāsūtra* of the *Saṃyuktāgama* (T. 99 [no. 288]: 81b) as being the primary source of the discussion of this issue in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (Schmithausen 1987: 170, 460 n. 1076). Schmithausen discussses the interpretation of this simile in great detail, mainly to refute Kajiyama's thesis that "the exegesis of the relation between *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* played an important if not the decisive role in the formation of the concept of ālayavijñāna" (Schmithausen 1987: 171). Although he concludes that "a connection of ālayavijñāna with the context of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is not found before Mahāyānasaṃgraha" (Schmithausen 1987: 171), Schmithausen refers to a number of other texts in which mutual dependence is mentioned, among them both Vaibhāṣika (e.g., the *Vibhāṣā* and *Nyāyānusāra*) and Yogācāra works (e.g., the *Yogācārabhūmi*). In fact, we have seen that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* defines the first function of *nāmarūpa* as forming the "mutual support"; as I indicate in my translation, this must refer to its relationship of mutual dependence with *vijñāna*.

The challenge of solving the problems raised by either the "doubling" of *vijñāna* (its inclusion in two *aṅgas*) or the mutual of dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* would seem to provide a Yogācāra author with the opportunity to "prove" the existence of *ālayavijñāna*; in fact, Asaṅga does so in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*.[16] The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, is not concerned with proving the existence of *ālayavijñāna*, so it does not address these questions. Nevertheless, the understanding of *nāmarūpa* revealed by the definition of its functions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* presupposes, I believe, an identification of *saṃskārapratyayavijñāna* with *ālayavijñāna*.

To understand what the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* means when it says that "Individual

[16]*rnam par śes pa dan/ miṅ daṅ gzugs mduṅ khyim ltar gcig brten pa'i tshul gyis 'jug pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ/ rnam par smin pa'i rnam par śes pa med na mi ruṅ ṅo* -- *MS*$_t$: 16; Lamotte 1973: 58-59).

Existence makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence,"[17] it may be helpful to look at a portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in which a similar notion is expressed in greater detail, as well as at the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, in which the position of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is explained and criticized.

The first phase of the *śarīra* section of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* concerns rebirth from the past life into the present and describes what happens in the first moments of the new life: "After he [namely, a person who, in the past, performed acts conditioned by Ignorance] has passed away from the previous life, he produces in the proper order a basis of personal existence (*ātmabhāva*), that is to say, the conception consciousness in the mother's womb, the fruitional consciousness (*pratisaṃdhiphalavijñāna*), which is conditioned by the causal consciousness (*hetuvijñānapratyaya*), namely [we are to understand "in the proper order" as meaning] through the successive stages of the Individual Existence (*nāmarūpa*) in the form of the embryo, such as the fetus, etc., up until Old Age."[18] Schmithausen cites this passage as a case in which *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* precedes *nāmarūpa* by one moment, and he contrasts it with the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* section on *aṅgasamāsa*, according to which, he implies, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* is simultaneous with *nāmarūpa* (Schmithausen 1987: 175, 467 n. 1129). However, I am not sure that this passage must be read as unambiguously separating *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* from *nāmarūpa*; the extremely confused syntax of the passage makes it difficult to determine the exact temporal relationship between the *pratisaṃdhiphalavijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*.

[17]*ātmabhāvaṃ ca sattvān grāhayati* (*AS*: 26).

[18]*sa kālaṃ kṛtvā pūrvāntād vartamāne 'dhvany ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayaty anupūrveṇa mātuḥ kukṣau hetuvijñāna*[*pratyayaṃ* -- Schmithausen's emendation from the manuscript (Schmithausen 1987: 468 n. 1130)] *pratisandhiphalavijñānaṃ yāvad eva kalalatvādibhir avasthāviśeṣair uttarottarais tasya garbhagatasya nāmarūpasya yāvaj jīrṇatvāya* (*YBh*: 199). Schmithausen, who translates this passage (Schmithausen 1987: 467-468 n. 1130) mentions that it is difficult, and my translation differs somewhat from his.

In any case, what concerns me here is the use of the term "basis of personal existence" (*ātmabhāva*) in a context similar to that in which Asaṅga uses it. Throughout his book on *ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen discusses this term at length, and in a long footnote he identifies four aspects of *ātmabhāva*, "which are not mutually exclusive but may be variously stressed or ignored according to the context." Among these he identifies a "qualitative aspect," in which *ātmabhāva* is similar to *nikāyasabhāga*, and a "concrete aspect," referring to "the constituents on which a certain personal existence is based, or which forms its nucleus resulting from karmic Maturation, especially the *vipākajaṃ ṣaḍ-āyatanam*" (Schmithausen 1987: 558-559 n. 1477). In both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* passages under discussion here, the concrete aspect seems prominent; the beginning of the *ātmabhāva* in the new life, which consists of either the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* together with *nāmarūpa* at the same moment, or the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* immediately followed by the *nāmarūpa*, is the karmic result of the causal consciousness from the preceding life.[19] The fact that these are the only two passages that I have come across in which the term *ātmabhāva* is used in the context of *nāmarūpa* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula further suggests that the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* is a major source of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition.[20]

Another peculiarity of the terminology, or rather phraseology, of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* here is the use of the verb, *grāhayati*, which, like almost all of the verbs in the *aṅgakarmavyāvasthāna* section, is causative. Unlike in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*,

[19]The *ASBh*, on the other hand, stresses the qualitative aspect by relating the arising of *nāmarūpa* to the distribution of beings among the *nikāyasabhāgas*.

[20]In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the term *ātmabhāvaphalam* appears as the fruit due to an ignorance of which the causal chain leading to the projection of a new existence begins (*ŚrBh*: 384; Wayman 1961: 114. In the passage *tatrākṣepako hetur dvividhe phale saṃmohasaṃmohapūrvakāś ca puṇyāpuṇyāniñjyāḥ saṃskārāḥ*, etc., Wayman reads *dvividhe phale* as a locative absolute ["while there is the fruit of two kinds"], but I think that it should be construed with *saṃmoha*). This passage appears to be a less complete (or perhaps less systematic) version of the description of *ākṣepakahetu* found in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* and *Sav pratītyasamutpāda* expositions.

where the functions attributed to the *aṅgas* from Individual Existence through Feeling are rather passive and are, for the most part, related to the process of cognition, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* they are decidedly active and are related to the process of rebirth. This can be explained, I believe, by the fact that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, when it refers to the *aṅgas* from Individual Existence through Feeling, is actually referring to their seeds. The *Ch'eng wei shih lun* suggests that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* uses the terms *nāmarūpa*, etc., rather than *nāmarūpabīja*, etc. because it designates these *aṅgas* from the point of view of the time of their actualization, when they appear in the order of the formula, rather than from the point of view of their causal state, when they are still simultaneous.[21] This explanation is convincing since the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* here is, in fact, explaining the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula per se, in the order in which it is traditionally presented.

More specifically, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* states that, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya aṅgasamāsa* section, *nāmarūpa* includes the *bījas* of *vipākavijñāna*.[22] If, keeping this assertion in mind, we examine the statement that *nāmarūpāṅga* "makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence," we can see that actualized *nāmarūpa* would have no power to cause a being to do anything; it is, essentially, the being itself. However, if *nāmarūpāṅga* consists of the seeds of the first moment or moments of the karmically produced next life, then one can understand how it has the potential to make beings commence a new existence. In the immediately following discussions of the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* similarly uses verbs indicating capabilities that can only be explained if these *aṅgas* represent seeds rather than actualized entities.

The notion that a member of the formula can be a seed seems to have its roots in

[21]T. 1585: 412c; *Shindō*: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483. See also my translation of the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section (Chapter 2, section B5).

[22]異熟識種名色攝 (T. 1585: 412c).

the *Śrāvakabhūmi*.[23] It is further elaborated, I believe, in the passage from the *śarīra* portion of the *Savitarāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition (translated in Chapter 3, section C2) that describes the transition from the present life to the future life. As I have indicated, this passage may have originated in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, from which it was adopted as the *śarīra* portion (*YBh*: 200-201). The *vibhaṅga* (*vibhāga*) portion of the same exposition (summarized in my translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section) appears to have applied some concepts from the *śarīra* portion to the individual members of the formula (*YBh*: 204-212).

However, the seed theory implicit in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* exposition is, as I have mentioned in an earlier chapter, somewhat different from the theory (or theories) found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. According to the explanation of *nāmarūpa* in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi vibhaṅga* portion, the term refers to a seed that is contained in the seed of consciousness (presumably, the consciousness that has been projected by *karma* from the previous life), as well as to *nāmarūpa* in the form of the actualized result of that seed. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* system, on the other hand, *nāmarūpa* is not contained in the seed of consciousness; rather, it is the seed of the fruitional consciousness, itself. Nor does it refer to the actualized *nāmarūpa*, which is only to be found in *jātyaṅga*. Similarly, in the discussions of the Six Senses, Contact, and Feeling, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* seems to have refined the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* theory so that seeds and actualized *dharmas* no longer are included in the same member. This interpretation of the formula is possible only when the member Consciousness, which in the *śarīra* portion has the ambiguous nature of being both the causal consciousness in the past life and the fruitional conception consciousness in the present life, is taken unequivocally to

[23]*tatrākṣepako hetur dvividhe phale saṃmoha-saṃmoha-pūrvakāś ca puṇyāpuṇyāniñjyāḥ saṃskārāḥ saṃskāraparigṛhītaṃ ca/ punarbhavavijñānāṅkura-prādurbhāvāya tadbījaṃ vijñānaparigṛhītam paunarbhavika-nāmarūpa-bījaṃ ṣaḍāyatana-bījaṃ sparśa-vedanābījam iti/ sa evam āyatyāṃ jāti-saṃjñakānāṃ vijñāna-nāmarūpa-ṣaḍāyatana-sparśa-vedanānām utpattaye/ ānupūrvyā pūrvam eva bījaparigrahaḥ/ ayam ākṣepa[ka]-hetuḥ/* (Wayman 1961: 114).

refer to the projecting *karmavāsanās* in the past life.

4. The Six Senses

Unlike the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* emphasize the role in the rebirth process of the Six Senses, which, as we have seen above, Schmithausen describes as the result of karmic maturation. In this respect, at least, their definition is quite close to the *āvasthika* definition in the *Abhidharmakośa*, as explained in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. According to the *āvasthika* interpretation of the formula, Individual Existence refers to a stage of the embryo in which only two of the organs, namely *manas* and *kāya*, are present,[24] while the Six Senses refer to the stage at which the other four organs have developed.[25] This explains the comment of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* that the remaining organs are no longer lacking. As for Vasubandhu, in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, where he gives his own opinion, he essentially agrees with the *āvasthika* definition of the *ṣaḍāyatanas*, as he does with that of *nāmarūpa*.[26]

According to the *Abhidharmakośa* the *ṣaḍāyatanas* refer to the actual completion of the embryonic new existence. However, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* they are, again, seeds, which, when they yield results, will result in the completion of the *ātmabhāva*. Like the actualized *nāmarūpa*, the actualized *ṣaḍāyatanas* are included in *jātyaṅga*.

[24]At the end of the *AKBh* explanation of *nāmarūpa* (see note above), Vasubandhu adds *prāk caturāyatanotpādādini vaktavye ṣaḍāyatanavacanaṃ tadā tadvyavasthāpanāt* (*AKBh*: 132). Yaśomitra explains: *tadā tad-vyavasthāpanād iti. cakṣur-ādy-āyatanotpatti-kāle kāyamana-āyatanayor vyavasthāpanād ity arthaḥ* (*AKVy*: 285; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 63 n. 2).

[25]*utpanne ṣaḍāyatane sāvasthā tāvat ṣaḍāyatanam ity ucyate* (*AKBh*: 132).

[26]Here Vasubandhu simply quotes again from the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*: *tathā nāmarūpaparipākāt krameṇa ṣaḍāyatanam* (*AKBh*: 140).

5. Contact

a. The *Abhidharma* Controversy about *Sparśa*

In this section, before discussing how *sparśa* functions as a member of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I shall examine the *abhidharma* debate concerning the reality of *sparśa*, as well as the Yogācāra position on this issue.

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the definition of *sparśa* is presented as a subject of controversy. According to Sarvāstivāda, *sparśa* is a real *dharma*, defined as that which is produced by the coming together of three *dharmas*;[27] the Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, say that it is not a *dharma*, but only the coming together of the three. Jaini, in the introduction to his edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa*, identifies the *sūtra* source of the Sautrāntika position as being similar to a passage from the *Madhupiṇḍikasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*,[28] and he says that the Vaibhāṣika position is based on the *Ṣaṭṣatkasūtra*.[29] Furthermore, in the *Saṃyuktāgama*, one can find two *sūtras* that seem to be minimal pairs with regard to this issue.[30]

[27]However, it is not clear that all Sarvāstivādin texts agree with this definition. The *Prakaraṇapāda* (阿毘達磨品類足論), for example, defines *sparśa* simply as having the nature of the coming together of the three (觸云何。謂三和合性。T. 1542: 693a).

[28]Jaini refers to a passage quoted in *AKVy*: *ata indriya-viṣaya-vijñāna-trayaṃ sparśa-bhūtam* (*AKVy*: 304). Honjō identifies another passage, quoted in the *AKBh*, as *Samyuktāgama* 214: *iti ya eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ dharmāṇāṃ saṃgatiḥ saṃnipātaḥ samavāyaḥ sa sparśaḥ* (*AKBh*: 143; Honjō 1984: 41; see also La Vallée Poussin 1971. v. 2: 97 n. 1).

[29]La Vallée Poussin identifies this *sūtra* as being parallel to the *Chachakkasutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* iii. 180 and *Dīghanikāya* iii.243 [La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97 n. 3]). Honjō also refers to *Saṃyuktāgama* 304 (Honjō 1984: 41).

[30]*Saṃyuktāgama* 306: "The conditions *cakṣus* and *rūpa* produce *cakṣurvijñāna*; the coming together of the three is *sparśa*" (眼色縁生眼識三事和合觸。-- T. 99: 87c); *Saṃyuktāgama* 68: "*Cakṣurvijñāna* arises in dependence on *cakṣur* and *rūpa*. The coming

Jaini implies that the view of *sparśa* as a separate *dharma* prevails "in the Abhidharma" (Jaini 1959b: 59). While this is largely true, it is, perhaps, an oversimplification of what appears in the various strata of the immense *abhidharma* literature. One might expect to find the simpler definition, that *sparśa* is the coming together of the three, in the earlier *abhidharma* texts. However, it is interesting that in the earliest[31] *Abhidharmapiṭaka* texts that I have consulted, the *Dharmaskandha*[32] and the *Saṅgītiparyāya*,[33] I have only found references suggesting that *sparśa* is, indeed, a dharma distinct from the coming together of the three; these state that *sparśa* results from the coming together of the sense organ, the object, and the corresponding consciousness.

Among texts of the middle period, the *Dhātukāya* holds to the same position,[34] as does the *Vijñānakāya* in a general discussion of *sparśa* (T. 1539: 545b-547a). However, in an immediately following passage that concerns *pratītyasamutpāda*, the *Vijñānakāya* states that the coming together of the six *āyatana*s is *sparśa*.[35] This passage, I believe, is the *sāṃbandhika* interpretation described in the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 118c; see Chapter 5, section B2) which is related to the *kṣaṇika* interpretation[36] presented in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, according to which *sparśa* is the activity of the organs on their objects.[37] In this context, at least, the definition of *sparśa* is closer to that of the

together of the three produces *sparśa*" (縁眼及色眼識生。三事和合生觸。-- T. 99: 18a). The *KIK* translation of *Vibhāṣā*, which mentions these two *sūtra*s in a note, seems to understand them as identical in meaning (*KIK* Bidon bu 14: 285 n. 5), but there is clearly a difference in the relationship between the coming together of the three and *sparśa* in the two passages.

[31]For the relative chronology of *abhidharma* texts, see Mizuno 1961: 69-75.

[32]云何六處縁觸。謂眼及色為縁生眼識三和合故生觸。, etc. (T. 1537: 509b).

[33]云何眼觸身。答眼及諸色為縁生眼識。三和合故觸。, etc. (T. 1538: 429a).

[34]眼觸云何。謂眼及色為縁生於眼識。三和合故觸。, etc. (T. 1540: 615c).

[35]六處和合即是其觸。(T. 1539: 547a).

[36]La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65-66.

[37]*ṣaḍāyatanābhinipātaḥ sparśaḥ* (*AKBh*: 133). *Abhinipātaḥ* is glossed as *pravṛttiḥ* by Yaśomitra (*AKVy*: 286; see also La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65 n. 4). I follow

Sautrāntikas.

Among the later texts, the *Prakaraṇapāda* also contains two different definitions of *sparśa*. In a long discussion of *cakṣuḥsparśa* as one of the six *sparśas*, *sparśa* is defined as resulting from the coming together of the organ, etc.[38] However, in a discussion of the five categories of *rūpa, citta, caitta, cittaviprayukta,* and *asaṃskṛta*, *sparśa*, although included in *caitta*, is simply defined as having the nature of being the coming together of the three.[39] Similarly, the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*, which Mizuno describes as containing material belonging to all three periods (Mizuno 1961: 71-72), contains both definitions. In a long discussion of many types of *sparśa*, *sparśa* is said to be produced by the coming together of the organ, etc.,[40] while in a reference to the Buddha's words in a discussion of *dhyāna*[41] and in an explanation of the six *sparśas* in an exposition of *caittadharmas*,[42] the coming-together-of-the-three definition appears.

This inconsistency in the definition of *sparśa* in the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* suggests to me that the Sarvāstivādins generally defined *sparśa* as a separate *dharma* in their earliest texts, and that the definition did not become a matter of controversy until a later period. In the *Vibhāṣa*,[43] however, the Dārṣṭāntikas are credited with the view that the *sūtra*[44] definition of *sparśa* as the coming together of the three rules out the possibility that it is a separate and real *dharma*. The *Vibhāṣā* disagrees, pointing out two undesirable consequences

Yaśomitra in my translation.

[38]眼觸云何。謂眼及色為縁生眼識。三和合故觸。(T. 1542: 701).

[39]觸云何。謂三和合性。(T. 1542: 693a).

[40]復次縁色生眼識三法和合生觸。是名眼觸。(T. 1548: 697b).

[41]如佛說。云何觸。縁眼縁色生眼識。三法和合觸。(T. 1548: 622c-623a).

[42]復次眼觸縁眼縁色生眼識。三法和合觸。是名眼觸。, etc. (T. 1548: 672b).

[43]T. 1545: 670a-b. This passage, as the *KIK* translation states (*KIK* Bidon bu 14: 283-284 n. 2), occurs at the beginning of a passage commenting on a verse from the *Jñānaprasthāna* concerning sixteen types of *sparśa* (T. 1544: 996b-c).

[44]The *KIK* identifies *Saṃyuktāgama* 306 (see note above) as one version of this *sūtra* (*KIK* Bidon bu 14: 285 n. 5).

that would obtain if *sparśa* were not real: in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, the *aṅga*, *sparśapratyayā vedanā,* would have to be replaced by *ṣaḍāyatanapratyayā vedanā,* with the result that the formula would have only eleven members, and not the twelve mentioned in the *sūtra*; and the list of *dharmas* present in every moment of consciousness (*cittamahābhūmika*) would consist of only nine, not ten.[45] The *Vibhāṣā* then goes on to interpret the *sūtra* quoted by the Dārṣṭānikas as meaning that the coming together of the three is actually the cause of the production of *sparśa* and states that it is not the case that something unreal can be "produced." Furthermore, if *sparśa* were not produced, there would be no condition that would give rise to *vedanā*.[46] Thus it seems that in the period between the composition of the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* texts and that of the *Vibhāṣā,* the definition of *sparśa* became a topic of scholastic contention.

The controversy is quite elaborately laid out in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.* Vasubandhu's clearest and most detailed description of the Sarvāstivādin definition is found in his exposition of the *caitasikadharmas* in Chapter II: "*Sparśa* is the contact that is produced by the coming together of a sense-organ, an object, and consciousness."[47] Yaśomitra reiterates the distinction between the "contact" and the "coming together": "that [entity] by means of which a sense-organ, an object and consciousness touch one another, as it were, is *sparśa*."[48] Vasubandhu does not discuss the Sautrāntika position here, however, so we must return to the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition. There, in a comment on

[45]便違經說。如契經說。觸為縁受。若無觸者但應説六處縁受。惑説無縁不應言觸縁受。又若觸體非實有者。應説縁起唯十一支。契經不應説有十二。又若觸體非實有者。但應説有九大地法。然説有十故觸實有。(T. 1545: 760b).

[46]問若觸實有云何會釋彼所經。答彼經意説三法和合為縁生觸非於無體得有生義。此若不生云何縁受。(T. 1545: 760b; *KIK* Bidon bu 14: 284).

[47]*Sparśa indriyaviṣayavijñānasannipātajā spṛṣṭiḥ* (*AKBh*: 54; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 154).

[48]*yad-yogād indriya-viṣaya-vijñanāny anyonyaṃ spṛśantīva sa sparśaḥ* (*AKVy*: 127; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 154).

Abhidharmakośa III 30b,[49] Vasubandhu presents the controversy in the form of an argument between Sautrāntika[50] and Sarvāstivāda. Below, I shall attempt to summarize this argument, which, of course, is quite closely related to the one found in the *Vibhāṣā*.

The Sautrāntikas begin by quoting a *sūtra* that states that *sparśa* is simply the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness.[51] The Sarvāstivādins counter with the *Ṣaṭṣaṭkadharmaparyāya*,[52] which enumerates six external and internal *āyatanas*, *vijñānas*, *sparśas*, *vedanās*, and *tṛṣṇās*;[53] they say that the *sūtra* would not mention *sparśa* in this context if it were not a separate *dharma* because that would result in an undesirable repetition.[54] In other words, if *sparśa* were merely the coming together of the three, the *sūtra* would not mention it since it has already mentioned the object (the external *āyatana*), the organ (the internal *āyatana*), and consciousness.

The Sautrāntikas, however, object to this reasoning, saying that the *sūtra* in fact does mention things that are already included in other categories; for example, *vedanā* and *tṛṣṇā* belong to one of the six so-called external *āyatanas*, namely, *dharmāyatana*.[55] The

[49] *sparśāḥ ṣaṭ saṃnipātajāḥ* (*AKBh*: 141-142; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 95-98).

[50]The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* of Harivarman (identified in Katō 1980 as a fellow student, along with Śrīlāta, of Kumāralāta) not surprisingly takes the same position as Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika opponent: 識在緣中是名為觸。以三事和合名觸。是非觸相。所以者何。根不到緣。是故根緣不應和合以三事能取緣故名為和合。(T. 1646: 286c; *KIK* Ronshū bu 3: 186).

[51]*Saṃyuktāgama* 214; for text, see note above.

[52]*Saṃyuktāgama* 304; see note above.

[53]*ṣaṭṣaṭko dharmaparyāyaḥ katamaḥ/ ṣaḍādhyātmikāny āyatanāni/ ṣaṭ bāhyāny āyatanāni/ ṣaṭ vijñānakāyāḥ/ ṣaṭ sparśakāyāḥ/ ṣaṭ vedanākāyāḥ/ ṣaṭ tṛṣṇākāyā iti* (*AKBh*: 143; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97).

[54]*ananyatve hi satīndriyārtha-vijñāneṣūkteṣu sparśa-kāyavacanam punar uktam syāt. tataś ca ṣaṭṣaṭ-katvaṃ hīyate.* (*AKVy*: 304; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97).

[55]*na va pṛthi*(sic)*gnirdeśāt pṛthagbhāvo bhavati/ mā bhūd dharmāyatanād vedanātṛṣṇayoḥ pṛthagbhāva iti* (*AKBh*: 143), which Yaśomitra explains as follows: *yadi pṛthaṅ-nirdeśāt pṛthag-bhāvo bhavet. vedanā-tṛṣṇe api dharmāyatanāt pṛthaṅ nirdiṣṭe. tayor api vedanā-tṛṣṇayor dharmāyatanāt pṛthag-bhāvaḥ syāt. na ca tayoḥ pṛthag-bhāva iṣyate. dharmāyatanāntarbhāvāt. naiṣa doṣa iti vistaraḥ.* (*AKVy*: 304; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v.

Sarvāstivādins respond by pointing out the difference between the "repetition" of *vedanā* and *tṛṣṇā* and the mention of *sparśa* in this context. According to them, many *dharmas* belong to *dharmāyatana*; hence, it is reasonable to mention the *vedanākāyās* and the *tṛṣṇākāyās* separately. If *sparśa*, however, is, as the Sautrāntikas maintain, merely the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness, it would be unreasonable to mention it separately from these three, well since there can be no question as to which three entities are coming together.[56]

The Sarvāstivādins continue, saying that since consciousness is always caused by an organ and an object, the Sautrāntikas cannot claim that the *sūtra* mentions organs and objects without reference to consciousness. Therefore, organ, object, and consciousness clearly go together, and *sparśa* need only be mentioned if it is indeed a real and separate *dharma*.[57] The Sautrāntika[58] response to this is that it is not the case that, whenever any *cakṣus* and *rūpa* are present, they always cause visual consciousness; nor is it the case that all visual consciousness is the result of the presence of every *cakṣus* and *rūpa*.[59]

2: 97).

[56]*naiṣa doṣas tadvyatiriktasyāpi dharmāyatanasya bhāvāt/ na caivaṃ sparśabhūtāt trayād anyat trayam asti yasya śeṣasyātra grahaṇaṃ syāt* (*AKBh*: 143). *naiṣa doṣa iti yathoktas tad-vyatiriktasyāpi vedanā-tṛṣṇā-vyatiriktasyāpi dharmāyatanasya saṃjñādi-svabhāvasya bhāvād astitvāt. na caivam iti vistaraḥ. na caivaṃ bhavatas trayāṇām saṃnipātaḥ sparśa ity evaṃ bruvāṇasya sparśabhūtād indriyārtha-vijñāna-trayād anyad asparśa-bhūtaṃ trayam indriyārtha-vijñāna-trayam asti. yasya śeṣasyātra sūtre grahaṇaṃ syāt.* (*AKVy*: 304).

[57]*yady api hīndriyārthau syātām avijñānakau na tu punar vijñānam anindriyārthakam/ tasmāt triṣu nirdiṣṭeṣu punaḥ sparśasya grahaṇam anarthakaṃ prāpnoti* (*AKBh*: 143). *yady apīndriyārthau syātām avijñānakau. tat-sabhāgāv ity arthaḥ. na tu punar vijñānam anindriyārthakam. avaśyaṃ hi vijñānaṃ sendriyārthakaṃ bhavati. tac ca vijñanam apadiṣṭam atra ṣaḍ vijñāna-kāyā iti. tasmāt triṣu nirdiṣṭeṣu indriyārtha-vijñāneṣu ṣaḍ-vijñāna-kāya-vacanena punaḥ sparśa-grahaṇam anarthakaṃ prāpnoti. ṣaṭ-sparśa-kāyā iti. ataḥ saṃnipātād anyaḥ sparśa iti siddhaṃ.* (*AKVy*: 305; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 97-98).

[58]The *ASVy* identifies this as the opinion of Śrīlāta (*AKVy*: 305; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 98). For a discussion of the identity of Śrīlāta, see Katō 1980.

[59]*na khalu sarve cakṣūrūpe sarvasya sakṣurvijñānasya kāraṇaṃ nāpi sarvaṃ cakṣurvijñānaṃ sarvayoś cakṣūrūpayoḥ kāryam* (*AKBh*: 143; for a remark on the translation of the repeated use of *sarva*, see Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 261 n. 1). Except for

Therefore the term *cakṣuḥsparśa* must be used to refer to the occasions when the three do enter into a relationship of cause and result.[60]

Finally, Vasubandhu explains how the Sarvāstivādins maintain their opinion when confronted with the *sūtra* passage mentioned above: "*sparśa* is the meeting of, the contact among, the coming together of these three" (*ya eṣām trayāṇāṃ saṃgatiḥ saṃnipātaḥ samavāyaḥ sa sparśaḥ* -- *AKBh*: 143). They either read the *sūtra* differently: "*sparśa* is that which is produced from the meeting of, the contact among, the coming together of these three *dharmas*" (*ya eṣāṃ dharmāṇāṃ saṃgateḥ saṃnipātāt samavāyād utpannaḥ sa sparśaḥ* -- *AKVy*: 305; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 98 n. 2); or they say that the *sūtra* figuratively identifies the result, *sparśa*, with the cause, *saṃgati*.[61] As we have seen, it is, in fact, possible to find *sūtra* passages that support either interpretation so the first explanation, at least, is quite convincing. Vasubandhu then cuts off this argument, allowing the Sarvāstivādins to have the last word, and in this case I believe that he agrees with them, and not the Sautrāntikas.

identifying this as Srīlābha's (sic) opinion, La Vallée Poussin in his translation does not provide any information from the *AKVy*. Instead, he refers to chapter four of the *AKBh*, in which are mentioned two types of *rūpa* (*samādhiviṣaya* and *avijñapti*) that are not visible (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 18). His implication seems to be that these are examples of *rūpa* that cannot result in *cakṣurvijñāna*. Yaśomitra, however, explains Śrīlāta's opinion differently. According to him (if I understand this rather difficult passage correctly), only previously produced *cakṣus* and *rūpa* can be the cause of a *cakṣurvijñāna*, not *cakṣus* and *rūpa* produced at the same time as the *vijñāna*. Similarly, only the *vijñāna* that is produced afterwards, and not every *cakṣurvijñāna*, can be the result of the previous *cakṣus* and *rūpa*, and not of *cakṣus* and *rūpa* produced at the same time (*na khalv iti vistaraḥ. pūrvotpanne cakṣu-rūpe kāraṇām. na tu vijñāna-sahotpanne. nāpi sarva-cakṣur-vijñānam iti. paścād utpannaṃ pūrvayoś cakṣū-rūpayoḥ. na sahotpannayoḥ* -- *AKVy*: 305). Śrīlāta's point seems to be that causes and effects cannot be simultaneous, a Sautrāntika position (for discussions of this issue, in the context of *pratītyasamutpāda*, see Katō 1989: 317-326; in the context of the relationship between *sparśa* and *vedanā*, see *AKBh*: 145; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 101; in the context of perception, see La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 282).

[60] *ato yeṣāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvas te sparśabhāve vyavasthāpitā ity eke* (*AKBh*: 143).

[61] *kāraṇe va kāryopacāro 'yam iti bruvanti* (*AKBh*: 143), which is explained by Yaśomitra: *saṃgatau saṃnipāte samavāye kāraṇe kāryopacāraḥ sparśa iti* (*AKVy*: 305).

b. Vasubandhu's Position

In order to ascertain Vasubandhu's personal opinion, we must return to the context of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula as a whole. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, there are three general interpretations of the formula. The first, an explanation of each member as a state (*avasthā*) of the five *skandhas*, is accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas. The second, *kṣaṇika*, interpretation is an explanation of each member as it occurs in a single moment; Vasubandhu gives the example of the moment a murder is committed.[62] This interpretation is not, as far as I know, associated with a particular school. Finally, there is a passage in the comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, in which Vasubandhu presents his own understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*. In this passage, Vasubandhu often criticizes Sarvāstivādin positions, seemingly from a Sautrāntika point of view,[63] but in the case of *sparśa*, he seems to accept the Sarvāstivādin position. Before discussing this passage in detail, I shall examine the *āvasthika* definition in order to see whether it is consistent with the Sarvāstivādin definition of *sparśa* as a *mahābhūmikadharma* described above.

According to the *āvasthika* interpretation as presented by Vasubandhu, the *ṣaḍāyatanas* refer to the five *skandhas* from the time that all six sense organs are present until the the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness;[64] that is to say, they refer to the last stage of the embryo, immediately before birth. *Sparśa* refers to the *skandhas* from the moment of the coming together of the three until the ability to distinguish the causes of pleasurable, unpleasurable, and neutral feelings has developed.[65] Yaśomitra

[62] See the previous section and Chapter 5, section 5Bh.

[63] Again, see Chapter 5.

[64] *utpanne ṣaḍāyatane sāvasthā tāvat ṣaḍāyatanam ity ucyate yāvad indriyaviṣaya-vijñānatrikasaṃnipātaḥ* (*AKBh*: 132).

[65] *trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātāt sparśo bhavati. sa yāvad vedanātrayakāraṇaparicchedena samartho bhavati sā 'vasthā sparśa ity ucyate* (*AKBh*: 132; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 64).

points out that *sparśa* is established at the state of birth, because only then is the coming together of the completed sense organs and their objects possible.[66] He also suggests a possible upper age limit for this stage, giving the example of a child who touches a fire because he does not know that it will cause him pain.[67] Thus, the stage seems to coincide with very early childhood.

Certainly, the term *sparśa* seems to be used almost synonymously with *trikasaṅgama*, another synonym for *trikasaṃnipāta*, in the verse here.[68] Nevertheless, I think that I can distinguish a difference between the significance of the two terms in the *āvasthika* interpretation. Vasubandhu uses the terms *trikasaṃgama* and *trikasaṃnipāta* in the verse and the commentary respectively to refer to the first moment of the stage, the moment of birth. However, to refer to the entire stage, he uses the term *sparśa*, again in both the verse and the commentary.[69]

I believe that the key to understanding this passage lies in the fact that certain members of the formula, including *sparśa*, have a strongly cognitional role, even in the "embryological" *āvasthika* system.[70] If from birth to about age three, an infant or child can experience the outside world, albeit without understanding how it functions causally, it is, as Yaśomitra states, because the elements necessary for cognition become present at

[66]*sparśo jātāvasthāyāṃ vyavasthāpyate. paripūrṇa-ṣaḍāyatana-saṃnipāta-sadbhāvāt.* (*AKVy*: 285).

[67]*tathā hi bālako 'gnim api spṛśed duḥkhasyaitat kāraṇam ity aparicchindan* (*AKVy*: 285).

[68]"[*Nāmarūpa*] before the production of the six *āyatanas*; that [namely, the six *āyatanas*] before the coming together of the three; *sparśa* before the ability to know the cause of pleasure, pain, etc." (*prāk ṣaḍāyatanotpādāt tat pūrvaṃ trikasaṅgamāt/ sparśaḥ prāk sukhaduḥkhādi-kāraṇajñānaśaktitaḥ* --*AK* III 22; *AKBh*: 132; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 63-64).

[69]It is true that Yaśomitra glosses *sparśa* as *ṣaḍ-indriya-viṣaya-vijñāna-saṃnipātaḥ*, but this is in the context of explaining why the stage called *sparśa* begins at the moment of birth (*AKVy*: 285; see note, above).

[70]For a discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* that touches on this issue, see Takasaki 1987: 149-162 (for *sparśa* in particular, 152-156).

the time of birth. Therefore, the potential for cognition that occurs at the moment of birth, *trikasaṃnipāta*, is the cause, in some sense, of the stage, *sparśa*. In this way, I believe, the Sarvāstivādins' embryological explanation of *sparśa* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula can be reconciled with their insistence in other contexts that *sparśa* is a *dharma* that exists independently from organ, object, and consciousness, but that is caused by the coming together of the three.

Coming to Vasubandhu's own exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* commentary on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, we are immediately confronted with a textual problem. According to Pradhan's Sanskrit text,[71] *sparśa* is the coming together of the three.[72] If we accept his reading, it would appear that Vasubandhu here, as is frequently the case, favors a Sautrāntika opinion. However, the Chinese and Tibetan translations all differ from Pradhan's text, and they all suggest an original Sanskrit *trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātajaḥ* ("produced by the coming together of the three")[73] or *trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātāt* ("as a result of the coming together of the three").[74] These versions suggest that Vasubandhu here accepts the Sarvāstivādin position. Unfortunately, neither Yaśomitra nor Sthiramati comments on, nor even quotes, the definition of *sparśa* in Vasubandhu's

[71] *trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ sukhādivedanīyaḥ* (*AKBh*: 140). Pradhan's reading here has been confirmed by inspection of a photocopy of the manuscript.

[72] Mareck Mejor's translation reflects the Sanskrit text: "there is a meeting of the three [viz. visual consciousness, sense of vision, object of vision, etc.], [and this is called] 'contact'. [which may be felt as pleasant etc.]" (Mejor 1991: 96).

[73] Paramārtha's Chinese translation: 次於塵起亂心時。由識生故。從三和合生觸。謂於樂受等勝。 (T. 1559: 208a).

[74] Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation: 次與境合便有識生。三和故有順樂等觸。(T. 1558: 51b). Tibetan: *gsum 'dus pa las bde ba la sogs pa myoṅ bar 'gyur ba'i reg pa'o/* (*AKBh*$_t$: 151b 8). Naturally, both La Vallée Poussin in his French translation ("et, par le concours des trois [*vijñāna*, *ṣaḍāyatana* et *viṣaya*], *sparśa*: lequel est d'être éprouvé agréablement, etc." [La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 85]) and Yamaguchi and Funahashi in their Japanese (三の和合より順楽受觸[sukha-vedanīya-sparśa]等あり。 [Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 231]) reflect these versions since the Sanskrit text was published after their translations.

exposition[75] so we are unable to know what version of the text was available to them. P'u-kuang, although he does comment on this portion, abbreviates the text at the crucial point, so we are likewise ignorant of the text that he was looking at.[76] Moreover, we cannot definitely infer from his comment which version of the text he had, and it seems that he was not, at this point, considering the distinction between these two definitions of *sparśa*. Nevertheless, his syntax would appear to support the equation of *sparśa* with *saṃnipāta* even less than a causal or temporal relationship between the two.[77] Finally, it seems quite plausible that Pradhan's manuscript simply dropped one letter, turning *saṃnipātajaḥ* into *saṃnipātaḥ*.

On the basis then of the available sources, I believe that Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* accepts the Sarvāstivādin, rather than the Sautrāntika, definition of *sparśa*. My conclusion is supported by the fact that Vasubandhu elsewhere either implicitly or explicitly grants *sparśa* the status of an independent *dharma*. In the *Pañcaskandhaka*,[78] he defines *sparśa* simply as one of the universally present (*sarvatraga*)

[75]See Mejor 1991: 98-110 for the Tibetan text of Sthiramati's gloss on Vasubandhu's exposition.

[76]次與境合至順樂等觸者。(T. 1821: 172b).

[77]出觸支體。既六根生次與合便有識生。根境識合有順樂受等三觸。 (T. 1821: 172b). The last sentence can be translated as follows: "Organ, object, and consciousness coming together, there are the three [kinds of] *sparśa* that are to be experienced as pleasurable, etc." P'u-kuang's use of the verb *yu* (有) instead of a copulative like *shih* (是) suggests that he does not consider the coming together to be synonymous with *sparśa*.

[78]*reg pa gaṅ źe na/ gsum 'dus nas yoṅs su gcod pa'o* (*Psk*$_t$: 14a 2). This clearly indicates that *sparśa* and *trikasaṃnipāta* are not identical, unlike the Chinese translation, which is not so clear: 云何為觸。謂三和合分別為性。(T. 1612: 848c). However, the Chinese translation of Sthiramati's commentary, *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya*, explains the above Chinese text as follows: 三和。謂眼色識。如是等。此諸和合心心法生故名為觸。與受所依為 (T. 1613: 851c). Therefore, I think that the Chinese version can be understood in essentially the same way as the Tibetan, which I translate as follows: "What is contact? It is the distinct apprehension (for this translation of what was probably *pariccheda* in the original Sanskrit, see Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613) [that occurs] after the three come together" (see Anacker 1984:67 for a slightly different English translation and Dantinne 1980: 9 for a French translation).

dharmas, without referring to any difference of opinion, while in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, in his exposition of *ṣaḍāyatanapratyayaḥ sparśaḥ*, he quotes the *sūtra* on which the Sautrāntika position is based and proceeds to refute this position at considerable length, using some of the same arguments that he attributes to Sarvāstivāda in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.[79]

c. *Sparśa* in Yogācāra Texts

If, in fact, Vasubandhu accepts the Sarvāstivādin definition of *sparśa* as a separate *dharma*, it is not surprising. As I shall argue in more detail later in this chapter and in following ones, Vasubandhu, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, when discussing a controversial point, tends to side with whichever position is more consonant with Yogācāra doctrine. In this case, it is Sarvāstivāda that is closer to Yogācāra. The Sautrāntika denial of the reality of *sparśa* is incompatible with its status, according to Yogācāra texts such as the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, as one of the five *caitasikadharmas* always associated with *ālayavijñāna* and thus a separate and real entity.[80]

However, the definitions of *sparśa* in earlier portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

[79] *de dag ni rgyu la 'bras bu gdags pa yin te/ dper na 'phags pa rnams ni mthoṅ ba bde źes bya ba daṅ/ tshaṅs spyod dri ma bud med yin źes bya ba lta bu'o/ 'jig rten na yaṅ me ni bde ba'o/ me ni sdug bsṅal ba'o źes bya ba lta bu'o/ rgyu la 'bras bu de ltar gdags kyi gsum 'dus pa ñid reg pa ma yin no źes bya ba 'di ji ltar yid ches par bya/ 'jig rten na phrad la reg go źes brjod do źe na/ 'di ni re źig skye mched drug gi rkyen gyis reg pa źes 'byuṅ ba'i mdo sde daṅ 'gal ba yin te/ skye mched drug ni gsum gyi naṅ du 'dus pa'i phyir daṅ/ sems la 'byuṅ ba'i reg pa yaṅ ma yin par thal bar 'gyur la/ gsum 'dus pa ni sems las byuṅ ba'i chos reg pa yaṅ ma yin no/ reg pa ni btags pa yin te ris 'dra ba bźin no źe na yaṅ de ltar na mi ldan pa yin par 'gyur la de lta bu ni sde pa gaṅ gi grub pa'i mtha' yaṅ ma yin no/ btsun pa gos dam rab daṅ mdo sde 'di ñid las gsuṅs pa miṅ gaṅ źe na/ tshor ba daṅ 'du śes daṅ/ sems pa daṅ/ reg pa daṅ/ yid la byed pa'o źes bya ba daṅ/ sde tshan drug pa drug las kyaṅ sde tshan drug rnams ni rigs tha dad pa las rnam par bźag gi/ gsum 'dus pa ñid reg pa ma yin no* (*Psvy*: chi 35b 8-f.36a 6).

[80] T. 1585: 11b-c, especially 11c: 然觸自性是實非假。; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 143-146. Elsewhere in the *AS*, *sparśa* is defined as one of the *caitasikadharmas* (*AS*: 15); I shall discuss the particulars of the definition later.

differs from those in later ones, and it is necessary to examine the various definitions in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in order to determine at what point Yogācāra starts to identify *sparśa* explicitly as something other than the mere coming together of organ, object, and consciousness. As far as I can tell, those portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* identified by Schmithausen as the oldest, i.e., the *Śrāvakabhūmi, Bodhisattvabhūmi,* and *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī,* do not define *sparśa* in terms that indicate a concern with the question of its reality.[81]

In the *Manobhūmi,* on the other hand, most of the evidence suggests that *sparśa* is an independent *dharma.* It is true that we can find *sparśa* defined as *trikasaṃnipāta* (*YBh*: 60), and this could suggest that *sparśa* is nothing more than the coming together of the three. However, immediately before this definition, *sparśa,* which is said to be that by which the pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral characteristic of an object is ascertained,[82] is mentioned as one of the *sarvabhūmika caittadharmas.* Both its function and its inclusion among the *sarvabhūmikas* imply that it is real. After this passage, in which the functions of the *sarvabhūmikas* are described in order to prove that they are indeed present at each moment of consciousness, each *dharma* is defined by a single noun, nominal compound, or very brief nominal phrase,[83] hence the definition: "What is *sparśa*? The coming together of the three." Thus, the term is probably used here, not to indicate the author's rejection of *sparśa* as a real entity, but simply for convenience since, as we have seen, *trikasaṃnipāta* is found in the *sūtras,* and can thus be understood as a kind of shorthand

[81] There is a reference to 三和合觸 in *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 800c), but there is no discussion of the term. Furthermore, the context neither indicates an awareness of the issue nor implies a position.

[82] *tatraiva śubhāśubhobhayaviparītalakṣaṇaṃ yat* [*tat*] *sparśena pratipadyate* (*YBh*: 59; see Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613).

[83] *manaskāraḥ katamaḥ/ cetasā ābhogaḥ/ sparśaḥ katamaḥ/ trikasannipātaḥ/ vedanā katamā/ anubhavanā/ saṃjñā katamā/ sañjānanā/ cetanā katamā/ cittābhisaṃskāraḥ* (*YBh*: 60).

definition.[84] In the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, too, *sparśa* is included among the *dharmas* always associated with *vijñāna*, which in this case is specified as *ālayavijñāna*.[85] From these passages, we can infer that *sparśa* is considered real and separate, but, unlike in the Sarvāstivādin discussions, it is never explicitly stated to be the result of the coming together of organ, object, and consciousness

In the *pratyayaprabheda* portion of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* analysis, however, the question is raised as to how, if *sparśa* is defined as being the result of the coming together of the three, it can be called *ṣaḍāyatanapratyaya* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula. The answer is an attempt to reconcile cognitional theory with the terminology of the formula: when a sense organ is present, the other two (namely, object and consciousness) must also be present, but, because of the predominance of the six sense organs, the other two are here included in the term *ṣaḍāyatana*.[86] Thus, this passage, which occurs in a part of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that I consider to be quite highly systematized, implies a definition of *sparśa* identical to the one accepted by the Sarvāstivādins: *sparśa* is conditioned by, and hence is not identical to, the simultaneous presence of organ, object, and consciousness, all three of which are here designated as *ṣaḍāyatana*. In the *vibhaṅga* portion of the same *pratītyasamutpāda* analysis, moreover, we can find an explicit statement that *sparśa* is produced by the coming together of the three.[87]

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[84]This passage is referred to in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, which reproduces its enumeration of *sarvabhūmikas* (T. 1579: 684a).

[85]云何建立相應轉相。謂阿頼耶識。與五遍行心相應所恒共相應。謂作意觸受想思。(T. 1579: 580a-b).

[86]*yadā trikasamavāyapratyayaḥ sparśaḥ kena kāraṇena ṣaḍāyatanapratyaya evoktaḥ/ sati ṣaḍāyatane tadanyadvayāvaikalyāt ṣaḍāyatanapradhānaṃ pradhānam iti kṛtvā dvayasaṃgrahāc ca ṣaḍāyatanasya* (*YBh*: 217).

[87]*cakṣuḥsaṃsparśaḥ katamaḥ/ trikasamavāyajā viṣayaṃ śubhādyarthataḥ udgrahaṇātā* (Schmithausen's correction from manuscript of Bhattacharya's edition, p. 207--Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613). I have summarized the passage in which this definition occurs and provided the complete text in the notes to my translation (Chapter 2, section B5f).

Except for the mention of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, the definitions of *sparśa* in the earliest Yogācāra materials are essentially similar to the Sarvāstivādin definitions. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, perhaps elaborating on the passage from the *Manobhūmi* in which *sparśa* is said to ascertain the pleasant, etc., characteristic of an object (see above), redefines *sparśa* in a way that seems to influence later texts, such as the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*, and *Ch'eng wei shih lun*. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *sparśa* is *trikasannipāta*[88] *indriyavikāraparicchedaḥ*. This is difficult to translate. There is not much difference in meaning between "when there is coming together of the three" and "after (or due to) the coming together of the three," so whether one follows the Sanskrit or the Tibetan, it is clear that *sparśa* and *trikasannipāta* are not equivalent here. However, the compound *indriyavikāraparicchedaḥ* is more problematic. Walpola Rahula thinks that he is following La Vallée Poussin in translating *vikāraparicchedaḥ* as "analogue à la transformation," and quotes him as saying, "Cette signification de *pariccheda* n'est pas connue de nos lexiques."[89] But Rahula must not have noticed that La Vallée Poussin is referring to a specific and idiosyncratic explanation of *pariccheda* (*fen pie*, 分别) in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*,[90] and its further explanation in K'uei Chi's commentary.[91] There is no reason to assume that this definition applies to the term as used in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya;* in fact, La Vallée Poussin remarks in a footnote that Sthiramati,[92] who follows the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*,

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[88] According to Pradhan, this should be *trikasannipāte* (Pradhan 1950: 6). This is incorrect *sandhi* so I shall follow Gokhale. The Tibetan reads *gsum 'dus nas* (AS_t: 55b 6), which would suggest a Sanskrit ablative: *trikasannipātād*.

[89] Rahula 1980: 7; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 143-144.

[90] 觸似彼 (refers to *vikāra*) 起故名分別。(T. 1585: 11b).

[91] 故名分別　　分別之用是觸功能。分別領似異名。如子似父名分別父。(*Shindō*: 97; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 144-145 n. c).

[92] The reference here is to *Triṃśikābhāṣya*: 20. The entire passage is as follows:

tatra sparśas trikasaṃnipāte indriyavikāraparicchedaḥ vedanā-saṃniśrayakarmakaḥ/ indriyaviṣayavijñānāni triṇy eva trikaṃ tasya kāryakāraṇabhāvena samavasthānaṃ

gives an explanatiion in the *Triṃśikābhāṣya* different from that of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*: "Le Sparśa est le discernement (*pariccheda*) de la modification (*vikāra*) de l'organe, modification produite quand a lieu le concours de la triade" (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 144 n. b). Schmithausen's summary of the definition according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, therefore, is correct: "*sparśa* is the distinct apprehension of such modifications of the sense-organs as are suitable to the arising of pleasant, unpleasant or neutral feelings (*vedanā*)."[93] On the basis of all of the above, I shall translate the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* definition as follows: "The three [object, organ, and consciousness] having come together, *sparśa* is the distinct apprehension of the modification of the organ." Two other texts define *sparśa* in terms of *pariccheda*: the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*[94] and the *Pañcaskandhaka*.[95] Their nearly identical definitions, however, do not specify what is apprehended.

It is clear that the definitions containing the term *pariccheda*, of which the earliest I

trikasaṃnipātaḥ/ tasmin sati tatsamakālam evendriyasya sukha-duḥkhādivedanānukūlo yo vikāras tena sadṛśo viṣayasya sukhādivedanīyākārapariccheda yaḥ sa sparśaḥ/ indriyaṃ punar yena viśeṣeṇa sukhaduḥkhādihetutvaṃ pratipadyate sa tasya vikāraḥ/ sparśaḥ punar indriyavikāra-sādṛśyenendriyaṃ spṛśatīndriyeṇa va spṛśyata iti sparśa ucyate/ ata eva viṣayavikāraparicchedātmako 'pīndriyavikārapariccheda ukta (*TrṃśBh*: 20). Stcherbatsky interpets this last sentence as meaning that *sparśa* "represents rather a modification, or effect, on the object than on the sense-organ" (Stcherbatsky 1978: 042), while Lévi's translation also suggests that its being a modification of the object is primary: "Ainsi donc, quoi qu'il consiste essentiellement dans une modification définie de lobjet, il est aussi une modification définie de l'organe" (Lévi 1932: 74).

The *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* and *Ṭīkā* give yet another, similar definition: *triparicchedāj jagat kliśyata iti sambadhyate/ trayāṇāṃ hīndri[ya]viṣayavijñānasannipāte indriyasya sukhādivedanotapattyanukūlo yas triprakāro vikāras tatparicchedaḥ sparśaḥ/ ata evāyam indriyavikārasādṛśyaṃ spṛśati tadākāratayeti sparśa ucyate/ atha vā ṣaḍāyatanapratyayaḥ sparśa indriyasya sukhādivedanānukūlaṃ trividhaṃ vikāraṃ prasūte* (*Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*: 30-31; for translation, see Stcherbatsky 1978: 64).

[93]Schmithausen 1987: 380 n. 613. The text of the *ASBh* reads as follows: *vijñānotpattāv indriyasya sukhādivedanotpattyanukūlo yo vikāras tadākāraḥ sparśo veditavyaḥ* (*ASBh*: 5).

[94]觸者。謂三事和合分別爲體 (T. 1602: 481a).

[95]*reg pa gaṅ źe na/ gsum 'dus nas yoṅs su gcod pa'o* (*Psk*$_t$: 14a 2); 云何為觸。謂三和合分別為性。(T. 1612: 848c). See note above.

can find is that of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, are different from the Sautrāntika definition, on the one hand, and the Sarvāstivādin and various *Yogācārabhūmi* definitions on the other. I suspect that the reason for this new definition is related to a development in the concept of *indriya* that Schmithausen investigates in his attempt to establish the beginnings of the theory of *ālayavijñāna*. According to Schmithausen, "ālayavijñāna was, originally, nothing but a hypostasis of the Seeds of mind sticking in the material sense-faculties" (1987: 65). Eventually, "after this 'principle of hypostasis' and the connection of ālayavijñāna with the specific theory of Seeds from which it started had fallen into oblivion," *ālayavijñāna* came to include the seeds of the sense-faculties and other matter, as well; Schmithausen traces the original formulation of this new concept of *ālaya* to what he calls the *Nivṛtti Portion* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*.[96] He sees a further development along these lines in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* definitions of *cakṣur-*, *rūpa-*, and *cakṣurvijñānadhātus*.

According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *cakṣurdhātu* consists of the eye by which visible matter is perceived, the *ālayavijñāna* comprising the accumulated seed of *cakṣus* that will develop in a future existence, and the resultant *ālayavijñāna* ("from which the present *cakṣus*, etc., have arisen" [Schmithausen 1987: 64]).[97] *Rūpadhātu* consists of whatever visible matter is perceived by the eye, as well as the power of *cakṣurdhātu*

[96]He also provides a tentative retranslation into Sanskrit of the pertinent passage (*YBh*$_t$: zi 8a 5 ff.; T. 1579: 581a): **(tathā hi) 1. tat sattva-loka-nirvṛtti-mūlaṃ/ sādhiṣṭhānendriya-pravṛttivijñāna-janakatvāt/ 2. bhājanaloka-nirvṛtti-mūlaṃ ca/ bhājanaloka-janakatvāt* (Schmithausen 1987: 342 n. 444).

[97]*cakṣurdhātuḥ kiṃlakṣaṇaḥ/ yena cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭavān paśyati yac ca tasya bījam upacita[ṃ vaipakyaṃ cā]layavijñānaṃ tac cakṣuḥ* (retranslation into Sanskrit in Pradhan 1950: 3; portion in brackets represents Schmithausen's emendation on the basis of the Tibetan and *ASBh* -- 1987: 343 n. 445; see also *AS*$_t$: 52b 2-3; Rahula 1971: 3, who translates on the basis of Pradhan's uncorrected text). Schmithausen's addition to the translation is based on the *Bhāṣya*: *yena cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭavān ity atītavijñānopabhogadhārakatvena dhātutvaṃ darśayati/ paśyatīti vartamānavijñānopabhogadhārakatvena/ yac ca tasya cakṣuṣo bījam upacitam ālayavijñānaṃ yata āyatyāṃ cakṣur nirvartiṣyate, vaipākyaṃ ca yato nirvṛttam, tad api dvividhaṃ bījaṃ cakṣurdhātur ity ucyate, cakṣuṣo hetutavāt* (*ASBh*: 2; Schmithausen 1987: 343 ns. 446, 447).

over that visible matter;[98] Schmithausen understands this to mean that the sense-objects "arise under the influence of the sense-faculties, which would, in view of the fact that the sense-faculties, in their turn, originate from ālayavijñāna, amount to an indirect origination of the sense-objects, too, from ālayavijñāna" (1987: 64). Finally, *cakṣurvijñānadhātu* consists of the recognition of visible matter, having the eye as its basis and visible matter as its object, as well as the *ālayavijñāna* comprising the accumulated seed of *cakṣurvijñāna* and the resultant *alayavijñāna*,[99] "from which *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., have arisen or are going to arise in the present existence" (Schmithausen 1987: 343 n. 447).

As they have thus become identified with *ālayavijñāna*, the *indriyas* are the karmically produced receptors of experience in the present life. That is to say, the way in which the present life is experienced is conditioned by *karma* from the past life. Moreover, experience in the present lifetime creates an impression that will condition the way in which the future life will be experienced. In this way, one can say that there is "a change in the *indriya*" at the moment of cognition; what changes must be the accumulated seed of future consciousness. *Sparśa* is the registering of the nature of this change.

The definitions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and other, later Yogācāra texts are difficult to understand. Although I have indicated my reasons for thinking that they presuppose a theory of *ālayavijñāna*, I cannot be completely certain. In my argument, I have been assuming that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* definition is a refinement of ideas

[98] *rūpadhātuḥ kiṃlakṣaṇaḥ/ rūpaṃ yac cakṣuṣā dṛṣṭaṃ dṛśyate ca yac ca tatra cakṣurdhātor ādhipatyaṃ tad rūpadhātulakṣaṇam* (retranslation into Sanskrit in Pradhan 1950: 3; confirmed by AS_t: 52b 4-5). As Schmithausen points out, the *Bhāṣya* reads *rūpe* instead of *tatra*: yac cakṣurdhātoḥ rūpe ādhipatyam *iti rūpīndriyādhipatyena bāhyaviṣayanirvartanāt* (*ASBh*: 2; Schmithausen 1987: 343 n. 449).

[99] *cakṣurvijñānadhātuḥ kiṃlakṣaṇaḥ/ cakṣurāśrayā rūpālambanā rūpaprativijñaptiḥ yac ca tasya bījam upacitaṃ vipākālayavijñānam tac cakṣurvijñānadhātulakṣaṇam* (retranslation into Sanskrit in Pradhan 1950: 3). However, both the Tibetan (*gzugs su snaṅ ba'i rnam par rig pa* -- AS_t: 52b 7; *gzugs kyis so sor snaṅ ba'i rnam par śes pa* -- $ASVy_t$: 148a 3) and the Chinese (似色了別 -- T. 1605: 663b; T. 1606: 695c) say that the recognition has the appearance of visible matter. Pradhan should have added something like *ābhāsa* between *rūpa* and *prativijñaptiḥ*. Schmithausen has not corrected this passage.

originating in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but the possibility remains that the author (or authors or compiler) of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* took this definition from the *abhidharma* of his (or their) putative Hīnayāna school, which was presumably neither Sarvāstivāda nor Sautrāntika, but perhaps, as Wayman maintains, Mahīśāsaka.[100] If this is, in fact, the case, there may be another explanation of the meaning of *indriyavikāraparicchcda*. Nevertheless, we can say, at least, that Yogācāra, like Sarvāstivāda, consistently grants *sparśa* the status of a separate *dharma*, present at every moment of consciousness. Furthermore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, whether or not it borrowed the definition from a no longer extant Hīnayāna *abhidharma*, is the earliest known text to explain *sparśa* as *indriyavikāraparicchcda*.

d. The Function of *Sparśa* According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

Returning now to the function of Contact in the *pratītyasamutpāda* process, we can see that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* again, as in the case of the last two members (*nāmarūpa* and *ṣaḍāyatana*), stresses the active nature of its role in rebirth. That this is related to its role in the process of cognition emerges clearly from the remainder of La Vallée Poussin's translation of Sthiramati's explanation of *sparśa*: "Le concours, c'est quand l'organe et l'objet produisent le Vijñāna. A ce moment a lieu une modification de l'organe qui est favorable à une sensation agréable, désagréable, neutre. [L'organe est affecté d'une certaine manière lorsque, avec l'objet, il produit le Vijñāna]. En conformité avec cette modification, pareil à cette modification, a lieu le discernment de la qualité qu'a l'objet de pouvoir être senti d'une manière agréable, etc."[101] Thus, *sparśa* is the moment at

[100]I am indebted to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for pointing out to me this possibility, which is one that I am not inclined to favor (see Chapter 1 for my reservations about Wayman's insistence that Asaṅga's Hīnayāna school was Mahīśāsaka) but that I must acknowledge.

[101]See note above.

which one becomes engaged with what one perceives and, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, this engagement causes one to change internally.

At this moment, which, according to the *āvasthika* system, coincides with emergence from the womb in the present life,[102] begins the chain of events that results in the creation of new *karma* and the next rebirth. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* implies that Contact, like the rest of the projected members, refers to the seed of Contact produced by the *karma* of the previous lifetime; actualized *sparśa* is included in the member, Old Age and Death. Again, the causative verb form, *pravartayati*, can only apply to a seed, the potential of which can impel a being to do something. If the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* had intended for *sparśāṅga* to refer to an actualized *dharma*, it would have defined it as the movement of, rather than that which turns, beings towards the experience of the sense objects.

c. Conclusion

Thus, although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines *sparśa* differently than Sarvāstivāda, it does not question its status, and what it says about *sparśa* is congruent with the Sarvāstivādin arguments for its reality as a *dharma*. We have seen that one of these arguments is that, if *sparśa* were not real, the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula would not include it as a member. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, this is all the more true in that *sparśāṅga* must consist of *bīja*. Therefore, if *sparśa* were nothing but the coming together of the three, the member designated as Contact would have to consist of the seeds of an *indriya*, a *viṣaya*, and a *vijñāna*, and this would not make sense. The fact that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes *sparśa* in *saṃskāraskandha* recalls the Sarvāstivādin argument that *sparśa* would not be included among the

[102] *sparśo jātāvasthāyāṃ vyavasthāpyate* (*AKVy*: 285).

cittamahābhūmikas if it were not real. Finally, it is clear from the definition of *sparśa* as *indriyavikāraparicchcda* that *sparśa* is considered to be subsequent to, and quite different from, mere *saṃnipāta*.[103]

In many controversies, Vasubandhu opposes Sarvāstivāda and aligns himself with what he identifies as the Sautrāntika position, which is usually identical with that of the Dārṣṭāntika, Harivarman, and Śrīlāta. In these cases, the *Yogācārabhūmi* frequently contains a similar position, which in turn is often followed by subsequent Yogācāra texts.[104] In the case of *sparśa*, however, Vasubandhu disagrees with the Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika position, and it is not coincidental that the Yogācāra position is closer to the Sarvāstivādin stance that he takes than to Sautrāntika. We have seen three definitions of *sparśa*: According to Sautrāntika, *sparśa* is the coming together of object, organ, and consciousness; according to Sarvāstivāda, *sparśa* is produced from the coming together of the three; and according to the Yogācāra definition found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya, sparśa* is the distinct apprehension of the modification of the organ that occurs when the object, organ, and consciousness have come together. The Sautrāntika definition cannot be reconciled with that of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. The Sarvāstivādin definition, on the other hand, is in no way contradicted by the Yogācāra definition; from the Yogācāra point of view it can be seen as simply being incomplete.

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[103]Another argument against *sparśa*'s being identical to *trikasaṃnipāta* can be inferred from the statement in the *Cwsl* that *sparśāṅga* is exclusively non-material: 六唯非色。謂無明識觸受愛取餘通二種。 (T. 1585: 44b; *Shindō*: 359; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 491). If *sparśa* were the coming together of object, organ, and consciousness, rather than the result thereof, it is clear that it would often consist in part of *rūpa*.

[104]Some of the most striking examples can be found in the discussions of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*. See Chapter 6.

6. Feeling

a. *Vedanā* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

The sixth (*mārga*) chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, in the context of a discussion of the threefold nature of *duḥkha* (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā, saṃskāraduḥkhatā,* and *pariṇāmaduḥkhatā*) details a controversy regarding *vedanā*: according to some [teachers], there is no pleasurable feeling; all [feeling] is painful.[105] In a note, La Vallée Poussin refers to the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, which, according to him, identifies these teachers as Śrīlābha,[106] etc., to the "editeur Japonais," who says they are the Sautrāntikas, Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., and to Saṃghabhadra, who associates this position with the Sthavira[107] (LaVallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 129 n. 1). More recently, Katō Junshō has discussed the identity of these teachers and has concluded that Saṃghabhadra's reference is to Śrīlāta, otherwise known as the Sthavira, the Sautrāntika follower of Kumāralāta.[108]

Vasubandhu, after presenting their arguments, which appeal to scripture and reason (*sūtrād yuktitaś ca*), concludes that the *ābhidharmika* position is correct: *sukhavedanā* really exists.[109] He then embarks on a point-by-point refutation of the opponent's position (*AKBh*: 330-331; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 130-136). In the Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Vasubandhu devotes a large part of his discussion of

[105]*nāsty eva sukhā vedanety ekīyā duḥkhaiva tu sarvā* (*AKBh*: 330; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 129).

[106]However, according to Wogihara's edition of *AKVy*, *Śrīlāta* is the preferable reading (*AKVy*: 518).

[107] 上坐於此亦作是 (*Nyāyānusāra*, T. 1562: 663b).

[108]Katō 1980; see also Katō 1989: 183-197 for a detailed discussion of the Sautrāntika denial of *sukhavedanā*.

[109]*asty evety ābhidhārmikāḥ/ eṣa eva ca nyāyaḥ* (*AKBh*: 330; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 130).

vedanāvibhaṅga to a similar debate[110] and states that he has proven, both by scripture and by reason, that *sparśapratyayā vedanā* consists of three types of *vedanā* (including *sukha*).[111]

La Vallée Poussin was perhaps the first to point out (LaVallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: xlv) that an argument similar to Vasubandhu's can be found in an *abhidharma* text earlier than the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Dharmatrāta's *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*.[112] Katō Junshō, who concludes that this Dharmatrāta is later than Śrīlāta and is probably the author of the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, discusses in some detail the passage identified by La Vallée Poussin. According to Katō, Dharmatrāta borrows considerably from Śrīlāta in presenting the argument on the basis of *sūtra* against the reality of *sukhavedanā*, while he rejects this argument in the same way as Vasubandhu, by combining the three types of *duḥkhatā* (*duḥkha-*, *pariṇāma-*, and *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*) with the three *vedanās* (Katō 1989:191).[113] Harivarman, on the other hand, takes the opposite position in the section on *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, and after discussing both sides of the controversy declares that all *vedanā* is *duḥkha* (T.1646:281c-282c.). Katō points out the similarity between Harivarman's argument and that of Śrīlāta as recorded by

[110]The *vedanāvibhaṅga* begins at folio 38a 8 and continues to folio 41b 2. The discussion of the existence of three types of *vedanā* occupies folios 38b 5-41a 4. Tucci's fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript includes a portion corresponding to folios 40b 1-41b 2 (Tucci 1930: 615-616). Honjō Yoshifumi (1989: 173) has identified a passage corresponding to folio 38b 5-7 in the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* (*AVSN*: 127-128; Honjō 1989: 74-75).

[111]*ity āgamato 'pi yuktito 'pi siddhās tisro vedanā/ sparśapratyayā vedanā iti* (Tucci 1930: 615-616). *luṅ daṅ rigs pas kyaṅ grub pa yin te/ reg pa'i rkyen gyis tshor ba ni gsum mo žes 'byuṅ ṅo* (*PSVy*: 41a 3-4).

[112]La Vallée Poussin seems to have made a slip in referring to it as the *Pañcavastuka* when it is, in fact, Dharmatrāta's commentary, the *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*, but he gives the correct Taishō reference: T. 1555: 994c-995b.

[113]The *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* is mentioned by Saṃghabhadra in the *Abhidharmapiṭakaprakaraṇaśāsanaśāstra* as presenting a correct interpretation, and one that agrees with the *Nyāyānusāra*, of two types of *vedanā*: *chih ch'ü shou* (執取受) and *tzu hsing shou* (自性受) (T. 1563: 783ab; see also T. 1562: 338c). Perhaps there is some connection between these two types and *tzu hsiang* (自相) and *kung hsiang* (共相), or *tzu hsing* (自性) and *cheng chien* (正見), in the *YBh* passages mentioned later in this chapter (section 6b).

Saṃghabhadra and speculates that Harivarman, like Śrīlāta, was a student of Kumāralāta (Katō 1989:191-192).[114]

Vasubandhu again takes up the subject of *vedanā* several times, in the specific context of *pratītyasamutpāda*. In the *āvasthika* exposition, he defines *vedanā* as the state at which one becomes able to recognize the causes of the three kinds of feelings (pleasurable, painful, or neutral).[115] In his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28a-b, where he expresses his own opinion, which follows the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, Vasubandhu simply refers to the fact that *vedanā* consists of three kinds.[116]

Finally, in verse III 32, he analyzes *vedanā* into six and then eighteen types. The discussion of this verse in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* relates a disagreement between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas regarding the temporal relationship between *sparśa* and *vedanā* (*AKBh*: 144-146; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 101-107). According to the Vaibhāṣikas, *vedanā* is simultaneous with *sparśa*, and the two are described as reciprocal causes (*sahabhūhetu*). The opponent, who is not named here by either the *Bhāṣya* or the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, but who is identified by La Vallée Poussin as the Sautrāntika, denies the possibility of reciprocal causation. Vasubandhu seems to favor the Vaibhāṣika position here; after restating it and alluding to Chapter Two, in which the Vaibhāṣikas have already established *sahabhūhetu* (*AKBh*: 84-85; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 253-255), he terminates the argument (*AKBh*: 145; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 101-102).

Next, Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of "others" (*apare*), identified by Yaśomitra

[114]Schmithausen refers to this opinion of Śrīlāta and Harivarman and sees a relation between their radical emphasis on *duḥkha* and their negative concept of *nirvāṇa* (Schmithausen 1977: 922-923).

[115]*sa yāvad vedanātrayakāraṇaparicchedena samartho bhāvati sā 'vasthā sparśa ity ucyate/paricchedasāmarthye sati vitti prāk maithunāt* (*AKBh*: 132 [underlined portion is the first *pāda* of *AK* III 23]; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 64).

[116]*tatas trividhā vedanā* (*AKBh*: 140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 85).

as Śrīlāta (*AKVy*: 307; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 102), according to whom *vedanā* must occur after *sparśa*. This theory postulates three moments: 1) the moment in which the organ and the object come into proximity; 2) the moment in which *vijñāna* is produced, which, for Śrīlāta, is equivalent to, and simultaneous with, *sparśa*; and 3) the moment in which *vedanā* is produced as a result of *sparśa*.[117] The Vaibhāṣika shows that this theory results in an illogical explanation of cognition[118] and that it contradicts the principle of universally occurring (*mahābhūmika*) *dharmas*, according to which *vijñāna* is always accompanied by *sparśa* and *vedanā*, as well as by eight other *dharmas*.

The Sautrāntika replies to this argument by attacking the Vaibhāṣika category of *mahābhūmikas*. First of all, he says that he does not recognize as authority the *abhidharma*, in which the category is found. Next, he proposes a different interpretation of the term *mahābhūmika*. There are three groups of three *bhūmis*, in which the term *bhūmi* refers to respectively: planes of existence or meditational states (*savitarkasavicārā*, *avitarkasavicārā*, and *avitarkāvicārā bhūmis*); groups of *dharmas* classified according to their moral status (*kuśalā*, *akuśalā*, and *avyākṛtā bhūmis*); and groups of *dharmas* classified according to the type of person with which they are associated (*śaikṣī*, *aśaikṣī*, and *naivaśaikṣī* [*nāśaikṣī*] *bhūmis*). If a *dharma*, for example, *vedanā*, is found in all nine of these *bhūmis*, it is called *mahābhūmika*; it does not have to be present in every moment of consciousness.[119]

[117]*indriyārthau hi pūrvānto vijñānam/ so 'sau trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ sparśapratyayāt paścād vedanā tṛtīya kṣaṇa* [as Pradhan notes, the *AKVy* gives *tṛtīye kṣaṇe*, which is more correct in terms of *sandhi*; however, the Tibetan *reg pa'i rkyen gyis skad cig ma gsum pa tshor ba 'byuṅ ṅo źes zer ro* supports the nominative of Pradhan's Sanskrit text] *iti* (*AKBh*: 145; *AKBh*$_t$: 156a 8; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 103). *vedanā tṛtīye kṣaṇe iti. indriyārtha-kṣaṇaḥ prathamaḥ vijñānotpatti-kṣaṇo dvitīyo vedanotpatti-kṣaṇas tṛtīya iti.* (*AKVy*: 307).

[118]The argument in *AKBh* is rather complicated and compressed (*AKVy* devotes more than a page to explaining less than ten lines from the *Bhāṣya*), and I will not attempt to present it in full. The heart, I think, of the Vaibhāṣika argument is that the Sautrāntika position undermines the logically necessary association between the consciousness of an object and the mental factors that accompany consciousness of that particular object (*AKBh*: 145-146; *AKVy*: 307-308; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 103).

[119]The text here is not completely clear as to whose opinion this is. According to

According to Yaśomitra (*AKVy*: 309; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 105 n. 1), the correct understanding of the occurrence of *vedanā* can be found by consulting the *Pañcaskandhaka* (*Psk$_t$*: 14a 1-7; Dantinne 1980: 9-10), according to which two groups of *dharmas* are distinguished. *Chanda, adhimokṣa, smṛti, samādhi,* and *prajñā* are of limited occurrence (*pratiniyataviṣaya*). For example, *chanda* is defined as desire for an agreeable object, and, as Yaśomitra points out, if the object is disagreeable, there will be no desire.[120] In contrast, *vedanā, saṃjñā, sparśa, manaskāra,* and *cetanā* are specifically said to be universal; therefore, Yaśomitra implies, they must simultaneously be present in every moment of consciousness.[121]

Yaśomitra evidently refers to the *Pañcaskandhaka* here to illustrate that the opinion stated in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* coincides with what he considers to be Vasubandhu's own opinion: in this case, Vasubandhu agrees with the Vaibhāṣikas regarding the meaning of *mahābhūmika* and the simultaneity of *sparśa* and *vedanā* and disagrees with the Sautrāntikas, even though he only accepts half of the Vaibhāṣikas' list of *mahābhūmikas* as being truly universal. Elsewhere, Yaśomitra refers to the *Pañcaskandhaka* to show the contrast between a position stated in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Vasubandhu's own. For example, when Vasubandhu comments on *Abhidharmakośa* II 24, which gives the

the Sanskrit, it is at the end of what "others [presumably the Sautrāntikas] say" (*AKBh*: 146). According to the Tibetan, the sentence *de dag ni ci rigs par mam grańs kyis yin gyi/ thams cad cig car ni ma yin no* is introduced by *gźan dag na re* and concluded by *źes zer ro*, thus separating it from the preceding non-Vaibhāṣika definition of *mahābhūmika* (*AKBh$_t$*: 157a 1). For a discussion of the problems in identifying who is saying what in the entire section on *vedanā*, see Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 310-313).

[120]*tad-yathā chandaḥ katamaḥ. abhipreta-vastuny abhilāṣaḥ. anabhiprete nāsti chanda ity abhiprayaḥ* (*AKVy*: 309).

[121]These five *sarvatragacaitasikas* are commonly found in Yogācāra texts (see below). Certain Tibetan *siddhānta* texts, such as the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, also mention a Sautrāntika teacher who, contrary to the standard Sautrāntika position that, among the *caitasikas*, only *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* are real, accepts these five, which are identified as *sarvatraga*. The identity of this teacher is unclear; although his name is given as Buddhadeva in certain texts, the opinion attributed to him contradicts that of a famous Buddhadeva who, in the *Vibhāṣā*, is said to believe that the *caitasikas* are not independent *dharmas* (Mimaki 1979: 198; 1980: 151, 166-169 ns. 15-17).

Vaibhāṣika list of *mahābhūmikas*, he uses the word *kila* to indicate that he himself does not believe that they are all present at every moment, and Yaśomitra mentions the *Pañcaskandhaka* definitions of *chanda* and *adhimokṣa* to illustrate that Vasubandhu really believes that they are *pratiniyata* (*AKBh*: 55; *AKVy*: 127; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 153-156).

The argument continues in the *Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya* with another exchange regarding the Sautrāntika assertion that *vedanā* follows *sparśa*.[122] This exchange (*AKBh*: 146; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 105-107) ends with the Vaibhāṣikas having the last word and declaring "Therefore, whenever there is *vijñāna*, there must be *sparśa*, and *vedanā* must be produced together with *sparśa*."[123] Vasubandhu in the *Bhāṣya* thus rejects the various Sautrāntika positions regarding *vedanā* in favor of those of the Vaibhāṣikas, which, as Yaśomitra points out, coincide in this case with what Vasubandhu says in the *Pañcaskandhaka*.

b. *Vedanā* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*

As Harada Wasō has recently pointed out, those Dārṣṭāntika doctrines that Vasubandhu attacks are frequently irreconcilable with what is found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and the question of whether *sukhavedanā* really exists is a case in point. Referring to the work of Katō Junshō (1989), Harada (1993: 109-110) states that, although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not mention the controversy per se, it reconciles the theory of the threefold nature of *duḥkha* with the three types of *vedanā* in a way similar to Vasubandhu's

[122]Actually, there is a very problematic sentence concerning *akuśalamahābhūmika dharmas* between the end of the [presumably] Sautrāntika explanation of *mahābhūmika* and the beginning of this Vaibhāṣika rejoinder. According to Yamaguchi, this sentence is perhaps related to the discussion of the *manopavicāras* that follows *AK* III 32c-d (Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955: 311-312 n. 5).

[123]*tasmād avaśyaṃ sarvatra vijñāne sparśaḥ sparśasahajā ca vedanaiṣṭavyā*n (*AKBh*: 146).

discussion in the *Bhāṣya ad Abhidharmakośa* V 13 (*AKBh*: 328-333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 124-139). Harada refers to three passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi*: 1) the passage from *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* that I summarized in my translation of the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section of *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, in which the three types of *vedanā* are defined but in which there is no mention of *duḥkhatā*;[124] 2) a passage from the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, in which the three *duḥkhatās* and the three *vedanās* are related;[125] and 3) a passage from the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī*, which is similar to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage but more detailed.[126] Harada, who is here concerned with Vasubandhu's interest in, and not the internal development of, the *Yogācārabhūmi*, does not discuss the relative chronology of the portions of the text from which these passages are drawn. In fact, he does not even mention the portions by name.[127]

However, it may be useful to attempt to trace the discussions of *vedanā* in the various layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in order to see at what point the two groups of three

[124] *sukhā vedanā katamā/ yat sukhasthānīyam indriyaviṣayaṃ pratītyotpadyate sātaṃ vedayitaṃ vedanāgataṃ/ duḥkhā vedanā katamā/ yad duḥkhasthānīyaṃ [dvayaṃ] pratītyotpadyate 'sātaṃ vedayitaṃ/ aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā katamā/ yad aduḥkhāsukhasthānīyaṃ dvayaṃ pratītyotpadyate naiva sātaṃ nāsātaṃ vedayitaṃ vedanāgataṃ/ tisraḥ kāṃ{āv--my emendation}acaryāḥ/ dve rūpāvacarye tṛtīyād yāvad dhyānāt/ aduḥkhāsukhā caturthād dhyānād ūrdhvaṃ yāvān naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatanāt tā api vedanā dvividhāḥ sparśabījaparigṛhītabījabhūtās tadabhinirvartitaphalabhūtāś ca/* (*YBh*: 208; T. 1579: 323a-b).

[125] 相者。謂自相及共相。自相有三。樂受苦受不苦不樂受。樂受壞苦故苦。苦受苦苦故苦。不苦不樂受。行苦故苦。由此因縁諸所有受皆說名苦。是名受共相。(T. 1579: 594a).

[126]云何諸所有受皆說為苦。謂諸樂受變壞故苦。一切苦受生住故苦。非苦樂受。體是無常滅壞法故。說之為苦。此中樂受由無常故必有變壞。一切苦受由無常故。生住相續皆起於苦。非苦樂受已滅壞者由無常故。說之為苦。已生起者滅壞法故。亦說為故。此滅壞法彼二所隨逐故與二相應。故亦名為苦。etc. (T. 1579: 764a).

[127]Paramārtha's partial translation of the *YBh*, entitled *Chüeh ting tsang lun* (決定藏論), contains a similar passage:者自相苦樂不苦不樂。樂受者生樂住樂壞苦愛著因緣。苦若者生苦住苦壞樂離愛因緣。不苦不樂者行苦故苦解脫愛緣。此一切若皆悉是苦名若共相。(T. 1584: 1029c-1030a).

first became juxtaposed. The *Śrāvakabhūmi*, generally considered the oldest portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, contains definitions of *vedanāskandha*, *vedanā*, and *sukhavedanā*, but in none of these is there a reference to the three types of *duḥkhatā*.[128] Nor does its detailed treatment of the three *duḥkhatās* (*ŚrBh*: 254-257) deal with the question of the existence of *sukhavedanā*.

The earliest passage that I could find that resembles the two mentioned by Harada is in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*. This passage contains two verses that enumerate nine and seven aspects of *vedanā* respectively, together with a long commentary (T. 1579: 850c-853b; see Mukai 1985: 37). Mukai has shown that, with the exception of the first and the last, each aspect corresponds to a *sūtra* in the *Saṃyuktāgama* on the subject of *vedanā*.[129] Several of these aspects are of interest to us. The first of these aspects, self-nature (*tzu hsing*, 自性), is explained as simply the three kinds of *vedanās*.[130] The explanation of the

[128]*tatra vedanāskandhaḥ katamaḥ/ sukhavedanīyam vā sparśaṃ pratītya, duḥkhavedanīyam vā, aduḥkhāsukhāvedanīyam vā ṣaḍ vedanākāyāḥ/ cakṣuḥsaṃsparśajā vedanā[śro]traghrāṇa-jihvākāyamanaḥsaṃsparśajā vedanā//* (*ŚrBh*: 239-240; T. 1579: 433c).

tatra vedanā katamā [/] tadyathā sukhā, duḥkhā, aduḥkhāsukhā ca vedanā/ tatra sukhāpi kāyakī/ duḥkhāpy aduḥkhāsukhāpi [/] yathā kāyakī/ evaṃ caitasikī/ sukhāpi sāmiṣā, duḥkhāpy aduḥkhāsukhāpi/ evaṃ nirāmiṣāpi, evaṃ gardha[vā]śrite[tā], naiṣkramyāśritā vedanā, sukhāpi duḥkāpy aduḥkhāsukhāpi/ saiṣā ekaviṃśatividhā vedanā bhavati/ navavidhā vā// (*ŚrBh*: 293-294; T. 1579: 440b).

tatra sukhāvedanā yat sukhavedanīyaṃ sparśaṃ pratītyotpadyāte [/] sātaṃ, veditaṃ, vedanāgataṃ/ sā punar yā pañcavijñānasaṃprayuktā/ sā kāyikī/ yā manovijñānasaṃprayuktā sā caitasikī/ yathā sukhavedanīyam evaṃ duḥkhavedanīyam aduḥkhāsukhavedanīyaṃ sparśaṃ pratītyotpadyate asātaṃ, naivasātaṃ nāsātaṃ veditaṃ [vigatarāgaṃ (not in Chinese, added to ms.*] vedanāgatam idam ucyate duḥkhā aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā/ sā punar yā pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktā/ sā kāyakī/ yā manovijñānasaṃprayuktā/ sā caitasikī/ yā nirvvāṇānukūlā[sā]nairvvedhikī/ atyantaniṣṭhatāyai atyantavimalatāyai/ atyantabrahma-caryaparyavasānāyaī[ya?]/ saṃvarttate/ sā nirāmiṣā// yā punardhātupatitā, bhavapatitā sā sāmiṣā[/] yā puna (nā) rūpārūpya pratisaṃyuktā* [Chinese reads 若色無色界繫], *vairāgyānukūlā vā, sā naiṣkramyāśritā/ yā punaḥ kāyapratisaṃyuktā, nā ca vairāgyānukūlā, sā gardhāśritā//* (*ŚrBh*: 295-296; T. 1579: 440b-c).

[129]Mukai has found no corresponding *sūtras* for the first aspect, *tzu hsing* (自性), while he has found two corresponding *sūtras* in the *Madhyamāgama* for the last, *wen chi* (問記) (Mukai 1985:37).

[130]略說三受。是受自性。(T. 1579: 850c).

third aspect, correct view (*cheng chien,* 正見), corresponds to *Saṃyuktāgama sūtra* no. 467. According to this *sūtra*: when one considers *sukhavedanā*, one should think of *duḥkha*; when one considers *duḥkhavedanā*, one should think of a knife's piercing; and when one considers *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā*, one should think of impermanence.[131]

The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* explains at some length statements corresponding to those from the *Saṃyuktāgama*. *Sukhavedanā* should be viewed as *duḥkha* because it is always subject to change and because it is based on desire, which is the cause of all future *duḥkha*. *Duḥkhavedanā* should be viewed as an arrow because its nature is to cause pain in the present; it is like a poisoned arrow that has not yet been pulled out. *Aduḥkhāsukhavedanā* should be viewed as impermanent in nature and as subject to destruction because, when it is already destroyed, it is [manifestly] impermanent, while when it is present, it is subject to being destroyed. Therefore, if one correctly views *vedanā* in this way, one can properly understand the statement, "Everything experienced is *duḥkha*."[132] The juxtaposition of self-nature and correct view in this passage resembles that of *tzu hsiang* (自相 = *svalakṣaṇa*?) and *kung hsiang* (共相 = *sāmanyalakṣaṇa*?) in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage mentioned above. Furthermore, the explanations of why each type of *vedanā* is *duḥkha* are almost identical to those in the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī* passage. Therefore, in as early a portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi* as the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, the existence of three types of *vedanā*, was in some way contrasted with the universality of *duḥkha*, one of the basic principles of Buddhism.

In summary, of the passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi* discussed above, the

[131]觀於樂受而作苦想。觀於苦受。作劍刺想。觀不苦不樂受。作無常想。(T. 99: 119a).

[132]又諸樂受變壞故。貪依處故。貪是當來衆苦因故。由此應觀樂受為苦。若諸苦現在前時。惱害性故。如中毒箭而未得拔。由此應觀苦受如箭。非苦樂受已滅壞者。是無常故。正現前者。是滅法故。於二更續能隨順故。由此應觀非苦樂受性是無常性是滅法。如是於受所生正見。能隨悟入諸有所受皆悉是苦。(T. 1579: 580c-581a).

Śrāvakabhūmi and the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* define the three types of *vedanā* without reference to *duḥkhatā*, while the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī*, and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* all relate the three *vedanās* and the three *duḥkhatās*. The question then presents itself as to why certain texts connect the two doctrines in this way, and others do not.

Of course, the point of the teaching of three *duḥkhatās* is to show that what at first seems pleasant or neutral is ultimately to be experienced as suffering, and it is natural to state, as does the *Saṃyuktāgama* passage mentioned above, that one should regard even pleasant experience as *duḥkha*. However, the passage implies, and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* makes explicit by use of the term, "correct view," that the statement, "Everything experienced is *duḥkha*," is an epistemological one. The fact that *Vastusaṃgrahaṇi* defines the "self-nature" of *vedanā* as *sukha-*, *duḥkha-*, and *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā* indicates that it accepts the ontological reality of all three *vedanās*. At the same time, it suggests to me that, by the time of the composition of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, the ontological status of *sukhavedanā* was already being questioned. Therefore, although the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as Harada says, does not record a controversy, the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, followed by the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī*, may in fact be reacting to early proponents of the view, later accepted by Śrīlāta and Harivarman, that *sukhavedanā* does not really exist.

Following Harada, I have argued that the texts that explain the meaning of the statement "everything experienced is *duḥkha*" do so in order to show that *sukhavedanā* exists even though it must be recognized as unsatisfactory. As for the other two texts, we can speculate that the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, probably the oldest of all the material under discussion, was written before the reality of *sukhavedanā* was questioned. On the other hand, the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* is, by both Schmithausen's and Aramaki's reckoning,[133] later than

[133]See Chapter 1, section B2.

the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, so we must search for a separate reason for the omission of such a discussion from the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*. If we accept Schmithausen's assertion that the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* belongs to the middle layer of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* to the latest, it is difficult to explain why a text from the latest layer (the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*), along with a text from the earliest layer (the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*), should contain such a discussion, while a text belonging to the middle layer does not. On the other hand, if we follow Aramaki, who believes that the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* belongs to the middle layer and the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* to the latest, we can speculate that, for the author(s) of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, the issue is already settled, that is to say that *sukhavedanā* has been so thoroughly integrated into the Yogācāra *abhidharma* system that there is no longer any need to justify its existence.

As far as I can tell, there is no later Yogācāra discussion of this issue. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which gives a rather long definition of *vedanā* does not refer to *duḥkhatā* in this context, nor does the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* mention it in commenting on the definition.[134] Likewise, Vasubandhu ignores the question in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, contenting himself with a simple explanation of the three types of

[134] *vedanāskandhavyavasthānaṃ katamat/ ṣaḍvedanākāyāḥ/ cakṣuḥsaṃsparśajā vedanā śrotraghrāṇajihvākāyamanaḥ saṃsparśajāvedanā/ evaṃ ṣaḍvedanā kāyāḥ sukhā vā duḥkhā aduḥkhāsukhā vā/ punaḥ sukhā kāyikī vedanā duḥkhā kāyikī vedanā aduḥkhāsukhā kāyikī vedanā sukhā caitasikī vedanā duḥkhā caitasikī vedanā aduḥkhāsukhā caitasikī vedanā sukhā sāmiṣavedanā duḥkhā sāmiṣavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā sāmiṣavedanā sukhā nirāmiṣavedanā duḥkhā nirāmiṣavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā nirāmiṣavedanā punaḥ sukhā gredhāśritavedanā duḥkhā gredhāśritavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā gredhāśritavedanā sukhā naiṣkramyāśritavedanā duḥkhā naiṣkramyāśritavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā naiṣkramyāśritavedanā ca/ kāyikī vedanā katamā/ paṃcavijñānasaṃprayuktā vedanā/ caitasikī vedanā katamā/ manovijñānasaṃprayuktā vedanā/ sāmiṣavedanā katamā/ ātmabhāvatṛṣṇāsaṃprayuktā vedanā/ nirāmiṣavedanā katamā tattṛṣṇāviprayuktā vedanā/ gredhāśritavedanā katamā/ paṃcakāmaguṇatṛṣṇāsaṃprayuktā vedanā/ naiṣkramyāśritavedanā katamā/ tattṛṣṇāviprayuktā vedanā/* (Pradhan: 4-5; *AS*$_t$: 54a 5-54b 6; T. 1605: 663c-664a; Rahula: 5-6).

vedanāskandhavyavasthānam āśrayataḥ svabhāvata āśrayasaṃkalanataḥ saṃkleśa-vyavadānataś ca/ tatra rūpāśrayasaṃkalanataḥ kāyikīvedanāvyavasthānam/ arūpyāśraya-saṃkalanataś caitasikīvedanāvyavasthānam/ saṃkleśataḥ sāmiṣādīnām, vyavadānato nirāmiṣādināṃ vyavasthānaṃ veditavyam/ tattṛṣṇāviyukteti visaṃyuktā visaṃyogyānukūlā ca veditavyā/ (*ASBh*: 5; T. 1606 :696c).

vedanā.[135] Finally, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which contains a long section on *vedanā* that includes differing opinions on a variety of issues, does not mention the question of the reality of *sukhavedanā* (T. 1585: 27a-c; *Shindō*: 217-222; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 299-306). Therefore, it seems that the status of *sukhavedanā* was an issue in Yogācāra only for a limited period starting after the composition of the *Śrāvabhūmi* and ending before the composition of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*.

Let us now return to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. If, as I suspect, Vasubandhu's purpose in writing the *Bhāṣya* was to produce retroactively an *abhidharma* that would support Yogācāra doctrine, it is understandable that he would defend the ontological reality of *sukhavedanā*. As Schmithausen has shown, the occurrence of pleasant physical sensations in certain trance states is attested in texts such as the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (which is quoted in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*) and the *Śrāvakabhūmi*. These pleasant experiences are based on *ālayavijñāna* after *āśrayaparavṛtti* has taken place (Schmithausen 1987: 5-6, 44, 315 n. 297, 316 n. 300). However, according to Schmithausen, "due to the negative development of the concept of ālayavijñāna..., this idea does not appear to have struck roots" (Schmithausen 1987: 88). The question of *sukha* in the context of meditational states, however, is rather complicated and is the subject of a detailed discussion in the eighth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. I am not prepared to go into it here.

Of greater systematic importance in Yogācāra doctrine is the association of *ālayavijñāna* with *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā*. *Ālayavijñāna*, as we have seen in *Pañcaskandhaka*, is always associated with *vedanā*, and since *ālayavijñāna* and its associates are *vipāka*,

[135] *tshor ba gaṅ že na/ myoṅ ba rnam gsum pa ste/ bde ba daṅ/ sdug bsṅal ba daṅ/ sdug bsṅal ba yaṅ ma yin/ bde ba yaṅ ma yin pa de/ bde ba ni gaṅ 'gags na/ phrad par 'dod pa'o/ sdug bsṅal ni gaṅ byuṅ na/ bral bar 'dod pa'o/ bde ba yaṅ ma yin/ sdug bsṅal ba yaṅ ma yin ba ni gaṅ byuṅ na/ gñis kar 'dod par mi gyur ba'o/* (*Psk*$_t$: 13a 8-13b 2; T. 1612: 848a; Dantinne 1980: 6).

this *vedanā* must always be *aduḥkhāsukhā*.[136] Since the argument by which *sukhavedanā* is denied can also be applied to *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā*, it is clear that the Yogācāra system cannot accept the claim that only *duḥkhavedanā* really exists.

c. *Vedanā* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

i. The Existence of *Sukhavedanā*

Although the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not refer to the controversy over the reality of *sukhavedanā*, it mentions *sukhavedanā* or *sukha* on several occasions. Sometimes the terms occur in the enumeration of āgamic categories. For example, in its definition of *vedanāskandha*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* mentions the traditional six types of *vedanā* according to the sense organs from which they arise, as well as another classification of six; among these, each type is subdivided into *sukhā-*, *duḥkhā-*, and *aduḥkhāsukhāvedanā*.[137] *Sukha* also appears in discussions of the *dhyānas*. In the section on *samudayasatya*, *sukha* is said to accompany *rāga* in *kāmadhātu* and the first three *dhyānas* (Pradhan 1950: 51), while in the section on *mārgasatya*, *sukha* is listed as one of the *aṅgas* of each of the first three *dhyānas* of *laukikamārga*, while *aduḥkhāsukhavedanā* is an *aṅga* of the fourth

[136]This sentence undoubtedly grossly oversimplifies a very complicated issue in the Yogācāra system. For details, see Schmithausen 1987: 61, 68, 87-88, 337 n. 422, 352 n. 490, 458 n. 1064.

[137]*vedanāskandhavyavasthānaṃ katamat/ ṣaḍvedanākāyāḥ/ cakṣuḥsaṃsparśajā vedanā śrotraghrāṇajihvākāyamanaḥ saṃsparśajā vedanā/ evaṃ ṣaḍvedanā kāyāḥ sukhā vā duḥkhā aduḥkhāsukhā vā/ punaḥ sukhā kāyikī vedanā duḥkhā kāyikī vedanā aduḥkhāsukhā kāyikī vedanā sukhā caitasikī vedanā duḥkhā caitasikī vedanā aduḥkhāsukhā caitasikī vedanā sukhā sāmiṣavedanā duḥkhā sāmiṣavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā sāmiṣavedanā sukhā nirāmiṣavedanā duḥkhā nirāmiṣavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā nirāmiṣavedanā punaḥ sukhā gredhāśritavedanā duḥkhā gredhāśritavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā gredhāśritavedanā sukhā naiṣkramyāśritavedanā duḥkhā naiṣkramyāśritavedanā aduḥkhāsukhā naiṣkramyāśritavedanā ca/* (Pradhan: 4-5; AS_t: 54a 5-54b 6; T. 1605: 663c-664a; Rahula: 5-6). This passage is also found in a note to section B6b. I have repeated it here for the sake of convenience.

dhyāna (*AS*: 32).[138]

In our section on *pratītyasamutpāda*, too, the real existence of *sukhavedanā*, is implied, although it is not explicitly stated. Since *karma* is of three types, good, bad, and neutral, it follows that, when the seed of *vedanā* is actualized, the resulting feelings will be of three types, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, and *asukhāduḥkha*. This is what the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* suggests when it states that "on the basis of it [i.e., *vedanā*], there is the experience of the desirable, etc., results of action."[139] In the seed interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, the projected members are the means by which the moral values of actions of the past life are preserved, to receive retribution in the present life. Therefore, this is another context in which, for the Yogācāras, the real existence of *sukhavedanā* is necessary, in this case to ensure the consistency of action and result.

ii. The Temporal Relationship Between *Vedanā* and *Sparśa*

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not explicitly state a positionregarding the question of the temporal relationship between *vedanā* and *sparśā*. In its enumeration of *saṃskāras*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not specify subgroups such as *mahābhūmika* or *pratiniyata*, but its definitions of individual *saṃskāras* are generally similar to those found in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, in which six categories of *caitasikas* are specified[140]. The commentary (*Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya*) indicates the *dharmas* that belong to each category.[141] The *Pañcaskandhaka* defines *saṃskāraskandha* as the *caitasikadharmas*, except for *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* (which comprise their own *skandhas*), as well as the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskārās*,

[138]Again, I must set this topic aside for future study.

[139]*tadādhiṣṭhānenesṭādikarmavipākopabhogāt* (*ASBh*: 33; see Chapter 2, section B5g).

[140]*Psk$_t$*: 14a 1-2; T. 1612: 848c; Dantinne 1980: 9.

[141]T. 1613: 851b-c; see Dantinne 1980: 65-67, ns. 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93.

and it then enumerates the *caitasikas*, including *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*. However, in the definitions of *caitasikas*, which follow the list and the specification of categories, *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* are omitted, since they were defined earlier as *skandhas*. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, defines *saṃskāraskandha* as the six *cetanākāyās*, together with the remaining *caitasikadharmas*, except for *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*, as well as the *cittaviprayuktas*, and then enumerates and defines the *saṃskāras*.[142] By juxtaposing the lists, we can impose the subdivisions from the *Pañcaskandhaka* on to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* list[143] with the result that *vedanā* and *sparśa* fall into the *sarvatraga*

[142]There is a problem with the text here. After stating that *saṃskāraskandha* consists of *cetanā*, the other *caitasikadharmas*, with the exception of *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*, and the *cittaviprayuktas*, the Sanskrit text asks the question, "And what are they?" The answer is a list of the *caitasikas*, except for the three mentioned above (*itīyaṃ cetanā vedanāṃ saṃjñaṃ ca sthāpayitvā tadanye caitasikā dharmāś cittaviprayuktāś ca saṃskārāḥ saṃskāraskandha ity ucyate/ te punaḥ katame/ manaskāraḥ sparśaḥ chando ...vicāraś ca* --*AS*: 15): in other words, all the *saṃskāras* except for *cetanā*. After the list, all the *cittasaṃprayuktasaṃskāras*, including *cetanā*, are defined. Then the question is asked, "What are the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*?" The answer again consists of a list, which is followed by definitions.

Both the Tibetan and Chinese translators seem to have noticed a problem regarding the antecedent of the pronoun *te*, and the differences in their readings probably represent attempts to solve it. In the Tibetan text, the question is the same as in the Sanskrit, while *cetanā* appears at the beginning of the list (*de dag kyaṅ gaṅ že na/ sems pa daṅ/ yid la byed pa daṅ*, etc. -- AS_{t}. 55a 7). This suggests that the Tibetan translators understood *te* as indicating all the *cittasaṃprayuktasaṃskāras*. The Chinese text, on the other hand, asks a different question: "What are the other *caitasikadharmas*?" (何等名為餘心所法。 -- T. 1605: 664a). It, like the Sanskrit, omits *cetanā* from the list, and it seems to understand "other *caitasikadharmas*" as meaning other than *cetanā*, *vedanā*, and *saṃjñā*.

Although both the Tibetan and the Chinese make better sense than the Sanskrit, I believe that Pradhan, who notes the variants (Pradhan 1950: 5 ns. 8,9), is correct in letting the Sanskrit text stand. In the case of the Chinese translation, the specification of *te* as *tadanye caitasikā dharmāḥ* seems to be an example of Hsüan-tsang's tendency to explain, rather than simply reproduce, the text that he is translating. And the fact that *cetanā* is missing from the Chinese translation, as well as from the Sanskrit manuscript, makes it likely that it was added by the Tibetan translators, not without a purpose, as Pradhan suggests, but rather to correct what seemed like a mistake in the Sanskrit text.

Rahula's "Et que sont-elles [ces formations]?" is not satisfactory since "ses formations" should include *cetanā* (Rahula 1980: 6).

[143]Hsüan-tsang has, in fact, done just this in his translation of *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*. After the enumeration of the constituents of *saṃskārasakandha*, and before their definitions, the following passage is found in the Chinese text: 如是思等五十五法。若遍行若別境若善若煩惱若隨煩惱若不定。如

group. On the basis of this, they must, as in the Sarvāstivādin system, be simultaneous. My argument that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* implicitly considers *vedanā* a *sarvatraga caitasika* is strengthened by the fact that several passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi* classify it thus and were probably known to the authors/compilers of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.[144]

iii. *Vedanā* in the *Pratītyasamutpāda* Formula

The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, which, after *nāmarūpa*, suspends comment on the second function of the members belonging to the projected group, resumes here. Since *vedanāṅga* belongs to the second life, it is not immediately clear how it can be understood to function as the condition of *tṛṣṇā*, a member of the actualizing group, which belongs to the first life. The *Bhāṣya*'s explanation of this function, that *tṛṣṇā* arises due to a craving for *vedanā*, recalls the account in the *Yogācārabhūmi śarīra* exposition that I translated in Chapter 3 but will now summarize briefly. After having been reborn in the present life, a person receives two types of retribution for past *karma*: *vipākaphala*, which is, in effect, his existence itself, and *adhipatiphala*, which is the content of his experience and which consists of feelings produced by contact with objects. His delusion concerning the nature of existence, namely his not understanding that rebirth is suffering, leads him to perform new actions, which will project another rebirth. His delusion concerning the content of existence, that is to say, his not understanding that the world he experiences is unsatisfactory, arouses in him subconscious desire (*tṛṣṇā*) for feelings

其次第五五十一十二十四應知。(T. 1606: 697a). This seems to be Hsüan-tsang's interpolation since it is found in neither the Sanskrit *ASBh* nor in the Tibetan *ASVy*.

[144]From *Manobhūmi*: *tasmād ete manaskārādayaś cetanāparyavasānāś caitasāḥ sarvatra sarvabhūmike sarvadā sarve cotpadyante* (*YBh*: 59). From *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*: 云何建立相應轉相。謂阿賴耶識。與五遍行心相應所恒共相應。謂作意觸受想思。(T. 1579: 580ab); 問諸識生時。與幾遍行心法俱起。答五。一作意。二觸。三受。四想。五思。問復與幾不遍行心法俱起。答不遍行法乃有多種。勝者唯五。一欲。二勝解。三念。四三摩地。五慧。(T. 1579: 601c); 遍諸心起復有五種。謂作意觸受想思。如前意地已說其相。(T. 1579: 684a).

arising from sense-objects.[145] This suggests that *vedanā* conditions *tṛṣṇā* by being its object (*ālambana* -- see my translation of the *aṅgapratyayavyavasthāna* section of the *Abhiharmasamuccayabhāṣya*) and is consistent with the comment in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* on the second function of *vedanā*: "due to a craving for connection, etc., with it [i.e., Feeling], there is the arising of Subconscious Desire" (*ASBh*:33; see Chapter 2, section B5g).

Still, in our passage from *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the second function of *vedanā* is inconsistent with its being a seed rather than an actualized *dharma*. One's misunderstanding of the nature of experience should lead one to desire actual feelings, not the potential for feelings, with which *vedanāṅga* (= *vedanābīja*) is identified. This, in fact, seems to be the way that Sthiramati understands the relationship between *vedanā* and *tṛṣṇā*: in the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, he says that *tṛṣṇā* depends on *vedanā* that has arisen at this time from that which was previously projected.[146] Therefore, it seems that *sparśapratyayā vedanā* is a seed belonging to the future lifetime, projected from the present, while the *vedanā* on which *tṛṣṇā* depends is a *dharma* that was projected into the present lifetime from a still earlier lifetime and that has already been actualized.

7. Subconscious Desire

a. An Early Passage Concerning *Tṛṣṇā*

In a paper exploring the early development of the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda*, Aramaki Noritoshi (1986) identifies two prose *sūtras* from which he thinks the twelve-membered formula originated. He discusses one of these, a *sūtra* on the relationship

[145] *YBh*: 200-201. See Chapter 3, section C2 for the text and a complete translation.

[146] *tad evam ākṣiptaṃ kenābhinirvartyate/ yathoktakrameṇa pūrvākṣiptād ihotpannāṃ vedanāṃ pratītya yā tṛṣṇotpannā tatpratyayenopādānena* (*MvbhṬ*: 34).

between *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, but he reserves the other, the subject of which is *tṛṣṇā*, for a later paper, which, as far as I know, has not yet appeared. This second *sūtra*[147] clearly shows the importance of *tṛṣṇā* in the process of *saṃsāra*, and I shall translate a portion of it here:

"In the past, any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who viewed that which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as permanent, who viewed [it] as unchangeable, as secure, as health, as self, as belonging to self, increased *tṛṣṇā*. Those who increased *tṛṣṇā*, increased attachment to existence (*upadhi*). Those who increased attachment to existence, increased *duḥkha*. Those who increased *duḥkha* were not released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They were not released from *duḥkha*, I say.

But any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who viewed that which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as disease, who viewed [it] as a boil, as a thorn, as misfortune,[148] as impermanent, as misery, as empty, as lacking a self, destroyed *tṛṣṇā*. Those who destroyed *tṛṣṇā*, destroyed attachement to existence. Those who destroyed attachment to existence, destroyed *duḥkha*. Those who destroyed *duḥkha* were released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They were released from *duḥkha*, I say.

In the future, too, any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who view that which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as permanent, who view [it] as unchangeable, as secure, as health, as self, as belonging to self, will increase *tṛṣṇā*. Those who increase *tṛṣṇā*, will increase attachment to existence (*upadhi*). Those who increase attachment to existence, will increase *duḥkha*. Those who increase *duḥkha* will not be released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They will not be

[147] *Nidānasaṃyukta* 9 [Tripāṭhi 1962: 121-126]; *Saṃyuktāgama* 12, *sūtra* 291 (T. 99: 82); *Saṃyuttanikāya* 12. 66.

[148] For translation of *agato*, see Tripāṭhi 1962: 125, ns. 3, 10)

released from *duḥkha*, I say.

But any *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who view that which is pleasurable and desirable in the world as disease, who view [it] as a boil, as a thorn, as misfortune,[149] as impermanent, as misery, as empty, as lacking a self, will destroy *tṛṣṇā*. Those who destroy *tṛṣṇā*, will destroy attachment to existence. Those who destroy attachment to existence, will destroy *duḥkha*. Those who destroy *duḥkha* will be released from birth, old age, illness, death, grieving, misery, dejection, and mental disturbance. They will be released from *duḥkha*, I say."[150]

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[149]See above note.

[150]*(atīte 'py adhvani ye kecic chramaṇā v)ā br(āhmaṇā vā yal loke priyarūpaṃ sā)tarūpa(ṃ) ta(n) nityataḥ (sa)manvadrākṣuḥ/) (dhruvataḥ kṣemata ārogyata ātmata ātmīyataḥ samanvadrākṣus te tṛṣṇāṃ prāvardhayiṣuḥ/ ye tṛṣṇāṃ prāvardhayi)ṣus te (upadhiṃ prāvardhayiṣuḥ/ ye upadhiṃ p)rāvaradhayiṣus te duḥkha(ṃ p)r(āvardha)yiṣu(ḥ / ye duḥkhaṃ prāvardhayiṣus te) na (pari)mucya(nte sma) j(ā)t(ijarāv)y(ādhimara)ṇa(śokaparideva-duḥ)kha(daurma)nasyopāyā(sebhyaḥ/ na parimucyante) sma duḥkhād iti vadāmi/*

ye (tu) kecic chra(maṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā ya)l loke pri(yar)ū(paṃ) sā(ta)rū(paṃ) ta(d rogataḥ samanvad)r(ā)kṣuḥ/ gaṇḍa(taḥ) śalyato (')gato 'ni(tayto duḥkhataḥ śūnyato) 'nātmataḥ sam(anvadrā)kṣus te tṛ(ṣṇāṃ prajahuḥ/ ye tṛṣṇāṃ praja)hus te u(padh)i(ṃ) prajahuḥ/ ye upadhiṃ prajahu(s te) duḥkhaṃ prajahu(st)e parimu(cyan)te (sma) jā(ti)jarāvyā-dhi(maraṇa(śoka)pari(d)evaduḥkha(daurmanasyo)pāyā(sebhyaḥ/ parimucyante sma duḥkhād i)ti vadāmi/

anāgate 'py adhvani ye k(e)cic chramaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā yal loke (pr)iyarūpa(ṃ sātarū)pa(ṃ) tan nityataḥ sa(manuadrakṣyanti/) dhruvataḥ (kṣemata ārogyata ātmata) ātmīyataḥ samanudrak(ṣ)yanti te tṛṣṇ(āṃ pra)vardhayiṣyanti/ ye tṛṣṇā(ṃ) pravardhayiṣyanti te upadhiṃ pravardhayiṣyan(ti)/ y(e) upadhiṃ pravaradhayiṣyant(i) te duḥkha(ṃ) pravardhav(sic)yi(ṣyanti/ ye duḥkhaṃ pravardhayi)ṣya(n)ti te na parimokṣyante jātijarā(vyādhi)maraṇaśokaparideva-duḥkhadaurmana(s)y(o)pāyā(s)ebhyaḥ/ (na parimok)ṣya(nt)e duḥkhād iti vadāmi/

ye tu keci(c chra)maṇ(ā vā brāhmaṇā vā yal loke priya)rūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ tad rogataḥ sama(nudra)kṣyanti/ gaṇ(ḍa)ta(ḥ) śalya(to) 'gato 'n(i)tayto du(ḥkhataḥ) śūnyato 'nā(tma)taḥ samanu(d)rakṣyanti te t(ṛ)ṣṇā(ṃ) prahāsyanti/ ye (tṛṣṇāṃ prahāsyanti te upadhiṃ) prahāsyanti/ ye upadhi(ṃ) prahās(ya)n(ti te) duḥkhaṃ prahāsya)nti te (parimokṣyante) jātija(rā)vyā-dhimaraṇaśoka(pari)deva(duḥ)kha(daurmanasyopāyāsebhyaḥ/ parimokṣyante) duḥkhād iti vadāmi/(Tripāṭhī 1962: 124-126).

b. *Tṛṣṇā* in *Abhidharma* Texts -- The Context of *Samudayasatya*

As Takasaki Jikido, who probably has in mind texts such as the above, says, "The positing of craving [*tṛṣṇā*] as the cause of suffering is the oldest formula of dependent co-arising, and even in later Buddhism desire is ever looked upon as the root of all evil" (Takasaki 1987: 156). However, the subject of *tṛṣṇā* is not completely free from controversy, notably in the context of the Noble Truth of the origin of suffering (*samudayasatya*). Vasubandhu, in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* VI 2, defines *duḥkhasatya* as the *upādānaskandhas* in the state of result; *samudayasatya*, he says, consists of the *upādānaskandhas* in the state of cause.[151] In a note, La Vallée Poussin points out that not all *abhidharma* sources agree with this view, and he translates a passage from the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 397ab) in which the following opinions are attributed to various sources: According to the *ābhidharmikas*, *duḥkhasatya* consists of the *upādānaskandhas*, while *samudayasatya* is the cause of *sāsravadharmas*; according to the Dārṣṭāntikas, *duḥkhasatya* is *nāmarūpa*, while *samudayasatya* is *karma* and *kleśa*; and according to the Vibhajyavādins, *duḥkhasatya* consists of only those *sāsravadharmas* that have the eight characteristics of *duḥkha*, while *samudayasatya* consists of only that *tṛṣṇā* that produces rebirth.[152] La

[151]*tatra phalabhūtā upādānaskandhā duḥkhasatyam/ hetubhūtāḥ samudayasatyam/ ata eva tayoḥ phalahetubhāvān nāmataḥ bhedo na dravyataḥ* (*AKBh*: 328; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 122-123; Yaśomitra does not comment on these definitions). This echoes the definition of the *upādānaskandhas* in *AK* I 8: *ye sāsravā upādānaskandhās te saraṇā api/ duḥkham samudayo loko dṛṣṭisthānaṃ bhavaś ca te* (*AKBh*: 5; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 13-14).

[152]A fourth opinion, attributed to Ghoṣaka (尊者妙音), is also discussed, at greater length than the other three, in this passage (T. 1545: 397b-c; *KIK*, *Bidon-bu* 10: 320-321), but La Vallée Poussin does not summarize it. I shall provide extracts from this passage, which seems specifically to contradict the Vibhajyavādin opinion: 若墮自相續五蘊。若墮他相續五蘊。若有情數及無情數諸蘊。如是一切皆是苦是苦諦。修觀行者起現觀時。唯觀墮自相續五蘊為苦。不觀墮他相續五蘊。及無情數諸蘊為苦。所以者何。逼切行相是苦。(punctuation emended according to *KIK* translation) 現觀墮他相續及無情數蘊於自相續非逼切故。彼生智論作如是說。自相續蘊極自逼切。非他相續及無情數蘊。非離自身他及非情能相逼切。無自身者他及非情何所逼切。故現觀時唯觀墮自相續五蘊為苦非餘。

Vallée Poussin also refers to a definition from the *Saṃgītiparyāya*,[153] according to which *samudayasatya* is the cause of the *sāsravadharmas* (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 122-123 n. 3); this is identical to the *ābhidharmika* definition mentioned by the *Vibhāṣā*.

Elsewhere, the *Vibhāṣā* establishes what becomes accepted as the Vaibhāṣika definition. It indicates that *samudayasatya* consists of all the *sāsravadharmas*, and it

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若墮自相續五蘊因。若墮他相續五蘊因。若有情數及無情數諸蘊因。如是一切皆是集是集諦。修觀行者起現觀時。唯觀墮自相續五蘊因為集不觀墮他相續五蘊因。及無情數諸蘊因為集。(T. 1545: 397b).

This may be summarized as follows: everything that is *duḥkha*, including the *pañcaskandhas* of one's own and of others' *santatis*, as well as all animate and inanimate *skandhas*, is *duḥkhasatya*. But when meditators produce insight, they should only consider their own *pañcaskandhas* as *duḥkha*, not those of others or all the inanimate *skandhas*, because *duḥkha* is something that is to be destroyed, and having insight into the *skandhas* of others does not destroy that which is in one's own *santati*. Similarly, everything that is *samudaya* is *samudayasatya*, but in meditation, one should only consider the cause of one's own *pañcaskandhas*.

After presenting Ghoṣaka's opinion, the *Vibhāṣā* gives its own opinion: 若墮自相續五蘊。若墮他相續五蘊。若有情數及無情數諸蘊。如是一切皆是苦是苦諦。修觀行者起現觀時。皆觀為苦。問遍切行相是苦。(punctuation emended according to *KIK* translation) 現觀墮他相續及無情数蘊於自相續既非遍切。修觀行者起現觀時何故亦觀為苦。答設彼於自不能遍切亦為苦。所以者何。無始時來於一切苦皆起無智。為對治彼皆應起智。無始時來於一切苦皆起猶豫。為對治彼皆應起決定。無始時來一切起皆起誹謗。為對治彼皆應起信。故應遍觀一切為苦。況彼於自亦能遍切。所以者何。若有為他所打觸者。亦生大苦。豈非遍切。若有空中木石瓦等墮自身上。亦生大苦。豈非遍切。既有遍切自相續義。故現觀時亦觀為苦。若墮自相續五蘊因。若墮他相續五蘊因。若有情數及無情數諸蘊因。如是一切皆是集是集諦。修觀行者起現觀時皆觀為集。 (T. 1545: 397c-394a).

Thus, the *Vibhāṣā* agrees with Ghoṣaka regarding the constituents of *duḥkha*- and *samudayasatya*. However, it states that, at the time of producing insight, meditators should, in fact, consider the *pañcaskandhas* of others and all animate and inanimate *skandhas* as *duḥkha*. After all, even certain things that are in one's own *santati* and that one cannot destroy are considered to be *duḥkha*. From beginningless time one has produced ignorance (*ajñāna*) regarding everything that is *duḥkha*; in order to counteract that, one must produce knowledge (*jñāna*), etc. Therefore, one must universally consider everything as *duḥkha*. One will be all the more able to destroy that which is in one's own *santati* (the logic of this argument escapes me). For example (an example of the fact that the *pañcaskandhas* of another person are *duḥkha*?), if one is hit even on behalf of another person, one produces great suffering and one cannot destroy it. Or (an example of inanimate *skandhas* being *duḥkha*?), if even a tree, stone, or tile falls from the sky and hits one's body, one produces great suffering that one cannot destroy. Actually, these are cases of destroying one's own *santati* (?). Therefore, even in a state of insight, one should consider (all *skandhas*) as *duḥkha* (this passage does not quite make sense to me).

[153]云何苦集聖諦。答諸有漏因。是名苦集聖諦。(T. 1536: 392a)

justifies the apparent discrepancy between its definition and the *sūtra* definition, according to which *samudayasatya* is only said to consist of *tṛṣṇā*.[154] The *Abhidharmahṛdaya* of Dharmaśrī, the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* of Upaśānta, and the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* of Dharmatrāta all maintain a similar position,[155] as does Ghoṣaka in the *Abhidharmāmṛta*.[156] Vasubandhu, as we have seen above, accepts a version of the Vaibhāṣika definition that is closest to Ghoṣaka's in the *Abhidharmāmṛta*.

Near the end of his comment on verse three, after discussing the existence of *sukhavedanā*, Vasubandhu, like the *Vibhāṣā*, reconciles his definition of *samudayasatya* with that of the *sūtra*, explaining that the *sūtra* mentions only *tṛṣṇā* because of its

[154] 問苦集聖諦云何。答如契經說。諸所有愛及後有愛。喜俱行愛彼彼喜愛。是名苦集聖諦。問諸有漏法能為因義皆是集諦。何故世尊但說集諦是愛非餘。答愛於施設集聖諦中。勢用增強非餘漏。故偏說愛是集非餘。然有漏法皆是集諦。如施設行蘊中思最勝故說思非餘。而實相應不相應行皆是行蘊。是故偏說愛為集諦。復次愛是三世衆苦因本。道路由緒能作生緣。集起勝故偏說集諦。復次愛能數數招集苦果勝故偏說。etc. (T. 1545: 403a) La Vallée Poussin refers to this passage: "Tous les *dharmas* impurs (*sāsrava*) sont cause et par conséquent vérité de l'origine. Pourquoi Bhagavat dit-il que la soif est la vérité de l'origine? Il y a trente explications..." (v. 4, 136 n. 2) .

[155] *Abhidharmahṛdaya* of Dharmaśrī:

諸行若有果有漏是說苦者。一切有漏行從(corrected from 從行 following Willemen 1975:269 n. 82) 因中生。亦作一切苦患。是故一切行說苦諦。若有因是習者。一切有漏行他因。是以一切行說習諦。如一女亦說母亦說女前後故。如是有漏行亦說苦諦益說習諦。已生當生故。 (T. 1550: 827a; Willemen 1975: 131-132).

Abhidharmahṛdaya of Upaśānta :

果相似諸行有漏是說苦者。一切有漏行從因生。逼惱相是故說苦。因相似是集者。一切有漏行他因相似。是故彼說苦集。如一稻種子前後相望子。亦說果亦說因。如是有漏行觀已生當生子。亦說苦說集。(T. 1551: 861a).

Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya of Dharmatrāta:

謂性果諸行有漏是說苦者。一切有漏行有因及縛此故說苦。因性則為集者。此有漏行是因性者說集諦。是故苦集是一物。因果苦立二諦。 (T. 1552: 936b).

[156] 五受陰報果時是謂苦諦。五受陰因緣時是謂種諦。亦謂苦諦。譬如人亦名子亦名父。 (T. 1553: 978a; Śāstrī 1953: 119). A little earlier in his discussion of the four *satyas*, Ghoṣaka defines *duḥkha*- and *samudayasatya* in a way that resembles what was attributed to him by the *Vibhāṣā*: 一切種種苦是謂苦諦。云何習諦。是種種苦因五受陰是謂習諦。(T. 1553: 978a; Śāstrī 1953: 118). In his retranslation into Sanskrit, Śāstrī explains that the manifold *duḥkha*, like its cause, consists of the five *upādānaskandhas*.

prominence.[157] But he insists that the other *sāsravadharmas* are also included in *samudayasatya*, and he quotes from two *sūtras* from *Saṃyuktāgama* to support his position. According to the *Mānuṣyakasūtra*, not only *tṛṣṇā*, but *karma* and *avidyā* as well, are stated to be the cause of the *saṃskāras* in the future.[158] According to another *sūtra*, the five types of seeds, which grow into plants, are analagous to *sopādānavijñāna*, while the soil in which they grow are analogous to the four *vijñānasthitis*.[159] In this case, the seeds are *hetu* and therefore *samudaya*, as are the *vijñānasthitis*,[160] which function as cause by way of being support (*pratiṣṭhāhetu*).[161] On the basis of these other *sūtras*, Vasubandhu then states that the *sūtra* definition of *samudayasatya* is *ābhiprāyika*, while that found in the *abhidharma* is *lākṣaṇika*.[162]

Finally, he suggests another reason for the identification of *samudayasatya* with *tṛṣṇā*, namely that what is being explained in the *sūtra* is, specifically, the cause of rebirth (*abhinirvṛttihetu*). In support of this interpretation, he refers back to the *Mānuṣyakasūtra*,

[157]*pradhānyād asau sūtra uktā* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 136). Vasubandhu's reasoning here follows that of the *Vibhāṣā*, which compares the designation of *samudayasatya* by *tṛṣṇā* with that of *saṃskāraskandha* by *cetanā* (see note above).

[158]*karma ca tṛṣṇā ca atho avidyā saṃskārāṇāṃ hetur abhisaṃparāya iti* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 136). Honjō (Honjō 1984: 86-87) has identified the source as the *Mānuṣyakasūtra* of the *Saṃyuktāgama* (*SĀ sūtra*s 306-307; T. 99: 87c-88b, especially 88b: 諸業愛無明／因積他世陰). Mukai (Mukai 1985: 34) has identified the same *sūtra* as the subject of comment by the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 824c), but the discussion does not include this three-fold cause of the future *skandhas* or *saṃskāras*.

[159]*pañcabījajātānīti sopādānasya vijñānasyaitad adhivacanam/ pṛthivīdhātur iti catasṛṇāṃ vijñānasthitīnām etad adhivacanam* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 136-137). Identified by Honjō (Honjō 1984: 86-87) as *sūtra* no. 39 of *SĀ* (T. 99: 8c-9b). Again, as Mukai points out (Mukai 1985: 30), this *sūtra* is commented on in *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 794b).

[160]*bījaṃ punar hetuḥ. yaś ca hetuḥ. sa samudayaḥ. vijñāna-sthitayo 'pi pratiṣṭhā-hetuḥ.* (*AKVy*: 522). These four *vijñānasthitis* are undoubtedly the ones enumerated in *AKBh ad AK* III 7b, namely *rūpopagā-*, *vedanopagā-*, *saṃjñopagā-*, and *saṃskāropagāvijñānasthiti* (*AKBh*: 117; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 23-24).

[161]For *pratiṣṭhāhetu*, see *AKBh*: 102; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 314. For *pratiṣṭhāphala*, see *AKBh*: 97; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 297.

[162]*tasmād ābhiprāyikaḥ sutreṣu nirdeśo lākṣaṇikas tv abhidharme* (*AKBh*: 333).

from which, alluding to yet another *sūtra*,[163] he infers that *tṛṣṇā* is the cause of rebirth in general (*abhinirvṛttihetu*),[164] *karma* is the cause of rebirth into specific circumstances (*upapattihetu*),[165] and *avidyā* is the cause of both *tṛṣṇā* and *karma*.[166] Vasubandhu then compares *upapatti-* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* to a seed, which produces sprouts of a specific type of grain, and water, which causes the germination of any type of sprout.[167] Next, he provides us with a logical proof that *tṛṣṇā* must *abhinirvṛttihetu*: Although all people must die, only those who possess *tṛṣṇā* are reborn; therefore, there is no rebirth without *tṛṣṇā*, and we can know that *tṛṣṇā* is the cause of the production of existence.[168]

I have been unable to trace the term *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the *abhidharma* literature that precedes Vasubandhu. However, along with *ākṣepahetu*, *abhinirvṛttihetu* appears in Yogācāra texts in two contexts, in a list of ten *hetus* and in discussions of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula. Therefore, it seems likely to me that, in his reasons for insisting that *tṛṣṇā* is not equivalent to *samudayasatya*, but only to *abhinirvṛttihetu*, Vasubandhu is actually relying on Yogācāra sources. Before going further into the

[163] *karma hetur upapattaye tṛṣṇā hetur abhinirvṛttaya iti sūtre vacanāt* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 137). Honjō was unable to identify this *sūtra* (Honjō 1984: 86-87). Bhikkhu Pāsadika (1986:104) identifies the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* (T. 716: 834a) as the source, but this is unlikely, given the probable late date of this *sūtra*, as well as its possible authorship by Vasubandhu himself, and considering the fact that the passage is also cited in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, a citation that Pāsādika does not mention.

[164] *abhedena punarbhavapratisaṃdhānam abhinirvṛttiḥ* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

[165] *dhātugatiyonyādiprakārabhedenātmabhāvasyopapadanam upapattiḥ* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

[166] *upapatti-hetuḥ karma. abhinirvṛtti-hetus tṛṣṇā bhaveṣu. tayoḥ punas tad-dhetvoḥ karma-tṛṣṇayor avidyā hetur ity āha* (*AKVy*: 523).

[167] *tadyathā bījaṃ śālivādijātiprakārabhedenāṅkuropapadanasya hetuḥ/ āpaḥ punar abhedena sarvāṅkuraprarohamātrasyety eva dṛṣṭāntaḥ* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

[168] *tṛṣṇā 'bhinirvṛttihetur iti kā 'tra yuktiḥ/ vītatṛṣṇasya janmābhāvāt/ ubhaye 'pi mriyante/ satṛṣṇā vītatṛṣṇāś ca/ satṛṣṇā eva jātā dṛśyante na vītatṛṣṇā iti/ vinā tṛṣṇayā janmābhāvāt/ bhavasyābhinirvṛttihetau tṛṣṇāhetuṃ pratīmaḥ* (*AKBh*: 333; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 4: 138).

relation between Vasubandhu's argument here and a specific passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi*, I shall explain the background of *abhinirvṛttihetu* and *ākṣepahetu*.

c. *Abhinirvṛttihetu* and *Ākṣepahetu*[169]

The best known, and probably the earliest, occurrence of a list of ten *hetus* is found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. This list is followed by definitions of the individual causes, which are then assigned to two groups, *janakahetu* and *upāyahetu*, after which they are related to the four *pratyayas*. Finally, three processes are described in terms of the ten causes: a) the coming into existence of everyday things (*laukika bhāva*), with particular reference to grain (*sasya*); b) the process of defilement (*saṃkleśa*), which is equated with *pratītyasamutpāda* and analyzed with reference to the members of the formula; and c) the process of purification (*vyavadāna*), which is equivalent to *pratītyasamutpāda* in its reverse (*pratiloma*) order (*BoBh*: 97-102; T. 1579: 501a ff.). This passage has been translated into French by Cecil Bendall and Louis de la Vallée Poussin (1911: 176-182) and is summarized by La Vallée Poussin in a section of his pioneering work, *Théorie des Douze Causes*, entitled "La causalité dans le système des Vijñānavādins" (La Vallée Poussin 1913: 64-67). La Vallée Poussin treats this subject again in his translation of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which relates the ten *hetus* to fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas*, as well as to the five results (T. 1585: 41b-42c; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 453-468). In his notes, he provides extensive references to other occurrences of ten *hetus*, and he remarks that the order in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* differs from that of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 456).

More recently, Funahashi Naoya has examined the relationship between the ten *hetus* and the twenty *kāraṇas*, and he, too, notes the difference in order between the lists

[169]Some of the material in this section has appeared in a very abbreviated form in Kritzer 1994a.

of *hetus* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* on the one hand, and in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, as well as in the list of twenty *kāraṇas* (the last ten of which correspond to the ten *hetus*) of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other (Funahashi 1979; see also Funahashi 1991). In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *parigrahahetu* separates the third *hetu*, *ākṣepahetu*, from the fifth, *abhinirvṛttihetu*. In the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, *abhinirvṛttihetu* immediately follows *ākṣepahetu*, while *parigrahahetu* follows *abhinirvṛttihetu*. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *parigrahakāraṇa*, the fifteenth *kāraṇa*, similarly follows number thirteen, *ākṣepakāraṇa*, and number fourteen, *abhinirvṛttikāraṇa*. Funahashi suggests that the difference is due to the fact that the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* considers the *hetus* in relation to the scheme of fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas*, according to which *sābhiniṣyanda bīja*,[170] with which *abhinirvṛttihetu* is associated, precedes the group of six *adhiṣṭhānas* (*kliṣṭanirodha*, *viṣaya*, *indriya*, *kriyā*, *puruṣakāra*, and *tattvadarśana*)[171] with which *parigrahahetu* is associated (*YBh*: 107). The *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, on the other hand, mentions *parigrahahetu* in the middle because it consists of the auxiliary causes that help the seeds that comprise *ākṣepahetu* to become the immediate cause of rebirth, *abhinirvṛttihetu* (Funahashi 1979: 329-330; La Vallée Poussin 1913: 66-67; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 456-457). Funahashi does not pursue the issue further.

At this point I would like to make two comments with regard to Funahashi's article. First, the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* refers to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* list and reproduces it in the same order (T. 1579: 881b); as far as I can tell, Funahashi does not notice this. Although the chronological relationship between the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, two of the oldest sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, is still unclear, this

[170]According to La Vallée Poussin's translation of *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, *sasnchabījādhiṣṭhāna*.

[171]According to La Vallée Poussin, *anantaraniruddha-*, *viṣaya-*, *indriya-*, *karaṇa-*, *puruṣakāra-*, and *tattvadarśanādhiṣṭhāna* (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 456-457).

reference in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* would suggest that at least this portion of it[172] is newer than portions of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Second, Funahashi, as I mentioned above, thinks that the order of the *hetus* in *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* is related to the order of the *adhiṣṭhānas*, and this certainly seems to be true. However, I have been unable to find any mention of fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas* earlier than this same discussion of *hetu, pratyaya, phala,* and *adhiṣṭhāna* in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*. Therefore, it seems probable to me that the association of the fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas* with the ten *hetus* did not prompt the rearranging of the list. Instead, I think, the same influence led to both features of the *Savitarkāsavicārabhūmi* passage. In the following, I shall examine this influence.

In the introduction to his translation of the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and its *Bhāṣya*, Matsuda Kazunobu discusses the development of the Yogācāra "two lifetimes/singlefold causation" theory. Although the section on *aṅgasamāsa* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is the *locus classicus* of this theory, Matsuda suggests that the *Yogācārabhūmi* may contain its forerunners. There are several expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and Matsuda deals with two in particular. Regarding the *śarīra* portion of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition (*YBh*: 198-203), which, as he mentions, is also included in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 827b-828c), he disagrees with Ui Hakuju, who does not see it as similar to the two lifetimes/singlefold causation theory. However, citing the difficulties in understanding this passage, Matsuda does not analyze it in depth. Instead he turns to an exposition in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (*ŚrBh*: 384-385) that he says corresponds to it, in which two types of causes (*ākṣepakahetu* and *abhinirvartakahetu*, or *abhinirvṛttihetu*) and two types of fruits (*ātmabhāvaphala* and *viṣayopabhogaphala*) are mentioned, and according to which the members from Consciousness through Feeling are the seeds, in the present life, of Birth in the future life

[172]This last portion of *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, unlike the majority of the text, is not a commentary on *Saṃyuktāgama*; rather it consists of a *mātṛkā* of *abhidharma*, and Mukai notes that it does not exist in Tibetan translation. This, and the fact that the portion refers to the *Maulībhūmi*, suggests that it is a later addition to *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*.

(Matsuda 1983: 30-32). The *śārira* exposition in fact seems to present a very similar system, with certain slight differences in terminology (*vipākaphala* for *ātmabhāvaphala*; *viṣayanirjāta[phala]* for *viṣayopabhogaphala*; *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* for *abhinirvṛttihetu*) and perhaps a somewhat different mechanism of seed-causation.

Establishing the chronological sequence of these expositions is difficult. As I have mentioned above, Schmithausen thinks that the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* belong to the earliest layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Schmithausen 1987: 14). Since the *śarīra* portion of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition appears (without the heading *śarīra*) in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, the most natural assumption might be that it was borrowed by the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* to serve as the first of its nine sections; if this is the case, then the *śarīra* portion, unlike the remainder of the exposition, is very early. However, Mukai Akira has shown that, while much of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* is in effect a commentary on the *Saṃyuktāgama*, the part corresponding to the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi śarīra* portion is not (Mukai 1985: 34). On the other hand, it does not seem likely to me that this portion originated as late as the composition of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* and was interpolated from the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* into the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*. On the contrary, its rather disorganized contents suggest to me an early date of composition; in fact, its greater length and lack of clarity make it seem older than the *Śrāvakabhūmi* exposition, even though the *Śrāvakabhūmi* is generally considered to be earlier than the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, let alone the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*. Although Schmithausen refers to this passage and mentions the fact that it appears in both the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* and *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, he does not speculate on which came first (Schmithausen 1987: 38, 48, 170). Thus, the origin of this passage remains unclear, as does its chronological relation to the *Śrāvakabhūmi* exposition, at least to my mind. In any case, the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi śarīra* portion and its *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* parallel are probably considerably older than the remainder of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition,

while the *Śrāvakabhūmi* passage is undoubtedly so.

Thus, we can find the terms *ākṣepa* (*ākṣepaka*) and *abhinirvṛtti* (*abhinirvartaka*) occurring with essentially similar meanings in the systematic expositions of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula contained in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. As we shall see, they also are found in the fully developed two lifetimes/singlefold causation system of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. However, there seems to be some development over the course of time. In certain passages (the expositions in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, as well as the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi śarīra* section), the terms are mentioned as part of an explanation of the process of conditioned origination, while in others (the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratyayatva* section and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya aṅgasamāsa* section), they appear as the headings of groups under which the members of the formula are enumerated. On the basis of this, I think that the Yogācāra explanation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in terms of a theory of seed causation is in the process of being worked out in the earlier passages, while the later passages simply describe the implications of a theory that has already been more or less systematized.

How, then, are the *ākṣepakahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (or *abhinirvartakahetu*) of the *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions related to *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the list of the ten *hetus*? I shall attempt to show a sequence of ideas and texts, but given our lack of certainty regarding the chronology of the *Yogācārabhūmi* texts, my conclusions must be largely speculative.

The earliest interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula[173] containing the idea

[173]Aramaki cites a *sutta* from the *Saṃyuttanikāya*, according to which the body's development, depending on causes, is similar to a plant's development from a seed that has received "earthly nutrients" (Aramaki's translation) and water (*nayidaṃ attakataṃ bimbaṃ nayidaṃ parakatam aghaṃ/ hetuṃ paṭicca sambhūtaṃ hetubhaṅgā nirujjhati// yathā aññataraṃ bījaṃ khette vuttaṃ virūhati/ pathavīrasam cāgamma sinchañ ca tad ubhayaṃ//* -- as given in Aramaki 1986: 118). This, of course, is an earlier example of a botanical simile in a discussion of causation, and the basic metaphor may have originated in this or some other equally old text. However, this *sutta*, if I understand Aramaki correctly, precedes the emergence of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula as we know it. The very detailed application of the

that actions performed under the influence of Ignorance condition rebirth, not by directly causing Consciousness to arise in the next life, as in the Sarvāstivādin three lifetimes/twofold causation system, but by "planting" a seed that can become actualized in the form of the next life, is perhaps found in a passage from Chapter Six of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.[174] Although this passage does not contain the terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu*, its approach is more similar to that of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *śarīra* expositions than to that of the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, and the botanical metaphor that is elaborated on in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* discussion of the ten *hetus* seems to originate here. Both the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *śarīra* expositions seem to be attempts to explain more systematically the process described in the *Daśabhūmika*, and both expositions take the term *bīja* in a more technical sense. Granted that we do not know which is earlier, the *śarīra* exposition as found in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, or the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, I believe that, in the course of determining exactly how the members of the formula function in causing rebirth, one of these two texts introduced the terms *ākṣepahetu*[175] and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (or *abhinirvartakahetu*).

If I am correct then, the ten *hetus* passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, in which the description of how the *hetus* function in a botanical context clearly recalls the language of the *Daśabhūmika*,[176] borrows the terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* from one of

metaphor to the formula in the *BoBh* strikingly resembles that of the *DBh*. Although the two texts may in some sense have a common source, it seems likely to me that the author of *BoBh* was familiar with the *DBh* passage.

[174]*teṣāṃ taiḥ saṃskāraiḥ paribhāvitam avaropitaṃ cittabījaṃ sāsravaṃ sopādanam āyatyāṃ jātijarāmaraṇapunarbhavābhinivṛttisaṃbhavopagataṃ bhavati/ karmakṣetrālayam avidyāṃdhakāran tṛṣṇāsneham asmimānapariṣyandinaṃ dṛṣṭikṛtajālapravṛddhyā nāmarūpāṃkuraḥ prādurbhavati* (*DBh*: 97). The extensive discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* contained in this chapter deserves further study.

[175]I do not think that there is any substantial difference in meaning between *ākṣepa* and *ākṣepaka* in these compounds.

[176]E.g., *yato yataḥ svabījād yasya yasya sasyasya prādurbhāvo bhavati. tad bījaṃ tasyākṣepahetuḥ. pṛthivīvṛṣṭyādikaḥ pratyayo 'ṅkuraprādurbhāvāya parigrahahetuḥ. tad bījaṃ tasyāṃkurasyābhinirvṛttihetuḥ.* (*BoBh*: 99).

the early *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Although its definitions of these two causes as being, respectively, the seeds of Ignorance, etc., in the present life, which produce Birth and Old Age and Death in the next life,[177] and the seeds of Ignorance, etc., which produce themselves,[178] are not exactly the same as those of *ākṣepakahetu* and the *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* in the *śarīra* exposition, they are similar in their broad outlines. The main differences between the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* definitions and those of the *śarīra* exposition involve the mention of the seeds of Ignorance in the former. Both the *śarīra* (*YBh*: 200) and the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (*ŚrBh*: 384) passages include seeds in *ākṣepakahetu*, but only the seeds of the members from Consciousness through Feeling; Ignorance and the Karmic Forces are not described as seeds. Similarly, in the *śarīra* exposition, *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* is identified with Karmic Existence, which consists of the seeds from *ākṣepakahetu*, endowed with Subconscious Desire and Appropriation (*YBh*: 201);[179] in other words it comprises the seeds of Consciousness through Feeling after they have been rendered viable by Subconscious Desire and Appropriation. Again, the seeds of Ignorance are not mentioned; however, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, like the *śarīra* exposition, defines *abhinirvṛttihetu* as the seeds of the constituents of the next life in a state of readiness to yield results.

These differences in definitions can be explained by the fact that the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* passage, unlike the other two, is not an analysis of *pratītyasamutpāda per se* and so does not precisely identify where each member of the formula functions in the process of causation. Furthermore, the fact that another *hetu*, *parigrahahetu*, comes between *ākṣepa-* and *abhinirvṛttihetus* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* list suggests that, at the

[177] *avidyādīnāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dṛṣṭa eva dharme yāni bījāni jātasya bhūtasyeha. tāny anyajānmikasya jātijarāmaraṇasyākṣepahetuḥ* (*BoBh*: 100).

[178] *svakasvakaṃ bījam avidyādīnāṃ nirvṛttihetuḥ* (*BoBh*: 100).

[179] The *ŚrBh* simply says that *abhinirvṛttihetu* is the potential of *karma*, which as Matsuda notes is here equivalent to Karmic Existence (Matsuda 1983: 31), to produce *vipāka* (*ŚrBh*: 385).

time of its composition, the *Yogācārabhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* expositions were not yet established as the standard Yogācāra explanations of the formula, and thus *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* were not yet an inseparable pair. The botanical origin of the seed metaphor, which lingers in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* description of external causality, perhaps still overrides the more abstract theory of causality found in the *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions. After all, in the physical process whereby a seed gains the potential to yield fruit, auxiliary causes such as water clearly work their results after the planting of the seed in its "unmoistened" state and before its fructification, and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* devotes considerable space to describing this process. In contrast, the ten *hetus* passage in *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* does not refer to botanical development at all; in fact, it scarcely mentions the external world.[180]

As seed theory was refined, the original metaphor may have lost its force, and even in texts as early as the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* expositions, the term *bīja* seems somewhat divorced from the botanical setting. By the time of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* (here I exclude the *śarīra* portion on the grounds that it was probably borrowed wholesale from an earlier source), there has been even further movement away from the original meaning, and the remainder of the extensive treatment of *pratītyasamutpāda* found at the end of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* represents a later stage in the systematization of *bīja* theory. Unlike the exposition of *śarīra*, which is convoluted and repetitive, the rest of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* analysis is written in a straightforward *abhidharma* style, full of definitions and lists introduced by the questions, "What?," "How many?," and "Why?" Much of this section appears to consist of reinterpretations of earlier material in terms of *bīja* (for example, the entire *vibhaṅga* or *vibhāga* portion is

[180]E.g., in its explanation of *ākṣepahetu*, *Sav* simply states: *bāhyānāṃ ca bhāvānāṃ tenaivādhipatyena sampannavipannatā* (*YBh*: 108). In its explanation of *abhinirvṛttihetu*, on the other hand, it does not specifically mention external things at all.

a commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*).[181] Elsewhere there are attempts to coordinate already established categories with the *bīja* system. The *pratyaya* portion, for example, in explaining the types of causal relations the various members of the formula can enter into with one another, states that one member cannot be the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of another because the causal condition of something is always the seed of that same thing.[182] The terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* come up in further discussion of this point.

Here the two, as they occur in the list of ten causes,[183] are related specifically to the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula: *ākṣepahetu* consists of the members from Ignorance through Feeling, while *abhinirvṛttihetu* consists of the members from Subconscious Desire through Karmic Existence.[184] In the course of showing the connection between the four *pratyayas* and the twelve members of the formula, this brief passage in effect summarizes the lengthy descriptions of *ākṣepakahetu* and *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* from the *śarīra* exposition and equates the two with the *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* of the ten *hetus* system. By this point, the *bīja* interpretation of the formula is so well established that here, unlike in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *śarīra* expositions, the fact that the members from Individual Existence through Feeling are in the form of seeds rather than actualized *dharmas* is not even mentioned, a feature this passage shares with the *aṅgasamāsa* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. For the author of this text, the projection and actualization of seeds are the essence of conditioned origination, and thus the terms *ākṣepa* and *abhinirvṛtti* are inevitably found together.

[181]See *Saṃyuktāgama*, *sūtra* 298 (T. 99: 85a); also, T. 124: 547b.

[182]*kena kāraṇena hetupratyayena na pratyayāny etāny aṅgāni/ svabhāva-bījapratyayaprabhāvitatvād hetupratyayasya* (*YBh*: 215).

[183]We know that the reference is to the ten *hetus* list because another member of the list, *āvāhakahetu*, is mentioned here as well.

[184]*katy aṅgāny ākṣepahetusaṃgṛhītāni/ avidyām upādāya yāvad vedanā/ katy aṅgāny abhinirvṛttihetusaṅgṛhītāni/ tṛṣṇām upādāya yāvad bhavaḥ* (*YBh*: 215).

Hence, it is not surprising that, earlier in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, in the discussion of the ten *hetus*, the order of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* list has been changed to bring *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* together. Furthermore, the definition of the causes in terms of the *adhiṣṭhānas*, upon which Funahashi remarks, places more emphasis than the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* on the relationship between the two types of causes in the rebirth process. *Ākṣepahetu* is to be understood in terms of the *adhiṣṭhāna* of perfuming (*vāsanā*) because the Karmic Forces, perfumed by good or bad *karma*, project new lives in desirable or undesirable existences,[185] while *abhinirvṛttihetu* is to be understood in terms of the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the moist seed (*sābhiṣyandabīja*) because the seed, moistened by Subconscious Desire, results in the actualization of the projected new lives.[186]

With the exceptions of the *Vinścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and the *Chüeh ting tsang lun*, both of which refer the reader to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* exposition without enumerating the causes themselves, all discussions of the ten *hetus* that I have found in texts later than the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* follow the order of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*. Furthermore, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, although it contains two different explanations of a discrepancy between the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* regarding *janakahetu* and *upāyahetu* in which *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* figure prominently,[187] does not mention the difference between these two texts regarding the order of the *hetus*. Thus, the change in order of the *hetus* seems to occur after the *bīja* interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda*

[185] *tatra vāsanāhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate/ tat kasya hetoḥ/ tathā hi / śubhāśubhakarmaparibhāvitāḥ saṃskārās traidhātukeṣṭāniṣṭagatiṣv iṣṭāniṣṭātmabhāvān ākṣipanti.* (*YBh*: 107-108). It seems somewhat strange to say that the *saṃskāras* are "perfumed" (*paribhāvita*) by *karma* since they themselves are equivalent to *karma*.

[186] *tatra sābhiṣyandaṃ bījaṃ hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyābhinirvṛttihetuḥ prajñapyate/ tat kasya hetoḥ/ tathā hi/ kāmapratisaṃyuktānāṃ dharmānāṃ rūpārūpya-pratisaṃyuktānāṃ svakasvakād bījāt prādurbhāvo bhavati/ tṛṣṇā punar bījābhiniṣyanda ity ucyate/ tatas tayābhiṣyanditaṃ bījam ākṣiptānām ātmabhāvānām abhinirvṛttaye bhāvati* (*YBh*: 108).

[187] T. 1585: 41c; *Shindō*: 343-344; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 459-462.

formula has become systematized to the point at which each member, except for the purely fruitional Birth and Old Age and Death, is assigned explicitly to one of the two causes. After this point, while there is no further evolution in the exposition of ten *hetus*, the Yogācāra interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* is brought to yet a higher level of systematization in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. As we have seen, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* explains the formula in terms of four sets of members: that which projects (*ākṣepakāṅga*: Ignorance, the Karmic Forces, and Consciousness) and that which is projected (*ākṣiptāṅga*: Individual Existence, the Six Sense, Contact, and Feeling) at the time of cause, and that which actualizes (*abhinirvartakāṅga*: Subconscious Desire, Appropriation, and Karmic Existence) and that which is actualized (*abhinirvṛttyaṅga*: Birth and Old Age and Death) at the time of result (see Chapter Two, section B3).[188]

d. The *Yogācāra* Source of Vasubandhu's *Upapattihetu* and *Abhinirvṛttihetu*

As we saw earlier, Vasubandhu referred to an as yet unidentified *sūtra* to show that *tṛṣṇā* is the cause of rebirth in general (*abhinirvṛttihetu*), while *karma* is the cause of the specific rebirth (*upapattihetu*). The same *sūtra* passage (*karma hetur upapattaye/ tṛṣṇā hetur abhinirvṛttaye*) is quoted at the end of the explanation of *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition of the ten *hetus* summarized in the preceding section (*YBh*: 108; T. 1579: 301). Although the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* does not explicitly identify *upapattihetu* with *ākṣepahetu*, *ākṣepahetu*, like *upapattihetu*, is essentially *karma*, albeit in the form of *bīja* or *vāsanā*. Furthermore, the quotation appears to be used in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* passage to justify the categories of not only *abhinirvṛttihetu*, but *ākṣepahetu*, as well.[189] The *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, like Vasubandhu, cites the *sūtra* to

[188] *AS*: 26; *ASBh*: 31.

[189] This passage recognizes a distinction between *upapatti* and *abhinirvṛtti* that is not made in the *śarīra* portion of the *Sav pratītyasamutpāda* exposition. See note to

show the special role of *tṛṣṇā* in the rebirth process: *tṛṣṇā* moistens the seed, and the moistened seed results in the actualization of the projected *ātmabhāva*.

I have suggested in the previous section that the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition of the ten *hetus*, like the majority of its *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition (excluding the *śarīra* portion), reflects a highly systematized doctrine of seed causation. We have seen that the less systematized *śarīra* section uses the word *upapatti* in the compound *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* simply as a synonym of *punarbhava*, with no special reference to seeds. The ten *hetus* exposition, on the other hand, by quoting from a *sūtra* that contrasts *upapatti* with *abhinirvṛtti*, emphasizes the twofold process that constitutes seed causation.

Our discussion of *tṛṣṇā* began with the controversy about whether *tṛṣṇā* alone comprises *samudayasatya*. On the basis of the *Yogācārabhūmi* analyses of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the ten *hetus*, we must conclude that in the Yogācāra system *tṛṣṇā* cannot be solely responsible for *duḥkha* because *abhinirvṛttihetu* is not the only causal process involved; *ākṣepahetu*, which is equivalent to *karma*, is also necessary. This is what Vasubandhu suggests in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, although, in the context of *samudayasatya*, he avoids using the term *bīja* in a technical sense and does not mention *ākṣepa*. Again, I believe that Vasubandhu adopts a position, this time the Vaibhāṣika insistence that all *sāsravadharmas* comprise *samudayasatya*, because it can be more easily reconciled with Yogācāra doctrine than its alternative.

Elsewhere, in his discussion of *āhāra*, Vasubandhu uses the terms *ākṣepa* and *abhinirvṛtti* in the same sentence to analyze the process of rebirth: "Projection of a new existence is due to mental volition; actualization of that which is projected, moreover, [arises] from the seed of consciousness, which is impregnated by *karma*. The foremost [role] in producing the existence of a being who is not born belongs to these two."[190]

Chapter 3, section C2.

[190] *manaḥsaṃcetanayā punarbhavasyākṣepaḥ ākṣiptasya punaḥ karmaparibhāvitād vijñānabījād abhinirvṛttir ity anayor anutpannasya bhavasyākaraṇe prādhānyam* (*AKBh*: 154; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 126; also quoted and translated in Waldron 1994:

In this statement, Vasubandhu clearly proposes a model of rebirth similar to that of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* expositions. Mental volition, identified by Yaśomitra as *karma*, corresponds to *saṃskāra* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* passages and to *vijñāna* (understood as *karmabīja*) in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. The seed of consciousness corresponds to the seeds of *vijñāna* through *vedanā* (or, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *nāmarūpa* through *vedanā*). Actualization corresponds to *jāti*. Only the cause of actualization is not mentioned here.

However, Saṃghabhadra in his comment makes clear the relationship between *tṛṣṇā* and the future life: "*Cetanā* is projecting *karma*. *Vijñāna* is *bīja*. [They] bring about the future life. This means that, due to *karma*, one can project both the *nāma* and the *rūpa* of the future. *Karma* having projected [*nāmarūpa*], *tṛṣṇā*, moistening the seed of *vijñāna*, is able to make the *ātmabhāva*, which consists of the *nāmarūpa* of the future existence, arise. Thus it is said in the *sūtra*, '*karma* is the cause of *upapatti*; *tṛṣṇā* is the cause of *abhinirvṛtti*.'"[191] This, of course, is the same *sūtra* that is quoted by Vasubandhu and in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, and Saṃghabhadra equates *ākṣepahetu* with *upapattihetu* as I have done above.

Vasubandhu is being even more blatantly unorthodox than usual in this passage: he even inserts what I consider to be telltale Yogācāra terms, *ākṣepa* and [*abhi*]*nirvṛtti*, into the verse.[192] Therefore, it is the more surprising that Saṃghabhadra does not attack Vasubandhu for the reference to *bīja* in this passage of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. On the other hand, P'u-kuang, as La Vallée Poussin notes, characterizes the passage as a

211).

[191]思為引業。識為種子。引起當有。謂由業故。能引當來。名色二有。業既引已。愛潤識種。能令當有名色身起。故契經說。業為生因。愛為起因。(T. 1582: 511b).

[192]*dvayam anyabhavākṣepanirvṛttyartham yathākramam* (*AKBh*: 154; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 125-126).

Sautrāntika explanation.[193] But if he is correct, we can also describe the relevant passages in the *Śrāvakabhūmi, Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi, Abhidharmasamuccaya,* etc., as Sautrāntika. Again, I think that Vasubandhu is advocating a Yogācāra position here, and it is not recognized as such because of the tradition that Vasubandhu was a Sautrāntika and not a Yogācāra when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.*

The question remains as to how aware the authors of early Yogācāra texts were of the contradiction between the *sūtra* statement that *tṛṣṇā* is *samudayasatya* and the logical demands of their own system of causation. As far as I can tell, the earliest strata of the *Yogācārabhūmi* do not reveal such an awareness. In the *Śrāvakabhūmi, samudayasatya* is simply and explicitly defined, as it is in the *sūtras*, as comprising the various types of *tṛṣṇā.*[194] In the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī,* although *samudayasatya* is mentioned in a number of contexts, there seems to be nothing that suggest that its scope must be larger than *tṛṣṇā.* Finally, I have found no detailed discussion of *samudayasatya* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi.*[195]

However, when one turns to later portions, particularly the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, one can see clearly that the *sūtra* definition has been reconsidered. In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi* on *Śrūtamayībhūmi, samudayasatya* is said to consist of *kleśasaṃkleśa* and *karmasaṃkleśa*, in contrast to *duḥkhasatya,* which consists of *janmasaṃkleśa.* Furthermore, the text explains that the Buddha mentioned only *tṛṣṇā* in the *sūtra* because of its predominance.[196] Similarly, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on

[193]T. 1821: 182b. La Vallée Poussin does not give the reference (1971, v. 2: 126 n. 3).

[194]*tatra samudaya āryasatyaṃ tṛṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatra tatrābhinandinī* (*ŚrBh*: 252; T. 1579: 434c).

[195]As far as I can tell, it is mentioned only once, in a simple enumeration of the four truths (*BoBh*: 38; T. 1579: 486c).

[196]云何苦諦。謂生苦等。廣説如前。若略説者。如説一切生雜染事。皆名苦諦。云何集諦。謂説一切煩惱雜染及業雜染。皆名集諦。世尊就勝唯顯貪愛。其勝因縁如前應知。(T. 1579: 655c). A related passage is found in the *Cintamayībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*: 問若是苦諦亦集諦耶。設是集諦亦苦諦耶。答諸是集諦者皆是苦諦。或是苦諦而非集諦。謂一切阿漢清淨相續中所有若善若無記。一

Cintamayībhūmi states that *samudayasatya* really consists of *kleśa* and *karma* that can produce rebirth, but that the Buddha, speaking generally (i.e, not technically) in the *sūtras*, only mentioned *tṛṣṇā*.[197] These passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi* seem to be the basis for the standard Yogācāra *abhidharma* definitions of *samudayasatya* as found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*[198] and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*.[199] Elsewhere, in connection with the division of the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula into three categories of

切世間法一切異生身中所有果異熟攝無記諸法。一切現在士所生若苦若樂。若不苦不樂俱行無記行。當知唯是苦諦所攝。(T. 1579: 672c)

[197]復次即此能生後有諸行業及煩惱。由相道理是集聖諦。世尊經中據勝道理唯顯示愛。(T. 1579: 663c).

[198]*samudayasatyaṃ katamat/ kleśaḥ kleśādhipateyañ ca karma// prādhānyanirdeśas tu bhagavatā tṛṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī samudayasatyanirdeśena nirdiṣṭā* (the Chinese takes this to indicate four types of *tṛṣṇā*: 若愛若後有愛。若喜貪俱行愛。若彼彼喜樂愛。)/ / *prādhānyārthaḥ katamaḥ yaḥ sarvatragārthaḥ/ sarvatragārthaḥ katamaḥ tathāpi tṛṣṇā vastusarvatragā avasthāsarvatragā adhvasarvatragā dhātusarvatragā eṣaṇāsarvatragā prakārasarvatragā//* (*AS*: 32; T. 1605: 676a). See also *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* on the above passage: *kleśāḥ kleśādhipateyaṃ ca karma iti sāsravam ity arthaḥ/ yady evaṃ kim arthaṃ bhagavatā tṛṣṇaiva samudayanirdeśe nirdiṣṭā/ sarvatragatvena prādhānyāt/* (i) *tṛṣṇā vastusarvatragā prāptāprāptasarvātmabhāvaviṣayavastuvyāpanāt/ prāpte ātmabhāve tṛṣṇā aprāpte paunarbhavikī/ prāpteṣu viṣayeṣu* [*nandīrāgasahagatā/ aprāpteṣu viṣayeṣu*] *tatratatrābhinandinī veditavyā/* (ii) *avasthāsarvatragā duḥkhaduḥkhatāditryavastheṣu saṃskāreṣv anuga*[*ta*]*tvāt/ tatra duḥkhaduḥkhatāvastheṣu prāpteṣu viyogatṛṣṇā aprāpteṣv asaṃyogatṛṣṇā/ vipariṇāmaduḥkhatāvastheṣu aviyogatṛṣṇā saṃyogatṛṣṇā ca prāptāprāptabhedāt/ saṃskāra-duḥkhatāvastheṣu saṃmohatṛṣṇā kleśadauṣṭhulyaprabhāvitatvād aduḥkhāsukhavedanāprabhāvitatvāc ca / ālayavijñānaṃ viśeṣeṇa saṃskāraduḥkhatāvasthaṃ tatra cātma-saṃmohamukhena tṛṣṇā pravṛttā veditavyā/* etc. (*ASBh*: 55; T. 1606: 722bc).

[199]諸諦有六種。論說諦有六種一世俗諦二勝義諦。三苦諦。四集諦。五滅諦。六道諦。

世俗諦者。謂名句文身。及依彼義一切言說。及依言說所解了義。又會得世間心及心法。及彼所行境義。

勝義者。謂聖智及彼所行境義。及彼相應心心法等。

苦諦者。此有二種。一世俗諦所攝。二勝義諦所攝。世俗諦所攝者。如經中說。生苦老苦病苦死苦怨憎會苦愛別離苦求不得苦。勝義諦所攝者。如經中說。略攝一切五取蘊苦。

集諦者。此有四種。一全攝。二勝攝。三世俗諦攝。四勝義諦攝。全攝者。謂一切三界煩惱及業。皆名集諦。勝攝者。謂緣已得未得自體及境所起愛後有愛喜俱行愛處處喜愛。皆名集諦。世俗諦集者。若因能感世俗諦所攝苦諦。勝義諦攝者。若因能感勝義諦所攝苦諦。etc. (T. 1602: 485c).

defilement, we see that *duḥkhasatya* corresponds to defilement consisting of birth (*janmasaṃkleśa*), while *samudayasatya* corresponds to defilement consisting of *kleśa* (*kleśasaṃkleśa*) together with defilement consisting of action (*karmasaṃkleśa*); this relationship is only suggested implicitly in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.[200] However, it is stated explicitly in the *pratyayaprabheda* section of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, according to which: *duḥkhasatya* in the present life consists of *jati* and *jarāmaraṇa*; *duḥkhasatya* in the future life consists of the members from *vijñāna* through *vedanā* in the form of seeds; and *samudayasatya* consists of the remaining members, namely *avidyā*, *saṃskāra*, *tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava*.[201]

Although none of the passages referred above mentions *ālayavijñāna*, the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (see note above) comments that the *ālayavijñāna* is a state of *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* and that, due to ego-delusion with respect to it, *tṛṣṇā* is produced. In addition, there is a passage in the *Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* that relates *duḥkha*- and *samudayasatya* to the question of why *ālayavijñāna* is the source of all defilements:[202] "*Ālayavijñāna*, because it can hold the seeds of all *dharmas*, is the essential nature of *duḥkhasatya* in the present, and it is also the cause that produces *duḥkhasatya* in the future. Furthermore, it is the cause that produces *samudayasatya* in the present. Because it can produce the world of beings (*sattvaloka*), because it can produce the inanimate world (*bhajanaloka*), because it is the essential nature of *duḥkhasatya*, because it can produce *duḥkhasatya* in the future, [and] because it can produce *samudayasatya* in the present, we must know that *ālayavijñāna* is

[200] See Chapter 2, section B6.

[201] *katy aṅgāni duḥkhasatya* (emended from *pratyaya* on the basis of Tibetan *sdug bsṅal gyi bden pas bsdus* and Chinese 苦諦攝)*gṛhītāni dṛṣṭadhārmaduḥkhāya ca/ dve jātijarāmaraṇaṃ ca/ kati duḥkhasatyasaṃgṛhītāny evāyatyām eva ca duḥkhāya/ vijñānādīni vedanāvasānāni bījabhūtāni/ kati samudayasatyasaṃgṛhītāni/ avaśiṣṭāni.* (*YBh*: 219; T. 1579: 325c; *YBh*$_t$: 218b 8-219a 2).

[202] This is from what Schmithausen refers to as the *Nivṛtti* portion.

the basis of all impurity."[203]

These are the only explanations of *samudayasatya* in terms of *ālayavijñāna* that I have found in the early Yogācāra literature.[204] A discussion of the four *satya*s in the context of the *trisvabhāva* theory can be found in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, but there is no mention of the *ālaya*.[205]

c. The Function of *Tṛṣṇā* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

Returning to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, we can, if we compare the functions of *saṃskāra*- and *tṛṣṇāṅgas*, identify a distinction similar to that between *upapattihetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu*. As we have seen, the *saṃskāras*, which are identified with *karma*, determine the specific destiny into which beings are born, as well as being the cause of the seeds of future existence (see Chapter 2, section B52). Thus, they correspond closely to Vasubandhu's *upapattihetu*, which causes rebirth in specific circumstances (see section d above).

Tṛṣṇā, on the other hand, draws beings to existence in general; the term existence (*janman*) here seems synonymous with *abhinirvṛtti*. *Tṛṣṇā* is thus the first step of the three-step process (designated as *abhinirvartakāṅga* in the *aṅgasamāsa* section) that leads to the actual production of the new life. It ensures that beings will not be released from *saṃsāra* in this life and must, therefore, be born again. *Upādāna*, which Takasaki sees as

[203]又即此阿賴耶識。能持一切法種子故。於現在世是苦諦體。亦是未来苦諦生因。又是現在集諦生因。如是能生有情世間故。能生器世間故。是苦諦體故。能生未来苦諦故。能生現在集諦故。當知阿賴耶識是一切雜染根本。 (T. 1579: 581b). For an explanation of this passage, as well as a retranslation into Sanskrit, see Schmithausen 1987: 75,363 n. 548.

[204]But see Schmithausen 1987: 160 ff. regarding the possibility of a similar interpretation in the *Paramārthagāthās* of the *YBh.*

[205]*Mvbh*: 61-62; see also *Cwsl* (T. 1585: 47b; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 542-545).

corresponding to *karma* in the context of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula,[206] affects their consciousness, so that the impressions of past *karma* contained therein will result in the appropriate rebirth. When these impressions are activated, all the *karma* that leads to rebirth added up, as it were, at the last moment is called *bhava*.[207] *Bhava*, as the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* says, conveys beings immediately to the next existence (see Chapter 2, section B5j).

The main function of *tṛṣṇā* in this section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition is to act as *abhinirvṛttihetu*, or as the most important constituent of *abhinirvṛttihetu*, which is completed by *upādāna* and *bhava*. This becomes clear by comparison when one looks at the explanation of the functions of these three members in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. Chapter Six of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, I believe, foreshadows various features of Yogācāra *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions but without formulating a consistent system. Although elsewhere in the chapter, one can find an explanation of *pratītyasamutpāda* involving seeds,[208] the system of two types of cause, one that produces seeds and another that actualizes them, is not yet apparent. Nor does anything in the explanation of the functions in the *Daśabhūmika* suggest that *vedanā* and *tṛṣṇā* belong to different lifetimes,[209] or that *vedanā* is a seed, while *tṛṣṇā* is an actualized *dharma*.[210]

[206]This is in spite of the fact, which he recognizes, that *upādāna* is formally *kleśa* rather than *karma* (Takasaki 1987: 156-158). The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes *upādāna* in the category of *kleśasaṃkleśa* (see Chapter 2, section B6).

[207]Or so Vasubandhu explains *bhava* in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, where he presents his own understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*: *upādānapratyayaṃ punaḥ paunarbhāvikaṃ karmopacīyate/ tad bhavaḥ* (*AKBh*: 140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 86).

[208]*teṣāṃ taiḥ saṃskāraiḥ paribhāvitam* [omitted by Rahder (1926: 48) and La Vallée Poussin (1913: 116), but supported by *DBh*$_t$: li 102b 2] *avaropitaṃ cittabījaṃ sāsravaṃ sopādānam āyatyāṃ jātijarāmaraṇapunarbhavābhini*[*r*, Rahder and La Vallée Poussin clearly provide a better reading here]*vṛttisaṃbhavopagataṃ bhavati/ karmakṣetrālayam avidyāṃdhakāran tṛṣṇāsneham asmimānapariṣyandinaṃ dṛṣṭikṛtajālapravṛddhyā nāmarūpāṅkuraḥ prādurbhavati* (*DBh*: 97).

[209]However, in the portion of Chapter Six of the *Daśabhūmika* in which the members are assigned to the past, present or future, *vedanā* and *tṛṣṇā* are assigned to different lifetimes (see Chapter 3, section B).

Neither *tṛṣṇā* nor *upādāna* is related to rebirth at all; only *bhava* is said to establish the destiny of the new birth (see note to Chapter 2, section B5j), a function assigned by the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* to *saṃskāra*.

The *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* portion of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* thus seems to be a rewriting of the corresponding passage from the *Daśabhūmika* in the light of the fully developed two lifetimes/singlefold causation system. In the case of *tṛṣṇā*, the function described in the *Daśabhūmika*, namely to bring about desire for desirable things (see note to Chapter 2, section B5h), is similar to the definition in the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation, where *tṛṣṇā* is said to be the desire for pleasure, particularly sexual pleasure.[211] In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, its function is more grandiose although (or because) it is related specifically to rebirth, in which it acts as the principle cause of the actualization of the *bījas* that, when actualized, will constitute the next life. This, I believe, is the significance of the statement that *tṛṣṇā* "draws beings to existence" (see Chapter 2, section B5h).

[210]The *Ch'eng wei shih lun* says that the members from *vijñāna* through *vedanā*, although they are seeds and simultaneous, are always mentioned in the traditional sequence, either due to the relative importance of each member, or because when they are actualized, they appear in this order (識等五種由業熏發雖實同時。而依主伴總別勝劣因果相異故諸聖教假說前後。或依當來現起分位有次第故說有前後。由斯識等亦說現行因時定無現行義故。-- T. 1585:43c; *Shindō*: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483). According to the annotation of the *Shindōjōyuishikiron*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the *Daśabhūmika*, and the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* all follow the logic of the second reason mentioned above in representing the members as actualized *dharmas* and not *bījas* (*Shindō*: 355; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483). While this seems to be accurate with respect to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I think that the *Daśabhūmika*, in fact, represents them as actualized *dharmas* because it has not yet taken the step of considering them to be *bījas*. It seems to me to be on the verge of doing so.

[211]*tṛṣṇā bhogamaithunarāgiṇaḥ* (*AK* III 23b; *AKBh*: 132; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 64).

V. THE *ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA* AND VASUBANDHU ON *SAṂSKĀRAPRATYAYAṂ VIJÑĀNAM*

A. Introduction

The definition of Consciousness as a member of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, that is, of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam,* is crucially important to all interpretations of the principle of conditioned origination, and in any technical discussion of the formula, the treatment of *vijñāna* will give us a clue to the fundamental doctrinal stance of the author. Three definitions concern us here. Does *vijñānāṅga* consist of the six *vijñānakāyas*, visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), etc.? Is it *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, the exclusively mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) at the moment of conception? Or is it *ālayavijñāna*?

Of these, the six-*vijñānakāya* definition can be found in the two versions of the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* mentioned above (T. 99: 85a; T. 124: 547c) as well as in the Tibetan translation of the *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa*, edited by De Jong (1979: 147). Furthermore, a cognitional explanation of how the six *vijñānas* are conditioned by *saṃskāra* is also given as one of a number of interpretations of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in the *Dharmaskandha*, an early Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* text.[1] In a later period, Vasubandhu proposes one variation on this interpretation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and a somewhat different variation in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā.*

[1] *api khalu cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvvijñānaṃ* (/) *tattra cakṣuḥsaṃskṛtaṃ rūpāṇi ca bāhyaṃ pratyayaṃ cakṣurvvijñānasya tad ucyate saṃskār*[*a*] (pratyayaṃ vijñānam /) *śrottraghrāṇajihvākāyamanaḥ pratītya dharmmāṃś cotpadyate manovijñānaṃ* (/) *tattra manaḥsaṃskṛtaṃ dharmmāś ca bāhyaṃ pratyayaṃ manovijñānasya tad ucyate saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānaṃ* (Dietz 1984: 31). 復次眼及色為縁生眼識。此中眼是内有為行。色為外縁生眼識。是名行縁識。乃至意及法為縁生意識。此中意是内有為行。法為外縁生意識。是名行縁識。(T. 1537: 507a). See Cox 1993: 127-132 for a discussion of the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Dharmaskandha.*

The *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* interpretation, the best known version of which Vasubandhu presents in the verses of the *Abhidharmakośa*, is, as I shall show, the orthodox interpretation of the later Sarvāstivādin school from the period of the *Vibhāṣā*. It is in reaction to this interpretation that Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* insists that *vijñānāṅga* consists of the six *vijñānakāyas* in the intermediate realm. His reason for rejecting the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* definition is, I believe, that it cannot be rationalized in terms of Yogācāra doctrine while the six-*vijñāna* definition can.

Finally, the explicitly Yogācāra interpretation of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is that it must be *ālayavijñānā*. This is Vasubandhu's ultimate position in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, and it underlies, I believe, his discussion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, although it is by no means explicitly stated there. An examination of Vasubandhu's various interpretations may help us understand the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* explanation of the functions of *vijñānāṅga*.

B. Vasubandhu on *Saṃskārapratyayaṃ Vijñānam*

1. On the Question of Vasubandhu's Own Opinion

Vasubandhu in Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośa* devotes nineteen verses (v. 20-38) to a discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda*. During the course of this discussion, we can find two conflicting definitions of consciousness as a member (*aṅga*) of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, that is to say, of consciousness conditioned by the karmic forces (*saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*). In verse 21c, consciousness is defined as the *skandhas* at the moment of conception.[2] In his comment in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on verse 28ab, however, Vasubandhu states that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* actually

[2] *saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam* (*AKBh*: 131).

refers to the stream of the "six ordinary kinds of mind"[3] in the intermediate realm, and he cites a *sūtra* definition for support.[4]

In his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, La Vallée Poussin does not mention which school accepts the second definition. In his translation of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, on the other hand, he attributes it to Sarvāstivāda: "D'après les Sarvāstivādas, le membre Vijñāna = les six Vijñānas (Manovijñāna, oeil- *vijñāna*, etc.) de l'existence intermédiaire" (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 200). P.S. Jaini makes the same attribution in the introduction to his edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa*: "The other [i.e. not *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*] meaning, viz., the six *vijñānas*, although occurring in the Vibhaṅga-sutta of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, is most probably a later addition introduced by the Ābhidharmikas. This becomes evident from the attempt of the Vaibhāṣikas to apply this term not only to the moment of rebirth consciousness, but also to a long preceding period called *antarā-bhava*, where alone the six *vijñānas* could be understood to function" (Jaini 1977: 58-59). More recently, Marek Mejor has introduced a translation of the comment in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, together with the text and translation of the corresponding portion of Sthiramati's commentary, *Tattvārtha*, as "Vaibhāṣikas on the *pratītyasamutpāda*" (Mejor 1991: 96), thus indicating that he, too, considers the six-*vijñānakāya* definition to represent the Sarvāstivādin position.

N.H. Samtani has pointed out that the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* identifies another interpretation of the six-*vijñānakāya* definition, in which the six *vijñānas* are described as *saṃskāraparibhāvitāḥ*, as a Sautrāntika view,[5] and recognizes that this

[3]For this translation, see Schmithausen 1987: 650.

[4]*karmākṣepavaśāc ca vijñānasantatis tāṃ tāṃ gatiṃ gacchati/ jvālāgamana-yogenāntarābhavasambandhāt/ tadanyasaṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam/ evaṃ ca kṛtvā tad upapannaṃ bhavati vijñānāṅganirdeśe "vijñānaṃ katamat/ ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ" iti* (*AKBh*: 140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 84-85).

[5]This is Vasubandhu's position in another text, the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*; see below, section B4.

contradicts Jaini's opinion, which he quotes (*AVS*, introduction: 143-144). However, he does not go into the matter any further. Katō Junshō shows that Vasubandhu, in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab, is actually attacking the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*; according to Katō, Vasubandhu makes this attack in the name of the Sautrāntika. However, he too fails to explore Vasubandhu's interpretation of *vijñāna* in detail (Katō 1989: 315-317).

In this section, I hope to show that the first of these two definitions (*saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam*) represents the orthodox Sarvāstivādin position, while the second (*vijñānaṃ katamat/ ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ*) is Vasubandhu's own opinion. I shall also try to explain the implications of Vasubandhu's position.

2. The Sarvāstivādin Definition -- *Pratisaṃdhivijñāna*

Since the exposition of conditioned origination in the *Abhidharmakośa* is rather involved, I shall first explain the context in which each definition occurs. In the beginning of Chapter Three, the Exposition of the Universe (*lokanirdeśa*), Vasubandhu enumerates the various realms, destinies, etc., into which beings are reborn, and he explains *antarābhava*, the intermediate existence between death and rebirth. He then denies that there is any soul (*ātman*) that is reborn; rather, "the *skandhas* alone, conditioned by defilement and action, enter the womb by way of the series (that is given the name) of the intermediate existence, like a lamp."[6] To explain this conditioning process whereby defilement and action result in rebirth, and birth in turn results in defilement and action, Vasubandhu introduces the topic of *pratītyasamutpāda*. The first definition of *vijñāna* can be found at the beginning of this discussion.

In *Abhidharmakośa* III 20, Vasubandhu states that the twelve members of the

[6]*nātmāsti skandhamātraṃ tu kleśakarmābhisaṃskṛtam / antarābhavasaṃtatyā kukṣim eti pradīpavat* (*AK* III 18; *AKBh*: 129; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 57).

pratītyasamutpāda formula can be divided among three lifetimes, and in *Abhidharmakośa* III 21-24, he defines each member as being a "state" (*daśā* or *avasthā*) of the five *skandhas*. However, in verse 25, using the word *kila*, he indicates that he personally disagrees with this interpretation, which he attributes to the Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika school.[7] It is among the verses that present the *āvasthika* interpretation that our first definition of *vijñāna* is found.

Thus, Vasubandhu, himself, has identified the first definition as being that of Sarvāstivāda. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, near the beginning of his comment on verse 28ab, he attacks the entire *āvasthika* interpretation, to which, he says, the Sautrāntikas object, questioning whether it accurately reflects the meaning of *sūtra*.[8] Moreover, at the end of the same section, he again explicitly identifies everything contained in the *āvasthika* interpretation as Vaibhāṣika doctrine, a point noted by La Vallée Poussin in his translation.[9]

Similar *āvasthika* interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda*, including definitions of *vijñānāṅga* resembling the one found in *Abhidharmakośa* III 21c, can be traced to earlier Sarvāstivādin texts although not to the earliest group. I have not found such interpretations in the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmapiṭaka*, either in early texts, such as the *Dharmaskandha* (*A p'i ta mo fa yün tsu lun*, 阿毘達磨法蘊足論), which contains extensive discussions of both *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* and *nāmarūpapratyayaṃ vijñānam*,[10] or in later texts, such as the *Jñānaprasthāna* (*A p'i ta mo fa chih lun*, 阿毘達磨発智論), which is

[7] *āvasthikaḥ kileṣṭo 'yam* (*AK* III 25a; *AKBh*: 133; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 66, n. 5).

[8] *atra tu sautrāntikā vijñāpayanti / kiṃ khalv etā iṣṭaya ucyante yā yasyeṣṭiḥ āhosvit sūtrārthaḥ* (*AKBh*: 136; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 75).

[9] *sa eva tu vaibhāṣikanyāyo yaḥ pūrvam uktaḥ* (*AKBh*: 140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 88).

[10] Dietz 1984: 30-36; T. 1537: 506c-508b; see also Schmithausen 1987: 464-465 ns. 1114, 1119.

cited by La Vallée Poussin as the source of the division of members into three lifetimes.[11] Nor does the *Abhidharmāmṛta* (*A p'i tan kan lu wei lun*, 阿毘曇甘露味論), one of the earliest Sarvāstivādin manuals, contain an *āvasthika* interpretation, although it does divide the members among the three lifetimes, as well as classifying each member as *kleśa*, *karma*, or *duḥkha*.[12] However, at least three *abhidharma* texts prior to the *Abhidharmakośa* claim that the *āvasthika* interpretation represents the correct understanding of the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda* formula.

The earliest source that I have found is the *Vibhāṣā*, which is again cited by La Vallée Poussin in a footnote to the translation of *Abhidharmakośa* III 21a.[13] The *Vibhāṣā* first distinguishes its own, *āvasthika*, interpretation from the *kṣaṇika* interpretation of Śarmadatta (She ma ta to, 設摩達多) and the *sāṃbandhika* interpretation of the *Vijñānakāyaśāstra* (*A p'i ta mo shih shen tsu lun*, 阿毘達磨識身足論).[14] In the *kṣaṇika* interpretation, all twelve members are present in a single moment, as in the case of someone who harms a sentient being due to passion: his mental confusion is *avidyā*; his volition is *saṃskāra*; his consciousness (i.e., his awareness of the object of his crime) is *vijñāna*, etc.[15] According to the *sāṃbandhika* interpretation, which La Vallée Poussin explains as "par la liaison des causes et effets" (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65), a number of members can be present in a single moment: for example, when someone conceives of passion for an object, his ignorance (about the true nature of the object) is *avidyā*; his desire is *saṃskāra*; his discrimination of the object is *vijñāna*, etc. But these

[11]T. 1544: 921b; La Vallée Poussin 1971 v. 2:60, n. 1. See also the earlier translation, *A p'i t'an pa chien tu lun* (阿毘曇八犍度論 -- T. 1543: 775b-c) .

[12]T. 1553: 970c-971c; *Aām$_s$*: 70-73.

[13]T. 1545 (*A p'i ta mo ta p'i p'o sha lun*, 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論); T. 1546 (*A p'i t'an p'i p'o sha lun*, 阿毘曇毘婆沙論). See La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 62, n. 1.

[14]T. 1545: 118c-119a; T. 1546: 93c-94a.

[15]T. 1545: 118c; identical to *AKBh*: 133; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 65-66.

members do not consist of all five *skandhas*. Some members, on the other hand, do consist of all five *skandhas*: for example, the arising of all the *skandhas* in the new lifetime is *jāti*, and their deterioration is *jarāmaraṇa*. These members, however, do not occupy a single moment (T. 1545: 118c).

According to the *Vibhāṣā*'s own interpretation, each member refers to the five *skandhas* at a different moment; this is clearly the same *āvasthika* system described in *Abhidharmakośa* III 21-24. The definition of *vijñāna* in the *Vibhāṣā*, however, appears somewhat different at first glance. According to Hsüan-tsang's translation, *vijñāna* is the *pratisaṃdhicitta* (*hsü hsin*, 續心), together with its accompaniment (*chu pan*, 助伴), which the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* explains as the remaining four *skandhas* (T. 1545: 118c; *KIK*, Bidon-bu, v. 8: 9, n. 19). The earlier translation (attributed to Kātyāyanīputra) has *hsiang hsü hsin* (相續心) instead of *hsü hsin* (續心), but this is not significantly different (T. 1546: 94a). Nor, I think, is there any difference in meaning between this *pratisaṃdhicitta* and the *saṃdhiskandhas* of *Abhidharmakośa* III 21; according to the *āvasthika* system, the five *skandhas* at this point in the development of the new life can be called *vijñāna* (or *citta*, since the terms are synonymous here)[16] because *vijñāna* is the predominant element.[17] Vasubandhu perhaps condenses the term *pratisaṃdhi metri causa*, and Yaśomitra, judging from his comment on Vasubandhu's second definition,[18] considers that *saṃdhiskandhas* refers to *pratisaṃdhicitta*.

Similar to the *Vibhāṣā*'s definition are those of the *Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra* (*A p'i t'an hsin lun ching*, 阿毘曇心論経) and the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, or

[16]*cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānam ekarthaṃ* (*AK* II 34ab; *AKBh*: 61; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 176).

[17]*prādhānyāt tv aṅgakīrtanam* (*AK* III 25b; *AKBh*: 133; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 66).

[18]*saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānaṃ pratisaṃdhicittam evābhipretaṃ syāt* (*AKVy*: 299).

Kṣudrakābhidharmahṛdaya (*Tsa a p'i ta'n hsin lun*, 雜阿毘曇心論). The *Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra* defines *vijñāna* as the *pratisaṃdhicitta* (*hsiang hsü hsin*, 相続心) together with its associates (T. 1551: 860c). The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* defines it as the present *saṃtati* (*hsien tsai hsiang hsü*, 現在相続), which here seems to be equivalent to the five *skandhas* at the first moment of the present life, since the next member, *nāmarūpa*, is defined in the following way: "that *saṃtati*, (after) it already (exists), and while the six *āyatanas* are not completely differentiated, is called *nāmarūpa*."[19]

The *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, or *Abhidharmasāra* (*A p'i t'an hsin lun*, 阿毘曇心論), also agrees with the *Vibhāṣā* in maintaining that the twelve members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula refer to twelve sets, or states, of the *skandhas* and that the formula should not be understood in terms of a single moment. Its definition of *vijñāna*, on the other hand, is rather surprising; it states that *vijñāna* is the *chung hsin* (種心 = *bījacitta*) produced by the previous member, *saṃskāra*.[20] This would seem to support Mizuno Kōgen's statement that the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* sometimes contains doctrines that diverge from orthodox Sarvāstivāda (Mizuno 1961: 73). Although Willemen does not comment on it in his translation, this definition deserves further exploration, especially since the term *chung hsin*, or *chung shih* (種識), is a synonym for *ālayavijñāna* in some *vijñaptimātratā* texts (Nakamura 1975: 650).

All of the *abhidharma* texts mentioned above define *vijñānāṅga* as the initial moment of the present lifetime and as the karmic link between the past life and the present. In the *Vibhāṣā*, *Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra*, and *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, moreover, this *vijñāna* cannot possibly be the six *vijñānakāyas* because, as we discover from the definitions of the following *aṅgas*, the six sense organs are not yet present at the moment referred to as *vijñāna*. Furthermore, although the *Dharmaskandha*, which is

[19] 彼相続已六入分未満説名色 (T. 1552: 935b).

[20] 彼生種心是識 (T. 1550: 827a).

much earlier than *Vibhāṣā*, defines *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* as the six *vijñānas* (but not in the *antarābhava* [T. 1537: 507a]), in none of these post-*Vibhāṣā* texts, to the best of my knowledge, is *vijñānāṅga* ever defined as the six *vijñānakāyas*, nor is the definition from the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* that is quoted by Vasubandhu in his comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab ever discussed. Thus, I have found no evidence suggesting that the Sarvāstivādins, from the period of the *Vibhāṣā*, interpreted *vijñānāṅga* as the six *vijñānakāyas* in the intermediate existence, while there are a number of Vaibhāṣika texts that present the *āvasthika* interpretation as orthodox. Moreover, we should not forget that Vasubandhu, himself, identifies it as Vaibhāṣika doctrine.

Further confirmation can be found in Saṃghabhadra's two texts, the *Nyāyānusāra* (*A p'i ta mo shun cheng li lun*, 阿毘達磨順正理論) and the *Abhidharmapiṭakaprakaraṇa-śāsanaśāstra* or *Samayapradīpika* (*A p'i ta mo tsang hsien tzung lun*, 阿毘達磨藏顯宗論). In both texts, Saṃghabhadra quotes Vasubandhu's gloss on verse 21c and continues with a further explanation: "In the mother's womb, at the time of conception, the five skandhas in a momentary state are called Consciousness because, at this moment, consciousness is the most prominent (of the *skandhas*. This consciousness) is only *manovijñāna* because, in this state, the causes of the production of the (other) five *vijñānas* (i.e., the sense organs) are not yet possessed."[21] Again, in neither of these texts could I find the six-*vijñānakāyas* definition.

3. Vasubandhu's Definition in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* -- The Six *Vijñānas* in the Intermediate Realm

In order to show that the six-*vijñānakāyas* definition in fact represents Vasubandhu's

[21]於母胎等。正結生時。一剎那位五蘊名識。此剎那中。識最勝故。此唯意識。於此位中。五識生緣。猶未具故。(T. 1562: 484b; also, T. 1563: 841a).

own opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, I must begin by summarizing his rather long and complicated comment on *Abhidharmakośa* III 28ab: "The origination is the cause; that which originates is the result."[22] Vasubandhu explains the verse, saying that all the members are both *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pratītyasamutpanna*. He then mentions the differing opinion of a Sthavira Pūrṇāśa, who adduces four reasons to prove that that which is *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot be *pratītyasamutpanna* (*AKBh*: 136; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 74).

It is at this point that Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the criticism of the *āvasthika* interpretation, mentioned above, according to which nothing of the sort can be found in the *sūtras*. There follows an argument between the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivādin concerning the authority and completeness of the *sūtra* definitions of the members of the formula. In the course of this argument, the Sarvāstivādin maintains that these definitions are not complete and that their meanings are not clear.[23] The Sautrāntika, who has the last word in this dispute, states that the *sūtra* is, in fact, complete,[24] and he proceeds to point out the logical flaws in the *āvasthika* interpretation: "Why do you introduce something of a different kind [other than *avidyā*; i.e., the five *skandhas*] into [your definition of] *avidyā*? Although the five *skandhas* are found in these 'states,' only that [entity] whose existence or non-existence determines the existence or non-existence of some [other entity, i.e., the following member] can be established as a member. Although the *arhat* possesses the five *skandhas*, he does not have any *samskāras* [that, according to your interpretation would have to be] caused by the five *skandhas*. Why [not]? Because [the *saṃskāras* that constitute *saṃskārāṅga*] are only caused by *avidyā* [which the *arhat* does not have].

[22]*hetur atra samutpādaḥ samutpannaṃ phalaṃ matam* (*AKBh*: 136; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 74).

[23]*na vai sarvaṃ nirdeśato nītārthaṃ bhavati* (*AKBh*: 136; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 75).

[24]*evam ihāpy avidyādīnāṃ paripūrṇa eva nirdeśaḥ na sāvaśeṣaḥ* (*AKBh*: 136-137; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 75).

Likewise, [he does not have] any *vijñāna* that goes to good, bad or immovable destinies, or any *tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna*, etc.. [Therefore,] the meaning of the *sūtra* is just as was stated [in the *sūtra*]."[25] Yaśomitra explains that the *vijñāna* referred to here is *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* (*AKVy*: 293).

The point of this argument seems to be that, if the members of the formula are defined as states of the *skandhas*, the *arhat* would still be ensnared in *saṃsāra*, simply because he still possesses the *skandhas*. However, we know that the *arhat* is able to reverse the samsaric process precisely because he destroys the first member, *avidyā*. Thus, although he possesses the *skandhas* until his death, he does not produce the conditions for rebirth and the continuation of *saṃsāra*.

Vasubandhu next returns to the four points of Pūrṇāśa, refuting the first of them, and then discusses the question of whether *pratītyasamutpāda* is *asaṃskṛta*. This in turn leads into an etymological discussion of the term, *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is followed by various opinions regarding the question of why the Buddha expressed the principle of conditioned origination in two ways: "since this exists, that exists," and "due to the arising of this, that arises."[26]

Finally, Vasubandhu offers his own interpretation of the formula. Katō has remarked that, although Vasubandhu rejects *āvasthikapratītyasamutpāda* in principle and treats the formula largely in terms of a theory of cognition (*ninshikiron*, 認識論), his definitions of *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, and the *ṣaḍāyatanas* are not inconsistent with an embryological (*taiseigakuteki*, 胎生学的) interpretation, which is how Katō characterizes

[25] *jātyantarasya tv avidyāyāṃ kiṃkṛtaḥ prakṣepaḥ/ yady api ca tāsv avasthāsu pañcaskandhā vidyante yasya tu bhāvābhāvayor yasya bhāvābhāvaniyamaḥ tad evāṅgaṃ vyavasthāpayitum/ saty api ca pañcaskandhake saṃskārā na bhavanti pañcaskandhahetukāḥ/ kiṃ tarhi/ avidyāhetukā eva/ tathā puṇyāpuṇyāneñjyopagaṃ ca vijñānaṃ na bhavati tṛṣṇopādānādayaś ceti / yathānirdeśa eva sūtrārthaḥ* (*AKBh*: 137; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 76).

[26] *asmin satīdaṃ bhavati* and *asyotpādād idam utpadyate*.

āvasthikapratītyasamutpāda (Katō 1989: 315). While Vasubandhu does not define these members as states of the *skandhas*, he does trace the early development of the new being from its beginning as consciousness, mentally projected by the past life, through the appearance of the other three mental *skandhas*, together with *rūpaskandha* (i.e., *nāmarūpa*), to the development of the six sense organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*). However, as I have shown at the beginning of this section, Vasubandhu does not think that *vijñāna* refers only to the moment of *pratisaṃdhi* consciousness; rather, it encompasses the series of *vijñānas* that constitute the intermediate existence between one life and the next.[27] This interpretation of the definition from the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, which Vasubandhu quotes here,[28] can be justified because, according to *abhidharma*, the sense organs are all present in the intermediate existence,[29] and thus consciousness can include all six *vijñānakāyas* (it is to this abhidharmic rule that Jaini alludes in the passage quoted above). If, on the other hand, explains Yaśomitra, the *sūtra* had intended for *vijñānāṅga* to refer exclusively to *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, it would have said, "What is *vijñāna*? *Manovijñāna*," because, at the moment of conception, only *manovijñāna* is present, not the other five *vijñānas*.[30] Yaśomitra then quotes from *Abhidharmakośa* III 42a-c to support his claim that *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* can only be *manovijñāna*, a point on which Vasubandhu and Sarvāstivāda agree (see Saṃghabhadra's comment, quoted above).

Curiously, Saṃghabhadra does not, as far as I can tell, comment on this portion of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. The Chinese commentator, P'u-kuang, on the other hand,

[27]Some of his commentators think that he also includes in his definition the moment of rebirth into the next life (see note below).

[28]*vijñānaṃ katamat/ ṣaḍvijñānakāyā iti* (*AKBh*: 140; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 85).

[29]*sakalākṣaḥ* (*AK* III 14c; *AKBh*: 125; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 46)

[30]*evaṃ tu vaktavyaṃ syāt/ vijñānaṃ katamat/ manovijñānam iti/ na hi pratisaṃdhikṣaṇe pañcavijñānakāyasambhavo 'sti/ manovijñānenaiva pratisaṃdhibandhāt* (*AKVy*: 299).

does. In his *Chü she lun chi* (俱舍論記), P'u-kuang first explains that Vasubandhu's intention is to include both the stream of *vijñāna*s in the intermediate realm and the *upapattibhava*, which is equivalent to *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, in his definition of *vijñānāṅga*: "This *vijñāna* passes through both the intermediate realm and the moment of conception. Although the moment of conception is only *manovijñāna*, in the state of the intermediate realm, [the stream of the *vijñānas*?] produces all six *vijñānas*."[31] Then, after quoting Vasubandhu's approval of the definition of *vijñāna* in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* as the *ṣaḍvijñānakāya*s, P'u-kuang states, "If one relies on the Sarvāstivādins, *vijñānāṅga* is only the single moment of *upapattibhava* and does not pass through the intermediate realm; therefore, (for them) it is only *manovijñāna*."[32] Clearly, P'u-kuang believes that Vasubandhu disagrees with orthodox Sarvāstivādin doctrine.

I have puzzled over Vasubandhu's locating *vijñānāṅga* in the intermediate realm since I have found no earlier text in which it is similarly placed. However, Sthiramati's comment on Vasubandhu's exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* can perhaps clarify Vasubandhu's reasoning in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. In his explanation of *saṃskārāṅga* in the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu says that the *saṃskāra*s "plant" or establish the *karmavāsanās* in the *vijñāna*,[33] and Sthiramati insists that this *vijñāna* can only be

[31]此識通於中。生二有。生有雖唯意識於中有位通起六識。(T. 1821: 172c). P'u-kuang may not be alone among Vasubandhu's commentators in including *upapattibhava* or *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* in *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*; see also the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (*antarābhava-pratisaṃdhi-cittam upādāya yāvad upapattikṣaṇaḥ* -- *AKVy*: 299) and Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha* (*srid pa bar mar ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i skad cig ma nas gzuṅ ste/ skye ba'i skad cig gi bar du* -- quoted in Mejor 1991: 101-102. However, in the last two texts it is not completely clear whether the meaning is "up to and including" or simply "up to" the moment of rebirth. In any case, Vasubandhu himself does not explicitly include *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*.

[32]若依說一切有部。識支唯生有一剎那不通中有。故唯意識。(T. 1821: 172c).

[33] *ropaṇāt saṃskārair vijñāne karmavāsanāyāḥ pratiṣṭhāpanāt* (*Mvbh*: 28).

ālayavijñāna, and not the *pravṛttivijñānas*.[34] This is consistent with Sthiramati's explicitly Yogācāra position, while it apparently contradicts what Vasubandhu says in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

On the other hand, in his comment on Vasubandhu's explanation of *vijñānāṅga* in the *Triṃśikabhāṣya*, Sthiramati, although he does not use the term *antarābhava*, agrees with Vasubandhu's statement in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is located in the interval between death and rebirth. When Vasubandhu says that *vijñāna* "leads" beings to, or causes them to obtain, rebirth,[35] Sthiramati explains that the *vāsanās*, in the form of the seeds of rebirth, are led from death in the present life to rebirth in the next by means of the continuance of the stream of *vijñānas* that is impregnated by *karma*.[36] Sthiramati then seems to say that this is proof that the *vijñāna* of the previous life, and not the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, can be *saṃskārapratyaya*.[37] Thus, as I

[34] *vijñāna iti atrālayavijñānam abhipretaṃ na tu pravṛttivijñānam* (*MvbhṬ*: 29).

[35] *nayanād vijñānenopapattisthānasamprāpaṇāt* (*Mvbh*: 28).

[36] *karmaparibhāvitena vijñānena santānavṛttyā cyutisthānād upapapattisthāne punarbhavabījabhūtāyā vāsanāyāḥ prāpaṇaṃ nayanam* (*MvbhṬ*: 29).

[37] *tathā ca sati na pratisandhivijñānaṃ saṃskārapratyayam pūrvakālabhavavijñānam eva saṃskārapratyayam iti pradarśitaṃ bhavati* (*MvbhṬ*: 29-30). This portion is Pandeya's retranslation. Yamaguchi's is different: *tathā ca sati na pratisandhivijñāna pratyayaḥ saṃskāraḥ pūrvakālabhavavijñānam eva saṃskārapratyayam iti pradarśitaṃ bhavati* (Yamaguchi 1934: 37), as is Stcherbatsky's: *evaṃ kṛtvā pratisaṃdhi-vijñānam pratyayo, na saṃskāraḥ, pūrvakālīna-bhava-vijñānam eva saṃskāra-pratyayam iti pradarśitam bhavati* (Stcherbatsky 1978: 041). The Tibetan text as quoted in Stcherbatsky (1978: 041) is as follows: *de ltar byas na ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa rkyen ni 'du byed ma yin gyi sṅon gyi dus kyi srid pa'i rnam par śes pa ñid kyi rkyen 'du byed par rab tu bstan pa yin te*. However, the Derge edition reads (differences underlined): *de ltar byas na ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa'i rkyen ni 'du byed ma yin gyi/ sṅon gyi dus kyi srid pa'i rnam par śes pa ñid kyi rkyen 'du byed yin par rab tu bstan pa yin te* (*MvbhṬ$_{t}$*: 207a 7-208b 1). Of these, the Derge Tibetan and Pandeya's reconstruction are the most satisfactory. The three translations (Yamaguchi 1966: 58; Friedman 1937: 48; and Stcherbatsky 1978: 62) all disagree. Friedman probably comes closest to an accurate and intelligible translation, but he understands *pūrvakālabhava* in a technical sense that is not, I think, justified here. Referring to the *Abhidharmakośa*, which defines *pūrvakālabhava* as the *skandhas* between the moments of *pratisaṃdhi* and death, he explains the significance of our passage as follows: "The saṃskāras condition not only the first moment of the new existence, i.e. the moment of reincarnation, but the whole existence, starting from the moment of conception up to

understand him, the balance of the karmic account from one life is carried over to the next by means of a stream of *vijñānas* that are karmically equivalent to the *vijñāna* of the previous life.

In our passage from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* Vasubandhu does not use the term *karmaparibhavita*, let alone *ālayavijñāna*. But by locating *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in the intermediate realm, he contradicts the unequivocal identification of *vijñāna* with the present life that is prominent in the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation. And by doing so, he suggests that the nature of *vijñāna* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula is causal rather than resultant, which it would have to be if it were simply *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*.

4. Vasubandhu's Definition in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* -- *Saṃskāraparibhāvitāḥ Ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ*

Like P'u-kuang, Vīryaśrīdatta, in a passage of the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*, also draws attention to the difference between two definitions of *vijñānāṅga*.[38] The *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, itself, contains the text of the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* and hence the six-*vijñānakāya* definition, but Vīryaśrīdatta, who, according to Mejor, follows the Kashmirian Vaibhāṣikas (Mejor 1991: 18), points out that elsewhere *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is identified with *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, and he quotes *Abhidharmakośa* III 21c

death" (Friedman 1937: 127 ns. 62, 63). If Friedman is correct, *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the present lifetime, after the moment of birth and up until the moment of death. Friedman gives no citations to other texts that define *vijñānaṅga* in this way, nor do I know of any. Therefore, I think we should read *snon gyi dus kyi srid pa'i mam par śes pa* literally as "the *vijñāna* of the previous existence." In fact, the following sentence suggests that Sthiramati is arguing that the *saṃskāras* from the previous life, which no longer exists, cannot directly condition the *vijñāna* of the present life (*na hi vinaṣṭatvāt kāraṇāt kāryotpattir yujyate* -- *MvbhṬ*: 30). Sthiramati has already shown that, by planting seeds (see note above), the *saṃskāras* condition the *vijñāna* of the same life to which they belong.

[38]This passage corresponds to a portion of the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, in which Vasubandhu quotes the view of an opponent whom he will soon refute (Honjō 1989: 173); Vīryaśrīdatta, on the other hand, seems to approve of this view.

(*saṃdhiskandhās tu vijñānam*). He also refers to the well-known *sūtra* statement according to which *nāmarūpa* could not solidify into a fetus if *vijñāna* did not descend into the mother's womb (*Dīgha Nikāya* II 63; quoted in La Vallée Poussin 1913: 12) and understands it to imply that *vijñāna* in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula refers to *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and hence can only be *manovijñāna* (*AVSN*:118).

He then points out the discrepancy between this interpretation and the definition in the *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, but he argues that there is no contradiction (*virodha*). According to him, the *Arthaviniścayasūtra* (i.e., the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*) definition is overly broad and not specific to the context of rebirth; therefore, he says, it is not *lākṣaṇika*. To support this assertion, he compares the *sūtra* definitions of *vijñāna* and the *rūpa* portion of *nāmarūpa* and shows that, in the case of *rūpa*, too, the *sūtra* likewise gives an all-inclusive definition that does not pertain to the specific context of *vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam*. Furthermore, he states that the *lākṣaṇika* definition is to be found elsewhere, i.e., in the verse of the *Abhidharmakośa* that contains the *āvasthika* definition (*AVSN*:118-119).

However, Vīryaśrīdatta is also able to rationalize the *sūtra* definition; that is to say, he is able to understand it in the context of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula. He mentions by name the Sautrāntikas, who, he says, believe that the *vijñāna* conditioned by the *saṃskāras* is not *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* but rather the six *vijñānas*, which are permeated by the *saṃskāras*.[39] This passage is significant because it is the only explicit attribution of a six-*vijñānakāya* definition to the Sautrāntikas that I have found. However, the interpretation of the six *vijñānakāyas* here as *saṃskāraparibhāvita* is not identical to Vasubandhu's interpretation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, according to which they are the stream of *vijñānas* in the intermediate realm; I shall discuss the difference later in this section. Moreover, as Honjō has noted, there are many passages in the

[39] *sautrāntikamatena tv avirodha eva / yasmāt tasya saṃskāraparibhāvitāḥ ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam iṣṭaṃ na pratisaṃdhivijñānam eveti* (*AVSN*: 118-119; Honjō 1989: 67-69).

Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana that correspond to Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, including the first part of this one (Honjō 1989: 173), and it is to this text, and not to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, that Vīryaśrīdatta is referring when he mentions the opinion of the Sautrāntikas in the above passage.

In the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*,[40] Vasubandhu includes a long discussion of *vijñānāṅga* (folios 17a 5 - 26b 5 in the Peking edition of the *Bstan 'gyur*), in which he mentions the view of certain "others" (*gźan dag*) who maintain that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* in the mother's womb (see above concerning the correspondence between this passage and the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*). Schmithausen (1987: 467, n. 1128) has identified a passage, beginning with folio 20b 4 and continuing to folio 22b 4, in which Vasubandhu refutes this view as being inconsistent with both *sūtra*[41] and reason.[42] Among the several opinions that Vasubandhu attacks is the one quoted with approval in the *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana*, to the effect that the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* definition is *lākṣaṇika* and the six- *vijñānakāya* definition *ābhiprāyika*, and that the *śāstra* definition does not contradict the *sūtra* definition (*PSVy*$_t$: f. 20b7-21a2).

Vasubandhu ridicules this position, saying that the two definitions are indeed irreconcilable. He shows that, in the case of the *rūpa* portion of *nāmarūpa*, the *sūtra* definition, namely that *rūpa* consists of the four *mahābhūta*s and the four *upādāyarūpa*s, and the *śāstra* definition, presumably that *rūpa* is the material portion of the embryo, are compatible since the embryonic *rūpa* does, in fact, consist of the *mahābhūta*s and the *upādāyarūpa*s. In the case of *vijñāna*, however, the six *vijñānakāya*s are not present at the

[40] This text has been studied by Matsuda Kazunobu (1982a; 1982b), Muroji Gijin (1985), and Lambert Schmithausen (1987). Recently, Muroji has published an edition and study of the *saṃskāra*- and *vijñānavibhaṅga*s of *Psvy* (1993); unfortunately, I received it too late to be able to consult it while writing this chapter.

[41] *mdo sde daṅ 'gal* (*Psvy*$_t$: 20b 6-21b 8).

[42] *rigs pa daṅ 'gal* (*Psvy*$_t$: 21b 8- 22b 4).

moment of conception, so *śāstra* contradicts *sūtra*.[43]

Instead, Vasubandhu here defines *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* as *vijñāna* (i.e., the six *vijñānakāyas*) permeated by the *saṃskāras*.[44] Schmithausen describes this *vijñāna* as follows: "the *saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the prior existence which receives the Impressions of karma and -- by continuously propagating itself along with this impression -- becomes, in its turn, the cause of a new existence (beginning with *nāmarūpa*)" (1987: 253, n. 51).

Vasubandhu rejects the Vaibhāṣika assertion that the *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* definition is *lākṣaṇika*. However, as Matsuda points out (1982b: 63-64), he too considers the six-*vijñanakāya* definition in the *sūtra* to be intentional: according to him, *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is ultimately the stream of *ālayavijñāna* permeated by the *saṃskāras*.[45] The remainder of Vasubandhu's discussion of *vijñānāṅga* concerns *ālayavijñāna*, the discussion of which, according to Matsuda, is similar to that found in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, yet another text by Vasubandhu (Matsuda 1982a: 44).

C. Vasubandhu's Positions -- Sautrāntika or Yogācāra?

In all interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the context of rebirth, *vijñāna* is the

[43]*ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba na rnam par śes pa gaṅ yin pa de rnam par śes pa'i tshogs drug ma yin pas / 'dir chos 'dra ba ci yod / 'dir ni 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par śes pa bstan pa brtsams pa yin pas zla la ci'i phyir bya* (*Psvy*$_t$: 21a 3-4; see also Wayman and Wayman 1974: 55 n. 58, where this passage is referred to; however, I am not sure whether Wayman understands it in the same way that I do).

[44]*de ltar na 'du byed kyis yoṅs su bsgos pa rnam par śes pa de ñid 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis yin gyi ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa ni ma yin no* (*Psvy*$_t$: 23a 1-2).

[45]*'dir don ñid gaṅ że na / 'du byed kyis yoṅs su bsgos pa'i kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i rgyun yoṅs su gyur pas yaṅ srid 'byuṅ bar nus pa ni 'dir 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par śes pa yin par dgoṅs pa yin no* (*Psvy*$_t$: 24a 1-2; Matsuda 1982b: 64).

most important member since it is exactly at *vijñāna* that the karmic legacy of one life passes on to the next. However, as we have seen, different interpretations disagree regarding two interrelated issues: the stage in the rebirth process to which *vijñānāṅga* corresponds; and its causal nature. To the question of whether *vijñāna* is cause, result, or both cause and result, all possible answers have been proposed in one text or another during the history of the exegesis of the formula (for an example of a text that takes *vijñānāṅga* to be both cause and result, see Alex Wayman's description of Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation [Wayman 1984: 181-185]).

As I have shown above, *vijñāna* in the Sarvāstivādin system refers to the first moment of the present lifetime, and it is result (*phala*) since it is based on *kleśa* and *karma* (*AK* III 26ab; *AKBh*: 134). There is some disagreement as to whether or not *vijñāna* is *vipāka*. According to the Sarvāstivādins, it is not *vipāka* because for them, *pratisaṃdhi* is always defiled,[46] while *vipāka* must be morally neutral.[47] However, as Schmithausen has shown, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* is, in fact, considered to be *vipāka* in Theravādin *abhidharma*, in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, and in parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1987: 38; 307 ns. 256-257). On the other hand, certain Yogācāra texts, for example the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T. 1585: 19a; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 217) and *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya* (Lamotte 1973: 53-54), have adduced the defiled nature of *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* as proof that it could not be *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*, which, according to them, must be *vipāka* and hence neutral. Regardless of the moral nature of *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, there is certainly nothing about it that suggests the strongly causal and projecting qualities of the six *vijñānakāyas*, permeated by the *saṃskāras*, as described by Vasubandhu in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*.

[46] *upapattibhavaḥ kliṣṭaḥ* (*AK* III 38a; *AKBh*: 151; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 117-118).

[47] *vipāko 'vyākṛto dharmaḥ* (*AK* II 57a; *AKBh*: 95; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 289).

In the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā,* Vasubandhu locates *vijñāna* in the prior lifetime. Furthermore, by calling it *saṃskāraparibhāvita,* he shows that, rather than being a resultant entity, projected by *karma* into the next life, it is a causal entity, the ability of which to project the next life is conditioned by *karma.* As for *pratisaṃdhivijñāna,* it is the first moment of *nāmarūpa* in the present life.[48]

The general similarities between the explanations of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* have been noted by Matsuda (1982a: 47-48), and the interpretations of *vijñāna,* in particular, coincide in substance. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya, vijñāna,* which is considered a projecting (*ākṣepaka*) member of the formula and hence belongs to the prior life, "supports the bond of beings' actions";[49] the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* explains that this is "because it arises simultaneously with the impressions produced by the Karmic Forces."[50] This seems to be the same function that is implicit in Vasubandhu's *vijñāna* permeated by the *saṃskāras.* Furthermore, "it is the condition of Individual Existence,"[51] because "Individual Existence attains growth due to the entrance of consciousness into the mother's womb."[52] The consciousness mentioned here by the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* must be *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* and, being associated with the later lifetime, cannot be the same as the *vijñāna* that arises simultaneously with the karmic impressions. In the immediately following description of the function of *nāmarūpa,* which "makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence,"[53] it becomes clear that, as in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā,*

[48]*mdo sde 'di las rnam par śes pa'i rkyen gyis phuṅ po lṅa pa'i miṅ daṅ gzugs bstan pas ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa de ji ltar de daṅ lhan cig byuṅ ba'i miṅ daṅ gzugs kyi rkyen du ruṅ* (*Psvy*$_{t}$: 21b 4; Schmithausen 1987: 467 n. 1128).

[49]*sattvānāṃ karmabandhaṃ ca dhārayati* (*AS*: 25).

[50]*saṃskārāhitavāsanāsahotpatteḥ* (*ASBh*: 32).

[51]*pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya* (*AS*: 25).

[52]*mātuḥ kukṣau vijñānāvakrāntyā nāmarūpavivṛddhigamanāt* (*ASBh*: 32).

[53]*ātmabhāvaṃ ca sattvān grāhayati* (*AS*: 25).

pratisamdhivijñāna is identified with the initiation of *nāmarūpa*.

Thus, both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and Vasubandhu in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* recognize two types of consciousness, a causal one, which is identified (at least provisionally) with the six *vijñānakāyas*, and a fruitional one, *pratisamdhivijñāna*, which is not considered *samskārapratyaya* and which is associated with *nāmarūpa*. The idea that the six *vijñānas* can be permeated by the *samskāras*, which has been attributed to the Sautrāntikas,[54] is criticized in certain Yogācāra texts that

[54]See *AVSN*: 118-119, quoted above; also, La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 217; *Shindō*: 155).

A related idea appears in the *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, namely that the *cittasantati*, permeated by *karma*, is capable of producing results in the future (*'o na ni gal te las nus kyañ des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud las tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu 'byuñ na* -- *Ksp*: 193. Murōji [1985: 23] allows the *nub* of the Derge edition, upon which he bases his version, to stand in place of *nus*, which is attested in the Peking and Narthang editions).

All of the editors and translators seem to rely on the commentary (*Karmasiddhi-prakaranaṭikā*) of Sumatiśīla, whom Anacker (1984: 85) dates to the late eighth century, in order to identify the proponents of the various arguments presented in the text; even so, there remains considerable confusion regarding who is saying what and in answer to whom. In the case of the above passage, everybody agrees that it is either a Sautrāntika statement (Lamotte 1936: 233; Murōji 1985: 23; Anacker 1984: 106) or Vasubandhu's comment on a Sautrāntika position (Yamaguchi 1975: 162). However, their analysis of the surrounding text varies considerably (in the following, I shall refer to Lamotte's divisions of the text, which differ from Yamaguchi and Murōji's).

According to Lamotte, section 20 is a statement of the Sautrāntika theory of *samtānaparināma*. Section 21, in which the passage occurs, is a Sautrāntika answer to a Vaibhāṣika objection. Section 22 consists of a Vaibhāṣika statement that also mentions *paribhāvitavijñāna* (*kha cig na re tshe 'di ñid la des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud mtshams 'byor pa las so źe na* -- *Ksp*: 193) and that is questioned by someone, presumably Vasubandhu.

According to Yamaguchi, section 20 and the first half of section 21 comprise the Sautrāntika statement of *samtānaparināma*, while the second half of section 21, beginning with the phrase *'o na ni gal te las nus kyañ des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud las tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu 'byuñ na*, quoted above, as well as section 22, are Vasubandhu's comment on the Sautrāntika position, with which he disagrees. Yamaguchi identifies the *kha cig* in the statement *kha cig na re tshe 'di ñid la des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud mtshams 'byor pa las so źe na* as "some among the Sautrāntikas"; although he does not so indicate, he relies here on the *Karmasiddhiprakaranaṭikā* for this identification (see Murōji 1985: 23 note a).

According to Anacker, section 20 is Vasubandhu's opinion. Section 21 consists of the Vaibhāṣika objection and a Sautrāntika response. Section 22 consists of an interchange between Vasubandhu and certain Sautrāntikas.

Finally, Murōji agrees with Yamaguchi that section 20 and the first half of section 21 are the Sautrāntika statement, but he also identifies the second half of 22 as the

explicitly teach *ālayavijñāna*, for example, the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*[55] and the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*,[56] in order to prove that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* must be *ālayavijñāna*. However, a similar notion appears in the *śarīra* section of the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition of the *Savitarkāsavicārabhūmi*: "For example, a person in the past has performed and accumulated acts, whether meritorious, unmeritorious, or immovable (*āniñjya*), whether physical, verbal, or mental, which are conditioned by ignorance. His consciousness, accompanied by those acts, continues to exist up to the moment of death and becomes the cause of the

Sautrāntika *pūrvapakṣa*, in which the view of another group of Sautrāntikas is mentioned.

Clearly the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is a difficult text to make sense of, and it is probably not advisable to accept unquestioningly Sumatiśīla's identifications. Regardless of to whom the two references to *paribhāvitavijñāna* are attributed, I have been unable to find any references to *karmaparibhāvita-* or *saṃskāraparibhāvitavijñāna* among the texts (e.g., the *Vibhāṣā*, *Tattvasiddhi*, and *Nyāyānusāra*) that are our sources for pre-Vasubandhu Sautrāntika. Therefore, I think it likely that this notion originates with Vasubandhu himself.

[55]The *Triṃśikābhāṣya* argues that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* must be *ālayavijñāna* since it can be neither *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* nor the six *vijñānas*, and it gives its reasons in detail:

tatrālayavijñānād anyat saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānaṃ na yujyate/ saṃskārapratyayavijñānābhāve pravṛtter apy abhāvaḥ/ saṃsārasya ālayavijñānānabhyupagame pratisaṃdhivijñānaṃ vā saṃskārapratyayaṃ parikalpyeta saṃskārabhāvitā vā ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ/

tatra ye saṃskārāḥ prātisaṃdhikavijñānapratyayatvenesyante/ teṣāṃ ciraniruddhatvāt/ niruddhasya cāsatvāt asataś ca pratyayatvābhāvāt/ na saṃskārapratyayaṃ pratisaṃdhivijñānaṃ yujyate/ pratisaṃdhau ca nāmarūpam apy asti na kevalaṃ vijñānaṃ tatra vijñānam eva saṃskārapratyayaṃ na nāmarūpam iti/ kā tatra yuktiḥ/ tasmāt saṃskārapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam iti vaktavyaṃ/ na tu vijñānam iti/ katamad anyavijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ/ yad uttarakālam iti cet tasya prātisaṃdhikanāmarūpāt ka ātmātiśayaḥ yatas tad eva vijñānapratyayaṃ na pūrvaṃ/ pūrva ca saṃskārapratyayaṃ nottaram iti/ ataś ca saṃskārapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam evāstu kiṃ pratisaṃdhivijñānenāṅgāntareṇa parikalpitena/ tasmān na pratisaṃdhikavijñāna saṃskārapratyayaṃ yujyate/

saṃskāraparibhāvitā vā ṣaḍvijñānakāyā api na saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānaṃ yujyate/ kiṃ kāraṇaṃ/ na hi vijñānaṃ vipākavāsanāṃ niṣyandavāsanāṃ vā svātmany ādhattuṃ samarthaṃ/ svātmani kāritavirodhāt nāpy anāgate tasya tadānutpannatvāt/ anutpannasya cāsatvāt/ nāpy utpannapūrvasya tadā niruddhatvāt/ acittikāsu ca nirodhasamāpattyādyavasthāsu punaḥ saṃskāraparibhāvitacittopattyasaṃbhavāt/ (*TrṃśBh*: 37-38; see La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 217 for a summary of the argument against *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*'s being *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*).

[56]又行緣識應不得成。轉識受熏前已遮故。結生染識非行感故。(T. 1545: 19a; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 216-217).

consciousness at the moment of conception."[57] As for *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, it is explicitly called *vipākavijñāna*, and it is said to be conditioned by the causal consciousness. The relationship between this *vipākavijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is explained in terms of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* (*YBh*: 199).

Schmithausen, who considers this passage to predate a systematized notion of *ālayavijñāna*, emphasizes that both the causal and the *vipāka* consciousnesses here are the series "consisting of one or the other of the ordinary six kinds of *vijñāna*" (1987: 178). However, he does not suggest that it therefore represents a non-Yogācāra, for example, a Sautrāntika, doctrine. According to Schmithausen, the earliest Yogācāra thought, which he says is found in portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, does not encompass a fully developed theory of *ālayavijñāna*, explicitly identified as such. This raises the question of the development of Yogācāra doctrine and its relationship to the Sautrāntika school, a question that is very pertinent to the study of texts such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Vasubandhu, whose name is associated with both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools, of course figures critically in any discussion of the relationship between them.

There are many different opinions regarding Vasubandhu, especially concerning his dates and to how many people his name refers, but Hirakawa Akira, in his introduction to the *Index to the Abhidharmakośa*, summarizes the most commonly held views regarding his philosophical beliefs: "It is generally accepted among scholars that the author of the Kośa was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda School, but his thoughts were closer to those of the Sautrāntika School. The doctrine of the Sautrāntika School is based on 'the prajñapti,' which includes the teaching of bīja; therefore, the developed form of this doctrine can be

[57] *yathāpīhaikatyena pūrvam aviduṣāvidyāgatenāvidyāpratyayaṃ puṇyāpuṇyāniñjyaṃ kāyavāṅmanaḥkarma kṛtaṃ bhavaty upacitaṃ / tatkarmopagaṃ* (Schmithausen's correction from the manuscript of Bhattacharya's *tatkarmopabhogaṃ* [1987: 472 n. 1153]) *cāsya vijñānam āmaraṇasamayād anuvṛttaṃ bhavati pratisandhivijñānahetubhūtaṃ* (*YBh*: 198-199; also, Schmithausen 1987: 178).

related to the doctrine of Vijñānavāda. It does not necessarily mean that the Sautrāntika School itself developed into the Vijñānavāda, but it can be easily assumed that the author of the Kośa belonged to the Sautrāntika School [and] later changed to the Vijñānavāda, for there is a certain common ground between the doctrines" (Hirakawa 1973: xi-xii). According to this way of thinking, Vasubandhu wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* when he was a Sautrāntika, the *Triṃśikā* when he was a Yogācāra, and texts like the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* at some time in between, while he was presumably in the process of conversion from Sautrāntika to Yogācāra. For example, Muroji suggests just such a development (1985: [2]), while Matsuda implies something similar when he states that the *ālayavijñāna* that is expounded in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* and the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is different from that of the Yogācāra school since it is "tinged with a Sautrāntika hue."[58]

This model of Vasubandhu's literary and philosophical development is largely based on two types of evidence: traditional accounts of his life and the contents of his writings. According to Mejor, the reliable information in the Chinese and Tibetan biographies and historical sources "may be summarized in two points: 1) Vasubandhu's composition of the *Abhidharmakośa-karikā* and *bhāṣya* and a subsequent controversy with a Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika master, Saṅghabhadra, 2) Vasubandhu's conversion to Mahayana under the influence of his elder brother Asaṅga" (Mejor 1991: 7). As for the content of his works, it is well known that in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Vasubandhu frequently criticizes Vaibhāṣika positions while supporting positions that he identifies as, or we know from other sources to be, Sautrāntika. To summarize what Lamotte says about the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (and this applies to works such as the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* as well), Vasubandhu, although he mentions *ālayavijñāna*, does not propose a doctrine of consciousness-only; furthermore, he quotes almost

[58]"経量部的色彩を帯たものである"(Matsuda 1982a: 44).

exclusively from non-Mahāyāna *sūtras*, mentions the opinions mostly of non-Mahāyāna schools and teachers, and takes recognizably Sautrāntika positions on a number of important issues (Lamotte 1935-36: 176-179). Finally, in the *Triṃśikā*, his exposition is clearly and classically Yogācāra.

There may, however, be another way to explain why Vasubandhu asserts a "Sautrāntika" position, at least in our case of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*. Before I come to this, it is necessary to discuss briefly two differing opinions regarding the composition of the *Yogācārabhumi*, a text that precedes Vasubandhu and with which he was presumably acquainted.[59]

In *Ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen, in the course of trying to explain the context in which the Yogācāra concept of *ālayavijñāna* first arose, concludes that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is probably "a compilation consisting of several (or at least two) heterogenous (or at any rate chronologically distinct) layers" (Schmithausen 1987: 13), rather than the work of a single author. He goes on to identify three layers of the text: an oldest layer, in which there is no reference to *ālayavijñāna*; a middle layer, in which there are occasional references to *ālayavijñāna*, but no reference to the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*; and the newest layer, in which *ālayavijñāna* is discussed in detail and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* is fully utilized (Schmithausen 1987: 14). The assumption that underlies Schmithausen's view of the stratification of *Yogācārabhūmi* is that, roughly speaking, the less mention of *ālayavijñāna* and reference to Mahāyāna *sūtra* there is, the older the layer. Aramaki Noritoshi, on the other hand, takes a different approach in determining the strata of the text.[60] Aramaki agrees with Schmithausen regarding the portions comprising the oldest layer, but he takes issue with his identification of the other two layers, locating some

[59]Concerning the question of the relationship between the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, see Yamabe 1990, which raises the possibility that Vasubandhu's *bīja* theory can be traced back to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See also Hakamaya 1986.

[60]Personal communication.

portions containing *Saṃdhinirmocana* material and detailed treatments of *ālayavijñāna* in the middle layer and some portions containing scant mention of *ālayavijñāna* in the newest layer. According to Aramaki's theory, his middle layer contains the Yogācāra exposition of ultimate truth (*paramārthavyavasthāna*), namely the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, while the newest layer contains an exposition of provisional truth (*saṃvṛtivyavasthāna*), which presupposes *ālayavijñāna* theory. In this layer, Aramaki sees the origin of the Yogācāra *abhidharma*.

In the case of Vasubandhu's texts, as well as the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, we are dealing with a different situation. All of these texts belong to a later period than even the newest layer of the *Yogācārabhūmi*; and most are composed by a single, identifiable author. Furthermore, by the time these works were written, the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* was no longer in the early stages of the process of formation. Nonetheless, Aramaki's distinction between *paramārthavyavasthāna* and *saṃvṛtivyavasthāna* can perhaps help us understand the intention of these texts.

First, let us consider the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. The purpose of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* is specifically to expound the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, or, to use Aramaki's terminology, the Yogācāra *paramārthavyavasthāna*, and it contains systematic proofs and elaborations. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, while it occasionally mentions the term, does not expound *ālayavijñāna* in detail. Rather, a philosophical system based on *ālayavijñāna* having already been worked out, the author/compiler(s) of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* have attempted to produce an *abhidharma*, a *saṃvṛtivyavasthana*, consonant with, and supportive of, this *paramārthavyavasthāna*. In the case of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, the two-lifetime system, in which the causal *vijñāna* of the past life projects the seeds of the present life, only makes sense if *vijñānāṅga* is really *ālayavijñāna*. However, since the purpose is to explain the twelve-membered formula and not to prove the existence of

ālayavijñāna, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not mention it by name. This is in contrast to *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* I. 33, where, as one of a number of proofs of *ālayavijñāna*, it is stated that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* can only be *ālayavijñāna* (*MS*$_t$: 15; Lamotte 1973: 53).

Similarly, although he eloquently expounds *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñāptimatratā* in the *Triṃśikā*, Vasubandhu is writing for different purposes in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. The *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* is a commentary on a *sūtra*, the *Fen pieh yuan ch'i ch'u sheng fa men ching*,[61] the subject of which, as its name suggests, is *pratītyasamutpāda*, and Vasubandhu, in commenting on it, does not have to refer to *vijñaptimātra* theory, even though he uses the term *ālayavijñāna*. The fact that he does not mention the system of eight *vijñānas* need not mean that he does not believe in it, contrary to Matsuda (1982a: 44). Nor does his accepting on the level of "intentional meaning" the identification of *vijñānāṅga* with the six *samskāraparibhāvitavijñānas* a position associated by some (see above) with the Sautrāntika school, while rejecting the Sarvāstivādin identification of it with *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, prove that he is himself a Sautrāntika, at least in the sense of accepting the doctrines of other teachers, such as Śrīlāta, who are designated as Sautrāntikas.

Recently, Honjō Yoshifumi, in an article that explores a number of points raised by Katō Junshō in his book on Sautrāntika (Katō 1989), has suggested the possibility that Vasubandhu was the proponent of a Mahāyāna Sautrāntika doctrine, distinguishable from the "orthodox," Hīnayāna Sautrāntika of Śrīlāta (Honjō 1990). My own theory is that Vasubandhu espouses Sautrāntika or Sautrāntika-like ideas for the purpose of constructing Yogācāra *abhidharma;* this is, perhaps, not so different from Honjō's proposal. Whether he is writing as a Mahāyāna Sautrāntika or a covert Yogācāra, Vasubandhu, by contrasting the *abhipraya* of the *saṃskāraparibhāvitavijñānas* with *ālayavijñāna*, implies

[61] 分別縁起初勝法門経 (T. 717; referred to by Matsuda as the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* [Matsuda 1982a: 42]).

that, for him, *ālayavijñāna* belongs to the realm of ultimate truth while the six *vijñānas* belong to that of provisional truth.

To return to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, there is some question in my mind as to whether or not Vasubandhu's definition of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in his comment on *AK* III 28ab is substantially the same as his definition in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. At first glance, they appear different. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu does not use the expression *saṃskāraparibhāvita* to describe *vijñāna*, and this expression, with its connotations of *bīja*-theory, is one of the most striking features of his discussion in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. Furthermore, in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, he does not mention the intermediate realm, in which he locates at least a portion of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Although Sthiramati, in his subcommentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, calls the stream of *vijñānas* in the intermediate realm *karmaparibhāvita* (Mejor 1991: 101-102), he is perhaps, under the influence of what Vasubandhu says in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, reading too much into the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.[62] More important is the fact that, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu, as I mention above, has been understood by his commentators to include *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, along with the stream of the six *vijñanas* in *antarābhava*, in his definition of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*. This would seem to be inconsistent with the causal nature ascribed to *vijñāna* in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* as well as with the statement that *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* is the first moment of *nāmarūpa* in the later lifetime.

However, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is again quite a different type of text than either the *Triṃśikā* or the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. Although in *AK* VIII 40ab Vasubandhu claims to have presented an *abhidharma* system largely in agreement with

[62]In the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, Sthiramati likewise interprets *vijñāna* as the stream of *vijñānas*, impregnated by *karma*, in the *antarābhava* (*karmaparibhāvitena vijñānena santānavṛttyā cyutisthānād upapattisthane punarbhavabījabhūtāyā vāsanāyāḥ prāpaṇaṃ nayanam* (*MvbhṬ*: 29).

the Vaibhāṣika school,[63] it is well known that he rejects the Sarvāstivādin position on many crucial points. Nevertheless, even if the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* is correct in assuming, as Jaini puts it, that "the *Kośa* is not an authentic Vaibhāshika treatise but only a mouth-piece of the Mahāyānist Vasubandhu disguised as a Vaibhāshika āchārya" (Jaini 1977: 129), his intention in writing the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is not explicitly to expound Mahāyāna, specifically Yogācāra, doctrine, even less so than it is in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* or the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. In the case of his discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda*, Vasubandhu seems mostly concerned with undermining the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation and with promoting the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* as scriptural authority. Having established in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, without using any suspiciously Yogācāra terminology such as *paribhāvita*, that *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* consists of the six *vijñānakāyas*, he is free to interpret this six-*vijñānakāya* definition in a more overtly Yogācāra fashion in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. It thus seems possible that Vasubandhu, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, is adjusting the *abhidharma* system so painstakingly worked out by the Vaibhāṣikas in order to make it consonant with his Yogācāra beliefs.

In his introduction to the *Abhidharmadīpa*, Jaini identifies sixteen points on which the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* attacks Vasubandhu for departing from orthodox Vaibhāṣika doctrine. In a significant number of these cases, the "Sautrāntika" position taken by Vasubandhu is either virtually identical to that of the Yogācāra school (for example, regarding the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*) or, as Jaini puts it, "foreshadows the theory of *ālaya-vijñāna*" (Jaini 1977: 110), for example, regarding the *anuśayas*. Jaini draws attention to the fact that the Dīpakāra accuses Vasubandhu of being a *vaitulika*, i.e., accepting Mahāyāna, (see above; also, Jaini 1977: 128), and, in a discussion of the

[63] *kāśmīravaibhāṣikanītisiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyaṃ kathito 'bhidharmaḥ* (*AKBh*: 459; quoted by Mejor, who takes this verse to mean that Vasubandhu's own doctrinal standpoint agrees with that of the Vaibhāṣikas [Mejor 1991: 19]).

controversy about *sarvāstivāda*, states: "Although the main attack on the Sarvāstivāda comes from the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, the Dīpakāra's reference to the *ālaya-vijñāna* and to the *abhūta-parikalpita* unmistakably shows that his real opponents were Yogāchāra-Vijñānavādins..." (Jaini 1977: 121). However, Jaini takes the Dīpakāra's accusations as confirmation of the traditional, and still commonly accepted, assertion that Vasubandhu was a Sautrāntika when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and later converted to Mahāyāna and Yogācāra.

I, on the other hand, would like to suggest that the Dīpakāra may have been right, that Vasubandhu, when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, may already have been a Yogācāra, and that the Sautrāntika views that he espoused provided a better abhidharmic infrastructure for the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* than did the Sarvāstivādin positions that he attacked. I believe that what Vasubandhu says about *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* supports my speculation.

D. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* on *Saṃskārapratyayaṃ Vijñānam*

In the preceding section, I have mentioned, in the context of Vasubandhu's various positions, several features of the interpretation of *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Here, I shall examine the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* exposition, particularly as found in the *aṅgakarmavyavasthāna* section, as Yogācāra *abhidharma* in its own right.

Vasubandhu, in both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* is working under certain restraints. In the case of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, he is commenting on his own, fairly faithful summary of Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* in the form of his *kārikās*. Although he does not hesitate to criticize Sarvāstivādin positions, he is not willing to state explicitly the Yogācāra beliefs

that, if my speculations in the last section are correct, he held even at the time of writing the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. And, as I have mentioned, in the case of the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, he is commenting on a *sūtra*, not writing an independent exposition, even though his commentary is lengthy and far-reaching.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, on the other hand, is free of these limitations; it is able to include uncamouflaged Yogācāra concepts and terms, even if it does so sparingly. Furthermore, since the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is not in the form of a commentary on some other text, it can and must stand as an independent work. Therefore, unlike the *śarīra* section of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, which seems to belong to an earlier stage of Yogācāra thought, in which a preliminary theory of *ālayavijñāna* is being worked out, and unlike Vasubandhu, when he comments on the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not mention the six *vijñanakāyas* at all in connection with *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*. Nor does it mention the view that *pratisaṃdhivijñāna* is *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*, since the purpose of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is not to criticize Sarvāstivādin doctrine, as Vasubandhu does in both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, but to expound Yogācāra *abhidharma*.[64]

If we look at the comment in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* on the functions of *vijñāna*, we can find an explanation of how they coincide with the definition of *vijñāna* implied in the *aṅgasamāsa* section and inferred by the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* in its comment on the projecting set of members (*ASBh*: 31) and by the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T. 1585: 43c; see above). According to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, Consciousness "supports the bonds of action of beings" because its arising coincides with the *vāsanās* deposited by the Karmic Forces (*ASBh*: 32). This is tantamount to associating

[64]It is interesting to note that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, when discussing the functions of Consciousness, seems to be unaware of any but the Sarvāstivādin definition of *vijñānāṅga* (see note to Chapter 2, section B5c).

saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam with the *bījas* produced by *karma*. Thus, the first function of Consciousness, to support karmic continuity, is accomplished by the projection of the seeds of the new rebirth. This function of Consciousness is the one that Sthiramati in his *Triṃśikābhāṣya* argues cannot be performed by the six *vijñānakāyas* since a *pravṛttivijñāna* is unable to contain any sort of *vasanā*.[65]

The second function of Consciousness, to serve as the condition of Individual Existence, is accomplished when Consciousness, which in this case must be *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, enters the womb and initiates the Individual Existence of the next lifetime.[66] The two functions of Consciousness thus straddle the border between two lifetimes as well as partaking of two of the three aspects of the *ālayavijñāna* mentioned in the famous verse of the *Triṃśikā*: "Among these [three transformations of consciousness,] the consciousness called *ālaya* is *vipāka* and contains all seeds."[67] The first function is possible because Consciousness is *sarvabījaka*, the second because it is *vipāka*. However, as I have pointed out earlier, the members from *nāmarūpa* through *vedanā* are implicitly seeds, rather than actualized *dharmas*, and, according to the *Cheng wei shih lun*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* intends for the seeds of the *vipākavijñāna* to be included in *nāmarūpāṅga*.[68] Therefore, *pratisaṃdhi* actually takes place in *jātyaṅga*, which "produces beings in the proper order," beginning with *nāmarūpa*.[69]

Thus, without using the terms *ālayavijñāna*, *pratisaṃdhivijñāna*, or *ṣaḍvijñāna*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* describes a Consciousness capable of fulfilling the functions

[65] *na hi vijñānaṃ vipākavāsanāṃ niṣyandavāsanāṃ vā svātmany ādhattuṃ samarthaṃ svātmani kāritavirodhāt* -- *TrṃśBh*: 38.

[66] *pratyayaś ca bhavati nāmarūpasya, mātuḥ kukṣau vijñānāvakrāntyā nāmarūpavivṛddhigamanāt* (*ASBh*: 32; see Chapter 2, section B5c).

[67] *tatrālayākhyaṃ vijñānaṃ vipākaḥ sarvabījakam* (*Trṃś* II cd; *TrṃśBh*: 18).

[68] 異熟識種名色攝故。(T. 1585: 43c; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 483).

[69] *jātiḥ kiṃkarmikā/ nāmarūpaṣaḍāyatanasparśavedanānupūrvyā ca sattvān abhinirvṛtayati, pratyayaś ca bhavati jarāmaraṇasya* (*AS*: 26).

explicitly attributed to *ālayavijñāna* by the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*. To my mind, the reason that the term *ālayavijñāna* is not mentioned here is not that this section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* was written before *ālayavijñāna* was "discovered," as may have been true in the case of the *śarīra* portion of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition. Nor is the concept disguised, as it is by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and, to some extent, in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*. On the contrary, the concept has been discovered and accepted, and it lies unconcealed behind the description of a *vijñāna* that contains the impressions of which *saṃskāra* is the condition and that "supports the bond of action of beings." *Ālayavijñāna* is not mentioned simply because there is no need to use the term in an exegesis of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula the purpose of which is to eliminate "attachment to the *ātman* and to [the ideas that *dharmas*] originate without cause or that they originate from causes inconsistent [with their effects]."[70]

[70]*ahetuviṣamahetukātmābhiniveśatyājanārtham* (*AS*: 26; see Chapter 2, section A2c).

VI. *PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA* AND THE *CITTAVIPRAYUKTASAṂSKĀRAS*

A. Introduction

As I have mentioned in a note to my translation of the *pratītyasamutpādārtha* section (Chapter 2, section B7), there appears to be a connection between certain of the imports (*artha*) of conditioned origination and the group of nine or ten *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* that are associated specifically with the Yogācāra school. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* enumerates under the category of *artha* eleven features of the relationship between cause and result, and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* reiterates the importance of these features in the immediately following section, where it relates them to the fivefold profundity (*gāmbhīrya*) of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Ui Hakuju and Suguro Shinjō have examined the section on *artha* in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which appears to be the basis of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* treatment, and neither of them has found any specifically Yogācāra features in its description of causality. Ui thinks that the whole *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* is essentially similar to, and based on, the Vaibhāṣika three lifetimes/twofold causation system (Ui 1958: 283, 286). Suguro, too, although he points out the relationship between *paratantrārtha* and the *trisvabhāva* theory, stresses that he can find no signs of either a Mādhyamika theory of causality or one based on *ālayavijñāna* in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition (Suguro 1982: 210-212).

However, these lists of *pratītyasamutpādārthas* do not resemble anything found in the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* texts and commentaries. Instead, like a number of other lists pertaining to causality, for example those of the ten *hetus* and the four *yuktis*, they appear to be unique to the *abhidharma* of the Yogācāra, and they first appear in one portion or another of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The *pratītyasamutpādārthas* do not on the

surface presuppose *ālayavijñāna* or even a system of seed causation; however, later texts sometimes interpret them in such terms. For example, the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, in its comment on the *gāmbhīrya* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition, after explaining the five profundities in terms of the eleven *arthas*, explicitly connects the profundity of conditioned origination to causation by seeds (*ASBh*: 34; see Chapter 2, section B8).

Even more strikingly, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*[1] refers to a number of the aspects of causality described as *pratītyasamutpādārthas* in its definition of the six modes of *bījas*: *bījas* are 1) momentary (*kṣaṇika*), 2) simultaneous (*sahabhūka*), 3) continuous (*saṃtānānuvṛt*), 4) determined (*nīyata*), 5) dependent on conditions (*pratyayāpekṣa*), and 6) realized only in their own result (*svaphalasyaiva sādhanaṃ*).[2] Of these, the first corresponds to *kṣaṇikārtha*, the third to *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha*, the fourth[3] to *anurūpahetuphalārtha*, and the sixth to *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha*. Thus, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, unlike the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, understands these facets of conditioned origination explicitly in terms of the operation of *bījas*.

Furthermore, if Nishi Giyu is correct in his assertion that the source of most of the ideas about *bījas* contained in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* passage can be traced to the *Vibhāṣā* (Nishi 1975: 483-495), then these ideas predate the *Yogācārabhūmi* as well as the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Given that the *pratītyasamutpādārthas* do not appear in any

[1]*Mahāyānasaṃgraha* I: 22 (*MS*$_t$: 12; Lamotte 1973: 40-41; Nagao 1982, v. 1: 156-161). For the Sanskrit equivalents, I have followed Aramaki's retranslation in Nagao 1982, v. 1.

[2]A similar exposition is found in *Cwsl* (T. 1585: 9b-c; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 116-118; *Shindō*: 73-74).

[3]The *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya* explains this in almost the same way that *ASBh* explains *anurūpahetuphalārtha*: "Ils sont *déterminés*: ils sont individuellement déterminés (*pratiniyata*). Tout ne naît pas de tout, mais telle substance naît de tel germe qui lui est propre" (Lamotte 1973: 40). The *ASBh*, however, does not mention *bīja* (see Chapter 2, section B7).

Sarvāstivādin text, that they are explicitly related to *bīja* theory by later Yogācāra texts, and that many of the aspects of causality that they explain also appear elsewhere exclusively in Yogācāra texts, I think it likely that a *bīja* interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* does, in fact, underlie the *pratītyasamutpādārthas*, even though the term *bīja* does not appear in their exposition.

In the Yogācāra reinterpretation of the Sarvāstivādin category of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, some of the same features of causality that are described in the Yogācāra *pratītyasamutpāda* and ten-*hetu* expositions appear again in the definitions of various *viprayuktas*, especially those belonging to the group of nine or ten that are Yogācāra additions to the Sarvāstivādin list and that, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, are designations of states of cause and result.[4] However, before I discuss the Yogācāra lists and discussions of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* and their relation to *pratītyasamutpāda*, I must first examine the development of the category in the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* in an attempt to establish the chronological point at which the Yogācāra adopted the Sarvāstivādin list. I shall also investigate *saṃghabheda* and *sāmagrī*, two items that are not found on the orthodox Sarvāstivādin list but are sometimes considered to be *viprayuktasaṃskāras*. There is a possible relation between them and the Yogācāra *viprayuktas*, *sāmagrī* and *asāmagrī*, that I shall examine further in the second half of this chapter.

B. *Cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in Sarvāstivāda

1. *Cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in the Sarvāstivāda Literature

The best-known discussion of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in a Western language is

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[4]*hetuphalāvasthāyāṃ śeṣā iti* (*ASBh*: 11). See section C2.

P.S. Jaini's "Origin and Development of the Theory of *viprayukta-saṃskāras*" (Jaini 1959b). In this paper, Jaini has shown that the term is found in Theravāda literature as well as in Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, and he suggests a strong Vaiśeṣika influence on what he calls the "*dravya-vāda* of the Vaibhāṣika" (Jaini 1959b: 537) as well as in the case of the last nine *viprayukta*s of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* list. Although Jaini's account of the controversy in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* regarding the reality of the *viprayukta*s is excellent, his treatment of the development of the lists in early Sarvāstivādin texts, being limited to Sanskrit sources, is necessarily incomplete. For references to earlier *abhidharma* texts extant only in Chinese, the Japanese secondary literature is invaluable; Mizuno Kōgen's long article entitled "Shin fu sō ō hō ni tsuite" (Mizuno 1956, perhaps the most exhaustive treatment of the subject), the article on *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in *Mochizuki Bukkyō Dai Jiten* (Mochizuki 1974: 2089), and the chapter on *abhidharma* in Yamada Ryūjō's *Daijō Bukkyō Seiritsuron Josetsu* (Yamada 1959: 61-136) are particularly useful. Collett Cox also summarizes the earlier Sarvāstivādin lists in her unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, which consists of a translation and study of the *cittaviprayukta* section of the *Nyāyānusāra* (Cox 1983: 34).

Since the publication of Jaini's paper, a Sanskrit fragment of the *Pañcavastuka*, probably the earliest source for the five categories (*pañcavastu*),[5] as well as for a list of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, has become available (Imanishi: 1969). On the basis of the partial manuscript and the Chinese translations, Imanishi has arrived at a text with a list consisting of fifteen items: 1) *prāpti*; 2) *asaṃjñasamāpatti*; (3) *nirodhasamāpatti*; (4) *āsaṃjñika*; 5) *jīvitendriya*; (6) *nikāyasabhāga*; (7) *āśrayapratilābha*; (8) *vastupratilābha*; (9) *āyatanapratilābha*; (10) *jāti*; (11) *jarā*; (12) *sthiti*; (13) *anityatā*; (14) *nāmakāya*; (15) *padakāya* (Imanishi 1969: 8).[6] Although Imanishi's text does not indicate it, both

[5]The five categories are: *citta, caitta, rūpa, cittaviprayukta*, and *asaṃskṛta* (see Hirakawa 1973: xii-xxiv).

[6]The later Chinese translation includes *vyañjanakāya* as well, and even An Shih-

Chinese translations, as well as the text of the *Prakaraṇapāda*, which is probably based on the *Pañcavastuka*,[7] include references to other, similar *dharmas* that are *cittaviprayukta*.[8] Thus, we can add the sentence *ye 'py evaṃjātīyakā* (or *evaṃbhāgīyā*[9]) to the Sanskrit on the basis of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, which quotes from a *śāstra* identified by Wogihara as the *Prakaraṇapāda*.[10]

This is not merely a pedantic correction of Imanishi's text but in fact is significant because it proves that, at this period of *abhidharma* literature, the list of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* was still open.[11] Other texts that include similar phrases are

kao's very early translation probably indicates three *kāyas* rather than two. At the end of An Shih-kao's list of *viprayuktas* we find the characters 名, 字, and 絶 (T. 1557: 998c). 名 is the standard translation for *nāma*, and 字 is one of the translations for *vyañjana*. Although I could not find 絶 as a translation for *pada*, one of its meanings, probably as an abbreviation for the compound 絶句, is "a stanza of four lines" (Matthews 1975: 240). Although the Sanskrit *pada* in this context probably means "a sentence (*pāda*) or a line of a *gāthā*" (Jaini 1959c: 99), it seems likely that An Shih-kao is in fact translating it by 絶, which at least preserves the notion of an utterance longer than a word or syllable that expresses a complete meaning. Incidentally, the character 句 by itself is, in fact, used to translate *pada*.

7See Yamada 1959: 93.

8亦餘如是法分別意行。是名分別意行。(T. 1557 [An Shih-kao]: 998c); 復有餘法與心不相應。如是等類。名為心不相應行法。(T. 1556 [Fa ch'eng]: 995c); 復有所餘如是類法。與心不相應。總名心不相應行。 (T. 1542 [*Prakaraṇapāda*]: 692c).

9Mizuno Kōgen has pointed out that, in the *Mahāvyutpatti* (p. 152, item number 1999), *evaṃbhāgīyāḥ* is added, along with *bheda, prabandha, prabandhoparama, vyañjana, akṣara*, and *varṇa*, to the twenty-four Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktas* to form a list of thirty-one (Mizuno 1956: 32). He does not mention that it occurs after *padakāya* and before *pravṛtti*. It seems likely to me that it does not indicate a separate *dharma* in the *Mahāvyutpatti* list but rather refers to the unnamed additional *cittaviprayuktas* mentioned by the pre-*Abhidharmahṛdaya* texts and by the commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośa*.

10*nāma-kāyādayaś ceti. ca-śabda evaṃjātīyakānukta-viprayukta-pradarśanārthaḥ. saṃgha-bheda-prabhṛtayo hi dravyataś citta-viprayuktā iṣyante iti ye 'py evaṃjātīyakā iti śāstre 'py uktatvāt.* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 142).

11In fact, the list of *caitasikas* in *Pañcavastuka* is similarly followed by the phrase *ye vā punar anye 'py evaṃbhāgīyā dharmāś cittena saṃprayuktā ucyante caitasikā dharmāḥ.* But notice that An Shih-kao's translation of the phrase that indicates the remaining *caitasikas* (亦所有。如是法意共俱。是名為意所念法) is different from his translation of the phrase that indicates the remaining *viprayuktas* (see note above). In Fa ch'eng's translation, the phrases are identical (復有餘法與心不相應。如是等類。名為心不相應行法。; 復有餘法。與心相應如是等類。名為心相應行法。).

the *Dharmaskandha*, which includes an abbreviated list of *cittaviprayuktas*,[12] and the *Abhidharmāmṛta*.[13] Actually, the *Abhidharmāmṛta* includes two lists, only the second of which Jaini, referring to Sastri's often inaccurate Sanskrit retranslation, mentions in his article.[14] This second list contains seventeen *dharmas*, each preceded by a number, and does not refer to the existence of any *dharmas* not on the list.[15] However, the first list, which contains only sixteen items, is followed by a reference to "various similar *dharmas*."[16]

[12] "What is *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāraskandha*? *Prāpti*, *āsaṃjñikasamāpatti*, and so forth up to *vyañjanakāya*, as well as other, similar *dharmas*, which are not associated with *citta*, are called *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāraskandha*" (云何心不相應行蘊。謂得無想定。廣說乃至文身。復有所餘如是類法。不與心相應。是名心不相應行蘊。 -- T. 1537: 501b; not in Sanskrit fragment).

[13]The *Vibhāṣā* lacks a comprehensive discussion of the category of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, probably because it does not employ the *pañcavastu* category. Instead it has its own unique system of *shih men* (十門 -- see T. 1545: 466b; Yamada 1959: 108-109).

However, in a discussion of 退 (*hāni*, *parihāṇa*), the *Vibhāṣā* refers to the "remaining *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*": 評曰。退自性者是不成就無覆無記。即是非得心不相應行蘊所攝。即在復有所餘如是類法心不相應中攝。(T. 1545: 313a). See also T. 1546: 236a, where the term *aprāpti* (非得) does not appear. It would be interesting to see to what extent references to *aprāpti* are Hsüan-tsang's interpolations. I will refer again to this passage below.

[14]Jaini is not the only one to have overlooked the first list in *Aām*. Both Mochizuki (1974: 2089) and Fukuda (1990) refer only to the second.

[15]云何心不相應法。得等十七法。十七法者。一成就。二無想定。三滅盡定。四無想處。五命根。六種類。七處得。八物得。九入得。十生。十一老。十二住。十三無常。十四名衆。十五字衆。十六味衆。十七凡夫性。(T. 1553: 979b). According to Sastri's retranslation: *katame vipraytuktā dharmāḥ/ prāptyādayaḥ saptadaśa dharmāḥ/ prāpti* [1], *āsaṃjñikasamāpattiḥ* [2], *nirodhasamāpattiḥ* [3], *asaṃjñi āyatanaṃ* [4], *jīvitendriyaṃ* [5], *nikāyasabhāgatā* [6], *sthānaprāptiḥ* [7], *vastuprāptiḥ* [8], *āyatanaprāptiḥ* [9], *jātiḥ* [10], *jarā* [11], *sthitiḥ* [12], *anityatā* [13], *nāmakāyaḥ* [14], *padakāyaḥ* [15], *vyaṃjanakāyaḥ* [16], *pṛthagjanatvaṃ* [17] (Sastri 1953: 130). This list is followed by definitions of each item; these definitions are more elaborate than those of *Prakāraṇapāda*.

[16] 云何心不相應行。得生住老無常無想定滅盡定無想處。種種［類］方得物得入得名衆句衆味衆凡夫性。如是種種法。是謂心不相應行。(T. 1553: 970a). Sastri retranslates this as follows: *katame cittaviprayuktāḥ saṃskārāḥ/ prāptiḥ jātiḥ sthitiḥ jarā anityatā asaṃjñisamāpattiḥ nirodhasamāpattiḥ āsaṃjñikāyatanaṃ vividhā deśaprāptiḥ vastuprāptiḥ āyatanaprāptiḥ nāmakāyaḥ padakāyaḥ vyaṃjanakāyaḥ pṛthagjanatvam ity evaṃ vividhā dharmāś cittaviprayuktāḥ saṃskārāḥ* (Sastri 1953: 61). Mochizuki reads 種類 for 種種, but, like La Vallée Poussin, he reads it with 方得, which La Vallée Poussin retranslates as *nānādeśaprāpti* (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: xlvi). Mochizuki notes that, unlike *Prakaraṇapāda*, *Abhidharmāmṛta* has dropped *jīvitendriya* and added *pṛthagjanatva*,

The second list, in which the order and terminology are slightly different than in the earlier passage from the *Abhidharmāmṛta*, occurs in the final section of the text, *tsa p'in ti shih liu* (雜品第十六). Although none of the available secondary sources [17] mentions the possibility, I would guess it is a later addition. This would explain why *jīvitendriya* has been added and why the reference to "other similar *dharmas*" has been dropped; the list has been made more similar to the later, standardized lists of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* accepted by the later Vaibhāṣikas.

In both texts titled *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, as well as in the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, the number of *cittaviprayuktas* has been reduced to fourteen, [18] which is the number well known to us from the *Abhidharmakośa*.[19] In neither text does a phrase indicating the existence of other *viprayuktas* occur. The one other source that we have that predates the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *Abhidharmāvatāra*, exists in Tibetan and Eastern Tocharian translations, as well as in a Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang. Although Hsüan-tsang adds the word "et cetera" (*teng*, 等) to the list of fourteen *viprayuktas*,[20] the Tibetan

but he does not explain what has happened to *nikāyasabhāgatā*. In fact, we should follow Mochizuki in reading 種類, which is sometimes used instead of 衆同分 to translate *nikāyasabhāgatā*, e.g., in the earlier translation of *Prakaraṇapāda* (T. 1541: 627a; 628c), as well as in the later passage from *Abhidharmāmṛta* (see above footnote). Thus, by replacing *vividhā* with *nikāyasabhāgatā*, we arrive at a list of sixteen *cittaviprayuktas*.

[17]I.e., Mochizuki (1974: 2089), Sastri (1953:1-25), La Vallée Poussin (1971 v. 1: xlvi-xlvii), or *Bussho kaisetsu daijiten* (v. 1: 36).

[18]The lists, although identical in content, vary slightly in the terms used for translation and in order: 無想、無想定、滅盡定、衆生種類、句身、味身、名身、命根、法得、凡夫性、生、老、住、無常 (*Abhidharmahṛdaya* [阿毘曇心論] --T. 1550: 830); 無想、無想正受、滅盡正受、衆生種類、句身、味身、名身、命根、法得、凡夫性、生、老、住、無常 (*Abhidharmahṛdaya* [阿毘曇心論經] -- T. 1551: 866a); 無想、無想正受、滅盡正受、衆生種類、句身、味身、名身、命根、法得、凡夫性、生、住、老、無常 (*Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* --T. 1552: 942c-943a). Mochizuki remarks that the *Pañcaskandhaka* is identical.

[19]Although from this point on, the number of *viprayuktas* is generally given as fourteen, in the *Abhidharmadīpa*, only thirteen are included (verse 128; *AD*: 85); the exclusion of *asaṃjñisamāpatti* seems to be explained in verse 135 and its commentary (*AD*: 92). However, I don't really understand this passage, and Jaini does not comment on this difference between *AK* and *AD*.

[20] 與此相違名不相應。謂得非得無想定滅定無想事命根衆同分生住老無常

translation does not.[21] Marcel Van Velthem has remarked on the fact that Hsüan-tsang's translation on occasion contains more than the corresponding Tibetan (Van Velthem 1977: xix-xx). Perhaps in this case Hsüan-tsang had in mind the *Abhidharmakośa*, which he is said to have translated earlier than the *Abhidharmāvatāra*, [22] and which contains the word *ādayaḥ*, or perhaps such texts as the *Prakaraṇapāda*, which, although he is said to have translated it later than the *Abhidharmāvatāra*,[23] he must have already studied. The *Abhidharmāvatāra*, as Mochizuki points out, is noteworthy for substituting *aprāpti* for *pṛthagjanatva*, which is simply a special case of *aprāpti*; according to Mochizuki, the identical list of *viprayukta*s in the *Abhidharmakośa* must have been based on the *Abhidharmāvatāra* (Mochizuki 1974: 2089). The list in the *Abhidharmakośa* is generally considered to represent the orthodox Sarvāstivādin list.

Before coming back to later Sarvāstivādin opinions about the constituents of the list, I shall compare the Yogācāra list with the Sarvāstivādin lists mentioned above.

2. The Relationship between the Sarvāstivādin and the Yogācāra Lists

There are two passages about the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*s in the *Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktabhūmimanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. Of these, the first (T. 1579: 585c-588c) appears to be the oldest Yogācāra exposition, and it is to this passage that I shall devote the most attention in my later discussion. However, since it does not contain a complete list, I shall refer to the second passage, which includes the twenty-four *viprayukta*s most frequently associated with the Yogācāra, for the purpose of 名身句身文身等。(T. 1554: 982a; Van Velthem 1977: 14).

[21]Van Velthem 1977: 86. Van Velthem does not indicate whether the fragmentary Eastern Tocharian translation includes this portion, and I have been unable to consult it.

[22]The *Abhidharmāvatāra* was translated in 658, while the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* was translated between 651 and 654 (Lancaster 1979: 346, 343).

[23]Translated in 660. (Lancaster 1979: 341).

enumerating the Yogācāra *viprayuktas*.[24]

One should notice first of all that the first fourteen *dharmas* in this list correspond most closely to the list of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya*; notably, both texts include *pṛthagjanatva* rather than *aprāpti*. The first passage, although it omits *asaṃjñāsamāpatti, nirodhasamāpatti,* and *āsaṃjñika*, likewise contains *pṛthagjanatva*. In fact, all other Yogācāra enumerations of the first fourteen *viprayuktas* contain the same *dharmas* as the *Abhidharmahṛdaya*.

Another feature of all the lists found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as well as that of the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun*, is that they do not contain any reference to "other" *viprayuktas*. Although the Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes such a reference, neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation does, thus leading me to believe that it is another of Hsüan-tsang's additions. The appearance of a reference to other *dharmas* in the Chinese translation (also by Hsüan-tsang) of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, the Sanskrit and Tibetan of which are no longer extant, is therefore suspect as well. The *Pañcaskandhaka*, on the other hand, which includes only the first fourteen *dharmas*, undeniably contains a reference to similar *dharmas*.[25] P'u-kuang, in his commentary on the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun*, explains that the reference to other *dharmas* in the *Pañcaskandhaka* is to the last ten *dharmas* of the Yogācāra list, beginning with *pravṛtti*.[26]

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[24] 1. 得 (*prāpti*) 2. 無想定 (*asaṃjñisamāpatti*) 3. 滅盡定 (*nirodhasamāpatti*) 4. 無想天 (*āsaṃjñika*) 5. 命根 (*jīvitendriya*) 6. 衆同分 (*nikāyasabhāgatā*) 7. 生(*jāti*) 8. 老 (*maraṇa*) 9. 住 (*sthiti*) 10. 無常 (*anityatā*) 11. 名身(*nāmakāya*) 12. 句身 (*padakāya*) 13. 文身 (*vyañjanakāya*) 14. 異生性 (*pṛthagjanatva*) 15. 流轉 (*pravṛtti*) 16. 定異 (*pratiniyama*) 17. 相應 (*yoga*) 18. 勢速 (*java*) 19. 次第 (*anukrama*) 20. 時 (*kāla*) 21. 方 (*deśa*) 22. 数 (*saṃkhyā*) 23. 和合 (*sāmagrī*) 24. 不和合 (*asāmagrī*) (T. 1579: 607).

[25] 云何心不相應行。謂依色心心法分位。但假建立不可施設。決定異性不異性。彼復云何。謂得無想等至滅盡等至無想所有。命根衆同分。生老住無常。名身句身文身異生性如是等類。*Pañcaskandhaka* (T. 1612: 849b-c). The Tibetan translation also includes such a phrase: *de lta bu'i cha dan mthun pa dag go//* (Dantine 1980: 141).

[26] 何故五蘊論中唯有十四。無流転等十。解云。所以五蘊論不說流転等十也。彼論云。如是等類者則解彼論云。當知如是等類之言亦等流転等十也。此中唯略故不別列名也 (*Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun shu* -- T. 1837: 60a).

On the basis of the above, I think that the *Yogācārabhūmi* tradition regarding the *cittaviprayukta*s must have diverged from the Sarvāstivādin tradition between the time of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* and that of the *Abhidharmāvatāra*. Of course, the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* is considerably earlier than the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. However, it is possible that, at the time of the composition of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, the forerunners of the Yogācāras were already reconsidering the constituents, as well as the ontological status, of the category of *viprayukta*s. If, in fact, additions to the Sarvāstivādin list were suggested at this early date, phrases such as *ye 'py evaṃjātīyakā* may have been used as justification. Perhaps it was in reaction to this that the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* and its successors omitted such phrases and limited the category to fourteen *dharmas*.

3. *Saṃghabheda*, *Sāmagrī*, and the Reopening of the Sarvāstivādin List

If, as I propose, the Sarvāstivādin school from about the time of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* closed the list of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* at fourteen, the question arises as to whether, as a number of commentators suggest, Vasubandhu re-opens the list with the phrase *ādayaś ceti* in the verse of the *Abhidharmakośa*, and if so, why. In verse thirty-five and the first *pāda* of verse thirty-six of Chapter II, Vasubandhu says "the *viprayuktasaṃskāras* are *prāpti, aprāpti, sabhāgatā, āsaṃjnika*, the (two) *samāpattis*, *jīvita*, the *lakṣaṇas*, *nāmakāya*, et cetera."[27] It is clear that, due to the exigencies of versification, he like earlier authors has abbreviated the names of some of these *dharmas*, for example:

[27] *Abhidharmakośa* II 35-36a: *cittaviprayuktās tu saṃskārāḥ prāptyaprāptī sabhāgatā/ āsaṃjñikaṃ samāpattī jīvitaṃ lakṣaṇāni ca// nāmakāyādayaś ceti* (*AKBh*: 62; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 178);
心不相應行／得非得同分／／無想二定命／相名身等類／／(T. 1558: 23a);
不相應諸行。至非至同分。無想處二定。壽命及諸相。名聚等。(T. 1559: 180c);
mi ldan pa'i 'du byed rnams/ thob dań ma thob skal mñam dań/ 'du 'ses med sñoms 'jug pa dań/ srog dań mtshan ñid rnams dań ni/ miń gi tshogs la sogs pa yań/ (Fukuhara 1973: 240-242).

sabhāgatā for *nikāyasabhāgatā* (see *AKBh*: 67); the (two) *samāpattis* for *asaṃjñisamāpatti* (see *AK* II 42a; *AKBh*: 69) and *nirodhasamāpatti* (see *AKBh*: 71); *jīvita* for *jīvitendriya* (see *AKBh*: 73); and the *lakṣaṇas* for *jāti, jarā, sthiti,* and *anityatā* (see *AK* II 45cd; *AKBh*: 75). Therefore, it seems likely that "et cetera" here simply refers to *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya*. Furthermore, the structure of the presentation in the verses does not suggest the existence of any other *viprayuktas*. As we have seen, verses 35 and 36a consist of a list of the *viprayuktas*, while verses 36b through 47 contain definitions or explanations of each *dharma*.[28] Verse forty-seven quotes the phrase *nāmakāyādayaḥ* from verse 36b and explains that *nāmakāya*, et cetera, are equivalent to "the congregation of name (saṃjñā), clause (vākya) and syllable (akṣara)."[29] Vasubandhu, before criticizing the Vaibhāṣika position, explains in the *Bhāṣya* that the word *ādi* refers to *pada-* and *vyañjanakāya*.[30] He further clarifies the verse by stating that *nāma* corresponds to *saṃjñā*, *pada* to *vākya*, and *vyañjana* to *akṣara* (*AKBh*: 80). Thus, in his exposition of the *cittaviprayuktas*, Vasubandhu himself accounts for the word *ādi* without allowing for the possibility of more than fourteen *viprayuktas*. This is consistent with his general tendency to present in the verses a Sarvāstivādin position similar to that found in the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* or *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*. As for the words *ca* and *iti*, they seem to have no special meaning other than to fill out the verse and indicate the end of the list.[31]

In the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, however, Yaśomitra interprets the phrase *nāmakāyādayaś ceti* in verse 36a differently. According to Yaśomitra, Vasubandhu

[28]The second half of the next to last verse and the last verse in the section, *AK* II 47cd-48, contain a summary of the resultant nature (*niṣyanda, vipāka*, or both) of the *viprayuktas* (*AKBh*: 82).

[29]*nāmakāyādayaḥ saṃjñāvākyākṣarasamuktayaḥ* (*AKBh*: 80; translation from Fukuhara 1973: 264).

[30]*ādigrahaṇena padavyañjanakāyagrahaṇam* (*AKBh*: 80).

[31]For this meaning of *iti*, see Macdonell 1929: 45.

intends to include other similar *viprayuktas*, for example, *saṃghabheda*, that have not been mentioned but that are really *cittaviprayuktas*. Yaśomitra justifies this by referring to the phrase in *śāstra*, *ye 'py evaṃjātīyakā*, that I have already traced back to the *Pañcavastuka*.[32] In fact, in Chapter Four (*karmanirdeśa*) Vasubandhu defines *saṃghabheda* as a *viprayukta* having the nature of *asāmagrī*, which La Vallée Poussin translates as "non-concorde".[33] La Vallée Poussin refers to the passage in the *Vibhāṣā* that I mentioned in a note earlier in this section, according to which *saṃghabheda*, unlike *saṃghabhedāvadya* (namely, lying [*mṛṣāvāda*]), is a *cittaviprayukta*.[34] The identification of *saṃghabheda* with *asāmagrī*, a *cittaviprayukta*, can also be found in the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*[35] but not in the corresponding portion of the *Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra* (T. 1551: 843c).

It is, therefore, true that *saṃghabheda* has been defined by Vasubandhu, as well as by his Vaibhāṣika sources, as a *cittaviprayukta* and that the *Vibhāṣā* has even associated *saṃghabheda* with the phrase "remaining *dharmas* of the same type."[36] In translating the *Abhidharmakośa*, Hsüan-tsang seems to have such a phrase in mind when he renders *ādayaś ceti* as *teng lei* (等類); *lei* appears to be an abbreviation of *so yü ju shih lei fa* (所

[32] *nāma-kāyādayaś ceti. ca-śabda evaṃjātīyakānukta-viprayukta-pradarśanārthaḥ. saṃgha-bheda-prabhṛtayo hi dravyataś citta-viprayuktā iṣyante iti ye 'py evaṃjātīyakā iti śāstre 'py uktatvāt.* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 142; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 178 n. 2). According to Wogihara, the manuscripts read *iti-śabda*, but he has corrected the Sanskrit on the basis of the Tibetan *yaṅ*.

[33] *saṃghabhedas tv asāmagrīsvabhāvo viprayuktaḥ/ akliṣṭāvyākṛto dharmaḥ* (*AK* IV 98a-c; *AKBh*: 260).

[34] 如僧破與破僧罪異。僧破以不和合為自性。無覆無記心不相行蘊所攝。破僧罪以虛誑語為自性。僧成就破破僧人成就罪。 (T. 1545: 313b).

[35] 謂不和合性／當知是僧壞／不隱沒無記／是不相應行／　僧壞者。是不和合性。不隱沒無記不相應行陰攝。(T. 1552: 898c).

[36] I am assuming that the *Vibhāṣā*'s comparison of *saṃghabheda* with *hāni* extends to the phrase 復有所餘如是類法心不相應 (:評曰。退自性者是不成就無覆無記。即是非得心不相應行蘊所攝。即在復有所餘如是類法心不相應中攝。應知退與順退法異。退依不成就非得為自性。無覆無記心不相行蘊所攝。順退法以一切不善有覆無記為其自性。如僧破與破僧罪異。僧破以不和合為自性。無覆無記心不相行蘊所攝。破僧罪以虛誑語為自性。僧成就破破僧人成就罪. -- T. 1545: 313a-b; see notes above).

餘如是類法). Paramārtha, on the other hand, being more faithful to the original text and less interpretive, does not supply *lei*.[37]

The *Nyāyānusāra* also understands *ādayaś ceti* to include more than simply *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya*. As Cox points out, Saṃghabhadra makes "a clear distinction between those dharmas represented by the term '*ādi*' and those represented by the term '*ca*'."[38] *Ādi* includes *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya*, as well as *sāmagrī*, while *ca* refers to "dharmas erroneously proposed by other masters, which, according to Saṅghabhadra, are varieties of the previously listed dharmas" (Cox 1983: 104 n. 1).

The inclusion of *sāmagrī* is interesting for a number of reasons. Cox notes that Saṃghabhadra does not discuss the meaning of this term as a *cittaviprayukta*. However, she refers to the *Vibhāṣā*, where it is said that *sāmagrī*, and not the object itself, is the cause of the awareness of the object.[39] The objection is then raised: "if the individual (conditions of awareness taken) separately are not called the cause, then the totality (*sāmagrī*) of many factors must not be the cause." To this, the answer is given: "The individual (conditions of awareness taken) separately are not called the totality; the assembled group of many factors is called the totality. Therefore, the individual (conditions of awareness taken) separately are not called the cause; the totality (consisting of) many

[37]See note above.

[38]*Nyāyānusāra* (T. 1562: 396c; Cox 1983: 104):頌曰：心不相應行／得非得同分／／無想二定命／相名身等類／／　論曰：等者等取句身文身及和合性。類者顯餘所計度法。即前種類。謂有計度離得等有蘊得等性。如是諸法。不與心相應故。說名為此不相應行。 Although Cox says that she indicates in brackets all of Hsüan-tsang's additions to the Sanskrit text of *AK*, she does not bracket the words "that type" in her translation of *AK* II 36a: "name set (*nāmakāya*) and so on, and [other dharmas of] that type." While she is correct that Hsüan-tsang uses 類 to render *ca*, the entire phrase, "other dharmas of that type," is really Hsüan-tsang's interpretation, and not what Vasubandhu wrote. On the basis of *AKVy*, we can probably say that what Hsüan-tsang translates as 類 in Saṃghabhadra's comment was also simply *ca* in the original Sanskrit.

[39]Cox 1983: 35. This is the passage that she refers to:問由有瓶覺豈此瓶覺唯瓶為因。答非但有瓶則有瓶覺以無瓶時亦有瓶覺。雖有瓶時無瓶覺故然有和合故得有瓶覺。是故和合是瓶覺因緣。有作是說。和合是因此和合因說名為緣。(T. 1545: 109b-c).

factors can be called the cause."[40] Cox also mentions a passage from the *Nyāyānusāra*, according to which *sāmagrī*, as the object of *manovijñāna*, is the basis for awareness of past and future objects (Cox 1983: 36; T. 1562: 350c-351a). As we shall see, the *Vibhāṣā* description of *sāmagrī* in this context is quite similar to the Yogācāra definition of *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayukta*, and it is not surprising that Cox looks to these other passages for some clue as to what Saṃghabhadra meant by saying that *sāmagrī* is a *viprayukta*.

However, we have a second-hand account of Saṃghabhadra's opinion according to which the meaning of *sāmagrī* is much more limited. In the *Chü she lun chi*, P'u-kuang relates an argument between Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra regarding *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayukta*. When Vasubandhu challenges Saṃghabhadra regarding the nature of *sāmagrī*, Saṃghabhadra says that it is what one throws away at the time of *saṃghabheda*. Vasubandhu denies that this is a separate *dharma* and maintains that *sāmagrī* should be included in *sabhāgatā*.[41] After presenting a rather long debate, P'u-kuang states that, because there are different expositions of *sāmagrī*, the matter needs further investigation.[42] However, he is certain that *sāmagrī* does not consist of *prāpti*, and he uses the same argument as in his discussion of *saṃghabheda* (see the next paragraph). I have not been able to find any trace of this debate in either the *Abhidharmakośa* or the *Nyāyanusāra*; nevertheless it calls into question whether the broader meanings that Cox suggests for *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* are, in fact, intended by Saṃghabhadra (Cox 1983: 36 n. 10).

P'u-kuang, in his discussion of *Abhidharmakośa* IV 98, also has something to

[40] 問若一一別不名為因。衆事和合亦應非因。答一一別不名和合。衆事聚集即名和合。故一一別不名為因衆事和合得名為因。(T. 1545: 109c).

[41] 俱舍師問云。此和合性如何證知。正理師解云。如破僧時捨和合性。明知別有。正理師問云。如我所立別有體性。汝不立者何法中取。俱舍師解云。此和合性衆同分攝。(T. 1821: 84b).

[42] 其和合性異說不同。故須研究。(T. 1821: 84c).

say about *saṃghabheda* and *asāmagrī*. After mentioning the opinions of two other teachers,[43] he gives his own definition of *asāmagrī*: it is *aprāpti* with respect to *sāmagrī* (which, in this case, clearly refers to monastic concord). Prior to *saṃghabheda*, there is *sāmagrī*, and all members of the monastic community, sharing this *sāmagrī*, can obtain the *āryamārga*. In other words, because the *saṃgha* has *sāmagrī*, it is possible for the monks to enter the Path. If, however, the *saṃgha* is broken, *sāmagrī* is relinquished, and *asāmagrī* arises: because the *sāmagrī* has been broken, it is impossible to enter the Path. This is the reason that *saṃghabheda* is a deadly sin (*anantaryakarma*). Since the *saṃgha* does not achieve that *sāmagrī*, *asāmagrī* consists of *aprāpti* with respect to *sāmagrī*. However, *sāmagrī* does not consist of *prāpti*, because not every *dharma* has an opposite; for example, although the state of being an ordinary person is equivalent to *aprāpti* of the state of being an *ārya*, the state of being an *ārya* does not only consist of *prāpti*.[44]

P'u-kuang thus seems to understand *sāmagrī* as the opposite of *saṃghabheda* and not as a general causal principle, and he denies the separate reality of both of them as real *cittaviprayuktas* not included in Vasubandhu's list of fourteen. Furthermore, he interprets the *lei* as indicating subclasses of the fourteen, and maintains that Vasubandhu did not intend to include any other *dharmas*.[45] Fa-pao, on the other hand, disagrees with P'u-kuang; he says that Saṃghabhadra's inclusion of *sāmagrī* is justified since Vasubandhu, following texts such as the *Dharmaskandha* and *Prakaraṇapāda*, intended to leave the list open.[46]

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[43] 古德空法師 and空法師. I have been unable to identify these teachers.

[44] 不和合性以和合上非得為體。謂僧未破有和合性。同共和合許有聖道。僧由有此和合性故容得入聖。若僧被破。捨和合性。有不和合性起。由彼破此和合性故不得入聖。故成無間。既不成就彼和合性。即以和合體上非得為不和合性。問破僧不和合非得以為體。亦可僧和合以彼得為體　解云諸法未必皆相翻立。如異生性以非得為體。聖性非唯以得為體。　(T. 1821: 276c-277a).

[45] 若作俱舍師救。類言即顯此十四種同流類。故非顯餘計。(T. 1821: 85a).

[46] 此論不説更無。正理不弾俱舍。餘文皆通兩解。正理更無異端。教既分明。理須依釋。故知十四之外更有不相應行。(T. 1822: 135c; see Fukuhara 1973: 241).

Thus, there is some basis in the *Vibhāṣā* for Yaśomitra's assertion that *saṃghabheda* should be included on the list, and it is not too far-fetched for Saṃghabhadra to substitute *sāmagrī*, in the sense of the opposite of *saṃghabheda*. However, there is no evidence that in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* or the *Nyāyānusāra* either of these terms appears in the context of the *cittaviprayuktas* with a meaning extending beyond monastic discord or concord.

In the end, we cannot say anything conclusive about *saṃghabheda* and *sāmagrī* as *cittaviprayuktas* in these *abhidharma* texts. We do not know whether Vasubandhu actually intended to allow for the possibility of more than fourteen *viprayuktas*, although I suspect that he did not. And whether he did or not, it is not clear whether there is any connection between Yaśomitra and Saṃghabhadra's inclusion of those particular *dharmas* and the fact that they have counterparts in the Yogācāra lists. As far as I know, none of the commentators on the *Abhidharmakośa* refer to any of the other *dharmas* included among the nine or ten extra Yogācāra *viprayuktas*. Furthermore, although the commentators on the *Abhidharmakośa*, both Indian and Chinese, are clearly sensitive to the phrase *ye 'py evaṃjātīyakā*, none of them even draws attention to the possible relation between it and the fact that *Yogācāra* texts include twenty-three or twenty-four *viprayuktas*. Thus, *saṃghabheda* and *sāmagrī* remain possible, but elusive, points of connection between the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra lists.

C. *Cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in Yogācāra

1. *Cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in Yogācāra Texts

Although it is well known that lists of *cittaviprayuktas* appear in the Yogācāra literature and that the *viprayuktas* are considered merely provisional designations (*prajñapti*),

there has been, as far as I know, no detailed study of the relationship between the Yogācāra and Sarvāstivādin lists.[47] This may be due to the fact that one can find no explicit discussion of one another's lists in the literature of the two schools. The relationship between the lists is indeed difficult to understand, but I shall examine the Yogācāra reinterpretation of several of the *viprayuktas* that are common to both the lists in order to establish why, if it considers the *viprayuktadharmas* to be merely *prajñapti*, Yogācāra preserves the category. I shall also discuss the group of *cittaviprayuktas* that are specifically associated with Yogācāra in the hope of explaining why they were added.

In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *cittaviprayuktas* generally appear in two contexts, as members of the category of *prajñaptidharmas* and as constituents of *dharmadhātu*. I have located six places in the *Yogācārabhūmi* where *cittaviprayuktas* are discussed.[48] Of these, a passage in the *Manobhūmi* (*YBh*: 68; T. 1579: 293c) states that *dharmadhātu* consists of eighty-seven *dharmas*, including those that are *prajñapti*: the fifty-three *caitasikas* from *manaskāra* through *vitarka* and *vicāra*; the two types of *rūpa* included in *dharmadhātu* (*saṃvarāsaṃvarasaṃgṛhita* and *samādhigocara*); twenty-four *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*; and eight *asaṃskṛtas*. These *cittaviprayuktas* include the same fourteen that are found in the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* and *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*,[49] although in a different order, together with the ten causal *viprayuktas* peculiar to Yogācāra.[50]

[47]Jaini has found similarities between the last nine *viprayuktas* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* list and certain Vaiśeṣika categories, but he does not speculate about why these *dharmas* were introduced into the Yogācāra lists (Jaini 1959b: 537-538).

[48]Fukuhara refers to *chüan* 40 of Hsüan-tsang's translation, which is included in *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Fukuhara 1973: 241). However, I have been unable to locate the term *cittaviprayukta* either in this *chüan* or in the Sanskrit text, and I have found no other secondary sources that refer to a discussion of this subject in *BoBh*.

[49]See note above.

[50]*prāpti* (得), *asaṃjñāsamāpatti* (無想定), *nirodhasamāpatti* (滅盡定), *āsaṃjñika* (無想異熟) *jīvitendriya* (命根), *nikāyasabhāga* (衆同分), *pṛthagjanatva* (異生性), *jāti* (生), *jarā* (老), *sthiti* (住), *anityatā* (無常), *nāmakāya* (名身), *padakāya* (句身), *vyañjanakāya* (文身), as well as *pravṛtti* (流轉), *pratiniyama* (定異), *yoga* (相應), *jāva* (勢速), *anukrama* (次第), *kāla* (時), *deśa* (方), *saṃkhyā* (數), *sāmagrī* (和合), and *asāmagrī* (

Most of the remaining passages concern the provisional nature of the *viprayuktas*. In the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktabhūmimanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, a large number, but not the entire list, are examined in great detail (T. 1579: 585c-588c).[51] This section, which begins with a discussion of why the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are *prajñapti* and not *dravya*, contains the most complete and interesting definitions of the *viprayuktas* found in the Yogācāra literature, often with reference to *bījas*. Later in the same chapter, each of the twenty-four *cittaviprayuktas*, which are said to be states of the *skandhas*,[52] is defined simply and further divided into three types (T. 1579: 607a-608a). In the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, the twenty-four *viprayuktas*, as well as *vijñapti*, *avijñapti*, and *bīja*, are said to comprise a particular type of *prajñapti*.[53] Finally, the *Abhidharmamātṛkā* section of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* mentions the category of *cittaviprayukta* (T. 1579: 878c), and, referring to the *Manobhūmi*, describes the *cittaviprayuktas* as having one of the six types of provisional existence, provisional existence by way of being a state (*fen wei chia yu*, 分位假有 = *avasthāprajñapti*).[54]

In addition, another passage in the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktabhūmimanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 592c-593a) defines *asaṃjñisamāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti*, although not in the context of *cittaviprayuktas*. Here both of the *samāpattis* are said to have only provisional existence. Schmithausen says about the

不和合). The Sanskrit text includes neither the number nor the term *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, but Hsüan-tsang inserts the sentence 不相應行有二十四種 before the sublist (T. 1578: 293c). No definitions are given.

[51]A parallel passage can be found in *Chüeh ting tsang lun* (T. 1584: 1023a-1025b).

[52]問諸蘊分位有幾種。答有多種。謂得無想定等心不相應行。(T. 1579: 607a).

[53]又於有為諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身文身異生性。 和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數。 (T. 1579: 659a, perhaps commenting on *Maulībhūmi Cintāmayībhūmi* [T. 1579: 362a, where 假相有法 are discussed]).

[54]分位假有者。謂生等諸心不相應行。如前意地已標辯釋。即於諸行由依前後有及非有。同類異類相續文位假立生等。非此生等離諸行外有眞實體而別可得。(T. 1579: 879a).

definition of *nirodhasamāpatti* here that "the (traditional) definition of *nirodhasamāpatti* as cessation of mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) [in general, i.e. of all of them] is followed by the remark (once again by the compiler?) that what ceases is only the pravṛttivijñānas but not ālayavijñāna" (Schmithausen 1987: 271-272 n. 131).

There are several other Yogācāra texts that generally follow the *Yogācārabhūmi* treatment of *cittaviprayuktas*. The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (T. 1602: 484a-b)[55] and the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* (T. 1614: 855c) contain the same lists of twenty-four *cittaviprayuktas* as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, while the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* lists twenty-three, omitting *asāmagrī* (*AS*: 19).[56] The *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* does not define the individual *dharmas*, but the definitions found in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* are often almost identical, especially those of the *viprayuktas* from *pravṛtti* to *sāmagrī*.[57] The definitions in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, although only the

[55]In Hsüan-tsang's translation, the list of *viprayuktas* that precedes their definitions is ended by the phrase 復有諸餘如是種類差別。(T. 1602: 484a). However, we must be skeptical about whether this isn't Hsüan-tsang's own contribution (see above, section A2, as well as the following note).

[56]In his commentary on *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun*, P'u-kuang offers two explanations for the absence of *asāmagrī* in *AS*. According to the first explanation, the word "et cetera" (等), which follows *sāmagrī* in Hsüan-tsang's translation (but is found in neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation), should be understood to include *asāmagrī*. According to the second, *asāmagrī* is omitted in the interest of brevity because it really is included in *pṛthagjanatva*, which is equivalent to *aprāpti* of the *āryamārga* (何故對法論有二十三無不和合。此有何意。一解云。對法論云和合等者。論既言和合等。當知則等取不和合。又一解云。略故不說。問曰。等略何故不略餘數但略不和合耶。解云。已說在所說中。所以但偏略不和合性也。言說在所說中者。謂異生性是見道煩惱。可建立。望聖道有不得義故。即是不和合義。不和合中略擧隅。餘不和合類亦知。所以偏略不和合性。(T. 1837: 60a).

[57]There are some differences between *Hyscl* and *AS*. In *Hyscl*, *pṛthagjanatva* occurs after *nikāyasabhāga* and before the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, while in *AS* it occurs after *vyañjanakāya* and before *pravṛtti*. The definition of *prāpti* in *Hyscl* contains a reference to *bījas*, while that in *AS* does not. And the definitions of *pṛthagjanatva* are different: *Hyscl* describes two types, the ignorant nature of beings, which has no beginning, and the nature of all false paths other than the Buddha's (異生性者。此有種。一愚夫異生性。二無聞異生性。愚夫異生性者。謂無始世来有情身中愚夫之性。無聞異者。謂如来法外諸耶道性。-- T. 1602: 484b); *AS* simply defines it as non-obtainment of the *āryadharmas* (*pṛthagjanatvaṃ katamat/ āryadharmānām apratilambhe pṛthagjanatvam iti prajñaptiḥ* -- *AS*: 19).

first fourteen *viprayuktas* are included, generally agree with the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun.* Regarding these three texts, we can say that the definitions of the first fourteen *viprayuktas* in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* generally give the impression of being most directly taken from the definitions in the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage mentioned above (T. 1579: 607a-608a), which themselves seem to be based on the much longer definitions in the first passage (T. 1579: 585c-588c). This is most strikingly true in the case of *prāpti*.[58] The definitions of the *viprayuktas* from *pravṛtti* to *anukrama* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya, Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, and the second passage from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* are almost identical, while those of the remaining *dharmas* differ somewhat from text to text.

2. The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* on the *Viprayuktas*

The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, after commenting on many of Asaṅga's definitions of individual *viprayuktasaṃskāras*, provides its own explanation of the category as a whole and its provisional nature. This serves as a summary of the contents of the passages that will be discussed below, and so I shall translate it in full:

"These *cittaviprayuktas*, because they are designations of states of conditioned *dharmas*,[59] are all to be understood as being [only] provisionally real. Among them, one

[58]Compare:

(*AS*) *prāptiḥ katamā/ kuśalākuśalānāṃ* (Tibetan and Chinese both add *avyākṛtānāṃ*) *dharmānāṃ sācayāpacaye prāptiḥ pratilambhaḥ samanvāgama iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 18);

(*Hyscl*) 得者。此復三種。一諸行種子所攝相續差別性。二自在生起相續差別性。三自相生起相續差別性。(T. 1602: 484a-b);

(*YBh*) 當知此得略有三種。一種子成就。二自在成就。三現行成就。This last is later defined as follows:若現在諸法自相現前轉。名現行成就。(T. 1579: 587a);

(*Pañcaskandhaka*) 云何為得。謂若獲若成就。種復三種。謂若種子若自在若現在前。如其所應。(T. 1612: 849c).

[59]*Avasthāprajñapti* is mentioned in *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* as the fifth of six types of provisional existence (又此假有略有六種。一衆集假有。二因假有。三果假有。四

[*prāpti*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of the increase or decrease of good, bad, etc. Three [*asaṃjñikasamāpatti, nirodhasamāpatti,* and *āsaṃjñika*] are [designations] for the state consisting of the non-arising of *citta* and the *caitasikas*. One [*jīvitendriya*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of continued existence. One [*nikāyasabhāga*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of similarity. Four [*jāti, jarā, sthiti,* and *anityatā*] are [designations] for the state consisting of the characteristics [of conditioned existence]. Three [*nāmakāya, padakāya,* and *vyañjanakāya*] are [designations] for the state consisting of discourse. One [*pṛthagjanatva*] is [a designation] for the state consisting of the non-obtaining [of the *āryadharmas*]. The remainder [from *pravṛtti* through *sāmagrī*] are [designations] for the state consisting of cause and result. Moreover, cause and result is to be understood as all of conditioned existence: when something else arises due to a certain thing, [that thing] is a cause; when a certain thing arises due to something else, [that thing] is a result."[60]

As we can see from this passage, there is really no clear-cut distinction between the last nine *viprayuktas*, which are specified as designations for the state of cause and result, and many of the other *viprayuktas*, most obviously *prāpti*, the *saṃskṛtalakaṣaṇas*, and *pṛthagjanatava*. All of them are descriptions of certain aspects of how the causal process works, and as the *Bhāṣya* suggests, the causal process and conditioned existence are identical. The Sautrāntika/Yogācāra[61] criticism of many of the Sarvāstivādin

所行假有。五分位假有。六觀持假有。-- T. 1579: 878c) and is defined as consisting of the *viprayuktasaṃskāras* (see note above). This portion of *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* is late.

[60]*ity evam ete cittaviprayuktāḥ saṃskārāṇāṃ dharmāṇām avasthāsu prajñapanāt sarve prajñaptisanto veditavyāḥ/ tatra kuśalākuśalādyā*[sic]*cayāpacayāvasthāyām ekaḥ/ cittacaitasikāpravṛttyavasthāyāṃ trayaḥ/ sthityavasthāyām ekaḥ/ sādṛśyāvasthāyām ekaḥ/ lakṣaṇāvasthāyāṃ catvāraḥ/ vyavahārāvasthāyāṃ trayaḥ/ alābhāvasthāyām ekaḥ/ hetuphalāvasthāyāṃ śeṣā iti/ hetuphalaṃ punar atra sarvaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ veditavyam/ tato 'nyasyotpādād hetuḥ/ anyatas tadutpādāt phalam iti* (*ASBh*: 11).

[61]In an early but very important article on the Darṣṭāntika and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, Mizuno Kōgen was the first to establish the affinity among the criticisms of the *viprayuktas* by the Dārṣṭāntika, Harivarman, and Vasubandhu; furthermore, he stated that the Yogācāra school relied on the Dārṣṭāntika's opinion that the *viprayuktas* are merely *prajñapti* (Mizuno 1930: 145). However, he did not discuss the explanations of some *viprayuktas* in terms

cittaviprayuktas is based on a refutation of the overly mechanistic Sarvāstivādin explanation of these aspects. By "mechanistic," I mean that Sarvāstivāda has found it necessary to posit entities or forces to explain causal phenomena. Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, on the other hand, believe that these phenomena come about due to the very nature of conditioned existence. *Viprayuktas* such as *prāpti* are maintained as descriptions of phenomena but are no longer considered their causes, while *pravṛtti*, etc., are added to turn the Yogācāra interpretation of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* into an extensive discussion of causality.

As a result, it is not surprising that we should find material from other Yogācāra explanations of causality, for example, from expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda*, *bīja* theory, and the ten-*hetu* system, in the *cittaviprayukta* sections of texts such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*. In the following sections, I shall focus on the relationship between the definitions of the individual *viprayuktas* and these other expositions of causality.

3. Yogācāra interpretations of Sarvāstivādin *Viprayuktas*

As I said above, it seems that the first passage from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, although not a complete enumeration, is our earliest[62] Yogācāra exposition of the *cittaviprayuktas*.[63] Moreover, it is certainly the most explicit source of information about

of *bīja*, which are found in *YBh* and *AKBh* and which will be the subject of much of the following.

[62]This is in accord with Mizuno's opinion that the *YBh* originally did not posit a definite number of *viprayuktas*; the example he gives is our first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, which omits *asaṃjñikasamāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, and *āsaṃjñika*, as well as *deśa* and *asāmagrī* (he mistakenly says that it also omits *sāmagrī*). Later, he says, the number was fixed, and he gives the *Manobhūmi* and second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passages as examples (Mizuno 1956: 58).

[63]However, the separate existence of the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is denied as early as *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which, in a passage referred to by Fukuhara (1973: 263), maintains that they are nothing other than the *saṃskṛtadharmas* themselves (*tatra bodhisattvaḥ saṃskāra-mātraṃ sthāpayitvā na tasya jātiṃ na sthitiṃ na jarām nānityatāṃ sarva-kālaṃ dravya-svabhāva-parinispattitaḥ paśyati. tat kasya hetoḥ. saṃskāra-mātram utpadyamānam

the *dharmas* peculiar to Yogācāra as well as about the specifically Yogācāra interpretation of *cittaviprayuktas* that belong equally to the Sarvāstivādin list. Before I examine the group of the last ten *viprayuktas*, I shall discuss some of these reinterpretations in which the term *bīja* appears. These definitions are of particular interest to me because they contain many of the arguments adduced by Vasubandhu in his so-called "Sautrāntika" criticism of the Sarvāstivādin *viprayuktas*. Significantly, although some of these arguments can also be traced to the Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika tradition, a number of them seem to have originated in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

a. *Jāti*

The first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage begins by denying the real existence of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and granting them only provisional status. The text makes a number of arguments against the ultimate existence of *jāti*, several of which I shall mention briefly. The first of these is based on a denial of the real existence of the three times that immediately precedes the discussion of the *lakṣaṇas*.[64] Once the separate existence of the future *saṃskāras* themselves has been rejected, the real existence of *jāti*, which pertains to the future, must also be rejected.[65] This argument foreshadows one of Vasubandhu's

upalabhate nāsyānyāṃ jātiṃ na sthitiṃ na jarām nānityatām -- *BoBh*: 279; T. 1579: 544b).

[64]According to this passage, the past is a designation of the stream of *bījas* that have already produced results. The future refers to the stream of future *bījas* that have not yet produced results, while the present refers to the stream of present *bījas* that have not yet produced results (*bcom ldan 'das kyis khams 'das pa yaṅ yod de/ khams ma 'oṅs pa yaṅ yod do źes gaṅ gsuṅs pa 'de la gdoṅs pa gaṅ yin źe na/ sa bon gyi rgyun 'bras bu bskyed zin ba ni khams 'das pa źes bya'o/ sa bon gyi rgyun 'byuṅ ba 'bras bu ma bskyed pa ni khams ma 'oṅs pa źes bya'o/ da ltar sa bon gyi rgyun 'bras bu ma skyed pa ni khams da ltar byuṅ ba źes bya'o* -- *YBh*$_t$: zi 21a 7-8; 問如世尊言。有過去界有未来界有現在界。此何密意。答若已與果種子相續。名過去界。若未與果當来種子相續。名未来界。若未與未果現在種子相續。名現在界。-- T. 1579: 585c).

[65]*'di ltar ma oṅs pa'i skye ba ni med pa yin pas ji ltar gźan skyed par 'gyur la/ da ltar gyi skyes bas ni da ltar gyi 'du byed skyed pa mi nus pa'i phyir ro* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 21b 2-3). 未来世生自無所有。云何能生所餘諸行。亦非現在生能生現在諸行。(T. 1579:

criticisms of the Sarvāstivādin position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*,[66] and a similar objection is also raised in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*.[67] Another argument is that all *dharmas* are caused by their own *bījas*; hence there is no need for an entity called *jāti* to produce them.[68] Finally, the text asks whether *jāti* is the actualization of the *saṃskṛtadharmas* or the cause of their actualization. If it is their actualization, then *jāti* actualizes the *saṃskṛtas*; however, it does not make sense to say that *saṃskṛtas* are actualized due simply to the presence of *jāti*.[69] If on the other hand *jāti* is the cause of actualization, then for each *saṃskṛtadharma* there must be two *jātis*, one that actualizes and one that is actualization, and this also is illogical.[70] The reasoning here seems to resemble the

585c).

[66] *eko dharmaḥ ekasminn eva kāle jātaḥ sthito jīrṇo naṣṭaḥ syād eṣāṃ sahabhūtvāt/ kāritrakālabhedāt/ anāgatā hi jātiḥ kāritraṃ hi karoti/ yasmān na jātaṃ janyate janite tu dharme vartamānāḥ kṣityādayaḥ kāritraṃ kurvantīti na yadā jāyate tadā tiṣṭhati jīryati vinaśyati vā/ idaṃ tāvad iha saṃpradhāryaṃ bhavet/ kim anāgataṃ dravyato 'sti nāstīti paścāj janayati vā na veti sidhyet/ saty api tu tasmin jātiḥ kāritraṃ kurvatī katham anāgatā sidhyatīty anāgatalakṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam/ uparatakāritrā cotpannā kathaṃ vartamānā sidhyatīti vartamānalakṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam* (*AKBh*: 78; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 231-232).

[67]生名為有。寧在未來。(T. 1585: 6a; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 66; *Shindō*: 52).

[68]*gźan yaṅ raṅ gi sa bon gyi rgyu so sor ṅes pa daṅ ldan pa'i chos thams cad la skye par byed pa'i skye ba gźan brtags pas ci źig bya* (YBh_t: zi 21b 6-7).又一切法客客別有自種子因。何須計有異生能生。(T. 1579: 585c).

[69]*gźan yaṅ skye ba 'du byed rnams kyi mṅon par 'grub pa tsam źig gam/ on te mṅon par 'grub pa'i rgyur 'gyur ba źig yin/ re źig gal te mṅon par 'grub pa tsam źig yin na ni/ skye ba 'du byed rnams mṅon par 'grub par byed pa yin te/ skye ba yod na mṅon par 'grub par 'gyur ro źes bya ba mi ruṅ ṅo* (YBh_t: zi 21b 7-8). 又此生相為即諸行生耶。為是諸行生因耶。若即諸行生者。計此生相能生諸行由有生故諸行得生。不應道理。(T. 1579: 585c). This argument seems to be reflected in Vasubandhu's objection in *AKBh* to the effect that, if future *jāti* produces the future *dharma* that it is supposed to produce, all future *dharmas* will be produced simultaneously. The Sarvāstivādin answer to this is that all the causes and conditions of production must also come together for a *dharma* to be produced. (*api ca yady anāgatā jātir janyasya janikā kim arthaṃ sarvam anāgataṃ yugapan notpadyate/ yasmāt janyasya janikā jātir na hetupratyayair vinā na hi vinā hetupratyayasāmagryā jātir janikā bhavati* -- *AKBh*: 79; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 234). See the discussion of *sāmagrī* below.

[70]*gal te skye ba 'du byed rnams kyi mṅon par 'grub pa'i rgyu yin na ni/ des na 'du byed gcig la mṅon par 'grub par byed pa daṅ/ mṅon par 'grub pa'i skye ba gñis 'byuṅ bar 'gyur te mi ruṅ ṅo* (YBh_t: zi 21b 8-22a 1). 若是諸行生因者。諸行生時於一一行便有二生。謂生能生。不應道理。(T. 1579: 585c). See La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1:

argument of infinite regress raised by Vasubandhu against the *anulakṣaṇas*, *jātijāti*, etc.[71]

After stating that the other *lakṣaṇas* can be similarly criticized, the text concludes that they are, therefore, all designations for the *saṃskṛtadharmas* themselves.[72] When, due to causes, formerly non-existent *saṃskṛtadharmas* arise, this is called *jāti*. When the *saṃskṛtadharmas* that arise later are different from the earlier ones, this is called *jarā*. When these *saṃskṛtadharmas*, having been produced, persist for a limited time, this is called *sthiti*. And when, after the moment of production, the characteristics of these *saṃskṛtadharmas* are destroyed, this is called *nirodha* or *anityatā*.[73]

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*'s arguments against the real existence of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* seem somewhat truncated and are difficult to follow; nevertheless, in them one can recognize a number of general ideas that are expressed much more fully and systematically by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Furthermore, its explanation that they are designations for the *saṃskṛtadharmas* is perfectly clear and is obviously reflected in Vasubandhu's statement of his own position, particularly in the second of

224-225; Jaini 1959b: 543.

[71]*teṣām api nāma jātyādīnāṃ saṃskṛtatvād anyair jātyādibhir bhavitavyam/ bhavanty eva/ jātijātyādayas teṣāṃ teṣām api catvāry anulakṣaṇāni bhavanti/ jātijātiḥ sthitisthitiḥ jarājarā anityatā 'nityatā iti/ nanu caikasyaikasya caturlakṣaṇ*[sic]*ī prāpnoti aparyavasānadoṣaś ca/ teṣāṃ punaranyajātyādiprasaṅgāt* (*AKBh*: 76; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 224).

[72]This conclusion is the same as that of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: see note above.

[73]*de lta bas na skye ba la sogs pa yaṅ 'du byed rnams la* [*bta*]*gs pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o/ de la rgyu yod na raṅ gi mtshan ñid sṅon ma byuṅ ba 'grub pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi skye ba źes bya'o/ sṅa ma las phyi ma gźan ñid du gźan du 'gyur ba ñid ni 'du byed rnams kyi rga ba źes bya'o/ skye ba'i 'dus tsam la gnas pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi gnas pa źes bya ste/ de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed rnams kyi 'jig pa źes bya'o* (*YBh*ₜ: zi 22a 2-4). 又此生相為即諸行生耶。為是諸行生因耶。若即諸行生者。計此生相能生諸行由有生故諸行得生。不應道理。若是諸行生因者。諸行生時於一一便有二生。謂生能生。不應道理。如生如是。老住無常由此道理如應當知。故知生等於諸行中假施設。有由有因故諸行非本自相始起說名為生。後起諸行與前差別說名為老。即彼諸行生位暫停說名為住。生剎那後諸行相盡說名為滅。亦名無常。(T. 1579: 585c). Compare with *Cwsl*: 然有為法因緣力故。本無今有。暫有還無。表異無為假立四相。本無今有。有位名生。生位暫停即說為住。住別前後復立異名。暫有還無。無時名滅。(*Shindō*: 52; T. 1585: 6a; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 66-67).

three verses that he composes to support his argument: "*Jāti* is existence that has not existed before; *sthiti* is the series; destruction (=*anityatā*) is the cutting off [of the series]; the change in state of *sthiti* (=*jarā*) is intended to be the difference between the earlier and later [moments of] the series."[74]

Katō Junshō suggests that Harivarman, the "Sthavira" of the *Nyāyānusāra*, and Vasubandhu all rely on the Dārṣṭāntika of the *Vibhāṣā* in their criticisms of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* (Katō 1989: 308). It is certainly true that the arguments of all four are similar. According to the *Nyāyānusāra*, it is the Sthavira's opinion that Vasubandhu quotes in the first of the three verses in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* mentioned in the preceding paragraph: The stream of *saṃskṛtadharmas* is called *jāti* when it arises, *vyaya* when it is destroyed, and *sthiti* while it proceeds; the difference between earlier and later moments is called *sthityanyathātva*.[75]

Harivarman says that *jāti* is equivalent to the *skandhas* in the present world, *vyaya*[76] (=*anityatā*) to their abandonment of the present world, *sthiti* to the fact that they continue, and *sthityanyathātva* to the fact that their continuance changes.[77] They are not separate *dharmas*. Furthermore, *jāti* cannot be a *dharma*; according to the principle that all

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[74]*jātir apūrvo bhāvaḥ sthitiḥ prabandho vyayas taducchedaḥ/ sthityanyathātvam iṣṭaṃ prabandhapūrvāparaviśeṣa iti* (*AKBh*: 77; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 228, where the reconstruction of the Sanskrit is slightly inaccurate).

[75]諸行相續。初起名生。終盡位中。說名為滅。中間相續隨轉名住。此前後別。名為住異。(T. 1562: 407c; Katō 1989: 306; Cox 1983: 273). The Sanskrit as found in *AKBh* is as follows: *jātir ādiḥ pravāhasya vyayaś chedaḥ sthitis tu saḥ/ sthityanyathātvaṃ tasyaiva pūrvāparaviśiṣṭatā* (*AKBh*: 77; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 228, where the reconstruction of the Sanskrit is again slightly inaccurate).

[76]This is the Sanskrit equivalent of 滅 according to Katsura (1974: 86).

[77]生者五陰在現在世名生。捨現在世名滅。相續故住。是住變故名為住異。(T. 1646: 289b; Katō 1989: 304-305). Katō points out the similarity between this position and one attributed in the *Vibhāṣā* to the 經部師, whom he identifies (Katō 1989: 119) as being earlier than the Sautrāntikas generally familiar to us :或有執。色等五蘊。出胎時名生。相續時名住。衰變時名異。命終時名滅。如經部師。(T. 1545: 198a; Cox 1983: 273 n. 54). But he suggests the possibility that Hsüan-tsang altered the original of the *Vibhāṣā*, perhaps on the basis of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (Katō 1989: 304-305).

dharmas arise due to the conjunction of a number of conditions, no one *dharma* (*jāti*) can produce another *dharma* (any of the *saṃskṛtadharmas* in this case).[78]

Finally, the Dārṣṭāntika is represented by the *Vibhāṣā* as denying the reality of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*.[79] He is also said to reject the simultaneous presence of the three[80] *lakṣaṇas*, saying that the arising of all *dharmas* is called *jāti*, their subsequent destruction is called *vyaya*, and their maturing is called *jarā*.[81]

The four texts examined by Katō share the same conclusion as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, namely that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are designations for the *saṃskṛtadharmas* at different points in their careers. They all suggest that the principle of conditioned origination is sufficient to explain the progression of the *saṃskṛtas* from their initial production to their final destruction without the intervention of other *dharmas*.[82] Furthermore, both the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*[83] and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*,[84] while omitting their

[78]非別有法名生住滅。又佛法深義謂衆縁和合有諸法生。是故無法能生異法。(T. 1646: 289b; Katō 1989: 304).

[79]譬有者説生等諸相體非實有。(T. 1545: 198c; Katō 1989: 303).

[80]In some texts, only three *lakṣaṇas* are mentioned.

[81]謂或有執三有為相非一刹那。如譬喩者彼作是説。若一刹那有三相者。則應一法一時亦生亦老亦滅。然無此理互相違故。應説諸法初起名生。後盡名滅。中熟名老。(T. 1545: 200a; Katō 1989: 303).

[82]Vasubandhu makes this criticism explicitly in his comment on *AK* II 46c-d. The objection (Cox points out that, according to P'u-kuang, this is not Vasubandhu's objection -- Cox 1983: 313 n. 126; T. 1821: 107a) is anticipated that future *jāti* would produce all future *dharmas* at the same time (*api ca yady anāgatā jātir janyasya janikā kim arthaṃ sarvam anāgataṃ yugapan notpatyate*). The verse gives the Sarvāstivādin response, namely that production does not occur without causes and conditions, that is to say, according to the *Bhāṣya*, without the totality of causes and conditions (*janyasya janikā jātir na hetupratyayair vinā na hi vinā hetupratyayasāmagryā jātir janikā bhavati*). Vasubandhu then attacks, saying that only causes and conditions have the power to produce; *jāti* is unnecessary (*hetupratyayānām eva tarhi sāmarthyaṃ paśyāmaḥ/ sati sāmagrye bhāvād asati cābhāvān na jāter iti hetupratyayā eva janakāḥ santaḥ* -- *AKBh*: 79; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 234-235; see also the extensive discussion of this issue in *Nyāyānusāra* [T. 1562: 411a-b; Cox 1983: 312-320]). I shall discuss below the possible relation between Vasubandhu's *sāmagrī/sāmagryam* and the Yogācāra *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, *sāmagrī*.

[83]生者。謂諸行自相發起性。老者。謂諸前後變異性。住者。謂諸行生時相續　不斷性。無常者。謂諸行自相生後滅壞性。(T. 1602: 484b).

reasons for denying the reality of the *lakṣaṇas*, come to the same conclusions, as does the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*, which includes its reasons in full.[85] However, unlike these three openly Yogācāra texts, not to mention Katō's four sources, only the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* refers to *bīja* in its criticism of the Sarvāstivādin *dharma*, *jāti*.

It is difficult to trace the relationships among the various texts in this case. I have argued that in several places Vasubandhu rejects the Dārṣṭāntika-Harivarman-Śrīlāta position in favor of that of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but here the Darṣṭāntika and Yogācāra texts are essentially in agreement. Jaini has identified Vasubandhu's three main arguments against the real existence of the *lakṣaṇas*: "(1) they cannot simultaneously work upon a momentary (*kṣaṇika*) dharma; (2) the theory of *upa-lakṣaṇa*[86] results in the fallacy of regress; (3) the term *saṃskṛta* in the sūtra quoted by the Vaibhāṣikas does not refer to a momentary dharma but to a series of them (*pravāha*)" (Jaini 1959b: 543). Of these, the first is most obviously similar to the Dārṣṭāntika argument mentioned in the *Vibhāṣā*. The second, although it originated early,[87] is not attributed by the *Vibhāṣā* to the Dārṣṭāntika or by the *Nyāyānusāra* to Śrīlāta. On the other hand, it seems at least related to the last argument in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. As for the third, Vasubandhu's argument is closest to the Sthavira's as represented in the *Nyāyānusāra*; however, all of these texts, at least implicitly, take the *lakṣaṇas* to operate in the stream or the personality, rather than on an individual *dharma*.

Clearly, Vasubandhu essentially agrees with the Dārṣṭāntika position. However,

[84]*jāti katamā/ nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇām abhūtvā bhāve jātir iti prajñaptiḥ// jarā katamā/ nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhānyathātve jareti prajñaptiḥ// sthitiḥ katamā/ nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhāvipraṇāśe sthitir iti prajñaptiḥ// anityatā katamā/ nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhavināśe 'nityateti prajñaptiḥ//* (*AS*: 18-19).

[85]T. 1585: 5b-6a; *Shindō*: 51-53; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 64-68.

[86]Jaini is clearly thinking of the *anulakṣaṇas* here.

[87]See, for example, the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 200c; cited in Cox 1983: 253 n. 22) and the *Madhyamakaśāstra* (Chapter Seven, verses 1 ff.; cited in La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 224 n. 3).

his arguments cannot be traced solely to the Dārṣṭāntika tradition, and it is possible that he was influenced by the *Yogācārabhūmi* as well.[88] In any case, the Dārṣṭāntika and the *Yogācārabhūmi* are equally opposed to Sarvāstivāda here and for largely similar reasons.

b. *Prāpti*

As it does in the case of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* explains in detail the reasons for denying the real existence of *prāpti*. If *prāpti* is real, it must be the cause of the arising of all *saṃskṛtadharmas* as well as the cause of the non-loss of all *dharmas*.[89] The text first denies that *prāpti* can be the cause of the arising of the *saṃskṛtadharmas*. The argument is not completely clear to me, but I think the point is that *prāpti* itself, being a *saṃskṛtadharma*, would have to be the cause of its own arising, which it cannot be since it must have been nonexistent prior to its arising.[90] It cannot be the cause of the non-loss of all *dharmas* because if it were, the *prāptis* of all good, bad, and neutral *dharmas* would be present simultaneously, and morally contradictory *dharmas* would arise simultaneously. Therefore, the two functions of *prāpti* are both illogical.[91]

[88]With regard to the relationship between *YBh* and Harivarman, a comparison of their respective lists of *viprayuktasaṃskāras* shows that, while *YBh* includes *pṛthagjanatva* instead of *aprāpti* (see note above), the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* includes both *pṛthagjanatva* and *aprāpti* (T. 1646: 289a; Katsura 1974: 86). If the *YBh* actually relies on *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* for its criticism of the reality of the *viprayuktas*, it is hard to explain why it seems to follow *Abhidharmahṛdaya* in including only *pṛthagjanatva*; furthermore, it also omits *anyathātva* (異).

[89]*gal te 'thob pa rdzas su yod par gyur na/ de 'du byed rnams kyi 'byuṅ ba'i rgyu 'am/ yaṅ na chos daṅ mi 'bral ba'i rgyur 'gyur graṅ na* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 24b 8-25a 1). 此為是諸行生因。為是諸法不離散因。(T. 1579: 586c).

[90]*gal te 'du byed rnams 'byuṅ ba'i rgyur gyur na ni/ des na ji srid du chos de thob par ma gyur pa'i sṅa rol na de'i 'byuṅ ba'i rgyu thob pa med pas nam yaṅ 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur te/ de lta na de gtan mi 'thab* [=*thob*?] *pa ñid du 'gyur ro* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 25a 1-25a 2). 若是諸行生因者。若從先未未得此法。此既無有生因之得。應常不生。由此亦應畢竟不得。 (T. 1579: 586c).

[91]*gal te chos daṅ mi 'bral ba'i rgyur 'gyur na ni des na dge ba daṅ mi dge ba daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa'i chos de dag thams cad kyi 'thob pa mgo mñam du yod pas/ mi mthun*

The first of these arguments presages the second of Vasubandhu's three criticisms of *prāpti* as the cause of production of *dharmas*.[92] The second anticipates Saṃghabhadra's rejoinder to Vasubandhu that *prāpti* is not the cause of production but is rather the cause of *dharmas*' not being lost.[93]

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* then gives its own explanation of the reality behind the notion of *prāpti*, presumably in accordance with the system of seed causality expounded earlier in the chapter:[94] it states that the cause of the production of any *dharma* is really that *dharma*'s own *bīja*.[95] Furthermore, the cause of non-loss is really simply the fact that the reason that some conditions are lost is that other conditions become present.[96] In other words, if I understand correctly, non-loss refers to the replacement of past *dharmas* by present *dharmas* of the same sort. This replacement, moreover, is in accord with the principle of conditioned origination and does not require a separate *dharma* to effect it.[97]

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pa de dag kyaṅ mgo mñam du kun 'byuṅ bar 'gyur te/ de lta bas na gñi ga yaṅ mi ruṅ ṅo (*YBh*$_t$: zi 25a 2-25a 3). 若是諸法不離散因諸。一切善不善無記法得既俱有。彼雖相違應頓現行。是故二種俱不應理。(T. 1579: 587a).

[92] *utpattihetur dharmāṇāṃ prāptir iti cet/* (1) *asaṃskṛtasya na syāt/* (2) *ye ca dharmā aprāptā* (3) *ye ca tyāktā bhūmisaṃcāravairāgyatas teṣāṃ katham utpattiḥ syāt* (*AKBh*: 63; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 182-183; Cox 1983: 54. Numbers are mine). Yaśomitra explains: *ye ca dharmā aprāptā* as referring to *duḥkhe dharma-jñāna-kṣānty-ādayaḥ* (*AKVy*: 145-146; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 182 n. 2), but Cox gives the example of "insentient objects" (Cox 1983: 115 n. 24).

[93] 執有別物。是為非理。此定不然。非非理故。由所計得是已得法不失因故。(T. 1582: 397b; Cox 1983: 54, 115). Yaśomitra criticizes Saṃghabhadra's position, saying that, if *prāpti* were the cause of the non-loss of *dharmas*, it would be impossible to get rid of any *dharma* that one has acquired (*yadi ca pratilabdha-dharmāvipraṇāśa-kāraṇaṃ prāptir iṣyate. prāpti-parityāgo naiva syāt. bhavati ca. tasmād akāraṇam etat* (*AKVy*: 148).

[94] Beginning with *YBh*$_t$: zi 15b 5 (T. 1579: 583b); see Schmithausen 1987: 21, 64, 271 n. 131, 286 n. 172.

[95] *chos rnams kyi 'byuṅ ba'i rgyu ni so sor ṅes pa'i rkyen gyis raṅ gi sa bon yoṅs su zin pa'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 25a 3). 又生因者。所謂客別緣所攝受諸法自種。(T. 1579: 587a).

[96] *bral ba'i rgyu ni rkyen gźan mṅon du gyur pas rkyen gźan daṅ 'bral ba'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 25a 3-4). 不離散因者。謂由餘緣現在前故餘緣離散。(T. 1579: 587a).

[97] I think that similar reasoning is behind the *CwsI*'s denial of *prāpti* as the cause of non-loss: 若得於法是不失因。有情由此成就彼故。諸可成法不離有情。若離有

Having explained that *prāpti* is not a separate entity but simply a term that describes certain operations of causes and conditions, the text defines three types, namely *bījasamanvāgama*, *vaśitvasamanvāgama*, and *samudācārasamanvāgama*.[98] *Bījasamanvāgama* consists of the *bījas* of *kliṣṭadharmas* that have not been destroyed by *śamatha*, of *avyākṛtadharmas*[99] that have not been permanently annihilated by the *āryamārga*, and of those *kuśaladharmas* that are inborn and not obtained by effort, as long as they have not been destroyed by false views, as in the case of one whose *kuśalamūlas* are destroyed.[100] *Vaśitvasamanvāgama* consists of the *bījas* of *kuśaladharmas* obtained by

情實不可得。故得於方俱為無用。得實無故。(T. 1585: 5a-b; *Shindō*: 37). La Vallée Poussin, relying heavily on K'uei-chi's commentary, translates as follows: "Il réplique: La Prāpti est la cause qui fait qu'on ne perd pas les Dharmas, car c'est par la vertu de la Prāpti qu'un Pudgala rest 'muni' des Dharmas une fois possédés [même quand ces Dharmas ne sont pas présents et jusqu'au moment où la Prāpti est rompue.]

Observons qu'on n'est jamais sans les Dharmas dont il est possible d'être 'muni', c'est-à-dire sans les Dharmas actuellement présents et sans la Bhūtatathatā. Les Dhārmas sand lesquels on peut être ne sont pas rélement susceptibles d'être possédés (*prāp*): il s'agit des Dharmas passés et futurs, qui n'existent pas. Par conséquent, que l'on considère les Dharmas qui 'quittent' ou ceux qui ne 'quittent' pas, la Prāpti est sans utilité" (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 56-57).

[98]*sa bon daṅ ldan pa, dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa,* and *kun tu 'byuṅ bar ldan pa* (種子成就, 自在成就, and 現在成就). The Sanskrit equivalents are suggested by La Vallée Poussin (1928: 57). In this case, *prāpti* and *samanvāgama* seem to be interchangeable (see note to section c1, which contains the *Pañcaskandhaka* definition of *prāpti*, according to which *samanvāgama* and *prāpti* are synonymous). Mizuno mentions this definition as an example of the way in which the Yogācāra school adds its own theories of *bīja* or *ālayavijñāna* to material that it has "inherited" from Sarvāstivāda or the Sautrāntikas (Mizuno 1956: 57-58). However, I do not think that he does justice to the Yogācāra *viprayukta* exposition when he represents it as simple accretion; rather, it appears to me to be a radical and systematic reinterpretation of the *viprayuktas*. In any case, Mizuno is wary of the question of the Yogācāra definitions of the Sarvāstivādin *viprayuktas*: he says that it is trouble that he does not want to touch (p. 58), and he quickly moves on to a simple description of the group beginning with *pravṛtti*.

[99]According to La Vallée Poussin, these are *upapattilābhika* (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 57 n. 2).

[100]*thob pa de yaṅ mdor bsdu na rnam pa gsum du rig par bya'o/ sa bon daṅ ldan pa daṅ/ dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa daṅ/ kun tu 'byuṅ bar ldan pa'o/ de la re źig ñon moṅs pa can daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa daṅ/ skyes nas thob pa'i chos ma btsal bar kun tu 'byuṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de dag ni sa bon re źig gi gnas kyi ñams pas kyaṅ ñams par ma byas la/ 'phags pa'i lam gyis kyaṅ ya[ṅ] dag par ma bcom pa daṅ/ dge ba rnams kyi yaṅ 'di lta ste/ dper na dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu bcad pa rnams kyi ltar log par lta bas ñams par ma byas pa gaṅ yin pa de ni sa bon daṅ ldan pa źes bya ste* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 25a 5-7). 當知此得略有三種。一種子成就。

effort and of some[101] *avyākṛtadharmas*.[102] Finally, *samudācārasamanvāgama* consists of the activity of actualized, present *dharmas*.[103] La Vallée Poussin points out that the three types of *samanvāgama* mentioned in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* are drawn from our *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage. He also says that, although the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not mention three types, its general explanation of *prāpti* is similar to that of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*. However, he does not speculate on the relationship between the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.*

To me, a close comparison of the passage summarized above with the corresponding section of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*[104] strongly suggests that Vasubandhu follows the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, at least in his assertion that what Sarvāstivāda explains by *prāpti* should really be understood in terms of *bīja*. Neither of the passages in the *Vibhāṣā* that describe the Dārṣṭāntika criticism of *samanvāgama* mentions *bīja* (T. 1545: 231b, 479a),

二自在成就。三現行成就。若所有染污法諸無記法生得善法不由功用而現行者。彼諸種子若未奢摩他之所損伏。若未為聖道之所永害。若不為邪見損伏諸善如斷善根者。如是名為種子成就。(T. 1579: 587a).

[101]According to La Vallée Poussin, these are the *avyākṛtas* that are not *upapattilābhika* (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 57 n. 2).

[102]*dge ba'i chos mṅon par 'du bya bas bskyed pa rnams daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa de dag kha cig gi 'byuṅ ba'i rkyen gyis rgyu sa bon yoṅs su rtas pa yoṅs su zin pa ni dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa źes bya'o* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 25a 8-25b 1). 若加行所生善法。及一分無記法生緣所攝受增盛因種子。名自在成就。(T. 1579: 587a).

[103]*da ltar gyi chos rnams mṅon sum gyi dṅos bos raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis 'grub pa ni kun tu 'byuṅ ba daṅ ldan pa źes bya'o* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 25b 1-2). 若現在諸法自相現前轉。名現行成就。(T. 1579: 587a).

[104]*āśrayaviśeṣād etat siddhyate/ āśrayo hi sa āryāṇāṃ darśanabhāvanāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyāṇāṃ kleśānāṃ prarohasamartho bhavati/ ato 'gnidagdhavrīhivad abījibhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate/ upahatabījabhāve vā laukikena mārgeṇa/ viparyayād aprahīṇakleśaḥ/ yaś cāprahīṇas tena samanvāgato yaḥ prahīṇas tenāsamanvāgata iti prajñapyate/ kuśalā api dharmā dviprakārā ayatnabhāvino yatnabhāvinaś ca ye ta ucyante utpattipratilambhikāḥ prāyogikāś ceti/ tatrāyatnabhāvibhir āśrayasya tadbījabhāvānupaghātāt samanvāgata upaghātād asamanvāgata ucyate samucchinnakuśalamūlaḥ/ tasya tūpaghāto mithyādṛṣṭyā veditavyaḥ/ na tu khalu kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ bījabhāvasyātyantaṃ santatau samudghātaḥ/ ye punar yatnabhāvinas tair utpannais tadutpattir vaśitvāvighātāt santateḥ samanvāgata ucyate/ tasmād bījam evātrānapoddhṛtam anupahataṃ paripṛṣṭaṃ ca vaśitvakāle samanvāgamākhyāṃ labhate nānyad dravyam/* (*AKBh*: 63-64; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 183-185).

nor does Harivarman (T. 1646: 289a-b). On the other hand, in adducing the *Cakravartisūtra* as proof that the term *samanvāgama* is not used to indicate a real *dharma*, Vasubandhu seems to follow the Dārṣṭāntika of the *Vibhāṣā*.[105] Thus, as long as the Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika arguments and those found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* do not conflict, Vasubandhu seems to feel free to borrow from either tradition.

My observation that Vasubandhu relies on the *Yogācārabhūmi* for his *bīja* interpretation of *samanvāgama* is compatible with Yamabe's suggestion that the discussion of *bīja* that follows immediately after[106] the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī viprayukta*[107] passage is one of the sources of Vasubandhu's definition of *bīja*[108] (Yamabe 1990). However, it

[105]Compare with *AKBh*: 63 (*tena tarhi asattvākhyair api samanvāgamaḥ prāpnoti parasattvaiś ca/ kiṃ kāraṇam/ sūtravācanāt/ rājā bhikṣavaś cakravartī saptabhī ratnaiḥ samanvāgata iti vistaraḥ*) with T. 1545 (*Vbh*): 479a (答彼依契經故作是執。謂契經說轉輪王成就七寶。etc.). See also T. 1545: 796b for the same argument; these passages are pointed out by Katō (1989: 303). Both passages contain long explanations of why the Dārṣṭāntikas (according to *KIK* [Bidon-bu 11: 241 n. 7], the older translation of *Vbh* attributes this position to Buddhadeva) reject *prāpti* as a real *dharma*, but neither contains any mention of *bīja*.

[106]Yamabe states that this discussion of *bīja* is found within the *viprayukta* section (Yamabe 1990: 14), thus suggesting that in *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, *bīja* is in fact a *viprayukta*. A possible justification for this opinion can be found in *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on *Cintāmayībhūmi*, where the distinction between the real and the provisional is analyzed at great length. According to this passage, all twenty-four *viprayuktas* except for *asaṃjñisamāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, and *āsaṃjñika*, as well as *bīja*, *vijñapti*, and *avijñapti*, are designations for the *saṃskṛtadharmas* (YBh_t: zi 208a 4-6; T. 1579: 659a; see Schmithausen 1987: 158, 454 n. 1016). However, it is clear that this passage is about *prajñapti*, and not exclusively the *viprayuktas*. Coming back to our original passage, we can say that *bīja*, like the *viprayuktas*, is simply a designation for the *saṃskṛtadharmas*; nevertheless, although the other *dharmas* mentioned are elsewhere (for example, in the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage) specifically called *cittaviprayuktas*, *bīja* is nowhere so defined in *YBh*.

[107]*de la sa bon gaṅ źe na/* [I have omitted the phrase *sa la* on the basis of the Derge (YBh_d: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 52, line 5)] *sa bon ni 'du byed rnams las logs źig na rdzas gźan med de/ 'du byed de ltar gyur pa daṅ de ltar byuṅ ba daṅ/ de ltar gnas pa de dag ñid la sa bon źes bya bar zad de/ 'bras bu źes kyaṅ bya'o* (YBh_t: 29b 1-2; Yamabe 1990: 14). 復次種子云何非析諸行別有實物名為種子。亦非餘處。然即諸行如是種性如是等生如是安布。名為種子亦名為果。(T. 1579: 588c).

[108]*kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma/ yan nāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samarthaṃ sākṣāt pāraṃparyeṇa vā/ santatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt/ ko 'yaṃ pariṇāmo nāma/ santater anyathātvam/ ko ceyaṃ santatiḥ/ hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ saṃskārāḥ* (*ASBh*: 64; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 185; Yamabe 1990: 14).

is at odds with Nishi's understanding of the development of *bīja* theory. Nishi remarks on the close relationship between Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda, and he identifies passages from the *Vibhāṣā* that contain ideas about *bīja* similar to those of Yogācāra, but not completely worked out. According to Nishi, the "Sautrāntika" position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is the immediate forerunner of the fully developed Yogācāra doctrine, in which the *ālayavijñāna* is established as the basis for the *bījas* (Nishi 1975: 483-495), and Jaini writes under the same assumption (Jaini 1959a). Nishi's research, nevertheless, does not really take the *Yogācārabhūmi* into consideration and must therefore be considered somewhat dated. Similarly, Cox's statement that "the earliest sources that describe the dynamics of the seed theory are Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, and the *Nyāyānusāra*" (Cox 1983: 51 n. 49) clearly must be revised in the light of current research on the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* both rely on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* in denying the real existence of *prāpti*. In fact, the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*[109] also follows the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*'s tripartite division.[110] However, neither of these texts explains why *prāpti* can only be a *prajñapti*.

c. *Pṛthagjanatva*

Both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Pañcaskandhaka* give the same very simple definition of *pṛthagjanatva* that can be found in *abhidharma* texts such as the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*: *pṛthagjanatva* is the non-possession of the *āryadharmas*.[111]

[109]得者。此復三種。一諸行種子所攝相續差別性。二自在生起相續差別性。三自相生起相續差別性。(T. 1602: 484a-b).

[110]La Vallée Poussin notes that the *Cwsl* discussion of three types of *samanvāgama* follows this passage from *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 57 n. 2; T. 1585: 5b).

[111]*pṛthagjanatvaṃ katamat/ āryadharmānām apratilambhe pṛthagjanatvam iti*

The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* identifies two types of *pṛthagjanas*: the fool (*bāla*), who has been a fool for countless existences , and the untutored one (*aśrutavān*), who follows false paths that diverge from the Tathāgata's teaching.[112] Although these three texts consider *pṛthagajanatva*, like the rest of the *viprayuktas*, to be *prajñaptis*, there is nothing else about their definitions that distinguishes them from those found in *abhidharma* texts before the *Abhidharmāvatāra*. As I have mentioned above, beginning with the *Abhidharmāvatāra*, *pṛthagjanatva* is replaced by *aprāpti*.

The Dārṣṭāntika of the *Vibhāṣā* is, again, the earliest source to deny the reality of *pṛthagjanatva*, but the *Vibhāṣā* does not say on what basis.[113] Harivarman, on the other hand, gives his own reasoning in detail. There is no nature (*dharma*) of an ordinary person that is distinct from the ordinary person, himself. If there were, we would have to accept as *dharmas* a pot, as well as ideas such as number, measure, sameness, difference, conjunction, disjunction, desirability and undesirability, etc.[114] Harivarman goes on to

prajñaptiḥ (*AS*: 19). 云何異生性。謂於諸聖法不得為性。(T. 1612 [*Pañcaskandhaka*]: 849c). 凡夫性者。謂不得聖法。(T. 1552 [*Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*]: 943b).

[112]異生性者。此有二種。一愚夫異生性。二無聞異生性。愚夫異生性者。謂無始世來有情身中愚夫之性。無聞謂生性者。謂如來法外諸邪道性。 (T. 1602: 484b). La Vallée Poussin defines three types according to *Madhyamāgama*: "Le *bāla*, à qui manque la *prajñā* 'naturelle' (*upapattilābhikā*) qui provient des traces d'un exercice antérieur (*pūrvābhyāsavāsanānirjatā*); *aśrutavān*, à qui manque la *prajñā* qui naît de l'Ecriture (*āgamajā*); *pṛthagjana*, à qui manque la *prajñā* née de l'*adhigama*, c'est-à-dire du *satyābhisamaya* (La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 2: 87 n. 3).

[113]It simply states: 或復有執。異生性無實體。如譬喩者。(T. 1545: 231b; Katō 1989: 303).

[114]問凡夫法是心不相應行。是事云何。答曰。凡夫法不異凡夫。若別有凡夫法。亦應受別有瓶法等。又數量一異合離好醜等法。皆應別有。(T. 1646: 289c). In response to the Sarvāstivādin argument that, without a *dharma* called *jāti*, the realization that something is born would be impossible, Vasubandhu says something very similar: *tena tarhy anātmatvam apy eṣṭavyam anātmabuddhisiddhyartham/ saṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasattādayo 'pi tīrthaṃkaraparikalpitā abhyupagantavyā ekadvimahadaṇupṛthak-saṃyuktaviyuktaparāparasadādibuddhisiddhyartham* (*ASBh*: 79; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 235-236; Jaini 1959b: 537); 為成一二大小客別合離彼此有性等覺應如外道法外執有數量客別合離彼此有等別性 (T. 1558: 28c). Since I have not found a similar sentence elsewhere, I suspect that Vasubandhu's immediate source was Harivarman. Yaśomitra mentions the pot: *tathā dravyam etad rūpam idaṃ ghaṭo 'yam ity evam-ādi-buddhi-siddhārthaṃ saṃkhyādayo 'pi Vaiśeṣika-parikalpitā abhyupagaṃtavyāḥ* (*AKVy*:

show that the idea that *pṛthagjana* and *pṛthagjantava* are separate is tantamount to the heterodox (Vaiśeṣika) belief that a pot and pot-ness are different, that by means of pot-ness, we know that a pot is a pot. This contradicts the Buddhist principle that a *dharma* is identical with its own-nature.[115] Finally Harivarman criticizes those who base their *abhidharma* on heterodox scripture, namely those who maintain that *pṛthagjanatva*, etc., are real, as well as those who say that *asaṃskṛtas* such as *tathatā, dharmatā, bhūtakoṭi*, and *pratītyasamutpāda*, etc., are real. In conclusion, he recommends that they should ponder deeply on principles and not merely follow the letter [of the text].[116]

In contrast to Harivarman's purely negative argument, the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage again explains the designation in terms of seeds. *Pṛthagjanatva* refers to those seeds of *darśanaheya dharmas* in the three worlds that have not yet been permanently destroyed.[117] There are four types of *pṛthagjanatva*, one included in the *gotra* of those not possessing the *dharma* of *parinirvāṇa* and one pertaining to *śrāvaka-, pratyekabuddha-,* and *tathāgatagotras*, respectively.[118] As well as differing from those in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya, Pañcaskandhaka*, and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, this definition is not directly reflected in Vasubandhu's criticism of the Vaibhāṣika position in the

180).

[115] 外經 (corrected from 瓶 on the basis of the alternate reading in the Taishō notes)書中説瓶異瓶法異。因瓶法知是瓶色異色法異是事不然所以者何。法名自體。若汝謂凡夫法異。則色自無體。應持色法故有。是事不然。是故汝不深思故説別有凡夫法。(T. 1646: 289c).

[116]有諸論師習外典故造阿毘曇。説別有凡夫法等。亦有餘論師説別有如法性眞際因　縁等諸無為法故。應深思此理。勿隨文字。(T. 1646: 289c; for Sanskrit equivalents, see Katsura 1974: 87).

[117]*de la so so'i skye bo ñid gaṅ źe na/ khams gsum na spyod pa'i mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba'i chos kyi sa bon rnams yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa tsam gaṅ yin pa de ni so so'i skye bo ñid ces bya'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 1-2). 復次云何謂生性。謂三界見所斷法種子。唯未永害量名謂生性。(T. 1579: 587b).

[118]*de yaṅ mdor bsdu na rnam pa bźi ste/ yoṅs su mya ṅan las mi 'da' ba'i chos can gyi rigs kyis bsdus pa daṅ/ ñan thos kyi rigs daṅ ldan pa daṅ/ raṅ saṅs rgyas kyi rigs daṅ ldan pa daṅ/ de bźin gśegs pa'i rigs daṅ ldan pa'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 2-3). 此復略有四種。一無般涅槃法種性所攝。二聲聞種性之所隨逐。三獨覺種性之所隨逐。四如來種性之所隨逐。(T. 1579: 587b).

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. The first portion is, however, quoted in Fa-pao's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* where it seems to be given as an example of an alternate definition of *pṛthagjanatva* (T. 1822: 540a). Furthermore, it is reproduced almost word for word in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun,* where *aprāpti,* or *asamanvāgama,* is defined as a state in which the seeds of *darśanaheya dharmas* have not yet been permanently destroyed; this state in turn is equated with *pṛthagjanatva.*[119]

In his discussion of *aprāpti* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* Vasubandhu does not mention *bīja* in the definition of *pṛthagjanatva* that he accepts and attributes to the Sautrāntikas: *pṛthagjanatva* is the *santati* in which the *āryadharmas* have not been produced.[120] This definition more closely resembles that of the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, according to which *pṛthagjanatva* is a designation of the state in which the *lokottara āryadharmas* have not yet arisen.[121] However, I do not think that there is a contradiction between Vasubandhu's so-called Sautrāntika definition and the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, since the presence of the seeds of *darśanaheyadharmas* and the absence of *āryadharmas* are equivalent; at least this is what the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* suggests. Moreover, the long passage[122] preceding Vasubandhu's definition of *bīja,* which contains an explanation of the abandonment or non-abandonment of *kleśas* in terms of states of the *āśraya,* makes it clear that it is the presence of undestroyed seeds of *kleśas* that prevents

[119]翻此假立夫成就名。此類雖多。而於三界見所斷種未永害位。假立非得名謂生性。於諸聖法未成就故。(T. 1585: 5b; *Shindō*: 37; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 57-58). Neither La Vallée Poussin nor the *Shindō* refers to *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī.*

[120]*evaṃ tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām/ kathaṃ ca sautrāntikānāṃ/ anutpannārya-dharmasantatiḥ pṛthagjanatvam iti* (*AKBh*: 66; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 1: 193).

[121]*so so'i skye bo gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ 'jig rten las 'das pa 'phags pa'i chos ma bskyed pa'i gnas skabs la 'o/ rnam pa gsum ste/ 'dod pa na spyod pa daṅ/ gzugs na spyod pa daṅ/ gzugs med pa na spyod pa'o* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 77a 8-77b 1). 問依何分位建立異生性。此復幾種。答依未生起一切出世聖法分位。建立異生性。此復三種。謂欲界繫。色界繫。無色界繫。(T. 1579: 607c).

[122]This passage, beginning with the sentence, *āśrayaviśeṣād etat sidhyati,* is quoted in a note to section C3b.

one from obtaining the *āryadharmas*. Therefore, the *santati* in which the *āryadharmas* are not present is in fact the *santati* in which the seeds of *kleśas* still exist, and Vasubandhu's understanding of *pṛthagjanatva* is actually identical to that of the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage. As we have seen, the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman both merely criticize the status of *pṛthagjanatva* as a *dharma* without defining it, while Śrīlāta is silent. Thus, Vasubandhu again identifies as Sautrāntika a position taken from the *Yogācārabhūmi* when there is no textual corroboration for his claim.

4. Yogācāra *Viprayuktas*

I shall now come to the group of *cittaviprayuktas* that are specifically associated with Yogācāra. As I have mentioned above, this group typically consists of ten *dharmas*: 1) *pravṛtti*, 2) *pratiniyama*, 3) *yoga*, 4) *jāva*, 5) *anukrama*, 6) *kāla*, 7) *deśa*, 8) *saṃkhyā*, 9) *sāmagrī*, and 10) *asāmagrī*. However, the order is not always the same; in the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 659a), the list begins with *sāmagrī*. Nor is the number always the same; the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* includes only nine *dharmas*, omitting *asāmagrī*. Our first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage is peculiar in that it includes *sāmagrī* after *pṛthāgjanatva* but before *nāma-*, *pada-*, and *vyañjanakāya*. After this it defines the *dharmas* from *pravṛtti* to *saṃkhyā* in the order given above, with the exception of *deśa*, which it omits entirely. Like the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, it also omits *asāmagrī*.

With the exception of the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*KIK* Yuga-bu III), there is, as far as I know, no translation or study of the definitions of these *cittaviprayuktas* in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. Since the definitions in the first passage are by far the longest that we have, I shall examine them in detail in an attempt to determine why this group was added to the list at the same time that all the members of

the category were being criticized as mere *prajñaptis*. I shall refer to the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* by way of comparison, including for the sake of completeness definitions of *asāmagrī* and *deśa* from these three passages.

a. *Sāmagrī*

According to the first passage in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, all the causes and conditions that can produce *dharmas* are referred to by the single term *sāmagrī*, which is also equated with *sahakārihetu*.[123] There are six types of *sāmagrī*.[124] Experiential *sāmagrī* consists of *sparśa* conditioned by the *ṣaḍāyatanas*, by *rūpa*, etc., and by *manaskāra*, etc., as well as of *vedanā* conditioned by *sparśa*.[125] *Sāmagrī* that is the actualization of rebirth consists of the *saṃskāras* conditioned by *avidyā*, *tṛṣṇā* conditioned by *vedanā*, *upādāna* conditioned by *vedanā*, and all the other members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, that is to say, all of the members except for the ones from *vijñāna* through *vedanā*.[126] *Sāmagrī* that is the continued existence of the six senses consists of the four *āhāras* and *jīvitendriya*.[127]

[123]*de la tshogs pa gaṅ že na/ chos de daṅ de dag skyed pa'i phyir gaṅ dag rgyur gyur pa daṅ/ gaṅ rkyen du gyur pa de dag thams cad gcig du bsdus pa ni tshogs pa žes bya ste/ de ñid lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu žes kyaṅ bya'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 3-4). 次云何和合。謂能生彼彼諸法諸因諸緣。總略為一說名和合。即此名同事因。(T. 1579: 587b-c).

[124]I shall mention the definition from the second passage in my discussion of asāmagrī below.

[125]*tshor ba rnams myoṅ ba'i tshogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di ltar skye mched drug gi rkyen daṅ/ gzugs la sogs pa'i rkyen daṅ/ yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen gyi reg pa daṅ/ reg pa'i rkyen gyis tshor ba'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 4-5). 或有領受和合。謂六處緣觸。或色等緣或作意等緣。或觸緣受。(T. 1579: 587c).

[126]*yaṅ srid pa mṅon par 'grub pa'i tshogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnams daṅ/ tshor ba'i rkyen gyis sred pa daṅ/ sred pa'i rkyen gyis len pa nas rgyas par skye ba'i rkyen gyis rga śi'i bar dag go* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 5-6). 或有引生後有和合。謂無明緣行等。受緣愛愛緣取。廣說謂乃至生緣老死。(T. 1579: 587c).

[127]*skye mched drug gnas pa'i tshogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste/ zas bži daṅ srog gi dbaṅ po'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 6). 或有六處住和合。謂四食及命根。(T. 1579: 587c).

Sāmagrī that produces skill in the arts consists of knowledge of the arts and the tools and exertions associated with it.[128] Pure *sāmagrī* consists of the assemblage of the twelve non-hindrances, namely the wealth of self and others, etc.[129] Finally, conventional *sāmagrī* consists of the fact that beings, due to their unity of mind, do not have disagreement, disputation, contention, or disharmony.[130]

The association of the terms *sāmagrī* and *sahakārihetu* can be traced to the exposition of the ten *hetus* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, in which all the *hetus* that are involved in production, namely from *apekṣāhetu* through *pratiniyamahetu*, are designated as *sahakārihetu*;[131] in the botanical context, if any of these causes is lacking, the grain will not mature, and, therefore, the totality (*sāmagrī*) of all these causes is called *sahakārihetu*.[132] Similarly, in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* exposition of the ten *hetus*, *sahakārihetu* is

[128] *bzo'i gnas rnams 'grub pa'i tshogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste/ bzo śes pa daṅ/ de daṅ ldan pa'i las kyi* (corrected from *kyis* on the basis of the Derge edition -- *YBh*$_{td}$: v. 39, text 4038, p. 362, leaf 47, line 3) *yo byad daṅ skyes bu'i rtsal lo* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 6-7). 或有工巧處成辦和合。謂工巧智及彼相應業具士夫作用。(T. 1579: 587c).

[129] *rnam par dag pa'i tshogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste/ bdag daṅ gźan gyi 'byor pa la sogs pa khom pa bcu gñis 'dus ba'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 7). 或有清淨和合。謂十二種無雜集會。即自他圓滿等。(T. 1579: 587c). Professor Shirodate Kaiun (Tshul khrims skal bzaṅ) suggests that *khom pa* here is the opposite of *mi khom pa* (*akṣaṇa*), "inopportune birth"; a well-known list of eight such births, birth in hell, etc., is discussed by Edgerton (1970: 2-3), and Shirodate, although not familiar with a list of twelve, thinks that this passage probably refers to one (personal communication). Therefore, birth in a world in which oneself and others do not have adequate wealth would be a hindrance to learning from a Buddha. A list of eight *dal bas*, where *dal ba* is the absence of dwelling in the *mi khom pas*, is given in the *Tsang han ta tz'u tien* (1254).

[130] *brdar btags pa'i tshogs pa gźan pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste/ sems can kyi blo gcig pa'i dpaṅ du byas nas mi mthun pa med pa daṅ/ mi 'thab pa daṅ/ mi rtsod pa daṅ/ mi 'phrod pa med pa daṅ* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 26b 7-8). 或有世俗和合。謂諸有情依等意樂增上力故互不相違。無諍無訟無意乖離。(T. 1579: 587c). I can find no indices in which *blo gcig pa'i dpaṅ du byas* is equated with 等意樂. It would appear as though the Tibetan and Chinese differ here.

[131] *yaś cāpekṣā-hetur yaś c'ākṣepa-hetur yaś ca parigraha-hetur yaś ca nirvṛtti-hetur yaś c'āvāhaka-hetur yaś ca pratiniyama-hetur ity etān sarvān hetūn ekadhyam abhisaṃkṣipya sahakāri-hetur ity ucyate* (*BoBh*: 98).

[132] *sarve caite apekṣā-hetum upādāya pratiniyama-hetv-antā hetavaḥ sasyasyābhiniṣpattaye saha-kāri-hetuḥ. na hi tad dhānyam anyatama-hetu-vaikalyān niṣpadyate. tasmāt sarvā sā sāmagrī saha-kāri-hetur ity ucyate* (*BoBh*: 100).

defined in terms of *sāmagryadhiṣṭhāna*; in the case of *sāmagrī* of production, when the totality of causes necessary for the production of any *dharma* is realized, the *dharma* arises. There are four other types, *sāmagrī* of obtainment, of accomplishment, of completion, and of activity.[133]

Therefore, the definitions of *sāmagrī* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, both as an *adhiṣṭhāna* associated with *sahakārihetu* and as a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, are very broad. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* both preserve the scope of the *Yogācārabhūmi* definitions: according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *sāmagrī* is the coming together of the conditions of cause and result,[134] while according to the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, it is the fact that all *saṃskṛtadharmas* have as their nature the coming together of conditions.[135] However, the example given by the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* is the specific one of consciousness: the [coming together of] cause and result known as consciousness consists of an unimpaired organ, the transformation [of consciousness?] into the appearance of an object, and the presence of

[133]*tatra sāmagrīhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñāpyate/ tat kasya hetoḥ/ tathā hi/ svām utpattisāmagrīm āgamya kāmapratisaṃyuktānāṃ dharmāṇām utpādo bhāvāti/ yathā kāmapratisaṃyuktānām evaṃ rūpapratisaṃyuktānām ārūpyapratisaṃyuktānām apratisaṃyuktānāṃ/ yathotpattisāmagry evaṃ prāptisāmagrī siddhisāmagrī niṣpattisāmagrī kriyāsāmagrī/ tasmāt sāmagrīm adhiṣṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñapyate* (*YBh*: 110; T. 1579: 302a). Bhattacharya points out that the Tibetan also includes *sāmagrī* of subsistence (*gnas pa'i tshogs pa daṅ = sthitisāmagrī*). A similar definition can be found in *Cwsl*, which includes four types of *sāmagrī*, of production, of subsistence, of completion, and of obtaining fruit: 和合依處。謂從領受乃至差別功能依處於所生住成得果中有和合力。即依此處立同事因。謂從觀得乃至定異皆同生第一事業故。(T. 1585: 41c; *Shindō*: 343; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 459).

[134]*sāmagrī katamaḥ/ hetuphalapratyayasamavadhāne sāmagrīti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 19). Rahula translates this as "C'est une désignation pour indiquer la combinaison des causes, des effets, et des conditions" (1980: 17), but this does not make sense to me. In my translation, I follow the Tibetan, which seems to take *hetu* and *phala* as modifying *pratyaya*: *rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i rkyen 'dus pa la tshogs pa źes gdags so* (AS_t: 61a 8). The Tibetan translation of *ASVy* quotes the text as saying that *sāmagrī* refers to the fact that causes and effects arise from conditions: *rgyu daṅ 'bras bu rkyen las byuṅ ba la tshogs pa ces gdags so* ($ASVy_t$: 162b 1).

[135]和合者。謂諸行緣會性。(T. 1602: 484b).

the attention that produces that consciousness.[136]

If P'u-kuang is correct in saying that the *sāmagrī* that Saṃghabhadra considers to be a *cittaviprayukta* consists of monastic concord, then Saṃghabhadra's *sāmagrī* would seem to correspond to the conventional *sāmagrī* of the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage (see section B3). Obviously, however, the Yogācāra definition of *sāmagrī*, although it includes Saṃghabhadra's, is far more extensive. I think that both the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and Saṃghabhadra derive their notion of *sāmagrī* as a *viprayukta* from the *viprayukta saṃghabheda* in the *Vibhāṣā*; that is to say, they give the status of a *dharma* to the opposite of *saṃghabheda*. However, unlike Saṃghabhadra, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* extends the scope of the term to encompass a broadly applicable, causal principal.

b. (*Asāmagrī*)

Although *asāmagrī* is not mentioned in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, I shall discuss it here, since it, like *sāmagrī*, is a possible point of connection between the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra lists of *viprayuktas*.

A definition of *asāmagrī* is found only once in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage *asāmagrī* is simply said to be the opposite of *sāmagrī*;[137] in

[136] *hetuphalapratyayānāṃ samavadhānaṃ tadyathā vijñānākhyasya hi hetuphalasyendri-yāparibhedo viṣayābhāsagamanaṃ tajjñānaṃ* (Tatia says that the Chinese and Tibetan give *tajjanaka* for *tajjñāna*, but the Chinese really gives something like *tajjñānajanaka* [生此識 -- T. 1606: 701a]; on the other hand, he is correct about the Tibetan [*de skyes pa'i* -- *ASVy*$_t$: 162b 2]) *manaskārapratyupasthānaṃ eti/ evam anyatrāpi yojitavyam* (*ASBh*: 10-11). This passage is difficult; my summary is based mainly on the Tibetan translation of *ASVy*, which I find easier to understand than the Sanskrit: *rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i rkyen rnams tshogs pa ni 'di lta ste/ rnam par śes pa źes pa'i rgyu 'bras ni dbaṅ po ma mñam pa daṅ/ yul snaṅ bar gyur pa daṅ / de skyes pa'i yid la byed pa ñe bar gnas pa ste/ de bźin du gźan la yaṅ sbyar bar bya'o* (*ASVy*$_t$: 162b 1-2).

[137] *ma tshogs pa gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ ma tshogs pa'i gnas skabs daṅ/ rab tu dbye ba ni tshogs pa las bzlog pa las rig par bya'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 78a 2-3); 問依何分位建立不和合。此復幾種。答與和合相違。應知不和合若分位若差別。(T. 1579: 608a).

this passage *sāmagrī* is defined as the non-absence of the constituents of action and consists of three types: assemblage *sāmagrī*, singleness-of-purpose *sāmagrī*, and perfection *sāmagrī*.[138] These types are not further defined, but singleness-of-purpose *sāmagrī* perhaps corresponds to the conventional *sāmagrī* of the first passage. Outside of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *asāmagrī* is defined similarly in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*[139] and in the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun shu* of P'u-kuang,[140] where it is said to be the non-coming together of conditions.

Unlike the majority of the *viprayukta* lists in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and that of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, the list of *viprayuktas* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* does not include *asāmagrī*. P'u-kuang offers two explanations for its omission. The first is based upon Hsüan-tsang's addition of the word "et cetera" after *sāmagrī* in his translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: "et cetera" refers to *sāmagrī*.[141] Since neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation includes "et cetera," we can discount this explanation. The second is more convincing: *asāmagrī* is omitted because one type is included in *pṛthagjanatva*, which is the non-obtaining of the *āryamārga*, and the other types can be inferred from this.[142]

Thus, we can see that, like *sāmagrī*, *asāmagrī* is defined broadly in these Yogācāra texts; while *sāmagrī* refers to the concatenation of causal factors that results in production,

[138]*tshogs pa gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ bya ba'i yan lag ma tshaṅ ba med pa'i gnas skabs la'o/ rnam pa gsum ste/ 'dus ba'i tshogs daṅ/ don gcig gi tshogs daṅ/ yoṅs su rdzogs pa'i tshogs pa'o* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 78a 1-2); 問依何分位建立和合。此復幾種。答依所作支無闕分位建立和合。此復三種。謂集會和合。一義和合。圓滿和合。(T. 1579: 608a).

[139]不和合者。謂諸行緣乖性。(T. 1602: 484b).

[140]諸行緣乖名不和合。(T. 1837: 60a).

[141]一解云。對法論云和合等者。論既言和合等。當知則等取不和合。 (T. 1837: 60a).

[142]又一解云。略故不説問曰。等略何故不略餘數但略不和合耶。解云。已説在所説中。所以但偏略不和合性也。言説在所説中者。謂異生性是見道煩惱。假建立。望聖道有不得義故。即是不和合義。不和合中略舉一隅。餘不和合類亦可知。所以偏略不和合性。(T. 1837: 60a).

asāmagrī is a designation for the fact that if something fails to be produced, it is because the conditions necessary for production do not cooperate. In addition, special cases of *sāmagrī* are mentioned in both the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passages and defined in detail in the first. Special cases of *asāmagrī*, on the other hand, are implied in the second passage and referred to by P'u-kuang. Therefore, the opposite of conventional *sāmagrī*, or perhaps of singleness-of-purpose *sāmagrī*, probably corresponds to *samghabheda* in the *Vibhāṣā*.

Unlike those of most *viprayuktas*, the positions of *sāmagrī* and *asāmagrī* vary in the Yogācāra lists. Most frequently they are found at the end of the entire list.[143] However, in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, *sāmagrī* is defined after *pṛthagjanatva* and before *nāmakāya*, in other words, before *pravṛtti* and the other Yogācāra *viprayuktas* (*YBh*ṭ: Zi 26b 3-8; T. 1579: 587b-c). In the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, moreover, *sāmagrī* and *asāmagrī* occur as the first two of the final group of ten (T. 1579: 659a). This inconsistency suggests that they are somehow separate from, or more important than, the other eight Yogācāra *viprayuktas*.

In fact, *sāmagrī* is the most basic aspect of causality denoted by this group of *dharmas*. The fundamental role of *sāmagrī* in the causal process is emphasized, although outside of the context of the *viprayuktas*, in the *Paramārthagāthās*. Together with a commentary, these verses are found in the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi*, and Schmithausen describes them as "authoritative utterings at the level of ultimate truth, from various (canonical or paracanonical) sources or (oral) traditions" (Schmithausen 1987: 223-224). Five of the verses (27-31) explain in terms of seed theory how the operations of cause and result come to be mistaken for a self. According to the commentary, the first of these is a refutation of possible objections to the statement that "there is, from the point of view of ultimate reality, no proprietor nor doer nor feeler but only cause(s) and

[143] *Manobhūmi* (*YBh*: 69); second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage (*YBh*ṭ: zi 78a 1-3; T. 1579: 608a); *AS* (19; *sāmagrī* only); *Hyscl* (T. 1602: 484b); *Tcpfmml* (T. 1614: 855c).

result(s)."[144] The verse itself reads as follows: "because of the non-destruction of the course of causes, activity proceeds due to *sāmagrī*; [*saṃskṛtadharmas*] arise from their own cause, and they make a totality."[145] Aside from *sāmagrī*, we can find in the *Paramārthagāthās* other features of causality that appear in the Yogācāra *pratītyasamutpāda* and *cittaviprayukta* expositions. For example, the non-destruction of the course of causes corresponds to *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha* of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*AS*: 26; *ASBh*: 33) and the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* (*YBh*: 203) *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions, as well as to the *viprayukta pravṛtti*.[146] Similarly, the statement that *dharmas* arise from their own causes describes the same aspect of causality as *anurūpahetuphalārtha* (*AS*: 26; *ASBh*: 35; *YBh*: 203) and the *viprayukta yoga*.[147]

c. *Pravṛtti*

Pravṛtti, as I have mentioned above, is usually the first of the Yogācāra *viprayuktas*, although in the case of the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage it follows *nāma-*, *pada-*,

[144]Schmithausen 1987: 235. Wayman's translation (1961: 183) seems inferior.

[145]*hetuvartmā* [sic] *nupacchedāt sāmagryā vartate kriyā/ svasmād dhetoś ca jāyante kurvanti ca parigraham* [MS: *parigrahaḥ*]// (Wayman 1961: 171). I do not understand the phrase *kurvanti ca parigraham*; Wayman's translation, "and take control," does not seem to be helpful.

The commentary states that the four *padas* show, respectively : 1) how rebirth occurs even when a self is non-existent; 2) how the effect is not simultaneous with the cause; 3) how it is not the case that everything arises from everything (Wayman's translation, "how nothing at all occurs," is meaningless [Wayman 1961: 183]); and 4) how there is no destruction of the course of causes. (*tatra yathātmany asati punarbhavo bhavati/ nocchedaḥ/ yathā ca hetuto yugapat phalaṃ na bhavati/ yathā ca sarvataḥ sarvaṃ na bhavati/ yathā ca yasya hetuvartmanaḥ ucchedo na bhavati/ tad ekayā gāthayā paridīpayaṃś ca caturvidhaṃ codyaṃ paridīpayati harati/ caturbhiḥ padair yathākramaṃ* [Wayman 1961: 176; 183]).

[146] *pravṛttiḥ katamaḥ/ hetuphalaprabandhānupacchede pravṛttir iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 11). See also *Hyscl*: 謂諸行因果相續不斷性 (T. 1602: 484b).

[147]*yogaḥ katamaḥ/ hetuphalānurūpye yoga iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 19). hetuphalasārūpyam *anyatve 'pi yad yasya phalaṃ yujyate/ tadyathā dānasya bhogasampad ity evam ādi* (*ASBh*: 10). See also *Hyscl*: 謂諸行因果相稱性 (T. 1602: 484b).

and *vyañjanakāya*, which are preceded by *sāmagrī*. In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, *pravṛtti* is defined very simply as a designation for the non-interruption of the stream of causes and results (see note above); these definitions, especially that of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, are almost identical to the basic definition in the first passage of *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*.[148] Non-interruption is, in turn, one of the features of causality designated by the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as imports of conditioned origination, in this case *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha* (see above).

In addition, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* describes in detail a number of different types of *pravṛtti*, some of which are of particular interest to us. The first three types all are defined with relation to seeds. *Bījapravṛtti* consists of *dharmas* that possess seeds although they are not yet actualized.[149] The next type of *pravṛtti* consists of *dharmas* that are actualized while their seeds have been destroyed.[150] This type of *pravṛtti* seems to correspond to the explanation of *hetuphalaprabandhānupacchedārtha* in the

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[148] *de la 'jug pa gaṅ že na/ 'du byed rnams kyi rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i rgyun mi 'chad pa ni 'jug pa žes bya'o* (YBh_t: zi 27a 7). 復次云何流轉。謂諸行因果續不斷性。(T. 1579: 587c). The second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage defines *pravṛtti* simply as a *prajñapti* designating the state of the stream of causes and results and distinguishes three types: the succession of moments, the succession of births, and the succession of defilement and purification (*'jug pa gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i rgyun gyi* [corrected from *gyis* on the basis of YBh_{td}: v. 39, text 4038, p. 376, leaf 146, line 7] *gnas skabs la'o/ rnam pa gsum ste/ skad cig gcig nas gcig tu 'jug pa daṅ/ skye ba gcig nas gcig tu 'jug pa daṅ/ kun nas ñon moṅs pa daṅ rnam par byaṅ ba gcig gnas gcig tu 'jug pa'o* -- YBh_t: zi 77b 1-2; 問依何分位建立流轉。此復幾種。答依因果相續分位建立流轉。此復三種。謂刹那展轉流轉。生展轉流轉。染污清淨展轉流轉。-- T. 1579: 607c).

[149] *'jug pa sa bon gyi 'jug pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste sa bon daṅ bcas pa'i chos mṅon du ma* [missing in the Peking edition, but added on the basis of the Derge edition (YBh_{td}: v. 39, text 4038, p. 362, leaf 48, line 3) and the Chinese] *gyur pa rnams kyi'o* (YBh_t: zi 27a7 -8). 或有種子流轉。謂有種子不現前諸法。(T. 1579: 587c).

[150] *dbaṅ gi stobs kyis 'jug pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste/ sa bon mñams par byas pa kun tu spyod pa daṅ ldan pa rnams kyi'o* (YBh_t: zi 27a 8). 或有自在勢流轉。謂被損種子現行諸法。(T. 1579: 587c). I have not been able to retranslate into Sanskrit the name of this type of *pravṛtti*. A very awkward English translation would be something like, "*pravṛtti* by way of inherent power."

Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya, according to which the non-interruption of the stream of cause and results is due to the simultaneity of the destruction of cause and the production of the result. The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, however, does not mention seeds in this context.[151] The last of this group of *pravṛttis*, *bījaphalapravṛtti*, is said to consist of seeds as well as *dharmas* that are actualized but whose seeds have not been destroyed.[152] After this, *pravṛtti* of the streams (*rgyun*) of *nāma* and *rūpa*, of the streams of *kāma*, *rūpa*, and *ārūpyadhātus*, of the streams of pleasure, suffering, and indifference, and of the streams of good, bad, and neutral are defined (*YBh$_t$*: Zi 27 b1-6; T. 1579: 587c-588a).

Finally, *pravṛtti* of the *anuloma* stream is said to consist of *pratītyasamutpāda* in its progressive order, while *pravṛtti* of the *pratiloma* stream is defined as *pratītyasamutpāda* in its regressive order.[153] The term *pravṛtti*, which Schmithausen, although not in the context of *viprayuktasaṃskāras*, translates as "origination-and-continuance" (1987:173, 463 n. 1107), is frequently used in connection with *pratītyasamutpāda* to describe the process of conditioned production in its progressive order, in other words *saṃsāra*. Its opposite, *nivṛtti*, refers to the reversal that leads to the cessation of *saṃsāra*. However, this reversal is not always referred to by the term *nivṛtti*; for example, the summary of the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi śarīra* exposition describes it as the purification of *pravṛtti*.[154] In

[151] *kāraṇakṣaṇanirodhasamakālaṃ kāryakṣaṇotpādāt* (*ASBh*: 33-34; see Chapter 2, section B7).

[152] *sa bon dan 'bras bu'i 'jug pa yan yod de/ 'di lta ste sa bon dan bcas pa sa bon mñams par ma byas pa kun tu spyod pa dan ldan pa rnams kyi'o* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 27b 1). 或有種果流轉。謂有種子種不被損現行諸法。(T. 1579: 587c).

[153] *mthun pa'i rgyun gyi 'jug pa yan yod de/ 'di lta ste rten cin 'brel bar 'byun ba lugs su 'byun ba'i'o/ mi mthun pa'i gyun gyi 'jug pa yan yod de/ 'di lta ste/ rten cin 'brel bar 'byun ba lugs su mi 'byun ba'i'o* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 27b 6-7). 又有順流流轉。謂順縁起。又有逆流流轉。謂逆縁起。(T. 1579: 588a).

[154] *pūrvāntān madhyante pravṛttito madhyantād aparānte pravṛttito madhyānte ca pravṛttiviśuddhitaḥ/ itīdaṃ pratītyasamutpādasya śarīraṃ* (*YBh*: 203). See also *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 828c).

our definition of the *viprayukta pravṛtti*, *pratilomapravṛtti* is similarly equivalent to *nivṛtti*.[155]

Jaini has suggested that *pravṛtti*, like most of the Yogācāra *viprayuktas*, corresponds to a member of a Vaiśeṣika category, in which context it is defined as effort, zeal, or resolution.[156] However, I fail to see the relation between this and even the simple definition in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, to which he refers.[157] If I am correct that the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage is the earliest Yogācāra treatment of *viprayuktas*, it seems that the Yogācāras have drawn instead from their expositions of *bīja* and *pratītyasamutpāda* to invent a *viprayuktasaṃskāra* that describes the progression of cause and result that comprises *saṃsāra*.

d. *Pratiniyama*

Pratiniyama is defined in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as a designation for the

[155]We have seen the term *pravṛtti*, although not as a *viprayukta*, appear in a discussion of *anuloma* and *pratiloma pratītyasamutpāda* in the *ASBh* comment on the last section of the *AS pratītyasamutpāda* exposition ([*saṃ*]*kleśānulomapratiloma iti pravṛttyānupūrvim adhikṛtya, avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity evam ādy anulomanirdeśaḥ/ jarāmaraṇaṃ jarāmara*[*ṇa*]*samudayo* [*jarāmaraṇanirodho*] *jarāmaraṇanirodhagāminī pratipad iti satyavyavasthānam adhikṛtya pratilomanirdeśo veditavyaḥ/* ([*vyavadānānulomapratilomata iti*] *tadyathā 'vidyānirodhāt saṃskāranirodha ity evam ādi vyvavadānānulomanirdeśaḥ/ kasmin na sati na jarāmaraṇaṃ bhavati kasya nirodhāj jarāmaraṇanirodha iti pratilomanirdeśataḥ* -- *ASBh*: 35). See Chapter 2, section B10.

[156]Jaini quotes from the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*: *prayatnaḥ saṃrambha utsāha iti paryāyāḥ* (Jaini 1959b: 538).

[157]According to the definition of *prayatna* that follows the sentence quoted by Jaini, there are two types. *Jīvanapūrvaka prayatna* is what keeps a person breathing while he is a sleep and allows his mind to [re]-unite with his sense organs when he awakes. *Icchādveṣapūrvaka prayatna* is the cause of action that enables one to obtain the agreeable and to avoid the disagreeable and is the support of the body (*sa dvividho jīvanapūrvakaḥ icchādveṣapūrvakaś ca/ tatra jīvanapūrvakaḥ suptasya prāṇāpānasantānaprerakaḥ prabodhakāle cāntaḥ-karaṇasyendriyāntaraprāptihetuḥ/ asya jīvanapūrvakasyātmanasoḥ samyogād dharmādharmāpekṣād utpattiḥ/ itaras tu hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamarthasya vyāpārasya hetuḥ śarīravidhārakaś ca/ sa cātmamanasoḥ samyogād icchāpekṣād dveṣāpekṣād votpadyate* (*Praśastapādabhāṣya*: 216). Although *prayatna*, according to this definition, does not seem to resemble the Yogācāra *viprayukta pravṛtti*, it does seem to fulfill some of the functions of *ālayavijñāna*.

variety of causes and results. The *Bhāṣya* explains this as the fact that every result has its own separate cause; for example, a good action is the cause of a desirable result, etc. [158] Similarly, the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* defines *pratiniyama* as the manifoldness of causes and results.[159]

Again, the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage is much more detailed and explicit. Its basic definition stresses the absolute nature of this principle of causality: whether or not a Tathāgata appears in the world, from beginningless time it is the nature of all *dharmas* that the various causes and results do not get mixed up.[160] Of the various types of *pratiniyama*, *pravṛttinivṛttipratiniyama* (this and the following are all my Sanskrit retranslations) refers to *pratītyasamutpāda* in progressive and regressive order. *Sarvadharmapratiniyama* refers to the fact that all *dharmas* are included in the twelve *āyatanas*. *Vedanāpratiniyama* refers to the fact that all sensations are included in the three types of *vedanā*. *Sthitipratiniyama* refers to the fact that all bodies endure for their allotted time and that external things endure for a *kalpa*. *Pramāṇapratiniyama* refers to the fact that the size of the bodies of beings born in the various *rūpa* births and the size of the four external continents are fixed.[161]

[158] *pratiniyamaḥ katamaḥ/ hetuphalanānātve pratiniyama iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 19). *hetuphalanānātvam iṣṭasya phalasya sucaritam aniṣṭasya duścaritam ity evam ādi/ phalānāṃ pṛthak pṛthag anyonyahetukatvam* (*ASBh*: 10).

[159] 謂諸行因果各異性。(T. 1602: 484b).

[160] *de la so sor ṅes pa gaṅ źe na/ de bźin gśegs pa rnams byuṅ yaṅ ruṅ ma byuṅ yaṅ ruṅ/ thog ma med pa daṅ ldan pa'i dus nas bzuṅ ste/ chos rnams kyi rgyu daṅ 'bras bu sna tshogs ma 'dres pa ñid kyi chos ñid so sor ṅes pa'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 27b 7-8). 復次云何定異。謂無始時來種種因果決定差別無雜亂性。如來出世若不出世。諸法法爾。(T. 1579: 588a; see also T. 1584: 1025a). According to the second passage, *pratiniyama* is a *prajñapti* designating the state of the differing characteristics of *dharmas*, and it consists of three types: *lakṣaṇapratiniyama*, *hetupratiniyama*, and *phalapratiniyama* [my retranslation] (*so sor ṅes pa gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags pa/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ chos tha dad pa'i mtshan ñid kyi gnas skabs la'o/ rnam pa gsum ste/ mtshan ñid so sor ṅes pa daṅ/ rgyu so sor ṅes pa daṅ/ 'bras bu so sor ṅes pa'o* --*YBh*$_t$: zi 77b 2-3; 問依何分位建立定異。此復幾種。答依法別相分位建立定異。此復三種。謂相定異。因定異。果定異。(T. 1579: 607c).

[161] *de la 'jug pa daṅ ldog pa so sor ṅes pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste rten ciṅ 'brel bar*

As in the case of *sāmagrī*, there is a connection here between list of *viprayuktas* and the Yogācāra expositions of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the ten *hetus*. I have mentioned in a note to my translation of the *artha* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya pratītyasamutpāda* exposition (Chapter 2, section B7) that two of the *arthas* appear to be related to *pratiniyama*: *vicitrahetuphalārtha* refers to the variety of causes and results mentioned in all the definitions of *pratiniyama*, while *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* refers to the fact that a given cause produces a determined result. A similar observation is the focus of the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* definition.[162]

In the exposition of the *hetus*, we find that in the earliest version in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *pratiniyamahetu* is defined as the fact that the various heterogeneous things have their own separate causes.[163] In the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, *pratiniyamahetu* is related to *śaktivaicitrya hetvadhiṣṭhāna*; *śaktivaicitrya* refers to the multiplicity of forces necessary to produce the variety of *dharmas* associated with *kāma-*, *rūpa-*, and *ārūpyadhātus*, as well as non-associated (*anāsrava*) *dharmas*.[164] The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines

'byuṅ ba lugs su 'byuṅ ba daṅ / lugs su mi 'byuṅ ba'i'o/ chos thams cad so sor ṅes pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste skye mched bcu gñis po rnams gyi de las goṅ na yaṅ med de las lhag pa yaṅ med pa'o/ tshor ba so sor ṅes pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste tshor ba gsum po dag gi de las goṅ na yaṅ med la de las lhag pa yaṅ med pa'o/ gnas pa so sor ṅes pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste lus thams cad tshe ji srid pa daṅ/ phyi rol gyi dṅos po rnams bskal pa chen por [corrected from *po* on the basis of the Derge edition (YBh_{td}: v. 39, text 4038, p. 362, leaf 49, line 6)] *gnas pa'o/ boṅ tshod so sor ṅes pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste sems can skye ba'i gnas gzugs can de daṅ de dag tu skyes pa rnams kyi boṅ tshod daṅ/ phyi rol gyi gliṅ bźi pa rnams kyi tshad so sor ṅes pa'o* (YBh_{t}: zi 27b 7-28a3). 或有流轉還滅定異。謂順逆緣起。或有一切法定異。謂一切法十二處攝無過無增。或有領受定異。謂一切受三受所攝無過無增。或有住定異。 謂一切内分乃至壽量。一切外分經大劫住。或有形量定異。謂諸有情於彼彼有色生處。所受生身形量決定。及諸外分四大洲等形量決定。(T. 1579: 588a).

[162]Again as I mentioned above (see note to Chapter 2, section B7), Hsüan-tsang in his translation of *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra* renders *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* as 因果決定無雜亂義 (T. 717: 841b).

[163]*nānā-vijātīye vibhinna-kāraṇatvaṃ pratiniyamahetuḥ* (*BoBh*: 98).

[164]*tatra śaktivaicitryaṃ hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate/ tat kasya hetoḥ/ tathā hi/ kāmapratisaṃyuktā dharmā vicitrasvabhāvā vicitrād svabhāvaviśeṣāc chaktivaicitryād utpadyante/ yathā kāmapratisaṃyuktā evaṃ rūpapratisaṃyuktā ārūpyapratisaṃyuktā apratisaṃyuktāḥ/ tasmāc chaktivaicitryam adhiṣṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate* (*YBh*: 109-110).

pratiniyamakāraṇa as the variety of conditions, and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* explains this by saying that the various different results are produced by different conditions. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* gives as an example the conditions of rebirth in the five destinations, which produce rebirth in those destinations.[165] Finally, the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* gives the most detailed explanation of *pratiniyamahetu* and the *adhiṣṭhāna* that is its support. *Śaktivaicitryādhiṣṭhāna* is the special force possessed by all *saṃskṛtadharmas* due to which there is production or experience[166] of their respective results. *Pratiniyamahetu* is based on this because each *dharma* can produce a result pertaining only to its own *dhātu*, etc.,[167] and can obtain a fruit pertaining only to its own vehicle.[168]

Jaini notes that *pratiniyama*, like *yoga*, does not correspond to a member of the Vaiśeṣika lists, but he does not suggest a possible source for this *viprayukta* (Jaini 1959b: 536). In trying to establish a source, I have shown that the same principle of causality that is given the status of a provisional *viprayuktadharma* by the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is described in the definition of *pratiniyamahetu*. The use of the terms *pratiniyama* and *pratiniyata* to describe the fact that causes, despite their infinitely large number, give rise only to the appropriate results is, as far as I can tell, limited to the Yogācāra expositions of causality and to the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra*, a text that explains *pratītyasamutpāda* in a manner similar to that of the Yogācāra (Matsuda1982a: 48). All

[165] *pratiniyamakāraṇaṃ, pratyayavaicitryaṃ, tadyathā pañcagatipratyayāḥ pañcānāṃ gatīnām* (*AS*: 27). *pratiniyamakāraṇaṃ bhinnasvabhāvatayānyonyaphalatvāt* (*ASBh*: 36).

[166] 起證. According to the *Shindōjōyuishikiron*, 起 refers to *saṃskṛtadharmas* while 證 refers to *asaṃskṛta*, presumably, that is, to *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* (*Shindō*: 343). However, La Vallée Poussin ignores the term 證 in his translation (1929: 458).

[167] *Shindō* explains that a *dharma* of a certain *dhātu* will be the cause of a *dharma* of the same *dhātu*, a *dharma* within a *dhātu* of a certain nature will be the cause of a *dharma* of the same nature, and a *rūpadharma* of a certain nature will be the cause of another *rūpadharma*, etc. (*Shindō*: 343; see also La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 458).

[168] 十二差別功能依處。謂有為法各於自果有能證差別勢力。即依此處立定異因謂各能生自界等果。及各能得自乘果故。(T. 1585: 41c; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 458; *Shindō*: 343).

references to the *cittaviprayukta pratiniyama* and to *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* are later than our first reference to *pratiniyamahetu* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which is one of the oldest portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The relative positions of the *viprayukta* and *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha*, however, are not so clear, since the chronological relationship between the portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which they occur has not been definitely established. However, whether or not the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is, as I believe, generally older than the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*, the Yogācāra exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* exists in at least one form (in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*) that is undoubtedly older than any Yogācāra discussion of the *viprayuktas*. Therefore, although the earliest reference to *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* that we have is found in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*,[169] it is not impossible that the category of the *pratītyasamutpādārthas* was borrowed from another, no longer extant exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, later than the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, which does not mention them, but earlier than the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*. Thus, I would tentatively suggest that *pratiniyatahetuphalārtha* is later than *pratiniyamahetu* but earlier than the *viprayukta*. In any case, I think that the origin of the *viprayukta pratiniyama* can be found in earlier expositions of causality, specifically in *pratiniyamahetu*.

c. *Yoga*

The definitions of *yoga* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* are almost identical. They both seem to be based on the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, according to which *yoga* is a designation applied to the conformity between cause and result.[170] The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* explains this

[169]As for *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra*, Matsuda thinks that it is contemporaneous with, if not authored by, Vasubandhu.

[170]*AS* -- *yogaḥ katamaḥ/ hetuphalānurūpye yoga iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 19). *Hysel* -- 謂諸行因果相稱性 (T. 1602: 484b). *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* -- *rgyu dan 'bras bu mthun pa'i gnas skabs la'o* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 77b 3); 答依因果相稱分位建立相應。(T. 1579: 607c).

conformity as meaning that causes have appropriate results, despite the fact that cause and result are different, and it gives the example of the obtainment of wealth that can result from giving charity.[171]

The definition in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, however, is somewhat different. According to it, *yoga* consists of the established names of *dharmas*, their differentiation, and the means by which they can be discerned. *Yoga*, when subdivided, corresponds to the four types of *yukti*: *apekṣāyukti, kāryakāraṇayukti, upapattisādhanayukti,* and *dharmatāyukti*.[172] Finally, a reference is made to the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, in which the four *yukti*s are explained in greater detail.[173]

The four *yukti*s appear exclusively in Yogācāra texts,[174] where they play an important role in *vipaśyanā* meditation.[175] The *Śrāvakabhūmi* seems to be the earliest extant source, and it enumerates and defines the *yukti*s in two separate passages.[176] The

[171]*hetuphalasārūpyam anyatve 'pi yad yasya phalaṃ yujyate/ tadyathā dānasya bhogasampad ity evam ādi* (*ASBh*: 10).

[172]These Sanskrit equivalents are from *Śrāvakabhūmi* (Wayman 1961: 78-80).

[173]*de la sbyor ba gaṅ że na/ chos de daṅ de dag gi kun tu tha sñad gdags pa daṅ/ rnam par bźag pa daṅ/ so sor rtogs par bya ba'i thabs gaṅ yin pa de ni sbyor ba źes bya'o/ rab tu bye na rigs pa bźi po 'di lta ste/ ltos pa'i rigs pa daṅ/ bya ba byed ba'i rigs pa daṅ/ 'thad pas sgrub pa'i rigs pa daṅ/ chos ñid kyi rigs pa dag ni sbyor ba źes bya ste/ rigs pa de dag gi rab tu dbye ba ni 'di lta ste/ ñan thos kyi sa las 'byuṅ ba bźin du rig par bya'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 28a 3-5); 復次云何相應。謂彼彼諸法為等言説為等建立為等開解諸勝法便。是謂相應。又此相應差別分別有四道理。謂觀持道理。作用道理。因成道理。法爾道理。此諸道理當知如聲地等已廣分別 (T. 1579: 588a).

[174]Sources aside from *ŚrBh* include: *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which mentions the four *yukti*s and refers to a previous explanation, presumably in *ŚrBh* (*BoBh*: 293); *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 794a -- the *sūtras* [T. 99: 8b-c, *sūtras* nos. 37-38; see Mukai 1985: 30] on which this passage comments do not mention them; also 880a, which refers to *ŚrBh* by name); *Śrutamayībhūmi* (T. 1579: 346a), which defines *yukti* as consisting of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the four *yukti*s; the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (T. 676: 709b-710a; Lamotte 1935: 262-265), which is notable for its long discussion of *upapattisādhanayukti*, which it divides into two types, pure and impure; *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (T. 1605: 687a; Rahula 1980: 136; *ASBh*: 99); *Hyscl* (T. 1602: 582b-583a); and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (*Msā*: 168; Lévi 1911: 275). See also Mochizuki 1974: 3920.

[175]Especially *ŚrBh*: 369-370 (T. 1579: 451c-452a; Wayman 1961: 111-113).

[176]*ŚrBh*: 141-143 (T. 1579: 419b-c; Wayman 1961: 78-80 includes partial text and translation) and *ŚrBh*: 369-370 (T. 1579: 451c-452a; Wayman 1961: 111-113 includes

first of these explains that when one examines the teaching of the *skandhas* by reasoning, as opposed to enumeration, one should employ four types of reasoning.[177] *Apekṣāyukti* is reasoning applied to the relation of dependence whereby the *skandhas* appear due to causes and conditions and the relation of dependence whereby the *skandhas* are designated by words, sentences, and syllables.[178] *Kāryakāraṇayukti* is reasoning applied to cause and result, specifically to the fact that the various *dharmas* have their own particular causes and results and that there is a correlation between cause and result.[179] *Upapattisādhanayukti* is reasoning applied to proving, by means of the three types of valid knowledge, statements about the *skandhas*, for example, that they are impermanent, conditionally originated, etc.[180] Finally, *dharmatāyukti* is reasoning applied to the question of why things are the way they are, for example, why the *skandhas* are impermanent, and why *nirvāṇa* is peaceful.[181]

complete text and translation).

[177]*kathaṃ yuktyupaparīkṣākārayā cintayā skandhadeśanāṃ cintayati/ catsrabhir yuktibhir upaparīkṣate/ katamabhiś catasrabhir yad utāpekṣāyuktyā kāryakāraṇayuktyā upapapattisādhanayuktyā dharmatāyuktyā* (Wayman 1961: 78-79 [where Wayman includes the complete text, I shall refer to his text since it is generally more accurate than Shukla's; I shall refer to Shukla, however, when Wayman's text is incomplete]).

[178]*apekṣāyuktiḥ katamā/ dvividhā apekṣā utpattyapekṣā prajñaptyapekṣā ca/ tatrotpattyapekṣā yair hetupratyayaiḥ skandhānāṃ prādurbhāvo bhavati/ tasyām skandhotpattau te hetavas te pratyayā apekṣyante/ yair nāmakāyapadakāyavyaṃjanakāyaiḥ skandhānāṃ prajñaptir bhavati/ tasyāṃ skandhaprajñaptau te nāmapadakāyavyaṃjanakāyā apekṣyante/ iyam ucyate skandheṣūtpattyapekṣā/ prajñaptyapekṣatā (kṣā) ca/ yā cotpattyapekṣā/ yā ca prajñaptyapekṣā sā yuktir yoga upāyaḥ/ skandhotpattaye/ skandhaprajñaptaye tasmād apekṣāyuktir ity ucyate* (*ŚrBh*: 141-142).

[179]*kāryakāraṇayuktir yā [ta]d utpannānāṃ skandhānāṃ svena hetunā svena pratyayena tasmiṃs tasmin svakāryakaraṇe viniyogas tadyathā/ cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi draṣṭavyāni/ śrotreṇa śabdā[ḥ] śrotavyāḥ/ yāvan manasā dharmā vijñeyā iti/ rūpeṇa cakṣuṣo gocare avasthātavyaṃ/ śabdena śrotrasya evaṃ yā[va* {my addition}] *d dharmair manasa iti/ yad vā punar anyad apy evaṃbhāgīyaṃ/ tatra tatra dharmāṇāṃ anyo [a]nyaṃ kāryakāreṇa pratiyuktir yoga upāya iyam ucyate/ kāryakāraṇayuktiḥ* (*ŚrBh*: 142).

[180]*upapattisādhanayuktiḥ katamā/ anityā[ḥ] skandhā iti pratītyasamutpannā duḥkhā[ḥ] śūnyā anātmāna iti tribhiḥ pramāṇair upaparīkṣate yadutāptāgamena pratyakṣeṇānumānena ca/ ebhis tribhiḥ pramāṇair upapattiyukteḥ satāṃ hṛdayagrāhakair vyavasthāpanā sādhanā kriyate/ yad uta skandhānityatāyā vā pratītyasamutpannatāyā vā duḥkhatāyā[ḥ] śūnyatāyā iyam ucyate upapattisādhanayuktiḥ* (*ŚrBh*: 142-143).

[181]*dharmatā-yuktiḥ katamā/ kena kāraṇena tathābhūtā ete skandhā(s) tathābhūto*

Returning to the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, we find that it thus defines *yoga* very broadly in terms mainly of the relationships between words and their referents and between reality and the understanding of it. The second passage, on the other hand, which seems to rely on the definitions of the first type of *apekṣāyukti* and of *kāryakāraṇayukti*, focuses on the causal aspect of *yoga*. As I have mentioned, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* do likewise. Similarly, it is the causal aspect of *yoga*, specifically the facet corresponding to *kāryakāraṇayukti*, that is related to *anurūpahetuphalārtha*.

f. *Java*

Again, the definitions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*[182] are very similar to that of the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, according to which *java* is a designation referring to the fact that origination-and-continuance proceeds rapidly.[183] This in turn is based upon the basic definition of the first passage, namely that *java* is the rapid motion that is constituted by the production and destruction of the *saṃskṛtadharmas*. The first passage then defines ten[184] types of *java*: 1) the speed of the

lokasaṃniveśaḥ kena kāraṇena khara-lakṣaṇā pṛthivī drava-lakṣaṇā āpaḥ uṣṇa-lakṣaṇaṃ teja(ḥ) samudīraṇa-lakṣaṇo vayuḥ/ anityāḥ skandhā(ḥ)/ kena kāraṇena śāntaṃ nirvāṇam iti/ tathā rūpa[ṇa]-lakṣaṇaṃ rūpam anubhavana-lakṣaṇā vedanā saṃjānanā-lakṣaṇā saṃjñā abhisaṃskaraṇa-lakṣaṇāḥ saṃskārā vijānanā-lakṣaṇaṃ vijñānam iti/ prakṛtir eṣāṃ dharmāṇāṃ idaṃ svabhāva eṣa īdṛśaḥ dharmataiṣā(ṃ) caiva cāsau dharmatā/ saivātra yuktir yoga upāyaḥ evaṃ vā etasmāt/ anyathā vā naiva vāsmāt sarvatraiva ca dharmataiva pratiprasaraṇaṃ dharmataiva yuktiḥ/ cittanidhyapanāya cittasaṃjñapanāya iyam ucyate dharmatā-yuktiḥ (Wayman 1961: 79).

[182]*javaḥ katamaḥ/ hetuphalāśupravṛttau java iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 19). 謂諸行流轉迅疾性。 (T. 1602: 484b).

[183]*mgyogs pa gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags/ mam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ myur du 'jugs pa'i gnas skabs la'o/ mam pa gsum ste/ 'du byed kyi mgyogs pa daṅ/ skyes bu'i byed pa'i mgyogs pa daṅ/ rdzu 'phrul gyi mgyogs pa'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 77b 4-5). 問依何分位建立勢速。此復幾種。答依迅疾流轉分位建立勢速。此復三種。謂諸行勢速。士用勢速。神通勢速。(T. 1579: 607).

[184]The Chinese translation only includes nine, as does *Chüeh ting tsang lun* (T.

origination-and-continuance of the *saṃskṛtadharmas*, which is equivalent to their rapid production and annihilation; 2) the speed manifested in the motion of those dwelling on the earth, for example, that of men, elephants, horses, etc.; 3) the speed of those dwelling in the air, for example, that of birds, certain gods, and *yakṣas*; 4) the speed of sounds (I cannot understand the example given); 5) the speed of water, that is, the flowing of the current of rivers, etc.; 6) the speed of fire, that is, the movement of a fire consuming fuel (this is not clear); 7) the speed of wind;[185] 8) the speed of force, for example, that of turning a wheel; 9) the speed of knowing, for example, the speed with which a *yogin* is able to analyze that which is to be known; and 10) the speed of psychic powers, for example, the speed of mind and movement available to the possessors of great psychic powers.[186]

Only the first subdivision of *java* in the lists of both the first and second

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1584: 1025a-b).

[185]This type of *java* is not mentioned in the Chinese.

[186](This passage is difficult, and I have not translated it in full but only paraphrased it as best I could.) *de la mgyogs pa gaṅ źe/ 'du byed rnams kyi 'byuṅ ba daṅ/ 'jig pa'i tshul gyis myur du 'gro źiṅ rgyu ba ñid ni mgyogs pa źes bya'o/ de la 'du byed rnams kyi 'jug* (corrected from *'jugs* on the basis of the Derge edition -- YBh_{td}: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 50, line 2) *pa'i mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste 'du byed rnams kyi myur du skye ba daṅ 'gag pa'o/ sems can sa la gnas pa rnams kyi rtul ba'i mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste mi daṅ glaṅ po che daṅ rta la sogs pa'i'o/ sems can bar snaṅ la gnas pa rnams kyi mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste bya rnams daṅ/ bar snaṅ la gnas pa'i lha daṅ gnod sbyin la sogs pa'i'o/ sgra skad gyi mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste sgra 'byuṅ ba'i'o/ chu'i mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste chu kluṅ gi rgyun la sogs pa'i 'bab pa* (corrected from *bar ba* on the basis of the Derge edition -- YBh_{td}: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 50, line 4) *ñid do/ me'i mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste sreg bya'i me'i 'gro ba ñid do/ rluṅ gi mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste rluṅ gi mtshogs chen po rgyun gyi'o/ śugs kyi mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste mda' daṅ/ 'khor lo la sogs pa'i 'phaṅs pa'i'o/ śes pa'i mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste rnal 'byor pa'i śes rab myur ba ñid kyi śes bya rab tu 'byed pa ñid kyi'o/ rdzu 'phrul gyis mgyogs pa yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste rdzu phrul chen po daṅ ldan pa rdzu 'phrul gyis 'gro ba'i lus 'gro ba daṅ/ yid mgyogs pa'o* (YBh_t: zi 28a 5-28b 3). 復次云何勢速。謂諸行生滅相應速運 轉性。是謂謂勢速。又此勢速差別多種。或有諸行流轉勢速。謂諸行生滅性。或有地行有情輕健勢速。謂人象馬等。或有空行有情勢速。謂諸飛禽空行藥又及諸天等。或有言音勢速。謂詞韻捷利。或有流潤勢速。謂江河等迅速流注。或有燒然勢速。謂火焚燎猛焰飆 (the actual character in the Taishō text is a nonstandard variation of this [Morohashi 1957-1960: number 43965]) 轉。或有引發勢速。謂放箭轉丸等。或有智慧勢速。謂修觀者簡擇所知迅速慧性。或有神通勢速。謂大神通者所有運身謂勢等速疾神 (T. 1579: 588a-b).

Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī passages is directly related to causality. However, the basic definitions in both passages, as well as the definition found in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, refer to the arising and destruction of conditioned *dharmas* and hence are clearly causal. Furthermore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines *java,* as it does all but one (*saṃkhyā*) of the last group of *viprayuktas*, specifically with reference to *hetuphala*. Therefore, the primary significance of the *viprayukta java* is related to cause and result. Although Jaini points out a correspondence between *java* and the Vaiśeṣika *vega*, I do not see any real similarity aside from the nearly synonymous names.[187]

g. *Anukrama*

The basic definitions of the two *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passages and the definitions in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* all agree that *anukrama* is a designation for the fact that the constituents of conditioned existence appear one by one in a determined order.[188] The first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage lists seven types of *anukrama*: 1) *pravṛttyanukrama,*[189] which is the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in the progressive order

[187]Jaini quotes from the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*: *Vego ... niyata-dik-kriyāprabandhahetu* (Jaini 1959b: 538).

[188]*de la go rims gaṅ źe na/ 'du byed kyi rgyud so so* [corrected from *so so so so* on the basis of the Derge edition -- YBh_{t_d}: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 50, line 6] *dag la re re nas go rims sṅa phyis 'jug pa gaṅ yin pa de ni go rims źes bya'o* (YBh_t: zi 28b 3). 復次云次第。謂於客別行相續中。前後次第一一隨轉。是謂次第。(T. 1579: 588b).

go rims [corrected from *rim* on the basis of the Derge edition -- YBh_{t_d}: v. 39, text 4038, p. 376, leaf 147, line 4] *gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags...'du byed re re nas 'jug pa'i gnas skabs la'o* (YBh_t: zi 77b 5-6). 問依何分位建立次第。... 答依一一行流轉分位建立次第。(T. 1579: 607c).

anukramaḥ katamaḥ/ hetuphalaikatvapravṛttāv anukrama iti prajñaptiḥ (*AS*: 19). *ekaikasyaiva pravṛttir ayugapat pravṛttir veditavyā* (*ASBh*: 10).

謂諸行一一次第流轉性 (T. 1602 [*Hyscl*]: 484b).

[189]The Sanskrit equivalents are all my retranslations. In some cases I have not been able to retranslates the names of the types of *anukramas*.

of defilement;[190] 2) *nivṛttyanukrama*, which is the formula in the progressive order of purification;[191] 3) *anukrama* pertaining to entering and staying in the condition of being a householder or a monk;[192] 4) *anukrama* of growth, namely, the procession through the eight stages of childhood, youth, etc.;[193] 5) *abhisamayānukrama*, namely, the order in which one understands the four noble truths, starting with the truth of suffering;[194] 6) *samāpattyanukrama*, namely, the order in which one enters the nine *samāpattis*;[195] and 7) *śikṣānukrama*, namely, the fact that one produces *adhicitta* based on *adhiśīla* before producing *adhiprajñā* based on *adhicitta*.[196] The three types in the second passage are difficult to understand, and I do not see exactly how they correspond to the seven types

[190] *de la 'jug pa'i go rims kyaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnams źes bya ba nas/ rgyas par skye ba'i rkyen gyis rga śi'i bar du'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 28b 3-4). 或有流轉次第。謂無明緣行。廣說乃至生緣老死。(T. 1579: 588b). See also Chapter 2, section B10.

[191] *ldog pa'i go rims kyaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed rnams 'gags ces bya ba nas rgyas par* [*skye ba 'gags pas rga śi* -- added on the basis of the Derge edition (*YBh*$_{td}$: v. 39, text 4038, p. 363, leaf 51, line 1)] *'gags pa'i bar du'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 28b 4-5). 或有還滅次第。謂無明滅故行滅。乃至生滅故老死滅。 (T. 1579: 588b). See also Chapter 2, section B10.

[192] *khyim pa daṅ rab tu byuṅ ba rnams kyi rgyu ba daṅ/ gnas pa'i go rims kyaṅ yod de* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 28b 4). 或有在家出家行住次第。(T. 1579: 588b). There follows a long list of activities of the householder and monk that must be done in a certain sequence.

[193] *mṅon par 'grub pa'i go rims yaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste/ byis ba daṅ gźon nu la sogs pa'i gnas skabs brgyad po dag go rims kyis 'byuṅ ba'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 29a 2-3). 或有增長次第。謂嬰孩童子等八位次第生起。(T. 1579: 588b). *KIK* lists eight states but does not indicate the origin of the list (*KIK* Yuga-bu III: 329 n. 3).

[194] *mṅon par rtogs pa'i go rims kyaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste sdug bsṅal la sogs pa 'phags pa'i bden pa bźi po dag rims kyis mṅon par rtogs pa'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 29a 3-4). 或有現觀次第。謂於苦等四聖諦中次第現觀。 (T. 1579: 588b).

[195] *sñoms bar 'jug pa'i go rims kyaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste mthar gyis gnas pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa dgu po dag la rim gyis sñoms par 'jug go* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 29a 4). 或有入定次第。謂次第入九次第定。(T. 1579: 588b). *KIK* explains that these are the four *dhyānas*, the four *ārūpyas*, and *nirodhasamāpatti* (*KIK* Yuga-bu III: 329 n. 4).

[196] *bslab pa'i go rims kyaṅ yod de/ 'di lta ste lhag pa'i tshul khrims la brten pa'i go rims gyis lhag pa'i sems skye ba daṅ lhag pa'i sems la brten nas lhag pa'i źes rab skye ba'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 29a 4-5). 或有修學次第。謂增上戒學為依。次生增上心學。增上心學為依。後生增上慧學。(T. 1579: 588b).

of the first passage.[197] Translated literally, these comprise: the order in which moments proceed, the order in which the body proceeds (i.e., grows), and the order in which the accomplishment of what is to be done proceeds. If we compare these divisions with those of the first passage, we could say that the first type perhaps includes *pravṛtti-* and *nivṛttyanukrama,* the second, *anukrama* of growth, and the third, *abhisamaya-*, *samāpatti-*, and *śikṣānukrama.*

h. *Kāla*

The definitions of *kāla* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* are phrased differently but are similar in meaning. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya, kāla* is a designation for the forward movement of the stream of causes and results.[198] The *Bhāṣya* explains that when cause and result have both arisen and been destroyed, it is called the past. Similarly, when they have not yet arisen, it is called the future, and when they have arisen, but not yet been destroyed, it is called the future.[199] The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* says that *kāla* refers to the fact that *saṃskṛtadharmas* progress by arising and being destroyed again and again.[200] The second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* definition is even more abstract, but it also amounts to the same thing: *kāla* is the non-interruption of the stream of *saṃskṛtas.*[201]

[197]*rnam pa gsum ste/ skad cig pa'i 'jug pa'i go rim dan/ lus 'jug pa'i go rim dan/ bya ba sgrub pa 'jug pa'i go rims so* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 77b 6). 此復三種。謂刹那流轉次第。内身流轉次第。成立所作流轉次第。(T. 1579: 607c).

[198]*kālaḥ katamaḥ/ hetuphalaprabandhapravṛttau kāla iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 19).

[199]*hetuphalasya prabandhena pravṛttau satyāṃ yat tatra hetuphalam utpannaniruddhaṃ so 'tītaḥ kāla iti prajñapyate, yad anutpannaṃ so 'nāgataḥ kālaḥ, yad utpannāniruddhaṃ sa pratyutpannaḥ kāla iti* (*ASBh*: 10).

[200]謂諸行展轉新新生滅性。 (Compare with *AS*: 謂於因果相續流轉。假立時。[T. 1602: 484b]).

[201]*dus gnas skabs gan la gdags/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ 'du byed kyi*

The basic definition in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage is more complicated. *Kāla* is explained both in astronomical terms and in terms of the *saṃskṛtadharmas*: divisions of time are established and manifested due to the rising and setting of the sun as well as due to the arising and destruction of the *saṃskṛtadharmas*. Measures of time in diminishing order (epoch, year, month, etc.) are given as examples, as well as past, future, and present; Hsüan-tsang's translation suggests that the measures are divisions of astronomical time, while past, present, and future pertain to the *saṃskṛtas*.[202] Again, our other passages focus on only one of the aspects described in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage.

Interestingly, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Vasubandhu, in order to refute those (presumably the Vaiśeṣikas) who think that *kāla* is a permanent and substantial entity, asks "What is this *dharma* called *kāla*?" His answer is that it is an appellation designating the *saṃskṛtadharmas*.[203] Yaśomitra adds that the name indicates the *saṃskṛtadharmas* of the past, future, and present.[204] As P'u-kuang points out (T. 1821: 23b-c), a similar position can be found in the *Vibhāṣā*, which concludes that a *kalpa*, like the smaller units

rgyun mi 'chad pa'i gnas skabs la'o/ rnam pa gsum pa ste/ 'das pa daṅ/ ma 'oṅs pa daṅ/ da ltar byuṅ ba'o (*YBh*$_t$: zi 77b 6-7). 問依何分位建立時。此復幾種。答依行相續不斷分位建立時。此復三種。謂去來今。(T. 1579: 607c).

[202]The Tibetan and Chinese translations vary considerably here: *de la dus gaṅ źe na/ ñi ma 'char ba daṅ nub pa'i dbaṅ du byas te dus yoṅs su chad pa daṅ/ ñe bar mtshon pa rnam par gźag pa daṅ/ 'du byed rnams kyi 'byuṅ ba daṅ 'jig pa'i dbaṅ du byas te/ dus yoṅs su chad pa daṅ ñe bar mtshon pa'i rnam par gźag pa ni 'di lta ste/ dus tshigs daṅ/ lo daṅ/ zla ba daṅ/ zla ba phyed daṅ/ ñin mo daṅ mtshan mo daṅ/ skad cig daṅ/ thaṅ cig daṅ/ yud tsam rnams daṅ/ 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa daṅ/ da ltar byuṅ ba rnams kyi dus źes bya'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 29a 5-7). 復次云何時。謂由日輪出沒增上力故。安立顯示時節差別。又由諸行生滅增上力故。安立顯示世位差別。總說名時。此時差別復有多種。謂時年月半月晝夜刹那臘縛牟呼栗多等位。及與過去未來現在。 (T. 1579: 588b-c). Portions of the Chinese that seem to be Hsüan-tsang's interpretive additions are underlined.

[203]*kālo nāma ka eṣa dharmaḥ/ saṃskāraparidīpanādhivacanam etat* (*ASBh*: 212; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 62).

[204]*kālo ity asyābhidhānasya kim abhidheyam ity arthaḥ/ saṃskāra-paridīpanādhivacanam etad iti. saṃskārāṇām atītānāgata-pratyutpannānām abhidyotakaṃ nāmeti. tad-yathā 'tītaḥ kālo yāvat pratyutpanna it trayadhvikāḥ saṃskārā eva gamyaṃte* (*AKVy*: 375).

of time of which it is composed, is nothing other than the *skandhas*.[205] Furthermore, as P'u-kuang also mentions, Saṃghabhadra answers Vasubandhu's question in the same way, saying that *kāla* is nothing but the *saṃskṛtadharmas*.[206] However, none of these sources refers to the fact that the *Yogācārabhūmi* considers *kāla* a *viprayukta*, albeit a *prajñapti*.

i. (*Deśa*)

Deśa is not mentioned in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage. According to our second passage, which contains what must be the earliest extant definition of this *viprayukta*, it is a designation for a state of that which is included in *rūpa*. There are three types: that which is above, that which is below, and that which is to the side.[207] The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* says that it refers to the fact that it is the nature of *rūpin dharmas* to be distributed equally everywhere.[208] Finally, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states that *deśa* is simply a designation for cause and result in all ten directions, for example, the east south, west, and north, and above and below; the *Bhāṣya*, echoing the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* definition, points out that *deśa* only refers to cause and result consisting of *rūpa*, because that which does not consist of *rūpa* cannot pervade the directions.[209]

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[205]如是說者。晝夜等位無不皆是五蘊生滅。以此成劫劫體亦然。然劫既通三界時分。故用五蘊四蘊為性。(T. 1545: 700b-c).

[206]何法名時非離諸行。(T. 1562: 551c).

[207]*yul gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ gzugs yoṅs su bzuṅ ba'i gnas skabs la'o/ rnam pa gsum ste/ og gi yul daṅ/ steṅ gi yul daṅ/ thad ka'i yul lo* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 77b 7-8). 問依何分位建立方。此復幾種。答依所攝受諸色分位建立方。此復三種。謂上下傍。(T. 1579: 607c).

[208]謂諸色行遍分齊性。(T. 1602: 484b). I am not confident about my translation of this definition.

[209]*deśaḥ katamaḥ/ pūrvadakṣiṇapaścimottarādharordhvāsu sarvato daśasu dikṣu hetuphala eva deśa iti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 11). *hetuphalasya digvyāptau deśopacāraḥ/*

All of these definitions describe the peculiar quality of matter whereby it has a spatial location, but I cannot understand why *deśa* is posited as *viprayukta*, unless Jaini is correct in assuming a Vaiśeṣika influence. Even if there were such an influence, *deśa* seems out of place in that, unlike the other Yogācāra *viprayuktas*, it does not seem to explain any particular feature of causality, despite the attempt by the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* to make it appear to do so. In contrast, *kāla*, in the sense of past, present, and future, is similar to the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in being a designation for the *saṃskṛtadharmas* at different stages of the causal process (see section C3a). *Deśa* is not mentioned as a *viprayukta* in the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage. Furthermore, in the *Ta ch'eng pai fa ming men lun* (T. 1614: 855c), its position is transposed with that of *kāla*, while all the other *viprayuktas* appear in the same order as in the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*. Therefore, as well as appearing out of place among the other Yogācāra *viprayuktas*, *deśa* does not seem to have been thoroughly established in the Yogācāra lists.

j. *Saṃkhyā*

According to the first *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage, *saṃkhyā* establishes and manifests the different standards for enumerating various things, for example, one, two, many, and innumerable.[210] The second passage says that it is a designation for the state that manifests the enumeration of *dharmas* and that there are three types: one, two, and

rūpasaṃgṛhītaṃ cātra hetuphalaṃ veditavyam arūpiṇāṃ digvyāpanasāmarthyābhāvāt (*ASBh*: 10).

[210]*de la rnam grańs gań źe na/ rdzas tha dad pa grań ba'i tshad yońs su chad pa dań/ ñe bar mtshon pa rnam par gźag pa ni grańs źes bya'o/ de yań grańs gcig dań/ grańs gñis dań/ de phan chad kyi grańs mań po dań mthar thug pa'i grańs med pa ste/ de phan chad brań ba thams cad kyi grańs 'jug par mi 'gyur bas/ de'i phyir mthar thug pa'i grańs źes bya'o* (*YBh*$_t$: zi 29a 7-29b 1). 復次云何數。謂安立顯示客別事物。計算數量差別。是名為數。此數差別復有多種。謂一數二數。從已去皆名多數。又數邊際名阿僧企耶。自此已去一切算數所不能轉。是故數之邊際名不可數 (T. 1579: 588c).

many.[211] These two definitions are basically the same.

In the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, *saṃkhyā* represents not only enumeration but also the nature of *dharmas* that underlies the fact that they can be counted. The *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* says that the nature of *saṃskṛtadharmas*, etc., whereby their *svalakṣaṇas* proceed in a stream [consisting] of individual [*dharmas*, etc.], is called *saṃkhyā*.[212] The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is clearer: *saṃkhyā* is a designation for the distinctness between each and every *saṃskṛtadharma*, to which the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* adds that, if there were no such separation, one could not enumerate [using the numbers] two, three, etc.[213] Thus, these texts interpret the *viprayukta saṃkhyā* as a description of the plurality of entities that is at the heart of the Buddhist understanding of existence. This interpretation goes beyond what is suggested in the two *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passages.

5. *Kāla, Deśa,* and *Saṃkhyā* and the Eleven *Vijñaptis*

Kāla, deśa, and *saṃkhyā* appear elsewhere in Yogācāra literature, in a list of eleven *vijñaptis* in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha,* which is also referred to in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (T. 1584: 46a; *Shindō*: 370; La Vallée Poussin 1928-1929: 524). The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* defines dependent nature (*paratantralakṣaṇā*) as consisting of cognitions

[211] *grańs gnas skabs gań la gdags/ rnam pa du yod ce na/ smras pa/ chos yońs su gźal ba yań dag par mtshon pa'i gnas skabs la'o/ rnam pa gsum ste/ gcig gi grańs dań/ gñis kyi grańs dań/ mań po'i grańs so* (*YBh$_t$*: zi 77b 8-78a 1). 問依何分位建立數。此復幾種。答依法齊量表了分位建立數。此復三種。謂一數二數多數。(T. 1579: 607b-608a).

[212] 謂於諸行等各別相續體相流轉性。(T. 1602: 484b). Again, my translation is tentative.

[213] *saṃkhyā katamā/ saṃskārāṇāṃ pratyekaśo bhede saṃkhyeti prajñaptiḥ* (*AS*: 11). *pratyekaśo bhede saṃkhyety abhinnaikātmakatve dvitrisaṃkhyādyanupapatteḥ* (*ASBh*: 10).

that have *ālayavijñāna* as their seed and that are included in false imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*),[214] and it mentions thirteen[215] of these. The two commentaries define these *vijñaptis*, and Lamotte's translations of the definitions of *adhva-*,[216] *saṃkhyā-*, and *deśavijñapti* are as follows: "6. *kālavijñapti*: 'c'est l'ininterruption dans le courant du Saṃsāra (*saṃsārapravāhāsamucchcda*).' (Bh [= Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya*]) — 'C'est l'idée qui se manifeste avec l'apparence des trois époques (*tryadhvan*).' (U [=Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana*]) 7. *saṃkhyāvijñapti*: 'c'est la numérotation (*gaṇana*).' (Bh) — 'C'est l'idée qui se manifest numériquement, avec l'apparence de 1, etc.' (U) 8. *deśavijñapti*: 'c'est le monde-réceptacle (*bhājanaloka*).' (Bh) — 'C'est l'idée qui se manifeste avec l'apparence d'un village (*grāma*), d'un jardin (*ārāma*), etc.' (U)"

As I have mentioned earlier, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* is a very different kind of text from *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in that it systematically and explicitly presents such characteristically Yogācāra doctrines as *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñaptimātra*. Here we see explained in terms of *ālayavijñāna*, *trisvabhāva*, and *vijñaptimātra*[217] three of the same phenomena that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and other Yogācāra *abhidharma* expositions (which is how I would characterize both of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī viprayukta* expositions, as well as that of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*) explain by means of *viprayuktasaṃskāras*. That the *viprayukta kāla* and *adhvavijñapti*, in particular, refer to the same thing is supported by the fact that Vasubandhu's definition in the *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya* is almost identical

[214]*de la gźan gyi dbaṅ gi mtshan ñid gaṅ źe na/ gaṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i sa bon can yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pas bsdus pa'i rnam par rig pa'o* (*MS*$_t$: 24).

[215]Nagao says that this list is not intended to be inclusive (Nagao 1982, v. 1: 289)

[216]This is Aramaki's retranslation (Nagao 1982, v. 1: 58). Lamotte gives *kāla-* (Lamotte 1973: 88).

[217]*ji ltar rnam par rig pa 'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam ñid du gnas par 'gyur źe na/ mdor bsdu na rnam pa gsum gyi ste/ ... de ltar rnam par rig pa 'di dag thams cad ni don med pas de tsam yin la*, etc. (*MS*$_t$: 29; Lamotte 1973: 99-100; Nagao 1982: 303).

to that of the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage.[218]

6. Conclusion

The chronological relation among the non-Sarvāstivādin sources discussed in this chapter is beginning to seem clear. The Dārṣṭāntika of the *Vibhāṣā* is the earliest to criticize the reality of the *viprayuktas*: Katō has identified seven references to his opinions, one regarding *pṛthagjanatva*, two regarding *samanvāgama* (=*prāpti*) and/or *asamanvāgama*, three regarding the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, and one regarding *nāma-*, *pada-*, and *vyañjanakāya* (Katō 1989: 303-304). Our next earliest source is Harivarman's *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, which contains a fairly long section in which each *viprayukta* is shown to lack independent existence. Harivarman is of particular interest to us because of the way in which he invokes the principle of causality to show the superfluousness of the *viprayuktas*, particularly *jāti*.[219] Finally, Śrīlāta's denial of the reality of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is similar to that of Harivarman (Katō 1989: 306-307).

One of the earliest sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, although it does not discuss the category of *viprayuktasaṃskāras* or even mention the term, denies

[218]Compare Hsüan-tsang's translation of *MSBh* (世識者。謂生死相續不斷性。 -- (T. 1597: 338a) with the second *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* passage (答依行相續不斷分位建立時。 -- T. 1579: 607b). See note to section C4h.

[219]He identifies as the deep meaning of the Buddhadharma the statement that all *dharmas* arise due to the coming together of all the conditions (又佛法深義。謂衆縁和合有諸法生。是故無法能生異法。 -- T. 1646: 289b). And he states that *jāti* is defined by the Buddha in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula: 又十二因縁中。佛自説生義。諸衆生處處生受諸陰名為生。是故現在世中初得諸陰名生。(T. 1646: 289b). Sastri translates this as follows: "The Buddha himself explains the import of the term *Jāti* in the *Dvādaśa-Nidāna-Sūtra* thus: The birth (*jāti*) of such and such living beings in the midst of such and such places is the gaining of the five aggregates of elements. So *jāti* is the first appearance of five aggregates of elements" (Sastri 1978, v. 2: 189). However, he does not further identify the *Dvādaśa-Nidāna-Sūtra*; the *Répertoire du Canon Bouddhique Sino-Japonais* (Demiéville 1978: 70) identifies one *sūtra* by the short title of 十二因縁 (T. 713), but it does not contain such a definition of *jāti*. The last sentence of this passage contradicts the three lifetimes/twofold causation theory, which locates *jāti* in the future.

the separate existence of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* on the grounds that they refer to nothing other than the *saṃskṛtadharmas*. This argument is no different from those of the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman. However, in the first passage of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, we find a radical interpretation of the *viprayuktas*. Only part of this interpretation, the insistence that the *viprayuktas* are merely *prajñapti*, can be traced to those earlier sources. The explanation of many of the *viprayuktas* in terms of *bīja* is the original contribution of this passage and marks a divergence from, or advance upon, the philosophy of the earlier critics of Sarvāstivāda, who did not use the term *bīja*, at least not in any systematic way.[220] Furthermore, the addition of the final group of *viprayuktas*, is an example of the tendency in portions of *Yogācārabhūmi* to construct a new *abhidharma*, that is to say, an *abhidharma* different from those of the Hīnayāna schools. Moreover, the references to other expositions of causality within the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which are also examples of this new *abhidharma*, show a willingness to cite it as authority.

Vasubandhu in his discussion of *viprayuktas* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* thus relies on two groups of texts. For his criticism of the reality of the *viprayuktas*, he goes back directly to the earliest sources as well as to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But in his explanation that certain *dharmas* are really *bījas* he reveals his knowledge of the *Yogācārabhūmi*[221] and his acceptance of ideas found in it but not in the works of the earlier Sautrāntikas. Therefore, if we call Vasubandhu a Sautrāntika, he is a different kind of Sautrāntika than, for example, Harivarman or Śrīlāta. Honjō, as I have mentioned above, contrasts the orthodox Hīnayāna Sautrāntikas, the earliest of whom predate the *Vibhāṣā*, and who

[220]Honjō, who identifies Aśvaghoṣa's school as Sautrāntika (Honjō 1993), has, in a personal communication, drawn my attention to the fact that Aśvaghoṣa uses the term *bīja*. However, an examination of the occurrence of the term in, for example, the *Buddhacarita* shows that it is used in a simile and not with the technical significance it acquires in *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*: *ṛtubhūmyambuvirahād yathā bījaṃ na rohati/ rohati pratyayais tais tais tad tat so 'pi mato mama* (*Buddhacarita* XII 72, Johnston 1972: 137, 179).

[221]For other contexts in which Vasubandhu in *AKBh* reveals his familiarity with, and presumably approval of, doctrines originating in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, see Hakamaya 1986.

include the Dārṣṭāntika, Harivarman, and Śrīlāta, with the Mahāyāna Sautrāntika, namely Vasubandhu (Honjō 1992:152). In characterizing Vasubandhu thus, Honjō takes into account Vasubandhu's affinity with the earlier Sautrāntikas, as well as his use of their name, while alluding to his reliance on *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, might we not just as well characterize the Dārṣṭāntika, et al., as Hīnayāna Yogācāras? Better still, we should perhaps call them pre- *Yogācārabhūmi* Yogācāras, thus acknowledging the fact, repeatedly pointed out by Schmithausen (1987), that much of the material in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and other early Yogācāra texts, although not Sarvāstivāda, cannot be identified as Mahāyāna.

Hakamaya, in his discussion of the term *pūrvācārya* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, sees the Yogācāra school as we generally define it as a group that emerged from among the *yogācāras*, in the sense of practitioners of yoga, who had a much longer history than the school that later took the name. According to Hakamaya, this group, which was more theoretically inclined than the general run of practitioners, came to be known as the *pūrvācāryas*, and it was by the name *pūrvācārya* that Vasubandhu referred to Asaṅga, the most illustrious representative of the group (Hakamaya 1986: 100). Hakamaya does not identify any texts associated with the pre-Yogācāra *yogācāras*, nor does he state clearly whether the *pūrvācāryas* existed before the time of Asaṅga. Nevertheless, by enlarging the scope of the term *yogācāra*, he suggests another way of looking both at non-Mahāyāna material in Yogācāra texts and at figures who are identified as Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika and whose ideas are similar to those of the Yogācāra.

In this context, it is interesting to note that there are several texts, generally considered Hīnayāna, that bear the title *Yogācārabhūmi*, the best-known of which, by Saṅgharakṣa, has been translated and studied by Demiéville (1954). This text, although it is perhaps later than Hakamaya's original *yogācāras*, is probably earlier than any of the sources to which I have been referring. Significantly, Demiéville wonders whether Saṅgharakṣa, because of his frequent use of comparisons, should not be called a

"*dārṣṭāntika*," (1954: 339 n. 2), and he notes that Saṅgharakṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi* is mentioned in a work, the *Ch'u yao ching*,[222] attributed to the Dharmatrāta who was a prominent Dārṣṭāntika in the *Vibhāṣā* (1954: 406 n. 3). Another text the original Sanskrit title of which was perhaps *Yogācārabhūmi* is the *Ta mo to lo ch'an ching* (達摩多羅禪經 -- T. 618);[223] the Chinese title suggests a connection with Dharmatrāta, but the identity of the Dārṣṭāntika Dharmatrāta and the author of this text is questionable.[224] Perhaps these other *Yogācārabhūmis* may contain some clues to the still obscure relationship between the philosophers, texts, and arguments that we have been calling Sautrāntika and those that we have been calling Yogācāra.

[222] 出曜經 (T. 212). Demiéville describes this as "la partie en prose de l'*Udānavarga*" (Demiéville 1954: 406 n. 3).

[223] Yamabe Nobuyoshi is currently studying this text and has been kind enough to identify several occurrences in it of the word *bīja* (e.g., T. 618: 316c; 321a; 322a; 323a).

[224] Willemen summarizes Lin Li-Kouang as distinguishing three different Dharmatrātas: the *dārṣṭāntika* Dharmatrāta or Bhadanta of *Vibhāṣā*; the author of *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* and the commentary on *Pañcavastuka*; and the one connected with *Ta mo to lo ch'an ching* (Willemen 1975: xv). Yamada Ryūjō devotes a very long section to the identity of the various Dharmatrātas (Yamada 1959: 416-437), but in the end he seems unwilling to say definitely that they are different people (437). Lamotte, on the other hand, accepts Lin's opinion (Lamotte 1988: 696).

SUMMARY

This dissertation has been centered around the exposition of conditioned origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, of which mine is the first complete translation into a western language. In studying this exposition, I became aware of a number of issues raised by the text; the various chapters of this dissertation represent my attempt to clarify these issues.

First, I had to uncover the sources for the exposition. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is an *abhidharma* text that is associated with the Yogācāra school so in my search for its sources I had to look in both the Hīnayāna *abhidharma* and the early Yogācāra works. An examination of the Vaibhāṣika literature showed that a similar exposition cannot be found in any Sarvāstivādin work. However, there are many similarities between the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* exposition and several expositions of conditioned origination in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Some of these have been pointed out by the Japanese scholar Matsuda Kazunobu. In this study, I go into greater detail in showing how material from the *Yogācārabhūmi* has undergone further doctrinal development and refinement in our text. I also suggest for the first time that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* was a source for portions of the expositions in both the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

Having established that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* relies primarily on sources that are generally considered to be Yogācāra, I had to explain the doctrinal significance of material that does not contain much in the way of explicitly Yogācāra terminology.

The concept of conditioned origination is applied in at least three different contexts. Most generally, it explains the arising of all conditioned *dharmas*. More specifically, it is used to explain the processes of rebirth and cognition. In our exposition, we can find all three contexts. In my dissertation I have shown that what the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says in each context presupposes the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, or at least a theory of causation by seeds. The term *ālayavijñāna* and *bīja* are used sparingly in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and they do not appear in the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition. However, by referring both to the sources of our text and to later Yogācāra works, I have established that these concepts underlie the exposition.

When I first approached the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, I attempted to use the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu in order to compare the Yogācāra *abhidharma* that I found in my text with Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma*. Of course, I was aware from the start that Vasubandhu often favors a position that he or his commentators identify as Sautrāntika. However, as I compared the two texts, I was more and more struck by the similarity between Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika positions and Yogācāra. This has been noticed before by scholars such as P.S. Jaini, but I have been able to find new examples

of this similarity.

With regard to the three contexts of conditioned origination, I have noticed, in the case of the arising of all conditioned *dharmas*, a connection between the expositions of conditioned origination in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* and their expositions of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*. In all these expositions, we find similar explanations for observable aspects of the functioning of causes and results, for example: the fact that the series of cause and result is unbroken; the fact that a particular cause has only its appropriate result, etc. These explanations all appeal to a reinterpretation, of the statements of conditioned origination attributed to the Buddha: "If this exists, that comes into existence"; and "Because of the origination of this, that originates." This reinterpretation, as I show, is based on a theory of causation by seeds.

The major difference between the Yogācāra and Sarvāstivādin categories of *cittaviprayuktas* lies in the fact that Yogācāra considers them to be merely designations, frequently of aspects of causation, and not real *dharmas*. Real *dharmas* are not required; the very nature of conditioned things, as described in the *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions, is sufficient to explain how they operate causally. As Jaini has suggested, Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika criticisms of the reality of the *viprayuktas* are similar to the Yogācāra dismissal of the category as mere designation. In my dissertation,, I show that a number of his specific criticisms can be traced directly to the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Similarly, in the context of rebirth, I show that Vasubandhu's own opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, as well as in later texts in which he openly espouses Yogācāra, is much closer to the two lifetimes/singlefold causation theory of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* than to the three lifetimes/twofold theory of Sarvāstivāda. Here again a comparison of the Yogācāra *abhidharma* of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with the Sautrāntika positions of Vasubandhu supports my contention that Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika is actually crypto-Yogācāra.

Finally, in the context of cognition, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* accept the reality of *sparśa* as a separate *drama*, as well as the existence of pleasurable feeling (*sukhavedanā*). I suggest that both of these positions are related to *ālayavijñāna*. Here the Yogācāra position agrees with Sarvāstivāda and disagrees with Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika. It is significant that Vasubandhu rejects the Sautrāntika position in these cases: he supports Sautrāntika only when, and because, it is consonant with Yogācāra.

Thus my examination of a portion of a Yogācāra *abhidharma* text has shown how Yogācāra has created its own *abhidharma* to support its basic doctrinal positions of *bīja* and *ālayavijñāna*. Furthermore, I have presented a considerable body of evidence in support of the thesis that Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is, at least in places, a crypto-Yogācāra work.

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